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
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
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THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE:
ITS NATURE AND FUNCTION IN EPISTEMOLOGY

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WILLIAM DAVIS FURRY, Ph.D.

Henry E. Johnston, Jr., Scholar in the Johns Hopkins University

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INTRODUCTION¹

That the epistemological problem is the most urgent in current philosophical discussion is to be inferred from the introduction into the more complete works of Logic and Metaphysics of topics that directly pertain to neither. The preliminary discussions found in such works as Bradley's, Bosanquet's, and Sigwart's Logic are not however psychological precisely, neither are they to be regarded as an indication that Psychology is becoming sufficiently ample in its programme to include what previously was regarded as subject-matter of more or less independent philosophical disciplines. The introductory chapters in the works thus named are rather epistemological than psychological. Paulsen is historically justified in holding that Epistemology arises always as a critical reflection on Metaphysics with which it is, at the first, identified. From Kant and Locke until now the conviction has been growing that *knowing* precedes *being*, so that the priority which Metaphysics so long held should be given to Epistemology. The limitations as well as the possibilities of human knowledge are to be sought within the knowing process rather than in some already determined objective existence.

Since the time of Locke and Kant, epistemological inquiry has been increasingly to the fore. There was 'constant whetting of the knife' until the time of Lotze, who felt that the whetting process should end and an actual theory of the object of knowledge established. But despite the constant whetting of the knife the conviction will not down that the whetting has not yet been sufficiently done.

Both Kant and Locke were embarrassed by metaphysical presuppositions in assuming an existence falling beyond the

¹ This Introduction, while intended to define the epistemological problem, serves also in a measure as a summary of the writer's position. The detailed references to the authorities mentioned will be found in the later more extended passages of the essay.

limits of thought. The objective, as determined apart from the knowing process, held the determining rôle in thought, and continued so to do until the idealistic reaction of the Post-Kantians. The attempt was then made to establish the object of knowledge wholly in terms of the subject. Self-consciousness was held to be the sole condition of knowledge. Experience was regarded as the realization of a single, spiritual principle, while the successive modes in the development of knowledge were regarded as the specific ways in which this one principle embodies itself. The unity of experience, which had hitherto been sought beyond experience, was disclosed in the evolution of the self. The object of knowledge becomes thus intimately related to the subject that has it as object.

With Hegel the self came to be identified with reflective thought. Reality came also to be identified with thought, since being which should fall beyond the process of thought would be the same as the non-existent. The distinction of subject and object as the necessary condition of knowledge at any stage of the development of thought, is a distinction of mind from itself and finds its completion when mind becomes conscious that the distinction is of its own making. Nevertheless, the object of knowledge to be vital and fruitful, must be more than is already given in thought. The self is not furthered by merely revolving its own perfections. If the object is not more than the subject, thought as judgment, becomes both meaningless and useless. This position is also expressed in the view of Lotze that 'reality is richer than thought', and in the statement of Bradley that 'knowledge is unequal to reality.' All these expressions are based upon the conviction that thought must somehow refer to a real beyond itself. Thought, therefore, remains dualistic despite the attempted identification of its two aspects in terms of rational thought.

Kant also found that thought as such is dualistic and so concluded that "beyond the bounds of knowledge there is a sphere of faith." But what thought could not do, Kant thought the moral consciousness able to accomplish. The Voluntarists, including the Pragmatists of the present time, seek in turn to

make the will the explaining principle of the mind and the sole organ of reality. But Kant found that the moralistic position is also dualistic since the will cannot reduce the subject-matter of thought. Every genuine act of will involves a struggle upon the part of the subject toward its object, which is not, as yet, an actual possession. The object of the will, as also the object of thought, must represent an 'other' as a larger and more complete experience, in which the dualistic character of will is to be transcended by being absorbed in a more complete experience.

The dualisms of both the theoretical and the practical, bequeathed to modern philosophy by Kant, constitute under one form of statement or another, the epistemological problem of current discussion. Defined as the dualism of mind and body, it is sufficient to indicate that it cannot be solved by reducing either term of the dualism to the other. This means necessarily the loss of the meaning attaching to the one, without a corresponding increase of meaning attaching to the other. Both terms of the dualism have come to represent definite types of meaning and any attempt at a solution of the problem thus set by ignoring either type of meaning is already doomed. The inability of any one of the more modern attempts to solve the epistemological problem is to be found in the fact that these several attempts have either minimized or wholly ignored one or the other of these types of meaning. That mind cannot be reduced to body is evidenced by the fact that Materialism represents a passing philosophy. The rapid spread of idealistic philosophy in our day shows also how easily the metaphysical doctrine of the unreality of things visible and tangible can be popularized. Paulsen is abundantly justified in his characterization of modern philosophy as tending toward idealism. The inability, however, of either of these two general types of philosophy to satisfy the mind indicates that the solution of the epistemological problem has not only not been adequately achieved, but that such solution can be attained only by reaching a farther meaning in which both types of meaning are merged in a single unitary mode of experience.

The dualistic character of the epistemological consciousness is generally recognized in current discussion. The dual-

ism is, however, no longer regarded as a datum of immediate experience, but rather an experience into which consciousness develops. The epistemological consciousness [must therefore be treated genetically and while affirming the position of St. George Mivart that "Epistemology is a product of mental maturity both racial and individual," likewise the position of Ormond that "the distinction of subject and object is fundamental to Epistemology" and still further the position of Professor Baldwin that, "it is only when the mode of reflection has been reached, in which the subject takes the objective point of view, that the knower becomes an Epistemologist," we shall maintain in the present discussion that the epistemological consciousness of reflection, with its characteristic problem of unification and completion, has been reached only when consciousness has passed through a series of earlier dualistic experiences, in each of which the epistemological problem presented itself. No one mode of the development of thought is to be taken exclusively as containing the explanation of the whole, but all forms of knowledge are to be considered. Taking this point of view, it at once occurs to us that it is necessary to widen the generally accepted notion of the nature of the epistemological consciousness and the problem which it presents.

Upon analysis, thought is found to involve always the presence and operation of two moments, which in reflective thought are recognized as 'content' and 'control.' The programme of a Genetic Epistemology would be the tracing of the development of thought both in the individual and in the race with respect to the increasing determinateness of these two aspects. Hegel's *Phänomologie des Geistes*, represents an attempt in this direction but lacks the psychological point of view requisite to the genetic method. Baldwin's *Thought and Things* is the most complete and satisfactory attempt yet made to treat knowledge genetically.

In the light of such a method of treatment of the development of thought it is seen that thought has reached the dualism of reflective experience only by passing through a series of earlier dualistic experiences, at each of which a higher mode of conscious determination was made possible by the establish-

ing of a more comprehensive and complete experience. Each successive mode of mental determination is made possible and necessary by the presence in consciousness of partial and fragmentary meanings. Thought, as Bradley discerns, is always incomplete and must, for the sake of its own completion, be absorbed in a fuller experience. The Voluntarists also find the ideas, as internal meaning, finite and fragmentary, and this necessitates an external meaning as an 'other' and more complete and all-inclusive experience. Both the Intellectualists and the Voluntarists agree that thought and will seek an object in which both alike are to be completed. But such completion is necessarily a further experience. To attempt to solve the epistemological problem presented at any stage of its genetic development by a return to genetically earlier experience means a mutilation of the system of meanings already acquired, while the resulting constructions become more or less empty postulates.

Despite the increased discussion of the epistemological problem in modern philosophical inquiry, one seeks in vain for a definite statement of the problem itself. According to Bradley it is the problem of "forming the general idea of an absolute experience in which all phenomenal distinctions are merged—a unity which transcends and yet contains every manifold appearance in an immediate, self-dependent and all-inclusive individual." For Bosanquet, it is the "work of intellectually constituting a totality which we call the real world." With Royce, who proceeds from the more active aspect of consciousness, and makes will rather than thought the explaining principle of the mind and the organ of reality, the epistemological problem presented by the subject-object dualism of reflective experience is the "transcending of the subjective by the process of completely embodying, in individual form and in final fulfilment, the internal meaning of finite ideas." The Pragmatists finally, by subordinating the theoretical to the practical, thus identifying the true and the good, attempt to solve the problem by reinstating a form of experience in which stimulus and response, as the two aspects of the life of action, regain their old-time immediacy. Group-

ing the Pragmatists with the Voluntarists, it is to be said that they, together with the Intellectualists, represent the two current types of epistemological theory, while both alike reach the conclusion that the epistemological problem is the setting up of a larger and more complete experience in which the limitations alike of thought and will are overcome.

Defining the progress of cognition again as an increasing determinateness of the two aspects, content and control, the limitation of each of the two preceding types of epistemological theory becomes evident. Each proceeds by attempting to make the one or the other of the two aspects of thought an *imperium in imperio*, and both reach the common conclusion that either of these two aspects cannot interpret the whole of experience. Assuming that reflective thought involves the subject-object dualism, the Intellectualists attempt to reconcile the dualism thus presented by an exclusive emphasis upon the side of the object as a related content. The control aspect, according to Bradley is "something necessary, but still *per accidens*. And as thought can not make phenomena, it contents itself without them and is therefore symbolic and not existential." Whatever form and structure the content, of knowledge may come to show are dependent upon the laws of thought. The control aspect, however, retains its primitive value and validity, while the presented contents, as the result of a process of increasing contextuation, become but sublimated symbols of the reality which they once constituted. The dualism of the intellectualists represents the presence and conflict of two sorts of experience, one immediate, characterized by lack of reference beyond mere psychic existence, and the other mediate, characterized by the relational and discursive character of thought. The epistemological problem is occasioned by the conflict of these two types of experience, a conflict arising only when reflection is reached, and finds its solution, for the time being, by a process of making thought merely psychic, thus identifying the mediate with the primitive immediacy. Bradley is at pains to indicate, however, that the conflict between these two types of experience is due to the presence of reflective thought, rather than the reverse, as the Voluntarists and Pragmatists are today insisting.

The latter, as representing a second type of epistemological theory, seek to overcome the dualistic character of reflective experience by placing almost exclusive emphasis upon the control aspect of thought, inwardly or subjectively interpreted. The object of thought, they hold, must represent the expression and embodiment of the subject as the inner organizing, determining principle of knowledge. The object of knowledge is what it is only because the subject means it as its own object. Ideas as content of thought are acts of will as well as acts of cognition, and the object of thought is but the embodiment and fulfilment of an exclusive act of will or purpose. The subject of knowledge can acknowledge no object other than those of its own determination. What therefore the content of thought is, as well as the relational character which characterizes it, is determined solely in terms of the *will* as the controlling and organizing moment of experience.

But it is found that both types of epistemological theory are inadequate, in that each finds meanings which it is not able to reduce in terms of its explaining principle. The Intellectualists find with Bradley that thought can never harmonize its own content, meaning that thought as such can never transcend the dualism of the 'that' and the 'what' as the two aspects of thought. The more complete thought becomes as a relational system the deeper and broader becomes the dualism. To attain reality as the object of thought, meaning an experience in which these two aspects of thought are reconciled, means necessarily breaking with thought, so that the conclusion is reached in the present discussion that reality, as a unified experience, becomes for the Intellectualists an a-logical and mystical postulate.

The Voluntarists likewise find that will, as the controlling and organizing aspect of thought, is also dualistic, since it is unable to reduce the subject-matter of reflective thought. To reduce the true to the good, as for instance Professor James does in his recent lectures on *Pragmatism*, only shifts the emphasis of the dualism. The dualism remains as one of end or good and fact, together with the epistemological problem of its reconciliation. Will can not harmonize its content with the

data of thought, and the attempt to solve the epistemological problem thus presented by making the will all-sufficient by reaching a 'volitional immediacy' in which *the will wills only its own will*, is to set up an a-volitional postulate which is also mystical.

The final outcome of these two types of epistemological theory is closely identical, in that both alike reach an absolute experience which, as the completion alike of the finite and fragmentary character of thought and will, 'is not anything but sentient experience.' Such is the necessary outcome of any epistemological theory which proceeds by ignoring either of the two aspects of thought. The strength of each type of theory however represents the weakness of the other. The farther the Voluntarist pushes his programme, the more he reveals the need of thought as lending value and meaning to the life of will. Whatever meaning is found attaching to the practical life is borrowed from reflective and rational experience. The fact is that, if the will were able to will itself, to operate as it were in a void, occasion for an act of will would never arise. Professor Royce is quite right in holding that the active life is motivated by the finite and fragmentary character of finite ideas. But a farther experience, in which present experience as limited and incomplete is made more complete, can not be reached by reverting to an earlier more immediate mode; the absolute experience must represent fulfilment, not destruction. And likewise, the farther the Intellectualist extends his programme, the more is felt the need of bringing thought into more fruitful relations with the more active and selective aspects of experience. Thought as such is pale and as it were removed from the concrete character of life as actually lived. It only "formulates and duplicates, divides and recombines that fullness of reality which is had directly and at first hand in sense experience." Bradley recognizes the static character of reflective thought, but is unable to avoid this outcome. The Voluntarists, with Professor Royce, also appreciate that the dualistic character of reflective experience can be transcended only in a fuller and richer embodiment of whatever meanings consciousness already has. Neither type of theory can limit

itself to its own programme because each proceeds by abstracting one of the two essential aspects of knowledge.

These criticisms suggest that, if knowledge is to escape from the *cul-de-sac* in which reflective experience involves it, it can do so only in some mode of experience in which the two aspects of thought, content and control, with whatever meanings attach to them, are brought together in some larger whole. The determination of such a mode of experience represents the epistemological problem *par excellence*. Such experience will be in type neither purely rational and static nor wholly volitional and dynamic; it must be a mode in which, as Professor Baldwin says, "experience can find its dynamics intelligible and can act upon its static meanings as immediate and dynamic satisfactions."

The burden of the present discussion is that the aesthetic experience represents a mode of conscious determination in which the two aspects of thought are recognized and reconciled by the rise of a new mode of immediate experience.

The essential character of this type of experience is the 'semblant' treatment of meanings already present for the sake of further meaning as fulfilling personal purposes. By this method of treating meanings already present as having a further meaning, using present meanings as schemata for more complete meanings, consciousness completes the otherwise incomplete and fragmentary character of its present store. The epistemological problem of the Intellectualists is precisely the problem of setting up of an 'other' as a richer experience in which thought as incomplete might complete itself. On the other hand the epistemological problem of the Voluntarists is that of discounting a future experience which, as external meaning, completely embodies the otherwise finite and fragmentary character of finite ideas. Both alike hold that the experience in which thought and will are completed is a state of immediacy in which both theoretical and practical interests are wholly satisfied. But each type of theory, failing to recognize the mediatory rôle of the semblant treatment of an already guaranteed content, has to fall back on a mode of reality beyond its own monistic postulate, thus hugging to itself a mass of ill-gotten gain.

In the present discussion it is shown that the æsthetic arises with the epistemological alike in the race and in the individual; that the æsthetic experience has passed through a series of stages of development at each of which it reflects the epistemological problem then present and crying for solution. Upon analysis, the æsthetic experience at each of these several stages is found to possess precisely those characteristics which enable it to reduce the several meanings which neither thought nor will can of itself reduce. As Kant long ago perceived, neither the theoretical nor the practical reason can heal the wound that reflection makes. The need is for a type of interest *sui generis*; and this is what we find the æsthetic interest to be. It represents a treatment of meanings already acquired for the sake of the further meaning that inspires them, the process of reaching a completer experience—an ideal whole—through the schematic treatment of earlier partial experiences of thought and will. The object thus constructed is held up and treated as being what it is not and as being everything save precisely what in its concrete isolation it is. It sets up the 'other' of thought as a further meaning which while not realized, can nevertheless be treated 'as if it were.' The object of thought thus constructed does not break with experience, since it represents a more complete experience. There is a focusing of the two aspects of thought by a process of detachment from the original spheres in which they hold as mediate experiences, by the setting up of a larger whole of experience in which both aspects become moments in what is immediate.

The æsthetic experience thus represents the expression of an interest which is neither theoretical nor practical. Because of this, it is fitted to reconcile and unify these two types of interest. It is true, as Professor Tufts contends, that the æsthetic did not arise to satisfy an already existing sense of the beautiful; but to identify it with either of the two recognized types of interest means to reduce the æsthetic to the limitations from which it seeks to disengage them. The point to be insisted upon in the present discussion is the fact that the æsthetic can not be reduced to any form of mediate experience, without at once bringing about its own destruction; this qualifies it as a mode of experi-

ence in which these several mediate types are reconciled and the entire psychic function furthered.

Defining genetic epistemology as the tracing out of the development of thought with reference to the increasing determinateness of its two aspects of content and control, and defining the epistemological problem as that of the furthering of these two aspects without the sacrifice of either, by the establishing of a more complete experience in a new and higher immediacy which in turn becomes the platform for still higher reaches of thought; and further defining the æsthetic experience as a mode of conscious determination in which the guaranteed meanings of consciousness are mediated with reference to a further and ideal experience—an experience whose value lies, as Professor Baldwin says “in discounting in advance any new demands for mediation which new dualism may make,” the epistemological function of the æsthetic at once becomes evident. The ‘absolute’ experience is thus reached. It is not a formal and static experience, such as the Intellectualists reach, nor is it a blind and meaningless dynamic as the Voluntarists teach; but it is rather an experience which is richer and completer than either thought or will or both together, since it represents an experience in which the ‘genetic dynamogenies as well as the static dualisms are mediated.’¹

¹ Baldwin, *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. IV, No. 4, April, 1907; see also *Thought and Things*, Vol. II, Appendix, II. My indebtedness to Professor Baldwin, both with respect to general ideas and to details, will be evident to the reader. I wish especially to acknowledge the use of material from his unpublished lectures on the nature and rôle of the æsthetic.

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE: ITS NATURE AND
FUNCTION IN EPISTEMOLOGY.

PART I. EXPOSITORY.

CHAPTER I.

The First Immediacy as Illustrating an A-dualistic Consciousness and as being Pre-epistemological and Pre-aesthetic.

Mr. A. E. Taylor has pointed out that the character of experience for the metaphysician is its immediacy, meaning that character of experience in which existence and content considered as the two aspects of reflective thought are not separated in consciousness. Such immediacy, he proceeds to say, may be due to the absence of reflective analysis of the given content into its constituent aspects, or it may be due to fusion, at a higher level, into a single directly apprehended whole, of the results won by the processes of abstraction and analysis. There is, he concludes, an immediacy which is below reflective thought, as well as an immediacy which is above it. It is with what Mr. Taylor calls the immediacy below reflection that we have to do in the present chapter.¹

That consciousness, alike in the individual and the race, is, in its first appearance, immediate in the sense of being a-dualistic, is a conclusion by no means peculiar to Mr. Taylor. Psychologists and anthropologists alike hold, that consciousness, in its first appearance, is undifferentiated and protoplasmic, the 'big, booming confusion' of James, the 'undifferentiated continuum' of Ward, and the 'relatively pure objectivity' of Baldwin. These several writers agree in holding that primitive consciousness is a-dualistic in the sense, that there is present in consciousness no distinction between given data and the resulting constructed meanings. "The child" as James says, "does not see light, but is light." To open the eyes is precisely seeing. There is no reference of presentations to the external

¹ A. E. Taylor, *Metaphysics*, p. 32.

world since at this stage of conscious development there is no distinction made between content and other things. "There was a time" says Bradley, "when the separation of the outer world as a thing apart from our feelings had not even begun."¹ And again he says, "in the beginning there is nothing beyond what is presented; what is, is felt, or is rather felt simply. There is no memory or imagination or fear or thought or will and no perception of likeness or difference. There are in short no relations and no feelings but only feeling. In all one blue with differences which work and are felt, but are not discriminated."² A more recent description of this first immediacy is given by Professor James under the caption 'Pure Experience.' "Pure experience" he says, "is the name which I give to the original flux of life before reflection has categorized it. Only new-born babes and persons in semicoma from sleep, drugs, illnesses or blows can have an experience pure in the literal sense of a *that* which is not yet any definite *what*, though ready to be all sorts of *whats*. . . . Pure experience in this state is but another name for feeling or sensation. But the flux of it no sooner comes than it tends to fill itself with emphases and these to become identified and fixed and abstracted; so that experience now flows as if shot through with adjectives and nouns and prepositions and conjunctions. Its purity is only a relative term meaning the proportional amount of sensation which it still embodies. . . . In all this the continuities and discontinuities are absolutely co-ordinate matters of immediate feeling."³

It is assumed, therefore, that within this first immediacy the distinctions characteristic of reflective thought are not present. To be in consciousness and to be apprehended are identical and it is a matter of no difference whether we speak of this *feeling* or feeling *this*. The first immediacy represents a totality or continuum holding wholly within its own grasp. Whatever the object may come to be, it does so through the process in

¹ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 261.

² *Mind*, O. S. Vol. XII, p. 343. Cf. also Bradley, *Principles of Logic*, p. 457.

³ Quoted by Prof. Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, p. 25.

which it arises. There is no distinction, within this early consciousness, between an object and our perceiving it, and the resulting construction represents the unity of the object in perception. The knower and his world stand upon the same basis of reality in undisturbed feeling. Any particular form of sense-experience is but a modification of the undifferentiated sensory continuum. As yet there are no distinct forms for the different senses and whatever of discreteness or discontinuity or variety may be found within this early experience must be sought for on the side of the sensory content. This content both stimulates the active processes of the individual and serves as a center around which these processes gather. Things and not isolated sensations thus come to be the first results reached by consciousness and while in this first experience there is no distinction to be drawn between things and thought, things are nevertheless to be regarded as having the unity of objects in perception. Whatever the presented object comes to be it represents thus an immediate unity of consciousness.

Emphasis is laid upon this first immediacy of consciousness in the present discussion since, by almost universal agreement, it is regarded as the type of consciousness in which we are brought into closest contact with what later becomes the coefficient of reality. Present-day metaphysicians are almost unanimous in maintaining that reality as an absolute experience is realized only in some form of immediacy of consciousness. Bradley explicitly holds that reality is a matter of immediate experience and his further characterization of such immediacy as a state of 'sheer sentience,' as a state of undifferentiated feeling, identifies his absolute experience with this first immediacy of consciousness. 'The will-to-believe' of Professor James and the 'volitional immediacy' of Professor Royce must be interpreted in a similar way.

Whether this first immediacy of consciousness be identified with reality as an absolute experience and all else made phenomenal, or used only as a type of experience in which reality is actually given, the fact remains that the analysis of this a-dualistic consciousness has been motivated by certain metaphysical presuppositions. Assuming that reality can be given

only in an immediacy of consciousness and assuming still further that this immediacy is due to the absolute simplicity of the primitive consciousness, metaphysicians at once proceed to analyze this first immediacy. As a result three types of epistemological theory have been brought forward in modern discussion, viz., the Intellectualistic, the Affectivistic and the Voluntaristic, each attempting to make some one aspect of developed consciousness the explaining principle of conscious development as well as the sole organ of reality.

Each of these three types of epistemological theory proceeds upon the assumption that consciousness is, in its primitive stage, wholly simple, in the sense that only one of the later aspects is present. Experience thus comes to be regarded as the realization of some one principle, that is, in other words, each stage of conscious experience is but the embodiment in a specific mode of this one principle and these successive modes in the actualization of this one principle differ only in the way in which it is embodied. Mental development thus becomes the necessary evolution, through various modes, of a single principle. Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes* represents an attempt in this direction in assuming rationality as the explaining principle of the mind, while Herbert Spencer's *Synthetic Philosophy* represents a similar attempt, although in a wholly antipodal way. The more modern movement in philosophy generally known as 'Pragmatism,' with its characteristic interpretation of experience solely in terms of the practical and the identifying of the true and the beautiful with the good, is to be regarded not only as a revolt from Hegel and Green but also as an attempt to make *will* the explaining principle of mental development and the organ of reality.¹

From an analytical point of view, however, the simplicity of the first immediacy of consciousness is relative only. Every presentation is also a determination. From the beginning consciousness is active and constructive. "The so-called immediate intuition," says Green, "has content only in so far as it

¹ See James, *Pragmatism*, p. 76, and also Miss Adams, *The Aesthetic Experience*.

is not merely presentative."¹ Consciousness is never purely a-noetic. Every 'that' is also a 'what.' What the presented content is determined to be depends upon the active, dispositional tendencies of the individual. To make these tendencies absorb the whole of the presented content would make impossible the later dualisms of thought, while to make the presented object the determining factor, as the empirical school in general did, would create an absolute *impasse* in knowledge. Both factors are present and operative and the significance of the first immediacy is that it represents a stage of experience in which these two aspects of all thought are held together. It is a psychological truism to-day that nothing can be in consciousness except what consciousness puts in. The unity, however, of this early consciousness is not a unity won from a disturbed situation, but the unity of a consciousness that has not lost its original wholeness. The experience is one in which there are no spheres of reference and control, since the later distinctions of self and not-self, and inner and outer, are not present.²

From such interpretation of the rise of consciousness there can arise no absolute *impasse* in knowledge. While as yet there is no distinction of means and end, of interest and datum, it is nevertheless true that the affective-conative dispositions seize and determine the presented content in congruity with themselves. Whatever conflicts may arise between these two factors in this primitive experience they can be said to be resolved by the processes creating them. It is precisely here that we are to seek for the rise of the aesthetic experience, whose function in the development of thought is the burden of the present inquiry. The unity of the first immediacy of consciousness represents the merging of the two aspects of thought which are not as yet distinguished within consciousness. There is no justification for regarding the first immediacy of consciousness as absolutely simple in character, nor for identifying it with either of the aspects of reflective thought. What we are to assume at the outset, is not the duality of subject and object,

¹ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 48 (2d ed.).

² R. Adamson, *The Development of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 198.

but rather their unity. The real problem here, is not as to the character of the dualism of the perceiver and the perceived, but rather, as to the kind of unity that precedes them. This unity, from the present point of view, is to be regarded as the outcome of the activity of the perceiving subject and not the unity given it from without, which is the error of the dualistic theory of knowledge, nor wholly made by itself, which represents the error of subjective idealism. Confessing our own guilt of the 'psychologist's fallacy' but which fallacy, after all, becomes the only guide of the metaphysician (Ormond), it is to be concluded, that the unity of the first immediacy represents a unity of the active, constructive processes of the individual.¹ The thing perceived is the content of the act of perceiving, while the processes of perceiving are realized in the thing perceived. The relation between the two factors is not that between static entities, each fixed and complete, but a relation of 'togetherness' which, from a higher analytical point of view, represents a sort of universalization of an otherwise heterogeneous and meaningless content. The content of the object of perception thus becomes a related content, but in this early stage of conscious development, neither the object nor the relationships establishing it, are distinguished. The content of perception, when viewed from without, consists essentially of separable and distinguishable units; but consciousness in its first immediacy gets no such separable and distinguishable units, but things, 'projects,' which embody the unity of the primitive consciousness.

Of this early consciousness, before distinctions arise between content and control, it is to be said that, it acts in its entirety upon whatever content may be presented. There is as yet no manipulation of means with reference to a particular end, since these two aspects of thought are not held apart, but we have rather what Professor Ormond calls 'spontaneity of will-effort' which is selective and constructive without prior interest and purpose. Borrowing Professor Baldwin's formula of attention, Attention = A, a, α , (in which A stands for the gross general activities of the attentive process, a the special class of

¹ Baldwin, *Mental Development*, p. 286²(2d ed.).

motor reactions attaching to classes of experiences and α the finer adjustments within α)¹ it is at once to be seen that the attentive processes of the first immediacy are confined to the element A . The control of the object is thus direct and immediate, because consciousness being a-dualistic, the process of determination and construction of the object is a self-contained process. The resulting construction thus holds true of the whole of experience and represents, therefore, a quasi-generalization. This, I take it, is precisely what Professor Baldwin has in view in speaking of these projective constructions as 'concepts of the first degree'² and Royce as 'vague universals.' All things are in this sense universal in this first immediacy, since not only is there no distinction between content and control, but even the content functions only as a whole. The unity of consciousness within this early stage may be said to be due to the fact that the affective-conative tendencies as the control factor seize, envelope and determine the situation as a whole. The resulting construction represents a 'projectification' of consciousness in all that it can apprehend. The whole of whatever meaning is possible to consciousness as yet a-dualistic is given adequate rendering. From the psychic point of view we are to regard the control of this early experience as being 'autonomic' in character. The unity thus preserved between these two factors of primitive thought is rather functional in character, in the sense that the self is not distinguished from the inner dispositional processes, thus illustrating the general conclusion of modern psychology, that within primitive experience, motor adjustment is the measure and test of mental unity.

It is also to be pointed out that, within this first immediacy of consciousness, the distinction of individual and social does not arise. The life of the individual is largely one of group maintenance, and custom, fixed and specific, determines conduct. Education in primitive societies is largely a matter of handing

¹ *Mental Development*, pp. 313.

² See Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. I., whose terminology is followed in the present discussion. In the last edition of *Mental Development* (1906), Professor Baldwin applies the term 'Schematic Generals' to these first projective constructions.

down traditions. The exclusiveness of primitive society and the more or less constancy of the environment supplied both a common content and common control, while both were held in an undisturbed unity. The resulting constructions are thus common in character, but since the aspect of commonness is not psychic to the individual, it is rather to be regarded as 'aggregate.' No personality as such attaches to the constructions of this early experience and they are, therefore, to be regarded as anonymous as well as autonomous and collective in character. Thus the successful construction of a presented content makes possible communication with others and not vice versa as the Pragmatists contend. Moreover, the objectivity which attaches to the projects of the first immediacy, is not the result of their being communicable to others, but rather, they are common possessions precisely because of their being objective.

In conclusion it is to be said that the significance of this first immediacy of consciousness is, that it represents a stage of mental development, in which the several aspects of thought, while present and operative, are not distinguished, while the projects, as the resulting constructions, represent attempts at the maintaining of the equilibrium of stimulus and response, control and content, by reducing all presented content to terms of the inner dispositional tendencies. If, therefore, we define experience to mean the essential unity of subject and object, and further define such unity as the ideal toward which experience moves, it becomes evident that, in this first immediacy, we have to do with the first of the stages in this development.

Within the first immediacy, however, are found the materials and motives of its own polarization. Characteristic responses fail to bring the accustomed satisfaction and situations are constantly arising which put to confusion all earlier motor accommodations. Varied experiences with objects already familiar break down the equilibrium of stimulus and response. Thus while the object remains one, responses to it tend to multiply. The child's world as one of chance and change, creates at once the necessity and opportunity of thought. New presentations gain upon the individual's store of motor adjustments. Means

and end thus fall apart in consciousness and the need arises of a method whereby they may be brought together. Interest, which at the first is embodied in the affective-conative dispositions of the individual, which are not held apart in consciousness from the presented content, may make either of these two aspects of thought its objective, so that we have what Professor Baldwin has named the interest of habit and the interest of accommodation.¹ Each represents a form of control and the operation of the two forms of control in the presence of a common content, constitutes the dualism, whose reconciliation becomes the problem always of a dualistic experience. The epistemological problem arises only with the dualizing of consciousness, and its solution waits upon the setting up of a complete experience, which, at once explains and completes an experience otherwise fragmentary—the setting up of a whole which is not conditioned and controlled by its relations to other things, but is determined and complete within itself.

The employment of images to meet the demands of situations other than those in which they were originally given, tends to separate the images from the process in which they are contained. The memory image, as one bearing the coefficients of successful conversion back into the original experience, becomes distinguished from the images of fancy, which no longer possess conversion value. In a measure it is to be said, that fancy represents the freedom of memory run riot; it is, indeed, what Amiel has called it, 'La dimanche de la pensée.' But yet it seeks to be a-dualistic since while memory objects have no existence apart from immediate consciousness but find their sphere of reference beyond themselves, the images of fancy represent, by a complete removal of all external control, a return to an immediacy of consciousness. No distinction is made in fancy between the images wholly fugitive and fleeting, that is, wholly detached from their suggested termini or end-states, and the treatment given them in consciousness. As contrasted with the memory images, however, the dualism of inner and outer reference maintains itself.

¹ Baldwin, *Handbook of Psychology, Feeling and Will*, ch. vii.

The significance of the fancy consciousness in the present connection is, that it represents the setting up of a world in which consciousness can move freely, freed from the hard facts of the world of sense-experience and the limitations of memory. Judged in the light of memory, the fancy constructions are worthless, but they nevertheless possess positive value in sundering the two aspects of thought as well as supplying tractable material upon which consciousness can exercise its dawning sense of agency and control.

But fancy is not creative. We are to distinguish between the reproductive imagination and the imagination proper. Ribot fails to make this distinction in his otherwise valuable work entitled, *Essay on the Creative Imagination*. In a general way it is to be said, that fancy represents the objectification of consciousness with complete spontaneity. The fancies of the individual, like the unreflective myths of his primitive ancestors, are embodiments of an a-dualistic consciousness, thus comprehensive and for the time sufficient for all things. "This," as Sully says, "is the happy age of childhood when a new and wondrous world created by a lively phantasy (fancy) rivals in brightness, in distinctness of detail, aye in brightness too, the nearest spaces of the world on which the bodily eye looks out before reflection has begun to draw a hard dividing line between the domain of historical truth and fiction."¹

Thus the first immediacy, despite its apparent all-sufficiency, carries with it its own instability. The complete swing from memory to fancy makes necessary a return movement. Fancy errs by its own defect and possesses contrast value only. The complete detachment of fancy, however, constitutes it a world apart. As peculiarly inner, it comes to have a persistence and value peculiar to itself. Consciousness is now beset by rival claims and the evident need is a completed experience which finds its control wholly within itself. It is precisely here that the epistemological problem arises for the first time, which finds its solution in the 'semblant' consciousness, to the study of which the next chapter is given.

¹ Sully, *Studies in Childhood*, p. 82.

CHAPTER II.

The Second Immediacy or 'Semblant' Consciousness, as the Merging of Dualistic or Mediate Controls.

From the standpoint of reflective thought, the development of cognition is to be defined as an increasing determinateness of its two factors, content and control.¹ The first immediacy was treated in the preceding chapter, as illustrating a mode in the development of cognition in which the two aspects of thought, while present and operative, were not held apart in consciousness. Within such mode of consciousness, undetermined presence was given all objects. Presentation and determination, content and control, interest and datum, were held in the most perfect equilibrium. Reality was a matter of pure feeling, while the attitude of consciousness toward the object constructed was one of 'presumption.'²

But, within the first immediacy were found the motives and the materials of its own polarization. Making the stimulus, rather than the response, the determining factor in the construction of sense objects, it is to be said further, that the breaking down of the original immediacy was due to the presence of changing stimulations. Memory objects are valuable only in so far as they bring sense confirmation and dispositional tendencies are recognized apart from their accustomed responses, only when they fail to reach their accustomed end-state. The presence of objects which resist immediate treatment, as well as the irregular behavior of persons, contribute also to the isolation of the inner as a world in itself. In general it may be said that the presence of the new and the failure of the old, contribute to the sundering of the two aspects of knowledge, which until now, were held in an equilibrium more or less stable. Moreover, the

¹ Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. II, *Intr.*; reprinted in *Psychological Review*, Vol. XIII, No. 6, 1906.

² Baldwin (unpublished lectures).

individual's own body has long been the seat of certain definite experiences of 'storm and stress,' which, as being beyond his immediate control, come also to be regarded as ambiguous. Thus far it is to be said that the inner is such, as Professor Baldwin has pointed out, simply because it is not outer.¹ The outcome of the several movements already indicated, is the gradual formation of a sphere of images possessing a certain stability and character of its own. Unlike memory, however, the inner, as such, lacks all reference beyond itself and does not lead to anything beyond the process in which it is contained.² As thus separated from the outer as held in the net of memory the inner possesses as yet only the characteristics attaching to the images lying outside the established forms of control.

As the result of the element of detachment attaching to the memory object, both memory images and fancies come to be regarded as inner, in the sense of falling within the body of the individual. But the body is the starting place of the child's life of exploration and discovery. He has already learned that, by manipulating his members certain satisfactions are to be had. The child early imitates and strangely enough, as Professor Baldwin has shown, he begins by imitating persons. By this means, what was at first projective to him in the conduct of persons, comes to be associated with his own inner life. Imitation thus becomes the method of treatment whereby content hitherto untractable and capricious is carried over into the life of the individual. As the result of the absorption of what was at the first outer by the process of imitation, the inner is no longer regarded as made up alone of images that have lost all positive value, but is now recognized as being whatever lends itself to imitative treatment. Imitation, which is at first organic in character, comes to be applied to the whole inner content as detached from the external, and comes to be treated with reference to the fulfillment of inner purpose. It is evident, that with this separation of the images as content available for inner treatment, apart from its actual control in the outer, and with the

¹ *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, pp. 90 sq.

² *Ibid.*

adoption of imitation as the method of selection and reduction, knowledge has entered upon a higher mode of determination. Following the usage of Professor Baldwin we shall speak of this mode as the 'lower semblant' in which, by the merging of two sorts of control, consciousness regains a new and higher immediacy.

The Characteristics of the Semblant Consciousness.

The works of Groos,¹ Lloyd Morgan² and Professor Baldwin³ in connecting the aesthetic with the play consciousness, have opened a new epoch in the study of aesthetics, while the epistemological value assigned the aesthetic consciousness in Professor Baldwin's *Thought and Things*, supplies an adequate motive of aesthetic construction. The conviction is general that the aesthetic consciousness has not arisen to satisfy an already existing sense of the beautiful.⁴ This leaves open the question of the motive of the rise of the aesthetic, which in the present essay, is found within the general problem of knowledge.

It is quite evident, however, that the rôle assigned the aesthetic consciousness in the development of knowledge, depends wholly upon the characteristics found attaching to it. The conviction has long held that play is in some way a natural phenomenon of the mental life of the individual, while the closeness of its connection with art has been explicitly recognized since Schiller. We are not concerned with its biological and psychological value in the present discussion but rather with its epistemological value as coming in between the image and the reflective modes of consciousness, and thus standing mid-way between the first immediacy which is below reflection and the higher which extends above it.

According to Herr Groos the several theories of play may be

¹ *The Play of Animals* and *The Play of Man* (Eng. trans.).

² *Animal Behaviour*.

³ *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 148, ff., etc.

⁴ See Tufts, 'The Genesis of the Aesthetic Categories,' *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, Vol. III.

reduced to two: the first, dating back to Schiller and brought forward in more recent times by Herbert Spencer, has been most adequately defined by Wallaschek. "The surplus vigor in more highly developed organisms, exceeding what is required for immediate need, in which play of all kinds takes its rise, manifesting itself by way of imitation or repetition of all efforts and exertions essential to the support of the organism."¹ Play thus arises only when an excess store of energy has accrued to the organism and so has only a negative value to the organism, while art, as associated with play, comes to be regarded as a useless luxury—a sort of by-product—possessing no direct utility whatever for the life of mind or body. Professors Groos and Baldwin have pointed out certain facts that tell conclusively against the 'surplus-energy' theory, and the theory proposed in its stead corrects the limitations of the former theory and exhibits the real value of play. Limiting ourselves in the present connection to the epistemological value of play, it is said, subject to further elucidation, that the individual must be playful to be anything more. The several writers on the subject of play already referred to, have laid stress upon play as a sort of practice of what the organism already has for the sake of its retention and advancement. Professor Baldwin has shown that the method may be used for the advancement of the mental life as well as the physical and social. The several characteristics of the semblant or play consciousness treated in the present connection are selected with reference to the emergence of the epistemological consciousness and to the use made of the aesthetic, or semblant consciousness, as the organ of immediacy through a merging of two sorts of control.

(1) *The Content of the Lower Semblant or Play Consciousness.*

The inner-outer dualism, whose reconciliation becomes the epistemological problem of the semblant consciousness, is found to be a dualism falling within the field of images. Both the images of fancy and the images of memory are now inner, in the sense that they are alike materials for imitative treatment. To this

¹ *The Origin of Music.* Quoted by Lloyd Morgan in *Animal Behaviour*.

entire psychic field the imitative method is applied, with the result that the two types of images are redistributed and the images of fancy, lacking the coefficients of memory which justify their reference to a determined sphere, retreat again into the germinating sphere of the subject to which all else is object. The dualism is thus between two classes of objects, only one of which finds a determined sphere of reference and the epistemological problem is the erecting of a sphere of reference in which the two types of images are unified. Images, as Professor Baldwin has shown, are inner only because they are not outer. Lacking the coefficients of memory which justify and guarantee whatever use is made of them, the images of fancy are not available for imitative treatment. They lack the persistence and representing character attaching to the memory images and consequently have no reference apart from the process in which they occur. Having thus no field of reference, the images of fancy, might, like the stream, go on forever, but their flow would be aimless and meaningless. To have meaning and validity there must be some reference to a sphere of determined existence in which they hold true.

But only that which already possesses some determination as holding within a definite sphere of existence can be 'sembléd.' That which lacks determination altogether is not imitable. The defect of the fancies was their elusiveness. They err by defect.¹ But the images of memory are also found to be insufficient in the light of the demands of an increasing experience. From an analytical point of view it is to be seen, that we are in the presence of a real dualism and one which can not be transcended by ignoring either of its two poles. It is precisely here that we are to find the value and function of the semblant consciousness as the organ of reconciliation and unity. Since memory as the sole sphere of reference and control has proven itself limited, in the sense that it can not meet the demands of changed and changing experiences, and since the images of fancy functioning as a demand for unity and congruity have no field of reference whatever, a field of reference must be established in which the demands

¹ Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, p. 90.

alike of each are met and reconciled. But such sphere can be erected only as a projection from a sphere of reference and control already established, hence only the images of memory as held under definite coefficients of control are available for semblant construction. A further meaning is to be reached only by a reading forward of the present meaning, which is at once the function and value of the 'sembling' process. The absolute experience, at any mode of its genetic development, is but a projection of whatever meanings consciousness has at the time in question. To extend experience is not to break with experience, and if reality is to be immediate, it must needs be an immediacy which completes and merges all present meanings and interests.

To limit the semblant construction to the images of fancy would at once rob it of all variety and meaning and reduce it to a sort of empty immediacy, of which illustrations are not lacking in the history of epistemological theory. On the other hand, to limit the semblant to the memory images alone, would yield only a world of discrete and quantitative determination. But by an inner imitation of meanings already guaranteed, both aspects of the dualistic experience are at once recognized and reconciled. The semblant consciousness thus stands as a protest against any one-sided procedure and meets the several demands of increasing thought, by treating meanings already established as 'schemata' for the sake of further meaning, which while not as yet possessed, is nevertheless treated and accepted as already established. The reality-feeling, characteristic of the first immediacy, due to the immediate unity of the two aspects of the constructive process and which was lost in the mediate control of memory, is again possessed in the 'make-believe' character of the semblant.

(2) *The Control in the 'Semblant' Consciousness.*

Defining the development of knowledge as the increasing determinateness of its two aspects, content and control, the semblant consciousness, as a process of inner imitation, under the urgency of purpose selective of contents already established, is to be regarded as the first appearance of a relatively free sub-

jective control. Within the first immediacy no distinction was made between these two aspects of thought and the unity is to be regarded as a 'projection' embodying the affective-dispositional tendencies. Presentations were determined wholly in terms of what consciousness then possessed. From the vantage ground of reflection it is to be said, that consciousness, during its first immediacy, defined its world in terms of undifferentiated feeling.¹ It is further to be said, that within such consciousness, the emphasis is to be given rather to the subjective aspect. From the standpoint of the individual the process is 'autonomic,' since both aspects of thought are as yet involved in a psychic whole, while from the objective point of view the process is 'foreign,' in the sense that the presented object is the determining factor of the process. These two factors were detached in memory, but the mediate character of the control of memory shows that consciousness is yet a-dualistic. Fancy represented the detachment of memory become complete, in that a complete break was made with the outer as the sense-datum. In the semblant consciousness there is a return to the outer, as held in memory, but the return is not complete. The content is accepted as guaranteed by the coefficients of memory, while the control aspect is to be seen in the fact, that the images *are not used for the sake of regaining the original sense-control*. The content, thus guaranteed, is used for the sake of fulfilling inner purposes and thus given a determination which it does not have, but which its control coefficients justify. Consciousness, for the first time stands apart from its content and treats it with reference to its own purposes and demands. The semblant object thus represents an inner construction for inner purposes, but out of materials determined in earlier modes. It is neither a fancy object, nor a transcript of the outer as held in memory, but rather a 'prescript' for the reconciliation and unification of the claims alike of the two aspects of thought now present and operative. In fancy, the control aspect attaching to memory is wholly ignored and while recognized in the semblant is never-

¹ Professor Baldwin's 'Reality-feeling.' See *Handbook of Psychology: Senses and Intellect*, ch. vii.

theless lifted from its regular sphere and carried into another. The content accepted as a 'presumption' in the first immediacy is now carried temporarily to another sphere for the sake of further determination and made an 'assumption,' but an assumption justified by the already present 'presumption.'¹ As in the first immediacy the determination given presented content was regarded as an attempt upon the part of the inner dispositional processes to reduce the presented content into unity with themselves, so the semblant object is to be looked upon as an inner control of content with reference to its own embodiment. In the presence of the conflicting claims and demands of sense and memory, the semblant object, as an inner determination of presented content, restores unity and hence immediacy of consciousness, by merging these several demands into a whole that at once transcends and completes both without ignoring either.

(3) *The Immediacy of the Semblant Consciousness.*

A third aspect of the semblant consciousness is to be inferred from the attitude of consciousness toward the object thus constructed. Primitive consciousness was held to be only relatively simple, and its immediacy represented an equilibrium of the aspects of knowledge later to be distinguished. The determination given was found to be the issue of the affective-volitional tendencies and represented an attempt at a definition of the world in terms of feeling.² In the semblant consciousness the several aspects of thought have fallen asunder and each is present as a sort of demand peculiar to itself. Each of the two characteristics of the semblant already indicated has to do with one of the aspects respectively of the inner-outer dualism of the semblant consciousness. So long as consciousness remains a-dualistic the world of presented content is taken at its face value and 'things are what they seem.' Reality is solely a matter of feeling

¹ Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. II, chap. i, §4. See Bertrand Russell, Meinong's 'Theory of Complexes and Assumptions,' *Mind*, 1904.

² Cf., Reality-feeling: Baldwin, *Handbook of Psychology; Feeling and Will*, ch. vii.

or 'presumption,'¹ Both the content and the control aspects were placed upon the same basis of reality. Despite the detachment of the images of memory and their use as possessing conversion value into real facts of the outer world, the aspect of control is mediate, in the sense that it is vested in a content lying outside the control process. Fancies came and went, formed and dissolved, without prior interest or determination upon the part of consciousness. As a result no distinction was made within the field of fancies. But with the isolation of the inner as material available for imitative treatment, differences at once arise within the sphere of images between those that have outer reference and those that do not. The latter, as a sphere of reference, has as yet only negative value, being made up of images that can not be imitatively treated. Every image is determined as belonging to either one of these two spheres, but can not hold in both. In either case, the disposition of the images is through a mediational content, which means that the old-time immediacy is broken down. The obvious need is a sphere of reference in which the common content is treated with reference to the demand of the inner. The significance of the semblant is, that by merging these two aspects of control, it becomes the organ of a new and higher immediacy.

The semblant consciousness has objectivity as the first immediacy also had, but an objectivity secured *by taking over into the inner the outer pole of the inner-outer dualism*. It is in the the semblant, therefore, that we are to find the first instance of a real transcendence upon the part of consciousness, by the erection of a schematic object in which, for the time, its several aspects of control are completely harmonized. Thus consciousness transcends its dualistic experience by erecting an object in which the demand of the inner for unity and of the outer for consistency and meaning are merged in a new mode of control, which in turn becomes the organ of immediacy of the two aspects of knowledge. The semblant consciousness is immediate in character, an experience in which existence and content, interest and datum are merged into a common unity of reference

¹ Ibid.

and control. In the case of the first immediacy, such unity was secured and held in the absence of reflective analysis of the given into its characteristic aspects. In other terms, the first immediacy represents a rendering of the whole of consciousness, in its as yet unbroken unity, while of the semblant consciousness, it may be said that, it represents an experience in which the several aspects of thought are again merged in a complete and self-sustained whole.

(4) *'Syndoxic' Character of Semblant Constructions.*

The three aspects of the semblant consciousness thus far considered will later be found to be precisely the three criteria demanded by the several attempts at a solution of the epistemological problem of reflective thought, as well as the three aspects of the aesthetic experience *par excellence*. But there is another aspect of the semblant consciousness, viz., its 'commonness,' which is also a characteristic of both the reflective and the aesthetic experience. It has already been pointed out, that the 'projective' constructions of the first immediacy were 'aggregate,' that is, common to the group but not recognized as such by the individual. The anonymous character of the unreflective myth has often been noted but not as yet explained. No inquiry is raised as to the author of myths and fancies, still their value is not lessened in finding them both anonymous and collective.

Professor Baldwin has shown, that memory shows a form of 'secondary' conversion which is essentially social in character.¹ He has also pointed out how the individual in play comes to submit his creations to others for confirmation. The material thus entering into the semblant constructions is already under social guarantees and is selected because of its common character, while the images of fancy, as being purely private—rein innerlich—are at one relegated to the limbo of the illusory and meaningless. The semblant construction thus becomes an object for general acceptance. It carries with it a demand for general recognition. It is precisely here that we are to seek for the aspect of "shareableness" and 'universality' which attaches

¹ Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, p. 144ff.

to play and art alike. While the play object may be recognized by a few only, it nevertheless carries with it that common aspect which makes it hold for all competent observers. The objective character of the semblant object, like the projective character of the myths and fancies of the first immediacy, involves the aspect of commonness. It is precisely here that we are to seek for the normative and universal character of the semblant object.

It is very generally recognized in present-day aesthetic discussion, that the aesthetic consciousness has arisen from motives other than a pre-existing love of beauty. The determination of the motives from whence it has arisen remains as yet an open problem. Professor Tufts, of the University of Chicago, holds that we are to seek for the motives of the aesthetic in the field of social psychology. But Professor Tufts leaves open a still larger problem as to what makes social progress and intercourse possible. In the present discussion, following the conclusions of Professor Baldwin, thought is the matter of the social process and all thought is necessarily common. Accepting this conclusion, we are led to the result, that the motives of the aesthetic consciousness are to be sought in epistemology rather than sociology. At the several stages of the development of the epistemological consciousness the demand arises for an object which is not private, but which appeals to all members of the community. Thus we found that the fancies and myths of the first immediacy were 'aggregate' and non-individual. With the rise of the inner-outer dualism, the need is for an object which at once meets the demands of the individual and at the same time demands general recognition. At each successive mode of determination of thought, the purely private is eliminated and only materials under the test of secondary conversion, that is, tested by means of others, become available for imitative treatment. The problem of knowledge thus becomes not 'How can we think things together,'¹ but rather how can we manipulate an already common content for the effective embodiment of individual meanings and purposes.

¹ James, 'How can we Think Things Together?' *Psychological Review*, Vol. II, pp. 105ff.

It is thus seen that the characteristics of the lower semblant consciousness are precisely those demanded by the epistemological problem of the inner-outer dualism, whence the conclusion, that the two have arisen together, and that the motives and function of the aesthetic are to be found within the epistemological. By merging the two aspects of control issuing respectively from the inner and the outer, the aesthetic becomes the organ of world-unity and world-interpretation. The projects of the first immediacy were found to be 'synergetic' while the semblant objects are to be defined as 'syntelic' or 'contemplative.'¹ They are ideal, in the sense that they are neither pure fancies and thus private and subjective, nor mere transcripts of memory, which is mediate as to its control, but rather as Professor Ormond says a 'prescript' of a world in which the selective and the recognitive are reconciled.²

The semblant object therefore reconciles the inner-outer dualism by merging the two sorts of control issuing respectively from the poles of the dualism. It is neither inner nor outer, but it reconciles and satisfies alike the demands of each. The remote control of memory is, for the time, released. The control of the semblant construction is unique, in the sense, that the material entering into it is lifted, as it were, from its original control and used for personal purposes. The object thus constructed might be real but it is not, though treated 'as if it were.' The 'autotelic' character of the control of the constructions of the first immediacy was found in the fact that these constructions represented an attempt to fashion the presented world in congruous terms but without conscious separation of the factors involved. Interest then meant the whole of the affective-conative dispositions. But with the bifurcation of consciousness, interest may be directed either toward the content as held in memory, or to the control which is not yet able to function in its own name. But the very fact of the rise of the semblant object is indicative of a form of interest which does not terminate with the already guaranteed content of memory. It is precisely

¹ Baldwin, Unpublished Lectures.

² *Foundations of Knowledge*, ch. ix.

here that we are to seek the rise of the semblant as an attempt upon the part of consciousness to give expression and embodiment to the interest which gives it birth. The history of aesthetics would be simply the history of the rise and development of this *sui generis* type of interest. The several historically recognized art-periods of the world reflect the successive stages of the embodiment of the self. Within the first immediacy there is to be found what Vignoli has called "the objectification of the self in all the phenomena it can perceive."¹ But in the second immediacy, realized in the semblant consciousness, there is the fusion of two possible controls. Consciousness is now possessed of spheres of reference, only one of which, memory, is under its own characteristic coefficients of control. From this sphere the material of the semblant construction is drawn since it always gets its materials from the already established. But this material, as already established, is used in the semblant consciousness for the sake of a more complete embodiment of the self, which is accomplished by the self giving it a meaning of its own and not one guaranteed through something else. The 'reality-feeling' of the first immediacy which is lost in the mediate character of memory, is again reached in the 'make-believe' construction of the semblant construction. The self becomes one with its object in a new and higher immediacy. By a process of '*Einfühling*,' a reading of itself into the object, it completes itself, by setting up an experience in which all motives and controls are merged. The external world as held in memory is held up and treated schematically for the sake of further meaning. The aesthetic experience, at whatever stage of its development, is therefore an ideal experience in the sense that it does not mediate the original control. Its meaning is an *imported* meaning and comes *directly* rather than through something else. The control of the construction is not completely born of the self since the inner is yet lacking in determination. The semblant consciousness is, therefore, to be regarded as quasi-epistemological and the semblant construction in which new and higher immediacy is reached as quasi-aesthetic.

¹ Vignoli, *Science and Myth*.

CHAPTER III.

*The Mediate and Dualistic Character of Reflective Thought as
the Outcome of the Lower Semblant and the Prelude to
the Higher Semblant or Aesthetic Consciousness.*

The epistemological consciousness is dualistic.¹ To know implies and involves a knower as well as something known. Current epistemological discussion recognizes the subject-object dualism as the fundamental characteristic of thought. Inquiry as to the origin, nature and validity of knowledge arise only with the distinction of these two factors involved in every conscious construction. Paulsen is justified in the conclusion that since epistemological discussion arose as critical inquiry upon metaphysics, it arose late in the history of thought.² But it would not be true to say that epistemological inquiry was not present at a much earlier date than Locke's *Essay* and Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is neither a matter of chance, nor arbitrary procedure, that modern philosophical discussion has gathered about epistemological, rather than metaphysical inquiries. Theory of knowing rather than theory of being is now to the fore. If epistemological inquiry did not arise as an independent discipline until the latter half of the eighteenth century, it was not due to an absence of the necessary motives and materials at an earlier period. The fact rather is, that epistemological inquiries were present long before the name, and the more exact statement of the problem of knowledge in modern times, represents the focusing of a long series of converging motives and materials of an epistemological character.

The epistemological consciousness must be treated genetically rather than transversely.³ It arises with the breaking

¹ Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, p. 266, and Vol. II, chaps. xiii-xv; Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 170, 175.

² Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 339.

³ Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, p. 12.

down of the first immediacy of consciousness and its problem becomes the erection of an experience in which the dual character of thought is merged and a higher immediacy established. In the preceding chapter it was shown, that the semblant or play consciousness represented the reconciliation and merging of two sorts of control.¹ With the breaking up of the first immediacy, in which content and control were held in a relatively stable equilibrium, memory and fancy stood for two possible ways of treating presented content. Interest, at first identical with the affective-conative dispositions, and unitary, has also been polarized, so it is possible to speak of an interest of a selective as well as interest of a recognitive character. These two types of interest represent two possible attitudes of consciousness toward its own content. The significance of the semblant consciousness was seen in the fact, that it represented the reconciliation of these two forms of interest by setting up of a detached and self-controlled construction.

Before the rise of the semblant, as an inner determination, the inner possessed value only in contrast with the outer. But the semblant, as merging both memory and fancy, is neither a memory object, nor a pure fancy, but in a sense both. The rise and progressive determination of the semblant supply the materials and motives of the substantive dualism of reflection. The sense of agency and control found present in the semblant becomes completely generalized for all content and functions as the presupposition of control. The quasi-logical character of the control of the lower semblant consciousness was found in the fact that the constructive self was still identified with a portion of its content. The epistemological consciousness is reached only when the self as subject is set over against its entire content.

No adequate solution of the epistemological problem is possible so long as the subject is identified with some one of its aspects. With the rise of the mode of reflection, in which the self is set over against the whole of its content, a content inclusive of mind and body, each under its own form of control,

¹ Ibid., p. 119.

the epistemological problem becomes the reconciling of a dualism both terms of which are equally under subjective control. There is no ground whatever for making either mind or body prior in the solution of the problem, since both have arisen together. Either apart from the other represents an abstraction and reality must be inclusive of both. Any form of interactionism makes the problem of knowledge insoluble, while a parallelism of the type that forbids all reconciliation, reduces the epistemologist to the same extremity.

In the preceding chapters the attempt was made to show, that the earlier dualistic experiences were transcended in an imitative treatment by consciousness of the meanings already acquired. The limitation in each instance was found in the fact that the constructive self was identified with one term of the dualism. The semblant consciousness was found to be 'pragmatic' in the character of its control, because the materials of its construction were borrowed from memory. The outer world, as held in the grasp of memory, was as yet the sole sphere of reference and control. But with the rise of the subject-object dualism of reflection, both mind and body are equally objects of thought and available for imitative treatment. *From the genetic point of view, therefore, the epistemological problem of reflection can be solved only by a re-statement of the subject-object dualism for common reflection, which will make possible the transcending and merging of the subject-object dualism. This requires the same process as that by which the earlier dualisms were also transcended and merged.*

Reflective thought is thus dualistic, since the dualism of substances has been redistributed, but has not disappeared. Thought has still to do with two opposed spheres with characteristic forms of control, the one constituting the content and the other the judging self. The conflict here is a dualism of control, both forms of which however, are mediated through a common content, and the solution of the problem waits upon the erection of a field of reference and control in which reality is given immediately, rather than through a mediating content, the erection of an 'absolute experience in which phenomenal dis-

tinctions are merged, a whole become immediate at a higher stage without losing any richness.¹

(1) *Dualistic Character of the Content of Reflection.*

Defining judgment as the acceptance or rejection of materials determined in earlier modes of cognition, the content of the logical mode may be said to be whatever the mind may think about. The whole content of experience, sense objects, memory objects, semblant objects, and even fancy objects are alike objects of thought to the subject which is now set over against all content as the controlling, directing and organizing factor of experience. Self in this sense may think about everything and anything.² But the content of thought is mediate in character, since judgment, as the redistribution of earlier meanings, must of necessity accept its content as held under certain presuppositions of control. Whatever the objects of thought and whatever use may be made of them, the control of the sphere from which they are drawn still holds. Judgment may be selective but is selective of facts only, so that the control of the judgmental process is beyond the judging self. In the Kantian sense, judgment is, therefore, *regulative* rather than *constitutive* of experience. It is precisely here, I think, that we are to seek for the limitation generally recognized as attaching to thought. Thought, as Bradley says, is always desiring another than itself, because its content is always in an incomplete form,³ and it seeks to possess in its object that whole character of which it already owns the separate features. But since such a complete object lies beyond thought, it must remain forever an Other.⁴

(2) *The Dualistic Control of Thought.*

The content of the logical mode thus carries with it certain determinations due to its having a certain 'make-up.' The

¹ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 160.

² Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*, pp. 1 and 2.

³ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 180.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

character of such determination reflects the stage of development which the constructive consciousness has reached. The aspect of control, as the second factor of conscious construction, is to be sought for in the process by which presented content is referred to its appropriate sphere of existence and control. The aspect of control, therefore, is, in the logical mode, mediate in the sense that the content is used as holding within a certain sphere of reference. Truth as the outcome of the logical process means precisely reference to a sphere, and thus involves something to which it is true as well as some one to whom it is true.¹ But in judgment these two are never the same, for if they were, judgment would be wholly meaningless. There is, therefore, a real dualism present in judgment, which thought can not of itself transcend. Mr. Bradley is quite right in saying that thought can not, in its actual processes and results, transcend the dualism of the 'that' and the 'what.'² Thought is relational and discursive, meaning that its control falls outside the subject, so that Bradley, and the Intellectualists in general, conclude that the real subject of judgment is *reality*, that is, a fuller experience in which thought is absorbed, the predication of a content consistent with and in entire agreement with the self. The control aspect of thought, like the content aspect, thus points forward to a more complete experience, in which the two aspects are merged and completed. But this represents the epistemological problem of reflective experience.

(3) *The Subject of Thought.*

Within the logical mode arises the distinction between the 'I' and the 'me,' the thinker and the things thought. In our treatment of the two aspects of thought known as content and control, we found that both alike pointed forward to an aspect of the process of thought that was not fully rendered in either of its two factors. It was found that thought as such was unable to get its materials into a harmonious system or to establish a control in which the subject, as the existence factor, and the

¹ See Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. II, chap. xiii.

² Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, ch. xv.

predicate, as the content factor, were brought together within some immediate experience. As a result of this embarrassment between subject and object, the Intellectualists identify the subject of judgment with reality as such. Mr. Bradley has shown that the thinking self can not be identified with any particular content. Thought thus seems always to be unable to render its own subject. Mr. Bradley appreciates this fact and goes over to what may be called an 'a-logical' experience, meaning an experience in which subject and object are contained in an immediacy of feeling.¹ What Mr. Bradley among the Intellectualists and Professor Royce among the Voluntarists are searching after, is a form of experience in which the self is able to completely embody itself. The problem becomes the further reading of *present* meanings, for the sake of *further* meanings. The function of thought is the employment of already established forms of control for the sake of increase of knowledge; but the problem now becomes the employment of already guaranteed meanings for the sake of control of future experience.²

The epistemological problem thus becomes the problem of erecting an experience in which all partial and fragmentary meanings are made complete and in which the subject finds itself completely reflected. The first immediacy was maintained by the self objectifying itself in all the phenomena it could perceive. Without the distinction of subject and object, consciousness nevertheless maintained its primitive unity and purity by reducing the object to the unity of pure feeling. In the 'make-believe' character of the semblant consciousness we found the merging of two forms of control, by the erection of an object in which the self identified itself with its object. It is therefore to this same mode of conscious construction that we are to turn for a solution of the dualistic experience of reflective thought.

Summing up the discussion thus far made, it is found that within the movements of the logical mode we have found two

¹ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 172.

² See Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. II, chap. xiv, who distinguishes these two movements as 'knowledge through control' and 'control through knowledge' respectively.

types of meaning which were not only not rendered, but for the rendering of which consciousness within the logical mode was wholly inadequate. In the first place it was found that the thinking self could not be rendered in terms of logical thought and thus remains over as an element of 'intent.' Logical procedure can take place only within a related content. The thinker thus finds himself limited to and conditioned by the material with which he works. His point of view must be retrospective and his judgments must be of the factual type only. The personality of the thinker must be as completely lost as is possible. Formal logic by the use of a series of wholly neutral symbols represents an attempt to eliminate the personal element of thought. In the second place we have found that within the logical mode the control aspect of all thinking remains also unrendered. But we have also found that it was precisely by this means that thought was able to reconcile conflicting controls in earlier experiences and thus reach a platform for higher mental determinations and constructions. The projective constructions of the first immediacy were regarded, from the point of view of the consciousness that had them, as 'presumptions,' while the constructions of the semblant or play consciousness were regarded as 'assumptions.' The attitude of consciousness toward the first type of constructions has been characterized as 'primitive credulity' by Bain and 'reality-feeling' by Baldwin, meaning a sort of naïve acceptance of the object. In the case of play objects, in which the self stands apart from its objective constructions, there is a sort of identification of the self with the object, an acceptance of the object as constructed wholly for inner, personal purposes. Logic is not a matter of variable belief and every precaution is taken to rule out this aspect of thought. But thus far we have seen that consciousness has been able to unify itself and thus reach a platform for higher mental determination only by a reading forward of its present store of meanings and attaching to them meanings which they are not known to possess but accepting them and treating them as if they already possessed the meanings thus attached to them. Belief thus passes into 'faith,' the substance of things held as possible, the acceptance of something as if its reality were already realized.

In addition to these two types of meaning which the logical mode fails to render, Professor Baldwin has pointed out that it fails also to render certain 'singular' meanings. He points out, what is a matter of general recognition, that the singular judgment has been a sort of 'thorn in the flesh' to the logician and the philosopher alike. Traditional logic finds itself wholly unable to exhaust this type of meaning and as a result it is identified in some way with the universal.

The fact appears to be that there are two types of singularity, which Professor Baldwin has named 'essential' and 'imported' singularity, only the latter of which is of concern in the present connection. The first type is 'rendered only in community,'¹ whereas the second gives a judgment not of truth but of descriptive assertion. Its singularity is a matter of selection and appreciation, and thus can not be rendered in logical terms.²

There are therefore three types of meaning not rendered by the developments within the logical mode. Consciousness is again in the presence of a dualistic experience and the epistemological problem of reflection becomes the problem of erecting a whole of experience in which these several meanings are rendered.

The character and place of the ontological problem determine the character and function of the epistemological and the several historic types of reality reflect as well the several types of epistemological theory. Professor Baldwin³ has arranged those several types of theories of knowledge under two general types and his classification is here followed. Both types of theory which he knows respectively as the 'Identity' and the 'Representative' are found to proceed from ontological necessity rather than psychological analysis. Each alike assumes the subject-object dualism as the necessary presupposition of reflective thought and each also attempts to transcend the dualism

¹ Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. II, chap. xiv, §8; and in the article 'Logical Community and the Difference of Discernibles,' *Psychological Review*, Nov., 1907, Prof. Baldwin shows that it is only by generalizing its successive appearances that a singular object can be made matter of judgment.

² Baldwin, loc. cit., Vol. II, chap. xiv, §4.

³ Unpublished Lectures.

thus established by establishing some sort of correspondence between thought and reality.

The Identity theories proceed upon the assumption that thought and its object can not be foreign to each other. The object of thought must necessarily be the product of thought. The dualism must therefore fall within the process which is responsible for its appearance. But since consciousness is recognized as three-sided, we are to expect that each of the aspects of consciousness will be made in turn the organ of knowledge and reality. Accordingly we have with us Intellectualists, Voluntarists, and Mystics or 'Affectivists.' By neglecting the existence aspect of thought, the representatives of an identity theory of knowledge reduce thought and reality to a system of 'implications.' That each is unable to carry itself through, is to be inferred from the fact to be discussed in the following chapter, that each, in the end, arrives at a conception of reality in terms of immediate and undifferentiated feeling.

The value of the identity theory resides in the fact that it represents an attempt to preserve and restore the aesthetic and religious ideas threatened by the attempts of the empiricists and finally destroyed by the materialists. But because the identity theory refuses to accept any object as an item of knowledge which can not be explained by analysis of the subject, it becomes fixed and static and in the end a purely formal discipline.

The representative theory of knowledge arises through a failure of the former type of theories to deal adequately with the more urgent and vital matter of life and experience. The rapid development of empiricism is to be found in its keeping close to experience. The object of thought must be other than thought, in which 'other' thought must find both its motives and sanctions. But in either type of theory reality is given as a fixed system in which, according to the Rationalists, thought must find its law and goal, while according to the Empiricists, thought is true only in so far as it adequately represents a world already organized apart from the knowing mind.

But as in the time of Kant, so also to-day, the conviction is felt that these two types of theory have run themselves out.

The fact that the champions of an identity theory of knowledge find themselves in the presence of an *impasse* which can be bridged only by a denial of the validity of the process by which it is established, reveals both the limitations and the defects of the theory. These writers proceed upon the assumption that reality must be one and immediate, but since thought is mediate in character, reality must, in the end, be gotten in terms of pure feeling. The Voluntarists also recognize the dualistic character of the practical life, but a dualism which conduct, as such, can not transcend, so that the 'other' in terms of which the self completes itself, must be gotten in an immediacy of the will. Thus in an indirect way the outcome of the rationalistic movement has been to arouse and ground the conviction that reality is larger than thought, and that the final interpretation and unification of experience will proceed the rather from the affective-volitional aspect of consciousness.

The outcome of the several attempts to establish a representative theory of knowledge has been strikingly similar to that of the former type of theory. Proceeding from an inadequate notion of experience, the Pragmatists, as the avowed empiricists of the present time, find the highest type of thought and reality in undifferentiated and unreflective feeling. The plain man of the street who does not *think* but *knows*, represents the ideal type of thought. Thought arises only with the collapse of habit as an equilibrium of stimulus and response, and reality means simply its successful re-establishment. The upholder of the Identity theory of knowledge found that reality, as the ultimate subject of thought, fell outside the process of thought. The Empiricists, on the contrary, in seeking to emphasize the control aspect of thought, erred in making the empirical occasion the sole cause of thought. The lesson to be derived from the failure of each of these two types of epistemological theory is, that thought can not bring unity and completeness into its content without transcending itself. The epistemological problem thus becomes the problem of transcending the subjective. But the failure alike of each of the two attempts at a solution of the epistemological problem already referred to forbids any further attempt at effecting a solution at the expense of the one or the other of the two aspects of thought.

In the present discussion the term experience is used as applying only to consciousness after the subject-object dualism has been reached. The Rationalists are quite right in holding that experience proper connotes conscious relation to something, that is, the distinction of object, of which the individual is conscious, from the mind which is conscious. Such experience is, however, only of gradual attainment. To identify experience with the first immediacy, in which thought functions as a self-contained whole, and make such experience the type of the ultimate experience, means to reduce the highest conceivable experience to undifferentiated and unrelated feeling. The Pragmatists are also right in the contention that thought is a function within experience, if reflective thought is meant. To identify reality with an immediacy of consciousness can mean only that reality is the highest and most complete type of experience, 'an immediate, self-dependent, all-inclusive individual.'¹ Bradley identifies reality with the Absolute as that which is at once without distinctions and relations. Still later he identifies reality with 'sheer sentience'—a sort of Nirvana in which all the attainments of thought disappear in a life-less immediacy. But to reach such immediacy, the relational side of thought must be merged, since reality can be had only by getting a 'whole which is not anything but sentient experience.'² It is precisely here that Bradley differs from Green, for while the latter would make reality a matter of relations, Bradley would make relations a sort of screen, which thought throws over reality. In the latter case the attaining of reality means the undoing of thought. Thus the 'sheer sentience' of Bradley in which the dualistic character of thought is overcome is an a-logical or mystical experience—a 'consummation of thought in which thought is lost.'

Professor Royce in *The World and the Individual*, reaches a quite similar conclusion while proceeding from the more active aspect of consciousness. According to Professor Royce, reality is that in which the ideas find their complete embodiment and

¹ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 179.

² *Ibid.*, p. 173.

meaning. Every idea, he continues, is as well an act of volition as of cognition, and possesses thus two meanings, an internal and an external, the latter being a sort of projection or a reading forward of the former, a discounting of future experience. The external meaning as the 'other' is that which the internal meaning seeks for its own realization. What is, or what is real, is the complete embodiment in individual form and in final fulfilment of the internal meaning of finite ideas.¹ Truth is no longer a matter of identity of subject and object, nor a more or less adequate representation of an external order of things existing either in the mind of God (Plato) or in the external world (Hobbes), but the conformity of an idea as an internal meaning with its own determined external meaning. "No finite idea can have or conform to any object save what its own meaning determines, or seek any meaning or truth but its own meaning and truth."² "This final embodiment is the ultimate object, and the only genuine object, that any present idea seeks as its Other." In a word, reality thus becomes the fulfilment of purpose.

"By thus distinguishing sharply between the conscious internal meaning of an idea and its apparently external meaning, we get before us" says Professor Royce, "an important way of stating the problem of knowledge or, in other words, the problem of the whole relation between Idea and Being."³

But how can the idea as a cognitive state, possessing only internal meaning, possess itself of an 'other' as an external meaning, as that which is essential to its own completion? Bradley, it will be recalled, was confronted with the same problem and finding that thought as thought is not able to grasp reality sought deliverance in an a-logical state of 'sheer sentience.' Professor Royce, on the other hand, finding that thought can not of itself create ideals, since it has to do with the categories of the true and the false, and holding that reality must necessarily be ideal in the sense of a more complete experience

¹ Royce, *The World and the Individual*, p. 339.

² *Ibid.*, p. 340.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

not as yet realized, finds in the moral consciousness the postulate of reality.

But *will* represents also a mediate form of experience. The object of moral conduct is under foreign control, in the sense that its value is not in itself, but in the end not as yet attained. Will, therefore, like thought, presupposes a reality which transcends it, a reality which it is forever pursuing but is never able to grasp. Professor Royce seeks to avoid the *impasse* into which the Intellectualistic position led him at an earlier period of his philosophic thought, by making reality an act of will, rather than an act of thought. "To be real," he says, "means to express in a final and determinate form the whole meaning and purpose of a system of ideas"¹—"A *totum simul*,—a single, endlessly wealthy experience."²

But Professor Royce nowhere points out the method by which the ideas as internal meanings are able to project a farther experience in which they find their final embodiment. The 'other,' as the object of the life of purpose, can not, in any sense, be foreign to the self. But the fact remains that every genuine act of will is actuated by an unrealized idea, hence the conclusion would seem to follow, that volition as such, can find no place in experience in which the aspects of existence and ideality, of the self that is willing and the object willed, are once for all finally united. Professor Royce appreciates the dualistic character of will, as well as the unitary character of reality, and in the end posits an immediacy of will in which the self identifies itself with the object necessary to its completion.

For both the Intellectualists and the Voluntarists the epistemological problem is the same, the problem of reaching a higher type of meaning in which the body of present partial and fragmentary meanings are explained and completed. Each alike arrives at the conclusion that reality must always contain a further aspect which is neither thought nor will and can not be apprehended under the form of either. Reality therefore can never be precisely what it is for thought or will. Neither proc-

¹ Royce, *The World and the Individual*, Vol. I. p. 545.

² *Ibid.*, p. 546.

ess is complete in itself, whereas reality must be an individual, all-inclusive whole. Lacking a method whereby consciousness can reach further meaning upon the basis of meanings already acquired, both Bradley and Royce find refuge in an immediacy of feeling. But to reach such a conclusion, each breaks with the principle which was made at the outset the explaining principle of the mind and the organ of reality.

In the preceding chapters it has been shown that consciousness is possessed of a method of treatment of its present store of meanings whereby it may be treated with reference to a more complete meaning. The dualism of reflection has been preceded by earlier dualistic experiences in each of which the aesthetic arose as a means of rendering content as a complete whole. In the discussion of the logical mode we have found three types of meaning left over after thought had exhausted itself, hence a dualism remains upon our hands. Bradley is quite right in holding that thought can not get its content into a harmonious system.¹ Volition necessarily carries with it the same limitation. Truth and good alike are under mediate control and are general, whereas reality is immediate and individual. But these are precisely the characteristics we found attaching to the semblant consciousness in its earlier modes and to it we are to return again as the aesthetic experience *par excellence*; and we shall find, upon analysis, that it arises with the epistemological consciousness as the necessary organ of rendering the meanings that have not been rendered in the logical mode.

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 179.

CHAPTER IV.

The Aesthetic Experience as a Hyper-logical Mode of Consciousness in which the Dualism of the Logical Mode is Overcome.

In the preceding chapter it was pointed out, that neither thought nor will is able to exhaust experience. In both types of conscious experience there is found to be something more than either thought or will. In either instance reality becomes that which satisfies both [thought and will and both the Intellectualists and the Voluntarists reached the common conclusion that reality is an immediate, self-dependent and all-inclusive individual. But since such type of experience can not be reached either in terms of thought, or of conduct, but is, nevertheless, the final realization of both, it is to be sought for in an immediacy which is the rather feeling in character. Mr. Bradley has also shown, that reality can not be regarded as a mere identity of thought and will, but rather the goal toward which both are striving—an experience in which both thought and will alike are present not, however, *formaliter* but *eminentur*.¹

Thus it is to be concluded from the outcome of the intellectualistic and voluntaristic discussions, that reality must always contain a further aspect which is neither thought nor will and which can not be fully given in either. Both types of epistemological theory reach the conclusion that thought and will are general and mediate, while reality is individual and immediate. But since neither thought nor will can establish an experience of such type, both must yield to an immediacy of feeling, which as being rather a-logical, in the instance of the Intellectualists and a-volitional, in the instance of the Voluntarists, is to be regarded as a mystical outcome.

Current epistemological discussion centers about the problem presented by the dualism of mind and body as representing

¹ See Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 469-485.

two antithetical substances. Accepting this dualism as a datum of logical experience, the attempt is made to bring the two together, either by reducing the one to the other, or by finding some third entity which issues in the two aspects of mind and body, respectively. To accept the dualism as a datum of logical experience and then attempt to reach a solution by reducing either one to the other leaves the problem unsolved, while the setting up of some *tertium quid* solves the problem by a sort of 'back-door' method. One grows tired reading that mind is a form of matter, or that matter is an aspect of mind, or still further that the universe is made up of 'mind-stuff.' To materialize the spiritual, or spiritualize the material rather pushes the problem farther back than reaches a solution. The individual is neither a thinking machine wholly impersonal in character, nor the creature of unreflective instinct, but has become conscious of himself as a thinking and acting personality and refuses to accept any solution of the problem of knowledge in which these two aspects of his nature are so etherealized or materialized as to lose whatever of vitality and value they have gained in the development of thought. The individual having become conscious of himself refuses to believe either in mutual exclusion, or ultimate antithesis of the two terms of the dualism. Thought has reached increased determination, not by the suppression or the elimination of either of its two aspects, but rather by merging both in a higher sphere of mental determination.

In the first two chapters above the attempt was made to show that thought reaches a higher plane of construction through an imitative treatment of its present store of meanings. The aspect of unity, what Bradley and Royce call individuality, is to be sought for on the side of the controlling self rather than of the controlled content. The more or less mystical outcome of the epistemological theories of Bradley and Royce (mystical in the sense of affectivistic) is the necessary outcome of any attempt to solve the epistemological problem by identifying the self, as the control moment of thought, with any one of its several aspects. Historically speaking, it is to be said that epistemological discussion has completely boxed the compass in that each

of the several aspects of developed consciousness has, in turn, been made the explaining principle of the mind and the organ of reality.

Each of the three types of epistemological theory referred to in the preceding paragraph is found to emphasize some one aspect of what later will be found to be the final interpretation of reality. The element of value in each particular theory represents also the limitations of the remaining types of theory. A more satisfactory theory of reality is to be reached, not by making a sort of composite picture of the three types of theory, but rather by the discovery of a mode of conscious determination in which the several claims of these otherwise partial and fragmentary theories are met and merged.

The Intellectualists maintained and still maintain, that the subject and object must be identical. "If" says Bosanquet, "the object-matter of reality lay genuinely outside the system of thought, not our analysis only, but thought itself, would be unable to lay hold of reality."¹ All knowledge is a product of thought in that it represents an immanent evolution from certain *a priori* principles which are neither derived from nor verified by experience. Experience is from one end to the other a realization of a spiritual principle. Thought can not exist apart from its object, nor can the object of thought exist apart from thought for which it is object. On any dualistic theory of knowledge, truth must mean some kind of agreement between opposed factors, which while opposed come into some sort of relation. This relation is generally spoken of as the reference of ideas to a reality beyond ideas.² The reference, however, is on the side of the knowing subject, while it also carries with it the conception of a real which always remains in some sense, external. But, the Intellectualists insist, while knowledge refers to reality, reality also refers to knowledge, that is, truth is a matter of accepted reference on the one side and an accurate reference on the other.³ The two references thus always concur,

¹ Bosanquet, *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 2.

² Cf. Bradley's definition of judgment, *Principles of Logic*, ch. i.

³ See Baillie, *Idealistic Construction of Experience*, pp. 64.

since the dualism of subject and external object falls within the knowing process as mode of conscious activity. The distinction of subject and object is experience broken up into its diversity. The object as such is neither external nor internal for either term would make the problem of knowledge insoluble. The dualism, in fact, is the creation of experience itself. Such dualistic experience is, however, a wound, but a wound of consciousness' own making and truth represents the attempt upon the part of consciousness to heal the wound homœopathically.¹ The ideal experience represents that mode of conscious determination in which the mind as the subject has itself as a whole consciously before it. The problem of knowledge thus becomes the setting up of the ideal experience at the successive stages in the development of thought—a problem which Hegel, the 'Father of the School,' solved in terms of the aesthetic, while his later followers find the solution in an immediacy in which the two aspects of thought are brought into unity. The point of special emphasis in the present connection is, that the Intellectualists sought to harmonize the entire content of thought by identifying the two aspects of conscious determination. The object of knowledge must, therefore, be of the subject's own construction, in which the subject finds itself fully realized.

The outcome of the Intellectualistic movement was the setting in of what Höffding calls 'the logical ice-age,' and from which Voluntarism represents a reaction. It at once occurs that a thorough-going Intellectualism rates all purpose and value low. Following the *Second Critique* of Kant, the Voluntarists make the will the primary and constitutive function of consciousness and reality a matter of will-acts (*Thathandlungen*) rather than ideas. Thought to be vital and valuable must, they hold, be selective and purposive, and both these aspects of conscious experience are ignored in a rationalistic theory of knowledge. The object of knowledge to be real, must be something more than an object already identified with the subject in cognition. The object of knowledge must be in a real sense an 'Other.' To say that the object must become content of the

¹ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 166.

self before it can become the object of thought makes an act of will an empty procedure. But reality is larger than thought, and back of thought lies a deeper part of the self. The categories of the will are more potent than the categories of thought. Reality is not something already given in a related content which only awaits further analysis, but something which we are striving to bring into being. Furthermore, reality is always ideal, in the sense that it represents that after which consciousness is aspiring in order to clothe itself with unity and completeness.

The real significance of the Voluntaristic movement is the emphasis placed upon the concrete and ethical character of thought. By their insistence upon the relational and discursive character of reflective thought to the complete exclusion of the existential import, the Intellectualists reduced thought to a wholly formal procedure and made the object the conclusion of a syllogistic process. But, as has been pointed out already, thought is never able to render harmoniously its own content. The meaning which connects the several phases of thought and adds unity to the process as a whole is found in the ideal of a completely individual experience, of which the several phases of thought are expressions. There can, therefore, be no real progress in thought, and truth and fact are identical, since thought is a self-contained process. That, however, which unifies thought in the sense of organizing and holding it together suggests alike the inadequacy of the Intellectualists and the starting point of the Voluntarists.

The Voluntaristic movement represents an attempt to render the 'intent' aspect of thought. The object of knowledge as that which will complete an otherwise inharmonious and incomplete experience, must be something more than an already contained experience, but rather that which calls forth effort for its possession, and in the possession of which consciousness experiences a positive widening of its active-emotional life. The 'other' of thought, as Professor Royce has pointed out, is precisely that which thought must needs have for its own complete realization. The object of thought must necessarily be beyond thought's present attainment or it becomes valueless either as object of thought or of moral endeavor.

But the practical life, like the theoretical, is also under a mediate form of control and the moral consciousness can no more realize its inner, organizing, controlling principle than can the theoretical consciousness. Each alike necessitates an absolute experience which is neither thought nor conduct, but an experience of an individual whole in which both thought and volition are lost in a higher immediacy. For the Intellectualists each phase of thought is significant and finds its interpretation only in so far as it represents a reflection of a higher experience. The ideal experience would be that in which the subject has itself as a whole consciously before it, or as Baillie has expressed it, "it would be the form of knowledge in which the object is the mind itself. But such experience is the condition which makes knowledge possible at any stage whatsoever, and is not merely the goal toward which the several modes of knowledge point, but the very principle which makes them what they are for finite consciousness."¹ But the problem at once arises, the epistemological problem par excellence for the Intellectualists, as to how any particular stage of experience as finite and fragmentary, can reflect a more complete experience. It will be recalled that Hegel made use of the art-consciousness as a sort of mirror in which the ideal experience was reflected, while Bradley and Bosanquet respectively fall back upon 'sentient experience' and a 'pure act of faith.' The Voluntarists are confronted by the same problem as to how present finite acts of will can reflect an experience in which the life of will is fully realized—an experience of 'purposiveness without purpose.'² In a later chapter it is shown how the earlier Voluntarists like Fichte and Schopenhauer made use of the aesthetic consciousness as setting up an experience in which the active life finds an object in which all its aspirations and appreciations are fully reflected, while in our day Professor Royce, as an avowed Voluntarist, finds the absolute experience in a 'volitional immediacy.' Thus it is seen that while the epistemological problem was the same for these two types of epistemological theory, they also arrived at

¹ Baillie, *Idealistic Construction of Experience*, p. 85.

² Kant, *Krit. d. Urteilkraft*, p. 87.

similar solutions. The immediate experience embodied in an individual form represents an attempt to unify and thus complete an otherwise mediate and incomplete experience by setting up an experience in which subject and object are completely merged in an all-embracing unity. Thus, the true and the good are transcended and completed in a whole of undifferentiated and unrelated feeling.

The character of the absolute experience thus reached proves, however, to be more or less meaningless and empty, since it has completely broken with the earlier partial meanings. The subject alike in thought and conduct is more than either. Both demand an 'other,' and such 'other' constitutes reality only in so far as it contains what at once puts an end to all thinking and willing. But in attaining this 'other' both thought and volition lose their essential character. Bradley seeks a way out of the difficulty thus presented by saying that the 'other' which thought is always seeking but which remains forever beyond thought is its own completion. "Thought," he says "can form the idea of an apprehension, something like feeling in directness, which contains all the character sought by its relational efforts. Thought can understand that, to reach its goal, it must get beyond relations. Yet in its nature it can find no working means of progress. Hence it perceives that somehow this relational side of its nature must be merged and must include somehow the other side. Such a fusion would compel thought *to lose and to transcend its proper self*.¹ And the nature of this fusion thought can apprehend in vague generality, but not in detail; and it can see the reason why a detailed apprehension is impossible. Such anticipated self-transcendence is an 'other;' but to assert that 'other' is not a self-contradiction."² But lacking a method of treating thought with reference to its own advancement, Mr. Bradley in the end sets up a conception of reality which is a-logical in character. The 'will-to-believe' of Professor James, 'the pure act of faith' of Bosanquet and the 'volitional immediacy' of Royce, are to be regarded also as

¹ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 181, 182.

² Ibid., p. 182.

postulates of reality of an a-logical or affectivistic character. With both types of theory the problem becomes the construction of a single whole of experience under some mode of conscious construction in which present finite meanings find themselves completely unified and realized.

In the preceding chapters the attempt has been made to show that consciousness is possessed of such a method whereby present guaranteed meanings may be treated with reference to further meaning. The first immediacy was found to represent a single whole of experience due to the fact that the affective-conative dispositions seized and determined the whole of the presented content. The resulting unity of this early experience, embodied in the 'schematic general,' under a form of naïve acceptance as an act of 'presumption,' represents in germ the two aspects of all thought, which, while already present and operative, have not been distinguished. Reality, in this early undifferentiated experience, is the 'projective construction' which represents the unity of the object in perception. The unity of the thing perceived represents the unity of the act of perceiving, or, in still other words, the unity of the thing perceived represents a specific activity of the perceiving subject. The unity of the projective consciousness is not given in the presented content, nor, on the other hand is it wholly made by the consciousness that has it, but the unitary character of the first immediacy, represents the realization, in a definite form, of the active-dispositional tendencies as a sort of embryonic self.

The significance of the 'lower semblant' or play consciousness was found in the fact that it is conscious of the merging of the two aspects of thought which were not held apart within the first immediacy. Imitation, as a method of manipulating a guaranteed content with reference to the fulfilment and embodiment of inner purpose, is now consciously applied to whatever content consciousness has. We found that 'semblant' control was not direct and mediate as in memory, but the content guaranteed in memory is lifted from its original moorings and used with reference to the fulfilment of dispositional tendencies. Play thus becomes a sort of self-contained process in the sense

that it finds its end in the process itself. It is indulged for its own sake and hence lacks all conscious utilitarian or experimental value. There is complete identification of the player with the object thus constructed—a reading-in, as it were, of the person of the player into the object thus constructed. As the 'projective' construction arises in an undifferentiated experience, so the semblant object represents an object, which while not true to any established form of control, is nevertheless accepted and treated 'as if it were' real. It is evident that we are in the presence of an wholly new form of control—a control of an already guaranteed content in the form of a completed whole of content. There is a detachment of the self from the stern realities of real life whose limitations are transcended by the erecting of an experience, not as yet realized, but which can nevertheless be treated as if it were already realized. The semblant construction thus becomes a personal, all-inclusive, self-contained construction, in which the self as the controlling and organizing principle of thought reaches, by a process of merging and unifying the several aspects of thought, a new and higher plane of mental determination.

Having shown that, in the earlier modes of consciousness the aesthetic and the epistemological arose together, and that the former was found in each instance to possess those characteristics demanded by the latter—whence the conclusion that the aesthetic experience functions as an epistemological postulate—it now remains to show that the aesthetic experience, when once reflective thought is reached, still possesses the characteristics which make possible a solution of the epistemological problem of reflective thought. Making use of the generally recognized characteristics of the aesthetic experience we will now show that the aesthetic experience possesses precisely those characteristics which qualify it to render the three types of meaning which the logical mode as such is unable to render.¹

¹ In this procedure, and in the results, the writer is following Professor Baldwin's unpublished lectures in which he has presented some of the material of the third volume of his work *Thought and Things*.

(1) The Objectivity of the Aesthetic Experience.

The failure alike of the Rationalists and the Empiricists to arrive at a satisfactory theory of knowledge is to be found in the fact that each starts with an assumption which lies outside the accepted analysis of knowledge, but which has nevertheless to be admitted into the result as the underlying presupposition. Hegel was wholly justified in describing Kant's theory of knowledge as but another expression of Lockeanism. Both assume a dualism of subject and object which must somehow be maintained. It is of interest to note in passing, that the correction of each took an idealistic direction; for as Berkleianism represents an attempt to remove the unknown substratum of the thing substance and to show that cognitive experience can get on without it, so the critical successors of Kant attempt to drop the 'Ding-an-sich.' For both Locke and Kant, knowledge must find its standard beyond itself in the sense that reality is, necessarily larger than thought. This same position is reflected in the statement of Lotze that 'reality is richer than thought' and in that of Bradley that 'knowledge is unequal to reality,' or still again in the statement of Kant that 'beyond the bounds of knowledge there is a sphere of faith.' All these expressions are based upon the same presupposition, that thought implicates always a reality beyond itself. But it at once appears that reality beyond thought is not only unknowable but valueless; for either knowledge determines reality, in which case the nature of reality falls within the limits of thought, or there is, from the outset, a fundamental cleavage between knowledge and reality which can never be healed by either. The significance of the Intellectual movement is to be sought in the fundamental presupposition that knowledge must, in some way, determine its own conditions, that is, it must be a self-contained experience.

The object of knowledge can be neither external nor internal; it is not the product of interaction between subject and object, but rather a unity reflected in the object as constructed within consciousness. The 'projects' of the first immediacy represented a unitary experience secured and held in terms of 'motor synergy.' While within this early consciousness pro-

ess and product were not distinguished, the point of insistence was, that within this first experience we found the condition which was to make real and possible all modes of knowledge whatsoever. The 'projective' experiences of this early consciousness were neither transcripts of the outer order of things nor complete determinations of presented content in terms of the affective-conative tendencies, but represented the unity of the two processes functioning as yet in an undisturbed immediacy.

In the 'semblant' consciousness, the resulting object in which the dualism of inner and outer was merged was shown to be clearly a matter of inner determination. The value of the object thus constructed was found to consist, not in its reference to the object as such, but to the subject that determines the object. The object is one in which the subject finds himself reflected and enlarged. If we were to define the ideal experience as that in which the subject found itself fully reflected and embodied, it is evident that in the lower semblant construction we have at least a type and an illustration of such experience. Taking its material at the place at which it finds it, the semblant consciousness erects this material for the sake of completing itself in a further experience. While therefore the semblant object is not an object held in memory, neither is it a break with memory but it is the memory object lifted from its guaranteed forms of control and used for the sake of further meaning. Thus it is seen that both in the early immediacy, in which there was no separation of the two factors of thought, as well as in the second immediacy, in which the two factors of thought were distinguished, consciousness is possessed of a method of treating its content for the sake of advancing its own meanings. The resulting object in each mode of consciousness represents a merging of the two aspects of thought in a construction which becomes a platform for still higher conscious determination.

But objectivity is a universally recognized characteristic of the aesthetic experience. Santayana defines beauty as pleasure objectified.¹ Kant uses the terms 'universality' and 'necessity.'²

¹ Santayana, *The Sense of Beauty*, pp. 44-49.

² Kant, *Kritic der Urteilskraft*, sec. 6.

Cohn in his *Allgemeine Aesthetik*, uses the term 'Forderungs-character,' while Volkelt has defined the objectivity of beauty as due to the 'fusion of feeling and contemplation.' What is meant in the several attempts at a definition of aesthetic objectivity is, that the aesthetic object and the consciousness in which it arises are no longer held apart. The self becomes identified with the object as peculiarly its own. Thus it is to be said that the self that could not be rendered in terms of logical meaning finds in the aesthetic experience its complete rendering at the stage of development thus far reached. It becomes true, as Professor Baldwin has pointed out, that the aesthetic reflects the stages in the development of the self. The aesthetic object is therefore not an external object as the Intellectualists well saw, but only a farther experience. The object which they attempt to set up represents always a more complete experience in which the self as the thinker would complete itself. But lacking a method whereby consciousness could extend its present store of meanings in an object in which thought finds its limitations transcended, the 'ideas of the reason' of Kant, the 'pure act of faith' of Bosanquet and the 'sheer sentence' of Bradley, become empty categories in the sense that they tell us nothing whatever about the reality beyond thought. To say with Kant that the object of knowledge represents a 'possible experience' is meaningless unless there is some point of contact with the actual, for possibility can only be determined upon a basis of what is already real. To treat a thing 'as if it were' is possible only when the thing as a further experience finds grounding in present experience. To ask 'How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible,' means for a genetic psychology, 'How can thought legitimately refer to a reality beyond itself?' But it will occur at once that no such transcendent object can be reached by a process of analysis of thought-content. It is precisely here that we are to seek for the inadequacy and failure of the intellectualistic programme. "The Absolute does not want," says Bradley, "to make eyes at itself in a mirror, or, like a squirrel in a cage, to revolve the circle of its own perfections. Such processes must be dissolved in something not

poorer but richer than themselves."¹ But how can thought do so? Bradley himself has said, that if 'thought becomes other than relational and discursive—that is, mediate in control,—it brings about its own destruction';² while it has been shown in the preceding chapter that there are meanings present in reflective thought which reflection cannot of itself render? But why limit thought to the movements within the logical mode? May it not again be true, as Hegel pointed out, that the wound occasioned by the presence of a dualistic experience has been made by consciousness which is also able to heal it? And did not Hegel show remarkable insight in holding that the nature of objectivity depends wholly upon the way in which experience as a whole is conceived? Both the attempts and the limitations of the Intellectualists to establish the objectivity of thought as a perfect whole of experience, lend confirmation to the assumption of the present investigation, that the aesthetic experience is precisely the organ of this sort of objectivity. The self, as the one meaning which the Intellectualists admit can not be expressed in terms of thought, once again, as in earlier experiences, embodies itself, as the presupposition of control, in a whole of experience. Objectivity thus becomes the unity of control issuing from the individual himself upon a content already set up. In a word, objectivity means only the unity of all experience as such and such unity is secured in terms of the aesthetic experience.

The aesthetic indeed as an experience in which the subject completely embodies itself in an object erected under its own presuppositions of control, an experience in which the subject identifies itself with its object, indicates not the completion of the process of thought but rather makes ready and possible a new and higher mode of mental determination. *It is, therefore, a sign that thought can proceed, rather than a sign that the work of thought is ended.* The latter view of the aesthetic experience, which is admirably worked out by Miss Adams,³ would reduce the aesthetic experience to a sort of epi-phenomenon of smooth-working thought. It, at the least, reduces the

¹ and ² Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, ch. xv.

³ Miss Adams, *The Aesthetic Experience: its Meaning in a Functional Psychology*, 1907.

beautiful like the true and the good to the practical, and Miss Adams would doubtless say with Professor James that the beautiful must also be considered as a good. The outcome of the present investigation, however, leads to the conclusion that, the beautiful has a value and function of its own in experience and that instead of being given a place and value subordinate to either the true or the good, it is rather to be said that the true and the good are such only because they are also moments in the larger whole of the beautiful.¹

According to Kant the object of knowledge must be both universal and necessary. It is of historical interest to observe that he found these two characteristics attaching to the beautiful. Bain also notes the fact that the beautiful is shareable. But still the question remains as to whether objectivity lends universality and necessity or whether universality and necessity lend objectivity. Professor Tufts, in his article entitled 'On the Genesis of the Aesthetic Categories,' attempts to show that the objectivity attaching to the beautiful is due to the elimination of the subjective and private and the setting up of a social standard of value, so that his solution of the above question as to the priority of the objective or the universal is that the 'universalizing or socializing' of the standard is the ground, rather than the consequent, of the objectifying. Beauty thus becomes a social phenomenon and its several categories are to be sought for in social situations and social demands; while art, instead of being the embodiment of an interest *sui generis*, has arisen to satisfy other motives largely of a social character. In the present discussion, however, reasons have been found for regarding the aesthetic experience as a *sui generis* experience, whose function is to be sought for in epistemology. The objectifying of consciousness has been found to be a matter of unifying of consciousness and the aesthetic has been found to have arisen as the organ of such unification. Within the first immediacy, 'motor synergy' was found to be the measure and test of mental unity. The 'projective constructions,' as the embodiments of the first immediacy, were found to be 'objectifications of con-

¹ Cf. Baldwin, *Fragments in Philos. and Science*, Introduction.

sciousness in all the phenomena perceived.' They were also found to be 'aggregate' in character, that is, common although not so to the constructing consciousness. But the point insisted upon in the present connection is, that they were aggregate in reference because they were 'projective' and not 'projective' because they were 'aggregate.' Likewise play was found to be 'syndoxic' and not private in character. Play always involves and demands an audience. The material that becomes available for play is found to be under social control. Moreover, it has been pointed out, that play is essentially a re-construction of a social milieu. But as Professor Baldwin has pointed out, play is not real, in the sense of setting up an actual situation. Memory is present as a sphere of reference and control, but the play object as the merging of two sorts of control represents a detachment from any exclusive claim that either form of control may make. The interest in preserving a social situation is precisely the interest which is lacking. The fact is that play never goes over to real life and is not indulged in for the sake of mediating real life. And so also of art. To make art social means to place upon the aesthetic experience the very limitations from which it is seeking to free itself. Likewise to say that art must be true, in the sense of mediating truth, means to involve art in the limitations from which thought is seeking, through the art-consciousness, to free itself.¹ It is not true, therefore, as Professor Tufts holds, that objectivity, as characteristic of art, is due to the universality of the experience, but rather that the universality is due to the objectivity of the aesthetic experience. 'Common' thought alone makes socialization possible and objectification gives the ground and possibility of universality.

The universality and the necessity which the Intellectualists sought for and which were found in an experience in which thought with its dualistic limitations and implications was transcended, are found among the generally recognized characteristics of

¹ Baldwin, Unpublished Lectures. Professor Baldwin holds that the universality of art comes from its use of materials already, in some degree, universalized in thought, and reflects the degree of commonness or 'social' meaning of the material; but that the aesthetic experience as such is not social in the sense that it lacks anything of full and immediate personal appreciation.

the aesthetic experience, so that it can be concluded that the demand of the epistemological problem for objectivity is supplied in the aesthetic experience,

(2) *The Aesthetic Experience as a Furthering of the Self.*

It has already been pointed out, that the several stages in the development of the aesthetic experience, represent and reflect stages in the development of the self, as the control factor of all mental determination. The child and the race alike project into things, including persons, the experiences passed through in connection with things. Primitive thought is animistic. Play was shown to be the setting up of a situation in which the feeling of self was involved. The significance of play, in the development of the individual, was seen in the fact, that it indicates the isolation of the two aspects of thought which were held together in the earlier modes. Professor Baldwin and others have characterized this aspect of play as 'the sense of agency.' The point of interest is, that the play object is one set up for the satisfaction of inner, personal purposes and indulged as such. As a semblant object, it is neither memory nor fancy but stands as an object in which both are merged and completed. As a type of interest it finds its end-state in neither memory nor fancy but in itself as a detached and self-controlled meaning. It thus represents a furthering of the self, as the pre-supposition of control, so that the value of the construction attaches to the subject rather than to the object constructed.

In the higher aesthetic experience this same characteristic has been noted and described by Volkelt as the "widening of our life of feeling toward the typical, the comprehensive and the universal." This characteristic is to be found in all stages of the aesthetic experience as attaching to the subjective aspect of the process. It is treated here, not only because it is a generally recognized characteristic of the aesthetic experience, but rather because it satisfies the demand made by the Voluntaristic type of epistemological theory that the object of thought shall in some way represent that in which the subject finds itself enlarged and realized. The meaning of experience is not to be found in the essential identity of subject and object but in an 'other' in

which the subject finds itself furthered and completed. The 'other' thus becomes a deliverance of the practical rather than the theoretical consciousness, and the moral consciousness is made the postulate of an all-comprehensive and individual experience. Thought not being able to encompass the object in which it finds itself fully reflected and its limitations overcome, seeks deliverance in the will. Growth, development, implies struggle and struggle implies something to be overcome, so that the object of knowledge is posited for the sake of moral struggle and perfection. To be vital and fruitful the object of knowledge must lie beyond the subject, whose attainment of the object brings the experience of an enlarged and increased self. The Voluntarists from Fichte to Royce emphasize thus the control aspect of thought rather than the relational aspect.

But will is also found to be dualistic and can, no more than thought, come to final fulfilment. Moral struggle always involves a struggle between existence as it is and what our active nature is seeking to make it. It is precisely this dualism that Professor Royce seeks to explain in terms of the two-fold meaning of ideas, the internal and the external. The epistemological problem from this point of view becomes the erection of an object as a not-self or an external meaning in which the self finds itself revealed and realized. The earlier rationalistic position of Professor Royce is still present despite the more voluntaristic statement of the problem of knowledge. The external meaning of the idea is a necessity inherent in the nature of the idea as a cognitive state. Experience is purposive and reality can be only the embodiment of a single, all-inclusive purpose. Thought is barren and judgment dead unless both are concerned with the more concrete matter of actual experience. Every idea is as much an act of will as an act of cognition and reality is an experience in which purpose, as a singular meaning, is embodied. Will, therefore, like thought, presupposes a reality beyond itself, in which it finds its partial and mediate meanings completed in the all-embracing immediacy of a single purpose.

But the Voluntarists, like the Pragmatists of the present, by ignoring the relational aspect of thought, reduce the acts of will in which the 'other' is erected to a sort of leap in the dark. Will

as function, must have something to work with and upon, and by ignoring the content aspect of thought, the control aspect becomes more or less capricious and arbitrary. Admitting that thought implies a situation in which the two aspects of knowledge have fallen apart, the question remains as to what sets up the situation that makes thought possible and necessary. The 'other' of thought, as Royce well sees, must not be a complete break with consciousness, *but must be a meaning for the consciousness which sets it up as an 'other.'* It is precisely here that the position of Royce is the more fruitful and which will not permit his being grouped with the Pragmatists. The epistemological problem for Royce thus becomes the setting up, by the ideas as internal meanings, of an external meaning as a single, all-inclusive whole of experience, in which consciousness is furthered and completed. But one seeks in vain for even an attempted solution of the problem as thus stated. The Voluntarist and the Pragmatist thus find the limitations which they found in the Intellectualistic position lying at their own door. Will, like thought, can complete itself only by becoming what is not will. Reality, as an absolute experience, can only be an experience in which the subject is one with its object, a sort of immediate apprehension in which the dualistic character alike of thought and will is merged in a single, harmonious experience. Professor Royce reaches therefore the conception of a 'volitional immediacy,' which being an essentially a-volitional experience must be regarded along with the 'will-to-believe' of James as a sort of mystical postulate.

Professor Royce's position represents an advance over the earlier intellectualistic position, *in that the object of knowledge is necessarily a meaning for the consciousness that has it.* The dualism thus falls within experience and represents a dualism of consciousness toward its guaranteed content, rather than a datum of immediate experience. But still the question remains as to how consciousness can erect a meaning as an 'other' in which it finds itself furthered without breaking with its store of present meanings? Or as Professor Royce himself puts the question 'How can the subjective transcend itself?' The 'other' of thought to be valuable, must be neither identical with the

subject, nor a complete break with experience, but a meaning external only in the sense that it represents a further but nevertheless possible experience. The outcome of the voluntaristic programme is identical with that of the Intellectualistic and each alike seeks a solution in an immediate experience, which must issue from the experience which is seeking its own completion. In the case of the Intellectualists, it was shown that consciousness is possessed of a method of extending its present guaranteed content for the sake of embodying the interest of an inner and personal sort without breaking with the meanings already acquired by thought; so it now remains to indicate that consciousness is also possessed of a method of postulating further meanings, in which the present limited and fragmentary meanings are merged and completed, without breaking with the values already acquired in consciousness.

Professor Baldwin and others have found the 'self-exhibiting' activities of the individual to be involved in the rise of the aesthetic experience. The burden of the present discussion has been that the aesthetic in the several stages of its development reflects the development of the self. Play was shown to be always the setting up of a situation of a personal sort. The limitations of the play mode are to be found in the material held in consciousness under its own coefficients of control; this determines and limits the possible construction which consciousness can make of it. As between memory under the most rigid control as representing an external order of things and fancy as wholly detached content, play as an essentially inner construction was neither and yet satisfied the demands of both. The motive of the play-construction is a motive *sui generis* and to reduce play to work would mean to destroy the essential character of play. The object thus constructed, while not real if tested only by memory, is nevertheless accepted as if it were real. The 'reality-feeling' of the projective consciousness, reflecting the unity of subject and object as the two factors of all mental construction—which unity was broken down by the mediate character of the control of memory—is once more secured by the playful setting up of a 'make-believe' object as the 'assumption' of still farther meaning. The limitation of the lower semblant con-

struction is to be sought in the material available for such treatment. Only when the logical mode is reached do the two types of meaning, with one or the other of which the self as control factor has been identified, become the content of the self as the presupposition of control. The failure of the Intellectualists to deal adequately with the epistemological problem is to be found in the assumed identity of the self and its related content. The Voluntarists on the other hand identify the self with the practical will. But both thought and will were found to be dualistic in character, so that the self could never embody itself fully and immediately in either. Both alike reached the conclusion that reality must be some form of immediacy of consciousness, as a sort of hyper-experience in which both thought and will are realized in an object which is neither exclusively. But the aesthetic experience as a hyper-logical mode of conscious determination is found to be possessed of a method of manipulating both types of meaning with reference to their being brought together under the presupposition of a control issuing from within. The object thus constructed under the presupposition of inner control, is accepted as meeting the demands alike of the life of thought and will, without being held under the mediate form of control of either, but at the same time standing for a type of mental determination in which both are advanced without breaking with the meanings already acquired.

Defining the development of cognition as a series of determinations of the two aspects of thought, the attempt has been made to show that consciousness has from the outset advanced from one mode of determination to another only by a process of advancing the meanings already acquired under definite forms of control. The object which made thought possible and fruitful at each of the successive modes of mental determination now falls wholly within experience without at the same time being a mere duplicate of an already acquired meaning. The unity of subject and object implied in all knowledge is the unity of the self acquired through an imitative treatment of its present supply of meanings. The resulting identity thus becomes a matter of acceptance, of belief, rather than an analysis of present content. The object is a semblant construction erected for inner, personal

purposes and wholly under inner determination. The identity of subject and object, which the Intellectualists were in search of is to be sought in aesthetic experience which permeates consciousness as a whole rather than in some Absolute, which lies, as it were, beyond the process of mental determination and operates upon it from without. But because the object is thus erected as having further meaning and thus serving to unify and complete all partial controls and meanings, it is also an object not as yet possessed; and hence it functions as an 'other' thus meeting the demands of the Voluntarists. Thus the self, which the Intellectualists identified with related content and the Voluntarists with the practical reason, but which as a meaning could not be rendered in terms of either, *becoming detached from both types of meaning, restates both for common reflection, and transcends the dualistic experience due to the presence and functioning of the two antipodal methods of control of content, by the same method by which the earlier dualisms were transcended.*

Thus it is to be concluded that the aesthetic experience as being an experience of unity of subject and object, as the two aspects of thought and will, as well as being also a furthering of the self toward what Professor Tufts has called the 'broadly significant' fully meets the demands of the epistemological postulate in these two respects.

(3) *The Aesthetic Experience as Meaning the Singular and Immediate.*

But while the Intellectualists and the Voluntarists differ as to what constitutes an object of knowledge, the former emphasizing the subjective aspect, the latter the objective, both agree that the object of knowledge as that in which the subject finds itself fully reflected must necessarily be one of single, immediate experience. The absolute, according to Bradley, must hold all content in an individual experience where no contradiction can exist—a unity which transcends and yet contains a manifold appearance.¹ He also describes such an immediacy of thought and existence as being nothing but 'sentient experience.'² Pro-

¹ and ² Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, ch. xv.

fessor Royce makes objectivity a matter of purpose. Ideas are selective. They seek their own. They attend only to what they themselves have chosen. Moreover they desire in their own way. The object thus comes to be precisely what it is because the ideas as internal meanings mean it to be the object of the ideas themselves. Ideas are also to be judged in the light of what they intend and the world of the ideas is simply will itself determinately embodied. The only possible object that an idea can ever take note of is precisely the complete content of its own conscious purpose, and the limit of the process would be an individual (singular) judgment wherein the will expressed its own final determination. "What is real," he says, "is, as such, the complete embodiment, in individual form and in final fulfilment, of the internal meaning of finite ideas."

This common demand upon the part of the Intellectualists and the Voluntarists alike, that the object of knowledge must needs be individual and immediate—while representing the 'other' of knowledge as that which while not yet real is to be treated as if it were, what Bosanquet calls 'an act of pure faith'—is to be regarded as an attempt to express two types of meaning which we found were not embodied in the logical character of thought, namely, the attitude of belief and the 'singular' type of judgment. But once more we find that these two types of meaning are rendered in the aesthetic consciousness. The immediacy of the aesthetic experience has been long recognized. Plato speaks of it as 'pure pleasure free from desire.' Schopenhauer calls it a 'stilling of the will,' while Kant refers to the same experience under the aspect of 'disinterestedness or contemplation.' In more recent literature it is known as 'conscious self-illusion,' imitation and 'make-believe.' Cohn, in his *Allgemeine Aesthetik*, assigns to the semblant construction an intensive or immanent value as opposed to the consecutive or transgradient value of the true and good as pointing always beyond themselves. Psychically play is wholly non-utilitarian in value. The child does not play for the sake of some further end. The play-object while recognized as not real is nevertheless indulged in as if it were real and is so for the time being. It is unreal only with reference to the interest which erected it.

As Professor Baldwin has expressed it in his as yet unpublished lectures, the semblant object is a construction that claims one control and has any form of control except the one claimed. But only because of this is it fitted to supersede and transcend the control of any particular kind. The disinterestedness is due to the union of motives which point toward and terminate in some form of indirect or mediate control. In fact, it is to be said, that the resulting immediacy is due to the absence, through suspension for the time being, of the motives that would make the situation a real one. It is accepted and treated as being what it is not. It might be true or good or real but immediately rather than through some external form of control. The situation is one wholly determined from within as satisfying the inner demand for unity. The content thus treated is detached from its original moorings and erected into a world apart. But this world is a closed world. Consciousness and its object are one and immediate, in the sense that the self finds itself fully absorbed in the object of its contemplation. The aesthetic experience thus represents a furthering of experience by widening the process of comprehension and at the same time reveals and enlarges the self that has been hidden, as it were, behind the mediate and discursive operations of thought. The process of world-construction and world-interpretation is essentially a process of embodying the self in what hitherto seemed wholly foreign to us.

Hence it is that all art is animistic and religion anthropomorphic. Thought and conduct can be generalized and the true and the good become so in their own right only in so far as the individual can identify himself with his world. But since such identity can be attained neither in thought nor will, as is to be inferred from the fact that both the Intellectualists and the Voluntarists seek such identity of the self and its object in an immediacy of experience which is neither thought nor will, it must be sought in some ideal construction. There is, therefore, a further agreement among writers upon epistemological theory that the transcendent notion which serves to unify the dualistic character of thought and will bears the impress of art rather than of science. The type-phenomenon which appears as

the solution of the epistemological problem at the several stages of its development are characterized always by an appreciative or selective element. Every philosophical system appears as a work of art. Lange has called philosophical construction an art because of the idealizing tendency exhibited in it, the tendency to look for the highest expression of the real in the ideal.

But knowledge has been found to be essentially an idealizing process. The various stages of this process are reflected in the several stages of the development of the aesthetic experience. Hegel shows remarkable insight in insisting that knowledge as a process reflects the coming to full consciousness of the self. But the self also passes through a series of stages in the course of its development, so that each object determined by the self is also a further determination of the self. The aesthetic experience represents always a construction of the self out of its own materials for the sake of its own embodiment, a construction in which consciousness has to do only with its own. The semblant object thus becomes an object for sensuous apprehension and consciousness accepts it, not because of its truth or goodness but rather because it finds itself expressed in it in individual form.

Such an experience meets the demands alike of the Intellectualist and the Voluntarist. In it the three types of meanings left unexpressed by thought are given complete embodiment. In the object thus erected the mind rests satisfied as with something complete, self-sustaining and unique and which leaves no purpose unfulfilled, no estrangement of self and not self unreconciled. In the work of art the form and matter, the content and the control are inseparable. As an ideal, it is not to be contrasted with the real world which stands hard-and-fast, but is the embodiment of an exclusive interest. The ideal does not necessitate a break with the real, but is only the real raised to a higher plane. The 'other' of Bradley and the 'external meaning' of Royce, reach after ideal constructions in which the self realizes itself. The individuality which each attaches to the object as the other of thought and volition is an 'intent' meaning and is what it is only because the self sets it up and accepts it for what it reads into it. It is an 'other' only

because it is ideal and it is ideal only because the self erects it under its own presupposition of control. It is immediate and singular because the self finds itself fully reflected in the object thus constructed. As freed from all sorts of foreign and mediate control, such as characterize thought and volition, the self can now move about in a world under its own form of control. The embarrassment and limitations of the dualistic character of thought and will are removed by the setting up of a new and higher immediacy, so that the work of thought can proceed to new and higher determinations. The aesthetic experience, it is thus concluded, functions as the epistemological postulate of world unification and world interpretation.

Miss Adams is quite right in seeking to place the aesthetic experience within the general process of thinking, meaning by thinking the attempt upon the part of thought to escape from a dualistic experience. But in placing the aesthetic experience at the close of the thought-process, as a sign that thought as unimpeded action may go on, she appears to reduce the aesthetic experience to a mere accompaniment of thought, rather than as serving some function within the thought-process. Thought, for Miss Adams, and the Pragmatists generally, means the breaking down of an immediacy of stimulus and response, and finds its function in restoring the immediacy thus lost. From immediacy to immediacy thus represents the whole of thought. Upon the analysis of the aesthetic experience, she finds that it exhibits precisely those characteristics attaching to an immediate experience, whence the conclusion that the aesthetic rises at the end of and indicates the success of the thought-process. The aesthetic experience thus becomes a sort of by-product—a feeling accompanying a smooth working experience.

In the present discussion it has been shown that the aesthetic experience arises with the epistemological consciousness. The latter is a dualistic experience occasioned by the presence in consciousness of contrasted meanings. The reconciliation and completing of these contrasted meanings becomes the epistemological problem at the several stages of mental development. The development of thought has proceeded only by an increasing determinateness of its two aspects. Unless the content of

thought at any stage of its development can be treated with reference to a further meaning, the content becomes at once fixed and static. On the other hand, unless the control aspect is informed and limited in its operations it becomes, as in the case of fancy, a meaningless and valueless dynamic. The epistemological problem thus becomes always the search after a mode of conscious determination in which these contrasted meanings are brought into a whole of meaning without the loss of either. As Professor Baldwin has put it,¹ "a discrete unintelligible dynamic is no better than a contentless formal static."

It has also been our purpose to show that thought is reduced to the postulate of an empty and mystical experience when a solution of the problem presented by the presence in consciousness of contrasted meanings has been attempted by exclusively emphasizing the one of these two aspects of thought to the complete exclusion of the other. From our present point of view the epistemological problem becomes the setting up of a mode of experience in which to use the same author's words, thought has a way of finding its dynamics intelligible as a truthful and so far static meaning, and also of acting upon its established truths as immediate and so far dynamic satisfactions.

The point of view contended for in the present investigation is that the aesthetic experience represents a mode of mental determination in which these two types of meaning are reconciled and thus unified and completed. In tracing out the several stages of the development of the aesthetic it is shown that each such stage reflects the character of the epistemological problem at the corresponding stage of its development. When the reflective mode of consciousness has been reached, with the presence of meanings which thought as mediate and discursive is unable to reduce, it is shown that the aesthetic experience, as a hyper-logical mode of consciousness, has those characteristics which enable it to set up an experience in which the dualistic character of thought is transcended. Our conclusion then is that the aesthetic experience has arisen with the epistemological,

¹ *Psychological Bulletin*, April 15, 1907, p. 124; see also *Thought and Things*, Vol. II, Appendix, II.

has passed through a corresponding series of stages of development, and has throughout functioned as the epistemological postulate of unification and completion. It is not therefore to be placed at the completion of thought but must rather be regarded as marking the pausing place in reflective thought brought about by a process of mediating and thus reconciling the otherwise dualistic character of experience.

Reaching thus the conclusion that the aesthetic has arisen with the epistemological and, as representing the expression of a type of interest *sui generis*, functions as the epistemological postulate of the unification and completion of experience, it is to be shown in the following chapters, that in the development of thought in the race, the two types of experience have arisen and developed *pari passu*, and that here also the aesthetic has functioned as the postulate of a unified and completed thought.

PART II. HISTORICAL.

CHAPTER V.

Greek Thought from the Earliest Beginnings to Thales: A-dual-istic in Character, hence Pre-Epistemological and Pre-Aesthetic, and Illustrative of the First Immediacy.

In the following chapters an attempt is made to trace the development of thought with reference to the rise and development alike of the Epistemological and the Aesthetic, together with the use made of the aesthetic Consciousness as the organ of world unification and interpretation. It will be shown that the aesthetic and the epistemological have arisen together, and that each, in the course of its development, has passed through a series of well-defined modes, all of which may be reconstructed with a tolerable degree of completeness. It will also be shown that the several modes of development of the one are in essential agreement with the corresponding modes in the development of the other.¹ In other words, each mode of thought will be found to have had its corresponding mode of aesthetic expression.² It will also appear that the conflicts and embarrassment of the epistemological became the occasion and opportunity of the aesthetic. The character of the aesthetic at the several stages of its development will be found to have been determined by the character of the epistemological problem demanding solution. The motive of the aesthetic is, therefore, to be sought in the epistemological. Professor Tufts has insisted that the motives are to be sought within the domain of social psychology. This conclusion is reached only by making the social prior to thought, whereas in the present connection, thought as common, is made the material of the social process. The conclusion upon which the present attempt is based, is

¹ F. Hegel, *Phil. of Fine Art*, trs. by Bosanquet, p. 101.

² Cf. Hirn, *The Origins of Art*, p. 2.

that the motives of the aesthetic consciousness are to be sought in *epistemology* rather than *sociology*.

It has already been pointed out that the epistemological consciousness must be treated genetically and that the several dualisms, through which thought passes in the course of its development, are to be regarded as the successive modes of its development. At each of these dualistic experiences the epistemological problem arises anew. These successive dualisms are, furthermore, to be regarded as situations into which consciousness grows, rather than states imposed ab-extra.¹ If we are to regard the several dualistic experiences into which consciousness develops as 'wounds,' they must be regarded as wounds of consciousness' own making, the leaves for whose healing are found arising with the wounds, since as Hegel says "the hand which inflicts the wound is the hand that must heal it."

The subject-object dualism of reflective thought within which the epistemological problem par excellence arises, is not, therefore, a datum of immediate experience, but represents that mode of conscious determination and control of experience made possible and intelligible by a series of earlier dualistic experiences. Within each of these earlier stages an epistemological problem arose whose solution made possible the next higher mode of determination and control of presented content. But in each instance, the problem became the problem of the unification of experience. From the analytic point of view the epistemological consciousness is dualistic, the unity of which can only be secured by the healing of the breach. But since the dualism is of consciousness' own making, there is the presumption that it will also bring about its own healing. In the present attempt, the purpose is to show that the aesthetic consciousness arises with the epistemological and presents always an ideal unity in which the unity and completion of experience are obtained.

Maintaining the dualistic character of the epistemological consciousness there is no need of carrying our investigations beyond the thought of the Greek world.² "The birth-day of

¹ Cf. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. II.

² Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, p. 23; Erdman, *History of Philosophy*, p. 13; Gomperz, *The Greek Thinkers*, Introduction.

our modern world" says Hegel, "is the moment when the Greek sages began to construe the facts of the universe. Before their time the world lay as it were in a dream-life. Unconsciously in the womb of time the spirit of the world was growing—the faculties forming in secrecy and silence—until the day of birth when the preparations were completed and the young spirit drew its first breath in the air of thought. Among the Greeks the Reason first became conscious, since they were the first to make the distinction between sense and thought."¹

But the distinction thus referred to was only gradually reached. The earliest conceptions of the Greeks are found to be those possible at a period when consciousness is relatively a-dualistic. The earliest Greeks possessed no clear distinction between mind and matter, the material and the spiritual.² One must, therefore, be naïve, as Professor Dewey says, in dealing with Greek philosophy and not introduced distinctions which only arose later. Throughout the period indicated at the head of the present chapter Greek consciousness was the rather vague and undifferentiated. Here as in the Orient custom forbade any separation of fact and meaning. The 'fatal boon of knowledge' had not yet been born and the immediate unity of consciousness was as yet undisturbed. Sensuous presence was the only reality and the world was one of pure appearance.

As the world on the banks,
So is the mind of man.

* * * * *

Only the tract where he sails
He wots of; only the thoughts
Raised by the objects he passes are his.³

The researches of the archaeologist and the comparative anthropologist have succeeded in pushing farther back the boundary line of the historic past, and the period of Greek philosophy before Thales has been reconstructed with great fulness and accuracy. Regarding consciousness as active and

¹ Wallace, *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 261.

² Janet and Seailles, *Problems of Philosophy*, p. 214.

³ Matthew Arnold, *The Future*.

reconstructive, rather than passive and receptive, its active and reconstructive processes are here seen in their entire spontaneity. Primitive man unembarrassed by a dualistic experience and wholly freed from the compelling character of external control and the demands of rational conceptions gave the freest embodiment to his active, dispositional tendencies. This stage in the development of the thought of the race, not unlike the corresponding period in the development of the individual, is characterized by the creation of myths. As the product of an a-dualistic consciousness the myth is to be defined with Vignoli as "The psychological objectification of man in all the phenomena he can perceive."¹ From the analytical point of view it may be said that the world presented is determined largely in terms of the affective-volitional disposition without any distinction whatever appearing to consciousness between the two factors thus involved.²

This first stage of thought must, therefore, be regarded as one of relative immediacy—a stage in which thought is free from internal complexity and in which stimulations call forth immediate responses. The unreflective myth, as the characteristic product of this first immediacy, is to be regarded, neither as a thing of pure presentation, nor of existential judgment, but rather one of pure 'presumption.'³ The deliverances of this a-dualistic consciousness are accepted as real, since no disturbing experiences have as yet arisen within the sphere of reality-feeling.⁴ These unreflective myths have been regarded, and rightly, as the first attempt at a metaphysics of nature. In fact, from the beginning until now, whenever pure reason has been found inadequate, thought has sought refuge in some form of mythological construction. Whatever theory of the universe primitive man possessed, is to be sought in the myth. It at once includes both science and religion and regulates both social and private life.⁵

¹ Quoted by Ribot, *The Creative Imagination*, p. 121.

² Cf. Wundt, *Outlines of Philosophy*, trs. by Judd, p. 303 ff.; and Perry, *The Approach to Philosophy*, p. 225.

³ Urban, *Psychological Review*. Two Articles, Vol. XIV, Nos. 1 and 2.

⁴ Baldwin, *Handbook of Psychology, Feeling and Will*, pp. 148 ff.

⁵ Cf. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Arts*, p. 375.

A. Lang and others have shown that the social life of the Greeks before the dawn of reflective thought, was a matter of group maintenance, controlled by specific and traditional customs. The individual was in unconscious unity with the community of which he chanced to be a member, and both regulated and justified his life through reference to the ideals incarnate in the habits and customs of the community.¹ Then it was true that the individual did not think but knew, since there was neither occasion nor opportunity of thought. The individual was one with the situation in which he lived. In fact, he carried the entire situation within himself. Primitive man was thus social from the outset and there is no justification for the later contention that the individual when first found stood alone and had in some way to be made social. The materials and motives of whatever determinations of presented content the individual might make were common to the group, but since they were not psychically common, they are rather to be regarded as 'aggregate' in character.² We should expect to find, what in fact we do actually find, that the unreflective myths are wholly anonymous as to their origin and collective as to their reference. It is not without significance that no names are found attaching to the myths. There was, as yet, no distinction between the producers' and the spectators' point of view and the myth became the sole means of expression of the social and mental life, and like the fancies of the individual, at the corresponding period, became the sole reality of primitive man.

Regarding the unreflective myth as the product of a primitive and uncritical consciousness and characterizing primitive thought as the representation of concrete objects in terms of the subject himself, without the distinction between subject and object coming into consciousness, the materials and motives of the polarization of the a-dualistic consciousness are already present. There follows close upon this early period of spontaneous myth creation a period of transformation and decline. Accepting the classification of the myths proposed by Ribot into expli-

¹ Cf. A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual and Religion*, Vol. I, ch. 9, Vol. II, ch. 17.

² Vide Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, p. 148 ff; cf. A. Lang, *Custom and Myth*, p. 5; Paulsen, *Introd. to Philos.*, p. 6.

tive and non-explicative,¹ it becomes extremely easy to indicate the influences that tended to make a reconstruction of the former necessary. Primitive thought, as anthropologists and ethnologists have shown, is anthropomorphic in character. The earliest conceptions of the world were purely mythical, because none other were possible. The myth thus becomes the response to a series of needs both theoretical and practical, but which have not as yet become distinct from each other. The resulting interpretation is not however subjective, as Ribot insists, but rather 'projective' thus corresponding to what Urban has called pure 'presumption.'²

The subsequent stages in the development of thought represent stages within this first immediacy, so that using the term objective in a somewhat loose sense, it can be said, that the development of thought is not from the subjective to the objective but a development within the objective.³ The embarrassments that supply the materials and motives of a new determination of thought, are to be sought in the increase of inner possibilities and differences of attitude toward presented content, rather than in the compelling character of the outer. The several movements both in the land of Greece and the outlying colonies referred to in the present connection are selected for the purpose of showing how they contributed to the isolation and deepening of the inner, in contrast with the outer, thus making a reconstruction of experience both possible and necessary.

Then as now, 'tempora et res mutantur,' and the fact of change, as Windelband says, became the stimulus to reflection; and the rise of reflection means that the old-time equilibrium of stimulus and response, motive and sanction, is breaking down. It is precisely within these changed and changing conditions that we are to seek the rise of the inner-outer dualism. Sense-perception and memory alike are questioned in a world whose scenes are constantly shifting. The unreflective myth-making consciousness loses its position and supremacy as the organ of world interpretation and unification. The multiplicity of myths

¹ Ribot, *Essay on the Creative Imagination*, p. 131.

² Cf. Urban in *Psychological Review*, Vol. XIV, 1907, Nos. 1 and 2.

³ Cf. Bosanquet, *Essentials of Logic*, p. 22.

and the host of deities become a stumbling block to some and foolishness to others, while the legends clustered like 'weeds in the pathless and primeval forest.' The thinning ax was everywhere in demand and as well the hand that could wield it with cunning. The familiar attitudes no longer bring the old-time satisfactions, and new experiences are constantly arising that throw the individual into confusion. Custom forbade the separation of fact and meaning, but the familiar supports are failing precisely when and where most needed. The world long held together is fast falling asunder. Things are no longer what they seem, and fact and meaning are no longer identical.

As has been indicated the unreflective myth served to satisfy both theoretical and practical needs which are not as yet distinguished from one another. The explicative and the non-explicative myths are significant as indicating the presence and operation of the materials and motives of the differentiation of the primitive constructions within the first immediacy. What is especially significant is, that when the demand for a transformation of the myths came, it was with reference to the former rather than the latter. It is important also to observe, that within the sphere of the explicative myths, the process of transformation did not issue in philosophic speculation wholly free from mythical elements. Hence from the beginning until now, despite the increasing skill and strength of science as the rival of the imagination, the latter has not lost its position as an interpretative and reconstructive principle of thought.¹

The increasing failure of the explicative myths in the presence of increased knowledge, tended to throw the non-explicative in greater relief and thus sharpen the contrast between the inner and the outer. In the race, as also in the individual, the embarrassment occasioned by the failure of the 'representing' and 'conversion' value of images² became the need and opportunity of fancy, which by a relatively spontaneous flow of images detached from the process in which they occur, seeks to regain the original immediacy and thus end the con-

¹ Cf. Urban, 'Appreciation and Description and the Psychology of Values,' *Philosophical Review*, Nov., 1905.

² Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, ch. v.

flict arising between expectation and reality. "Nothing" says Sully, "seems more to characterize the childhood of the race than the myth-making impulse which by an overflow of fancies seeks to hide the meagerness of knowledge." Thus the world of fancy, not unlike the primitive myth-world, becomes a 'projective' world in which thought can once more wander with absolute spontaneity. The naïve consciousness accepts it without question and, while neither science nor history, serves for both in the primitive mind. Both the myths and fancies of the unreflective consciousness are frankly naïve, claiming neither meaning nor moral, but loved for their own sake, as children delight in Fairy Tales and as even the wise of the 'grown-ups, have not outgrown genuine delight in pure romance.

The value of the myth is to be sought in the *process* rather than the *product*. The failure to estimate the myth from this point of view has led both anthropologists and ethnologists to attribute to it only a negative value in the development of thought. Max Müller thus defines the myth as a 'disease of language,' while Herbert Spencer finds its origin in the worship of the dead. In the present attempt, the myth-making consciousness, while looked upon as pre-aesthetic, is nevertheless regarded as the rise of a process of world objectification and unification continuous with the mental life. Thought is at the first 'projective,' in the sense that it reduces the presented world into terms of what it itself has, and fancy is to be regarded as the beginning of the process of unification of experience which will be shown to develop along with the increasing demands and possibilities of thought.

But the spontaneity of fancy does not sweep away the persisting character of the outer as held within the net of memory. Both the demand of the inner as embodied in fancy and the control of memory are now present and operative in consciousness and the first real sundering of consciousness is upon us. But the dualism is not complete, in that the inner as yet possesses only a contrast value. The presence of alternative responses and the compelling character of the new objects of presentation contribute to the separation of fact and meaning, datum and dispositional tendencies, stimulus and response. Neither mythological cosmology nor aphoristic ethics is ade-

quate to the demands which the individual now makes of them. As Professor Caird says: "The delicate moon-lit web of poetic fiction which the Greek imagination (fancy) had woven around the crude naturalism of pre-historic religion, insensibly coloring and idealizing it, could not maintain itself in the light of a critical age."¹ The myths of the early cosmogonists and theogonists yield to a poetry in which a subjective element appears. The naïve culture of Mycenae so beautifully pictured in the Homeric poems began to yield to individual thought and treatment. The primitive myths were recast by the masters of choral song and "The neutral tints of the back-ground were ever more and more relieved by strong self-conscious figures standing out from the uniform mass."²

Until now no question is asked touching the meaning and origin of things and the emancipation of thought from habit and custom means that the power of grasping the meaning of things apart from their actual existence has really come. "The Greeks" says Zeller, "were the first who gained sufficient freedom of thought to seek for the truth respecting the nature of things, not in religious tradition but in the things themselves; among them a strictly scientific method first appears, a knowledge that follows no laws except its own, became possible."³ Reality is no longer a matter of undisturbed feeling, and presence and meaning are no longer identical. The images detached from their original sense moorings and used as ideas, meanings, the problem at once arises of adapting these meanings to new situations and the satisfaction of varied interests. The problem of the inner and the outer has come, whose reconciliation became the burden of thought and the epistemological problem of all Greek thought. The rise of a dualized experience is significant as indicating that the epistemological consciousness with its characteristic problem of unification has come and it remains to show in the next chapter that the aesthetic consciousness has also arisen and, as 'semblant' consciousness, becomes the appropriate organ of the interpretation and unification of the inner-outer dualism.

¹ Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, Vol. II, p. 41.

² Gomperz, *The Greek Thinkers*, Vol. I, p. 11.

³ Zeller, *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 133.

CHAPTER VI.

Greek Thought from Thales to Neo-Platonism as Illustrating the Epistemological Use of the Aesthetic Consciousness as the Organ of World Unification and Interpretation.

That outward circumstances and thought act and re-act on each other is a truth that has passed into a truism in our day, but in Greece it was a fact preëminently true and important. From Thales to the death of Aristotle must be regarded as the great epoch of Greek speculation within which is comprised all that is most perfect and brilliant in ancient philosophy. When the period began, Greek thought was just beginning to emancipate itself from the mythological cosmogonies and theogonies,¹ while at the close of the period, thought had mapped out, and to some extent formed, the paths along which subsequent thought has been forced to travel. But, as Gomperz remarks, before reflection could flourish, a considerable mass of detailed knowledge had to be accumulated. Both geographical and temperamental conditions were highly favorable in Greece for such enlargement of knowledge during the period from Thales to Plotinus. The growing power of reflection and acquaintance with the knowledge of the East awakened the notion of stability and law, which brought the problem of matter into the foreground of human thought.

Other tendencies were at work which tended to throw the individual back upon himself and thus sharpen and deepen the inner life. The development of industry and commerce, of war and politics, brought the individual face to face with other occupations and aims. Frequent changes in the polity of the state led men to regard it as a creation more or less human. The presence of cases, which could not be dealt with by any law already in existence, necessitated a modification of the ideas themselves. The friction of circumstances tends always to

¹ Ferrier, *Institutes of Metaphysics*, p. 165, et seq.

dissolve the rigidity of custom and discussion is born, which, as Professor Dewey says, led among the Greeks to the generation of logical theory.¹ As the result of these repeated failures of the moral law, morals, like politics, was regarded as the product of individual creation and hence as personal.

The beginnings of Greek thought are to be sought in the colonies rather than the mainland, which as Gomperz says 'became the play-ground of the Greek intellect.' Reflection takes its rise in the presence of change, and science working outward and backward, has, from the time of Thales, until now, been seeking the ἀρχή, the 'what' as the fundamental stuff out of which all things have come, and in which their explanation is to be sought.² Beneath all change there must be that which does not change and which gives unity to the otherwise chaotic manifold. The so-called 'Physiologers' from Thales to Democritus were seeking a postulate which would make all change intelligible. By one fell stroke Democritus reduced all phenomena to the mechanics of atoms. The things perceived by the several senses are to be regarded as a sort of mazy dance of physical points, since the atom was characterized by an abstract corporeality. The atoms are as manifold, and are assigned whatever attributes, the problem of knowledge may demand. They were mechanically and mathematically arranged and determined. The outer world is no longer to be looked upon as a "play-ground of innumerable capricious and counteracting manifestations of Will,"³ the expression of unknown and unseen powers shifting the scenes from behind, but rather as composed of an infinite number of atoms determined in all their movements and combinations by unchangeable law. Thus, as Professor Baldwin says, "The outer was stripped of those relative and ambiguous predicates which embarrassed earlier speculation."⁴

¹ 'Stages in the Development of Logical Theory,' *Philosophical Review*, Vol. IX, No. V.

² Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, 3, 983, b6.

³ Gomperz, *The Greek Thinkers*, Vol. I.

⁴ *Proc. St. Louis Congress Arts and Science*; reprinted in *Psychological Review*, Vol. XII, 1905.

But the treatment of the inner did not keep pace with the treatment of the outer. By Democritus and the Atomists the mind was looked upon as a series of images produced by the movements of the atoms constituting the outer. The images were reduced copies of external objects. The contrast between sense-perception and thought, which was raised by Socrates was explained by the Atomists by establishing a quantitative relation between them.¹ The psychology of Democritus, established upon a materialistic basis, recognized no independent mechanism of ideas as conscious states.² The Atomists emphasized the physical side of the dualism of inner and outer and while the objective, as the external, was carried very far toward our more modern conclusions, the subjective, as the inner, was given only negative consideration and treatment.³ The general recognition of the relativity of the data of sense-perception by Democritus and others, contributed, however in an indirect way to the isolation and deepening of the inner. Democritus was convinced that knowledge was not possible upon a basis of relativity. Atomism represents a search after an epistemological principle in terms of which the world of experience can be explained and unified. The atoms of Democritus serve as 'schemata' the twofold purpose of scientific description, namely, communication and control of experience. They are however '*symbols*' not '*concepts*,' and thus illustrate the fact that all description involves an appreciative or selective element. The character and extent of the appreciative element thus employed depend upon the purpose in view. While therefore, the primitive explanations of the world have yielded to a more scientific, the selective element has not wholly disappeared, and whatever unity and stability were found in the world of Democritus and his contemporaries must be sought for in the aesthetic consciousness, as a mode of mental determination of presented content.

With the change of the seat of philosophy from the outlying colonies to the home-land, there took place also a characteristic

¹ Aristotle, *De Anima*, I, 2, 430b b 30 (Wallace).

² Vide Theophrastus, *Phys. Opin.*, 3 (Diehl).

³ Vide Ferrier, *Institutes of Metaphysics*, pp. 161, et. ff.

change in the character of philosophy itself. Hitherto philosophy was concerned primarily with the physical universe. But with the Sophists, the practical aspect came forward. The Protagorean 'homo mensura omnium' is significant as the first explicit recognition of the inner as a center of organization and control. The Sophists, as pure subjectivists, reduced knowledge to mere opinion.¹ But making the individual the measure of all things, they were unable to justify knowledge as a common possession and in the end gave up its pursuit. The urgent problem of the age, how to secure knowledge which would preserve the social and moral life of the nation in the presence of the continued failure of the old-time supports, while formulated, was not solved by the Sophists. To the solution of this problem a greater Sophist gave both his thought and life, whose 'γνώθι σεαυτὸν' is significant as indicating the change of emphasis in philosophic thought.

Socrates raised the question and called upon every individual to raise it for himself; but of its solution, he confesses himself as ignorant as any other individual. The outcome of the Sophistic movement was the discrediting of all thought—"the futile attempt to spin truth out of one's own inner consciousness."² The epistemological problem was the finding of the common element of all thought—a problem which Socrates set himself to solve. To know, is in order to do, so that with Socrates the moral consciousness functions for the first time as an epistemological postulate.

To think, according to Socrates, necessitates common premises, as well as a common end. That the outer is the determining pole in the inner-outer dualism of the age, is to be inferred from the fact, that the general conceptions which Socrates established by means of his characteristic method, represent the things of abiding worth in the existing social situation. Meaning is no longer identical with sense-perception, but is rather what one *intends*. Social life demands community of conduct and therefore common meanings, but since consciousness is still

¹ Dewey, 'Stages of Logical Theory,' *Philos. Review*, Vol. IX, 1905.

² On the Sophists, see Aristotle, *Met.* III., 2, 1004; Plato, *Protagoras*, Jowett's Trs., beginning at p. 310 A; *Theaetetus*, Ibid., p. 151 E.

regarded as passive and receptive the aspect of commonness must be sought without.¹

The latter part of the life of Socrates covered the period of the loss of Athenian prestige and supremacy, and his philosophy has been defined as an attempt to hold up consistently the better ideals of Athenian life.² With Plato, Athens having yielded to Macedonian rule, philosophy came to be an attempt to reconstruct the original Greek City-State. His philosophy, like that of his master, is primarily ethical, but the complete failure of the outer makes reconstruction possible only to the philosopher. Once more the epistemological problem becomes the obtaining of knowledge which will justify and guarantee conduct in the midst of constant change. Plato also recognized that neither thought nor conduct is possible upon a relativistic basis. The senses are deceptive and perception can yield opinion only. Only the ideas are real. Sense experiences become real only in so far as they participate in the ideas or imitate them. The ideas, however, are 'schemata,' and while they can not be verified in terms of sense-experience they are the necessary presuppositions of thought. They are also practical as were the notions of Socrates, as representing the things of most value in the social situation.

But Plato was poet as well as philosopher, seer as well as scientist, and his solution of the epistemological problem is poetical rather than logical.³ The myths which bulk so largely in the Dialogues are not to be regarded as instances of defeat or graceful embellishments merely, but rather as Westcott says "Venturous essays after truth—embodiments of definite instincts—material representations of speculative doctrines which while affirmed by instinct can not be verified by scientific process." As the unreflective myth represented an attempt to hold together the two worlds of sense-presentation and dispositional tendencies so in the hands of Plato, the myth, now become conscious, bursts in upon the Dialogue with the revelation of a world trans-

¹ Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*, p 133.

² Dewey, *Lectures on Greek Philosophy* in Johns Hopkins University, 1906-1907 (not published).

³ Cf. *Phaedrus*, Jowett's translation, p. 265 D; *Symposium*, Ibid., p. 201 D.

cending the world of sense-experience by which the latter is transfused and reduced to unity. The myths of Plato are, therefore, vital and integral parts of the Dialogues and represent deliverances of that larger aspect of consciousness which as Stewart says "Is not articulate and logical but which feels and acts and wills—to that major part of our nature which while not able to explain what a thing is or how it appears but feels that it is good or bad and thus expresses itself in judgments of worth or value rather than in existential judgments of fact."¹

Whatever unity therefore, the Dialogues of Plato contain, is to be sought in his artistic rather than in his logical treatment. Still Plato is unable to distinguish between the True and the Good; and this limitation is significant as reflecting both the character of the epistemological problem and the nature of the aesthetic consciousness which is used as the appropriate means of reconciling the inner-outer dualism. The two spheres of reference into which consciousness is now polarized are the world of sensible phenomena and the world of ideas. To the former Plato ascribes no specific value whatever. The world of ideas is the only true and essential world. The phenomena of sense may lead us to the realm of the eternal ideas, but to enter the latter, we must break with the former. The original beauty is both bodiless and colorless and bears no likeness whatsoever to the things of sense-perception. Like philosophy, the organ of artistic creation is a sort of higher inspiration. The artist is no longer guided by scientific methods but by a 'sort of uncertain and tentative empiricism.' Art products are therefore for Plato, a species of phantasy and while he nowhere defines precisely what the term phantasy means as used by him, it nevertheless appears to be a creation lying mid-way between the phenomena of sense-perception and the immutable ideas, corresponding to what in the case of the development of thought in the individual we found to be a process of 'sembling' as the form by which contents of thought are advanced and accepted as 'assumption' as compared with 'pure presumption' of the first immediacy. In one connection Plato hints that there might be

¹ Stewart, *The Myths of Plato*, p. 21.

a more perfect art because of a complete knowledge, but then art and philosophy would become identical. If we define the epistemological problem as it presented itself to Plato, as the unification of experience now sundered by the inner-outer dualism and known as the problem of the one and the many, we are justified in concluding that by the use of the aesthetic consciousness Plato sought to solve the problem thus presented by reducing his world to an artistic whole. Thus the expression of the 'one in the many,' of 'unity in variety' which represents the truly aesthetic principle of Greek thought touching the beautiful, represents also the urgent problem of Greek speculation and its characteristic solution. Plato clearly recognized the epistemological problem set by his two-fold world of ideas and sense-phenomena, and sought its solution in terms of beauty, which placed between the two worlds became the abiding sign and evidence of the presence of the Absolute and the stimulus to the development of higher possibilities.

The continuity of Greek thought must be sought in Aristotle, rather than in the several Platonic Schools that arose after the death of the Master. Both Plato and Aristotle agree in defining philosophy as the science of the concept, as the universal element of thought and conduct. But while Plato makes the universal the starting point of his philosophy and attempts to deduce the particular from it, Aristotle begins with the particular datum of experience and seeks to ascend to the universal. For Aristotle experience is the true cause of knowledge rather than a mere occasion, as Plato taught. The former universalized the concept by placing it in a world apart and above the particular, while the latter makes the universal an attribute of the mind itself.¹ Form and matter, the universal and the particular, actuality and potentiality, are related, and the determination of the relations existing between them becomes the chief task of the philosopher.

The philosophy before Aristotle represented a series of attempts to regulate and reorganize the social situation fast disintegrating, hence its practical character. By the time of

¹ *Met.*, III, 4, 999; *De Alma*, II, 5, 417.

Aristotle, social life has disintegrated beyond all hope of successful reorganization, so that thinking can be followed because of its own interest. Since the State, as the sphere of abiding truth and values, has wholly failed, such sphere can be sought only in and through thought. In fact, as Professor Dewey has shown, two short generations sufficed to effect a complete divorce between philosophy and life, and the isolation of reflective thought from practical conduct.¹ Philosophy now became an organ of vision, an instrument of interpretation, rather than a series of attempts to reclaim and reorganize a social situation that had wholly failed.

The limitation of the Aristotelian procedure is to be seen in the fact, that Aristotle was obliged to assume, as self-evident, certain fundamental truths which were neither established nor modified by thought, but which stood in their own right.² Apart from such truths the mind is still in the grasp of fancy and opinion.³ It became necessary to assume these fundamental truths as posts to which to fasten, organize and control the otherwise particular and contingent experiences. No question was asked, at the first, touching the universality and credibility of the truths thus assumed. Later however the problem of the 'quod semper, ubique, ab omnibus,' became one of special importance. But with Aristotle "commonness" was assumed and as in the case of Plato it may be concluded that the material thus assumed by the philosopher was of a 'syndoxic' character. The sphere of presuppositions was therefore 'common-as-common,' so that the use of it was more like to obtain general approval and acceptance.

Aristotle's philosophy represents an attempt to solve the dualism inherent in the Platonic conception of Ideas. But while he did not solve the problem presented by the dualistic consciousness, he cleared the way for a solution not hitherto possible. For Plato the world, as objective, is just the universals of thought, which in his abstract fashion, he separates

¹ Johns Hopkins University Lectures on Greek Philosophy (not published).

² Aristotle, *Ana. Post.*, II, 19, 99b, 20.

³ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII, 9, 1086, b 8.

completely from the particulars of sense by setting them apart as self-subsisting realities.

To bring these two worlds together represented the epistemological problem which Plato bequeathed to his successors. The positive contribution of Aristotle is his contention that the universal and the particular do not dwell apart in complete isolation, but that the universal existed only in and through the particular, while the latter existed only in and for the former.¹ Reality, therefore, must be found in the indissoluble union of these two aspects of thought. Thought and sense can not be taken apart from each other, except by a process of abstraction. The individual is not, therefore, the given of sense, as Plato held, but the joint product of sense and the universals of thought, of matter and form. In fine, the aspects of the problem presented by the epistemological consciousness are rather two aspects within the same process. Matter as the unformed tends toward form with something akin to desire, so that matter is not *negation* as Plato would say but *privation*. Form on the contrary as the final and efficient cause is the source of specific determination, actuality and perfection, while matter remains nevertheless a real principle of being.

The process of world-construction was considered by Aristotle after the analogy of the plastic arts in which the materials employed serve not only as a limit to the realization of formative thought, but as the means of the revelation of thought itself. The artist is not confined to a slavish imitation of things as they are but it is possible for him to reproduce things as they might be. Art is no longer the imitative reproduction of nature, which is itself a copy only, as Plato taught, but an act of creation in the form of an image in which the incomplete purpose of nature and her defects are corrected.²

Aristotle thus saw in art, as Butcher says, a rational faculty which divines nature's unfulfilled intentions and reveals her ideal to sense.³ The illusions which it employs are of consciousness' own making and acceptance and instead of cheating the mind

¹ Aristotle, *Ana. Post.*, I, 11, 77 a 5; *Met.* VI, 16, 1040, b27.

² Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and the Fine Arts*, pp. 110, 144, 150.

³ *Ibid.*

as Plato thought, image forth the immanent idea which can not find expression under the forms of material existence. Poetry is, therefore, more philosophical than history according to Aristotle,¹ and when we recall the long and bitter feud between poetry and philosophy the conclusion becomes extremely significant. Between poetry and history, however, there was no such feud and in primitive times the two are identical. Poetry, according to Plato, is only fiction and all fiction is necessarily immoral, hence poets must be denied citizenship in the ideal republic. In the *Poetics* of Aristotle there is a manifest attempt to heal this strife and Aristotle finds in art the meeting point of the universal and the particular, of form and matter.² Poetry is thus related to philosophy in that it seeks also to express the universal as pure form. It finds its differentia from philosophy in the fact that while their content is identical, the method of expressing the content is wholly different. Given reality is still the sphere of reference and control, but to Aristotle it must be ideal.

But if reality is thus preserved, in what direction does the process of idealization proceed and what is the standard by which such procedure is to be judged? Thus far, we have seen, that moralistic considerations embarrassed aesthetic speculation and artistic creation. This was due to the fact that the theoretical and the practical activities of consciousness were not clearly differentiated. With Aristotle the two forms of activity are clearly recognized as distinct and the attempt is actually made to give each independent treatment. With Aristotle the practical is made subordinate to the theoretical. Art, however, is for Aristotle a practical science, since distinction between the fine and useful arts was not reached by the Greeks at all.³ Nevertheless the recognition of the beautiful as subordinate to the practical is significant as indicating the rise of the sense of value and the interpretation of the world from the standpoint of meaning. But these meanings, values, ideals, can not be

¹ Ibid., p. 153 ff.

² Butcher, *op. cit.* p. 360 ff.

³ Bosanquet, *History of Aesthetics*, p. 22; cf. also. Butcher *op. cit.*, 144, and ch. iv.

expressed in terms of the theoretical reason which must take things as they are. In the instance alike of the theoretical and the practical the control is mediate in character which indicates that consciousness has lost its old-time immediacy. Theoretical philosophy sought some unifying principle but could only arrive at the conception of unity in terms of content and control outside the process of determination and construction. Art, on the contrary, as the expression of unity in direct and sensuous form, supplied the postulate demanded alike by the theoretical and the practical reason. Thus both Plato's 'reminiscence,' and Aristotle's 'blessed contemplation,' represent aesthetic attempts as a solution of the epistemological problem of the age.

In the presence of the dualism of inner and outer, form and matter, the actual and the ideal, consciousness at once bounds beyond 'flamantia moenia' and finds refuge and victory by identifying itself with the object of aspiration and contemplation, in a state of immediacy—a state in which reminiscences passes into intuition, faith into sight and in which the individual enters into the contemplative blessedness of the Deity in a life of 'wishless absorption.'

The significance of the several schools of thought that arose after Aristotle, is to be found in the several attempts to find the criterion of thought and conduct within the individual. The thought of the whole period is ethical, but of a negative character. Both the Stoics and the Epicureans were materialists in their conception of nature and sensuous in their theory of knowledge. The former were fatalists and taking life more seriously, their philosophy became the more popular. Nature was their great word as a whole in which every thing is necessitated and purposive. The world of nature, as comprehending the things of supreme worth, is given the place of respect and authority formerly enjoyed by the outer social order. The fatalistic character of the Stoics shows both the strength and limitation of the will. Thought being unable as yet to create a world for the will, the latter, by the aid of the imagination, from which it is never separated, attempts to carry itself through. The Stoics at once turned Pantheists, which means always an identification of the actual and the ideal, 'of what is and what ought-to-

be.¹ For the Stoics, there was no margin between the actual and the ideal, hence the static character of the system. The eschatological element, which bulks so large in the literature of the Stoics as well as in other literature of the time, represents an imaginative embodiment of human belief touching the final outcome of things and in the case of the Stoics represents the carrying of aesthetic insight to a cosmic conclusion. The dualism which runs through Stoicism is a dualism within matter, the terms of which differ only quantitatively (a sort of materialized idealism), hence the control is as yet in the outer. Thus as Bosanquet indicates, "The mechanical view of the imagination, the negative or intellectualist view of the emotions, the complete subordination of the theoretical to the practical, all these influences hindered the Stoic from completing his conception of man's place in nature by an adequate theory of aesthetic expression."² By universalizing the individual they found neither need nor opportunity of individual activity and construction and the doctrine of imperturbability or complete freedom from the outer represents an attempt to merge, in a mystical consciousness, the social and individual aspirations in a far away dream of a common fellowship of wise men.³

The Epicureans made the 'reasonableness of feeling' the criterion of conduct and made the world the work of chance. In matters of cosmology they revived the atomic theory of Democritus, while they drew their ethics and theory of knowledge from Aristippus. Being casualists they refused to acknowledge the objective value of art as expressing a definite content and even went so far as to reduce all imitative art to the level of cookery. Nevertheless, the Epicureans, with their characteristic emphasis on feeling, contributed in an indirect way to the isolation and deepening of the inner. Their general likeness to the Stoics is to be inferred from the fact that with both the highest ideal conceived was negative, both abhorred the conditions in which they were placed, and agreed in seeking happiness by freeing the individual from all disturbing elements.

¹ Martineau, *The Study of Religion*, Vol. II.

² Bosanquet, *History of Aesthetics*, p. 100.

³ Cf. *The Republic of Plato*, for an Ideal State for Philosophers only.

Both the cosmopolitanism of the Stoics and the individualism of the Epicureans contributed to the loosening of the ties that bound the inner to the outer and the search of both after a criterion of truth is significant as indicating that the standard of truth and conduct is regarded as a matter of inner determination.

Kuno Fischer suggests that the philosophic problem after Aristotle was the problem of freedom, that is, the freeing of man from the world whose dissolution became daily more evident. The Stoics would have men attain freedom by becoming dead to the world about them, while the Epicureans would have men enjoy as much as possible and suffer as little. The Skeptics went still farther and sought to convince men that the problems pressing for solution were after all insoluble. These three movements, while differing in details, nevertheless spring from one motive and aim at one end, namely, the freeing of the individual from the world and the attaining of a self-consciousness contained within itself with entire self-sufficiency.

To ground the individual thus freed from the outer world, and to create for him a world in which he can 'live and move and have his being,' becomes the urgent problem of the age. While freed from the outer, the individual has come to perceive that the inner is also a part of the outer.¹ Whether the inner be made pure will as with the Stoics, or feeling as with the Epicureans, or thought as with the Skeptics, it comes to be regarded as outer also, so that the outer now claims to be both inner and outer.

In chapter II it was shown that the individual is brought face to face with a similar experience, owing to what Professor Baldwin has called the 'anomalous position of the body;' the resolution of this double claim of the body issues in the substantive dualism of mind and body.²

But while widening to the utmost the chasm between the inner and the outer, the individual also seeks their union. The epistemological problem as to the reconciliation of the corporeal and the incorporeal, the physical and the spiritual, the temporal

¹ Plotinus, *Enneads*, IV., 7, sec. 2 (Creutzer text).

² *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, p. 95ff.; cf. chapter ii of this paper.

and the eternal, represents the philosophical problem of the last years of antiquity. The historians of the period agree in holding that the thought of the period is characterized by a search after aid in all possible sources, but more especially in the Orient. The motive for such procedure is close at hand. Since the outer has failed, only two possible modes of reconciling the dualistic experience are open: either by supernatural revelation on the part of God or supernatural illumination on the part of the individual. Accordingly aid was sought in two principal sources. In the first place deliverance was sought in the Jewish Scriptures, which had been made known to the Greek world through the Septuagint translation. It is to be noted also that the external fortune of the Jews at this time made them kin to the individuals of the Graeco-Roman world, while the ardent hope of future restoration, the spiritualized conception of God and the conception of angels as mediating between God and man, made the Jewish Scriptures extremely attractive to the individuals of the Graeco-Roman world. But while Greek thought was purely intellectual and thus made thought and reality identical, Jewish thought conceived of God as the highest reality in terms of will. The world is regarded as the expression and embodiment of the will of God and is therefore purposive, rather than mechanical, while the Messianic Hope, which unifies the Jewish Scriptures, reaches its climax in the Incarnation, which has been called the 'Poetry of Conscience.'

The reconciliation of the two worlds is thus secured by means of the working will, which has now become conscious of itself as apart from the materials with which it operates.¹ The resulting construction is neither a transcript of the outer, nor a creation of pure fancy, but a world which while not existent is nevertheless accepted and treated as if it were in actual existence. The world thus erected in which the several demands of consciousness are recognized and reconciled is no longer a 'presumption' such as characterized the first immediacy, but rather an 'assumption.' In the construction of this world materials are borrowed from any source whatsoever. The

¹ Plotinus, *op. cit.*, IV, 7, sec. 7; V, 11, 128, 1, 3 et seq.; IV, 7, sec. 8.

period therefore is comparable to the corresponding period in the development of thought in the individual, which we know as the 'semblant' or play consciousness. The result is that we are now presented with an aesthetic of the will, and beauty comes to be regarded as *coördinate* with morality rather than *subordinate* to it as in the earlier aesthetic theory.

The selective aspect of the thought of the period is to be seen also in the tendency to go back to the older conception and the selection made is extremely significant as showing the epistemological value of the earlier mythical constructions. The individual, in turning to the past finds two movements of thought which answer his need, namely, the teachings of Pythagoras and Plato, and both are at once surrounded with a halo of divine authority. But since the Pythagorean numbers must be taken conceptually only, the Neo-Platonic philosophy becomes the more valuable.

Plato's doctrine of the Ideas, as descending step by step from the highest unity to the lowest limit, where form enters into matter, is at once seized upon as supplying the reality of the two poles of the dualism, as well as supplying the series of intermediate beings which as rungs in the ladder become the means of communication and thus of reconciliation of the two worlds, otherwise completely irreconcilable.¹ The primordial Being, as the Idea of the Good, is placed beyond the world of men and things.² The intermediate beings are not the result of the creative act of God, but rather emanations of his fullness.³ The significant aspect of these emanations is that, as emanations rather than determinations of either thought or will, they become the plastic material of aesthetic or semblant treatment. It is precisely here that we are to seek for the general advance in aesthetic theory and construction in Plotinus.

According to Plotinus and also Dio Chrysostom and Philostratus, art is not a more or less exact imitation of an outer copy-world, which is itself only a copy, but the expression of a selective will in sensuous form. But since Plotinus was an emanationist,

¹ Plotinus, *op. cit.*, V, sec. 1; 11, 168.

² Plotinus, *op. cit.*, VI, 9, sec. 6.

³ Cf. The Pleroma doctrine of the New Testament.

rather than an evolutionist,¹ that which is realized in the form of art is necessarily less than the idea—the created less than the creator—but he nevertheless insists that “If any one condemns the arts because they create by way of imitation of nature, first we must observe that natural things themselves are an imitation of something further and next we must bear in mind that the arts do not simply imitate the visible but go back to the reason (Logous—Ideas) from which nature comes and that they create much out of themselves and add to that which is defective as being themselves in possession of beauty.” Art, therefore, is no longer slavishly *imitative*, but rather *symbolic*.

Nevertheless by making matter wholly antipodal to mind, a complete reconciliation of the dualism is impossible. To solve the epistemological problem thus presented the individual must rise above the material and temporal world² and grasp the eternal idea from which all things proceed and which therefore gives meaning and value to all things.

The moralistic considerations which embarrassed the aesthetic theory alike of Plato and Aristotle are removed by Plotinus and beauty comes to be regarded as the direct expression of reason by means of aesthetic semblance. Still, the Absolute Reason, while within the universe as the outer, is not contained by it, hence it can not be given in terms of external nature. Thus one must go beyond the process in which the dualism originated for its solution. Ecstasy rather than reason becomes the organ of the apprehension of beauty. Above the intellectual intuition is the ecstatic intuition of the One in which the duality of the human and the divine, the corporeal and the spiritual, the temporal and the eternal, of thought and being is reconciled through an immediacy of contact with the Primordial Being. Ecstasy, therefore, as a symbolic experience, becomes the means of transcending self-consciousness by erecting an object which transcends all particular determinations. The beautiful is more than a matter of unity in variety; it is the whole in which the parts are lost to view and which bodies forth in symbolic fashion

¹ Plotinus, *loc. cit.*, V, sec. 2.

² *Ibid.*, VI, 9, 10.

the eternal beauty and significance of the universe.¹ Insisting upon the epistemological problem as the unification of experience, it is to be concluded that in transcending the inner-outer dualism the Neo-Platonists made use of the aesthetic consciousness as the organ of world unification and interpretation.

¹ Vide, *Enneads*, IV, 1, a passage in which Plotinus bids us mount by means of the beauty of the external world, to the contemplation of the 'ideal form,' the 'universal world.'

CHAPTER VII.

The Development of Thought from Neo-Platonism to the German Mystics of the Sixteenth Century, as Illustrating the Progression from the Inner-Outer Dualism to that of Mind-Body, in which the Mind Term of the Dualism is Distinguished from the Body Term only for Theoretical and Theological Purposes.

The mystical reconciliation of the inner-outer dualism by the Neo-Platonists represented the merging of a two-fold control. There was, in the first place, an actual turning to the past for materials already under definite and guaranteed coefficients of control. The imperturbable self-certainty of the post-Aristotelian philosophy had been so completely shaken with the continued failure of the outer order, that man everywhere as in need of help and no longer finding his own insight sufficient turned to the 'records of the past.' These writings of the earlier periods were regarded as the means of a higher revelation. As Windelband has pointed out, the striking characteristic of the period after Aristotle is the search after authority, and not capable of being spun out of one's own inner imagination and thus gotten immediately, was sought in historically accredited revelations. Divine revelation thus became the highest source of all knowledge.¹ But the selection and manipulation of these materials were matters of individual illumination and thus *immediate* in character. The Neo-Platonic Mysticism represents a theory of knowledge, which as Windelband says, contains a heightened value of the individual as evinced in feeling and as the attempt at a fulfilment of the longing of the age that truth might be arrived at by experience as an inner communion of the individual with the Supreme Being. But since the dualism was not complete, the inner possessing 'contrast value'

¹ Windelband, *History of Phil.*, ch. vii, p. 102.

only, the symbolic constructions of the Neo-Platonists, as the semblant or imitative treatment of the material borrowed from the past under the urgency of practical need, must be regarded as the rather quasi-aesthetic; while the epistemological consciousness with its characteristic problem of unification of experience must be regarded as quasi-epistemological. It is to be inferred, therefore, that the aesthetic arose with the epistemological as the appropriate organ of world reconciliation and interpretation and that the character of the aesthetic construction reflects more or less faithfully the character and demands of the epistemological.

In the case of the development of the thought of the race, as also in the case of the growth of thought in the individual, the erection of a semblant object under inner control and assigned meaning which it does not as yet possess brings forward the problem of a further determination of the inner. Until the rise of the semblant, the body was recognized as the abode of both the outer and the inner, while the latter was wholly lacking in positive determination. As the result of the imitative treatment of the body it is at once assigned to the outer as a sphere of material available for inner treatment and the fulfilment of inner purposes. But with the rise of the semblant, the same method of manipulation is applied to contents once inner, so that what was once inner, is now made outer, while the inner, as such migrates still farther within. It is precisely here that we are to seek for the materials and motives of the dualism of the material and the spiritual, the corporeal and the incorporeal, that ran throughout the philosophy of the Middle Ages and which finally issued in the mind-body dualism of Descartes.

The development of the epistemological consciousness is thus seen to be the separation and increasing determinateness of the two factors that enter into its objective constructions as embodiments of meaning. These two factors are the content and the control. The characteristic of consciousness in its first immediacy was that it involved no separation of these two factors. In classic Greek, thought was largely 'projective' and philosophy represented a series of attempts to secure tranquillity in the midst of certain failure. Both the epistemological

problem and its aesthetic solution were rather objective—in the sense however of ‘projective’ that does not imply the corresponding subjective. The continued failure of the outer as held in memory and the rapid enrichment of experience in the fifth and fourth centuries made necessary and possible the distinction of theoretical and practical interest. With Plotinus, however, we find the first instance of the determination of an object as possessing a meaning and existence determined by the mind itself. But it remains to be pointed out, that in the end, the thought of the Neo-Platonists terminates, on the objective or content side, in a sphere which lies beyond existence and, on the subjective side, in a mystical illumination, which is after all the negation of thought.¹

But the erection of a semblant object as representing the coalescence of two controls raises the problems connected with the terms meaning, existence, reality, together with the larger problem of individuation, which has so far been raised only. As has been indicated, the semblant constructions of the Neo-Platonists represented an imitative treatment of materials borrowed from other sources and accepted as being under a definite form of control but which was lifted from its original moorings and made the object of inner manipulation and thus assigned to a sphere which is neither outer nor inner, but in which the demands of both are recognized and realized. The resulting construction was due very largely to religious interests and in the disposition of the object thus erected the two attitudes merged in its construction at once issue and set the problem which made necessary a similar construction toward the close of the period under discussion. The theory of Inspiration or Illumination, which as the merging of two controls and thus the symbolic means of an immediate unity of the individual with the Supreme Being at once diverged into two wholly different forms. In the case of the Church, borrowing the material and model of its organization from the Graeco-Roman world, revelation as Windelband says, became fixed as histor-

¹ Vide, *Enneads*, VI, 7, 34, where Plotinus says that ‘he who would rise above reason, falls outside it.’ Cf. also Bigg, *Neo-Platonism*, p. 199. Cf. also Siebeck, *Religionsphil. Studien*, 119.

ical authority and thus became the source of the Scholasticism of the Middle Ages; while the continuation of the inner control factor of the Neo-Platonic symbolism became the source of the Mysticism of the same period. The tracing out of the development of these two streams of thought with the emphasis however upon the former is the matter of present concern.

In its organization the church made free use of material which represented the generalization of a past experience, so that from the standpoint of the content of its organization the church represented a mixture of Greek and Jewish elements. The idea of God was made transcendent and the doctrine of divine election is only the carrying over of the old Greek ideas of aristocracy into the realm of the spiritual.¹ This transcendent view of things contributed to the separation and sharpening of the spiritual from the sensuous. But as thus organized out of materials that represented the generalization of a past experience, the kingdom is still interpreted outwardly, so that both the thought and the conduct of the Middle Ages terminate on an existence which lies beyond both.² The real treasures of earth still lie beyond it, and the kingdom that is to be, already is, and at a later day shall descend as the New Jerusalem from the clouds. The Church of the West was thus organized upon a thoroughly transcendental basis.

But having taken under her charge the highest interests of the individual, the Church at once proceeds to take control of the State. The separation of Church and State referred to as representing the ethical climax of antiquity is to be undone by bringing the two realms under a common organization with Rome as its center and the bishop of Rome as its common head.

Nevertheless, the attempted union of Church and State contributed to the farther isolation and deepening of the inner as the second aspect of the Neo-Platonic symbolism. The individual sought the Church because the State as the existing outer failed him when most needed. The ideas around which the doctrines of the Church gathered represented a generalization of

¹ Cf. Nash, *Genesis of the Social Conscience*, ch. ii.

² Cf. Baldwin, 'Sketch of the History of Psychology,' *Psychological Review*, Vol. XII, 1905.

a stage of knowledge already outgrown, hence the struggle between the Nominalists and the Realists. In fact, both as regards external organization and inner content, the Church stood above the individual, with the result that the individual is once more thrown back upon himself and compelled to go beyond the Church for the expression and realization of his ideas and aspirations. The age was characterized by the increasing presence and number of Saints, Knight-errants and Magicians. The growth of Monasticism, as a Church within the Church, kept pace with the increasing secularization of the Church Universal, and within monastic walls, were in process of forming the ideas and ideals which at a later period burst forth and became the formative principles of modern culture and religion.

At this time were produced the great epics of the German people—"Creations alive with all the stir and strife of the time, retaining an afterglow of the oldest mythical traditions but strangely tinged with the recent historical experiences, representing the old Germanic ideas of uprightness, devotion and fidelity, but also the loosening of all social bonds and the rule of vile passions brought about by this age of revolt."¹

By the ninth century the work of subjugation and conquest was completed. "The greedy, untrained individual of the North had drunk the wine and eaten the food of the Graeco-Roman civilization."² The authoritative truth contained in the mediaeval Church and State had accomplished its work of disciplining the untrained masses. What was at first purely outer has now become inner in the sense that the individual has made it his own. By a process of imitative absorption, the rude conqueror of the Roman world, has in turn, been captured by it, and a new civilization arises. But in the process of absorption, the appetites and impulses of the individual of the North, while controlled are not destroyed but quickened, so that he at once comes to make increased demands of materials which have been so fully and faithfully doled out to him. The immediacy of

¹ Francke, *loc. cit.*, p. 16.

² Dewey, 'Significance of the Problem of Knowledge,' *University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, No. III (1897).

stimulus and response, of motive and guarantee of thought and conduct, is again broken down, and the individual of Germanic origin, no less than the Graeco-Roman individual, must seek these beyond the Church-State community of which he is now a member.

That the burden of metaphysical discussion has shifted from the ontological to the epistemological—from the outer to the inner—is to be inferred from the character of the philosophy of Saint Augustine. The *Confessions* is significant as indicating the rise and potency of the principle of individuality. The placing of psychology in the very fore-front of his philosophy and his making will the chief factor of conscious life, are further illustrations of the change of attitude toward the inner. It will be recalled that with Socrates, thought and will were completely identified. To know is to do; and sin is a matter of ignorance. Aristotle made the will more central, but in the end his conception of the will is made to conform to his conception of the Deity. The emanational and dualistic conceptions of antiquity are the necessary conclusions of a static view of things. "Pagan antiquity" Baur says, "never got beyond the antithesis of matter and spirit and could not conceive a world produced by the free creative activity of a purely personal will."¹ With both Plato and Aristotle and the Post-Aristotelians, including the Theologians of the Church, the outward movement of thought into a reality already determined, rather than the treatment of the inner receives the emphasis. The large place assigned the will by the learned Bishop of Hippo illustrates the passage of thought from a static to a more dynamic conception. The relations obtaining between God and the world come to be regarded from the ethical point of view. "The peculiarity of Christian philosophy" says Windelband, "consisted essentially in this, that in its apprehension of the relations between God and the World it sought to employ throughout the ethical point of view of a free creative action." The Greek conception of an uncreated matter is part of a dualism which may be refined but never reconciled with the other

¹ Baur, *Church History*, Vol. I, p. 193.

term of the dualism, while the presence of an unreconciled dualism, means the presence of some element in the universe that successfully withstands the intellectual and ethical process.¹ But the conception of the freedom of God and the creation of the world as the outcome of a purposive act of a holy will, places at once the dualism of form and matter, of ideal and actual, in such relations to each other, that their reconciliation becomes the burden of philosophic discussion.

It is interesting to observe that the development of the subjective and the dynamic view of the world arise and develop together. The conception of the freedom of God, as embodied and illustrated in the creation and maintenance of the world, drew after it the conception of the freedom of the individual. Still, human freedom was regarded as a divine gift, rather than a natural attribute. The soul is not a *gift* but a *task*, while freedom no longer implies the identification of the real and the ideal but the opportunity for the most perfect realization of the individual. Hitherto the summum bonum represented the unchanging nature of things and virtue was only a capacity for its contemplation. But the highest good is now an *infinite force* rather than a *fixed quantity*. The realm of thought and conduct is not a completed and static universe in which means and end are identical, but a historic process in which the two aspects are correlative and determining factors. The old-time dualism of form and matter, the actual and the potential, still remains but finds now a new basis within the individual.

The limitation of the thought of Saint Augustine is to be seen in the fact that he holds the Church before him always as the ultimate criterion, while at the same time, he gathers all his ideas about the absolute and immediate certainty of consciousness. Although a virtuoso in self-observation and self-analysis, his separation of the soul from the body, the individual from the universal, was motivated by theological and practical purposes. The individual as erected by Augustine was wholly

¹ The identifying of the Absolute experience with unformed matter, thus making the Absolute matter without form, was the outcome of Neo-Platonism. Cf. also the Absolute of Herbert Spencer.

religious in character. The idea of God is immediately involved in whatever certainty the individual consciousness has of itself.

But he also insists that the essence of truth is its existence, and since truth is absolutely incorporeal, it can only be thought as the ideas of God after a Neo-Platonic fashion. All rational knowledge is thus knowledge of God. The relation of the individual to truth is therefore passive and receptive; hence it can be reached only through a process of illumination or revelation.¹

It is thus seen that the issue of the two types of thought in Augustine, the metaphysical and the theological, is the dualism of the individual and the universal whose reconciliation extends far into the Middle Ages. Saint Augustine however found the secret of the unification of experience, not in the restless activity of the will with Plotinus, but in the rest of contemplation, an experience into which the individual after the struggles and exertions of the present life are over may enter and by becoming absorbed in the divine truth may once more enjoy the perfect identity of the divine and the human, the individual and the universal.²

By the middle of the tenth century is seen for the first time in the history of the Western world a distinctly German State, which is not only able to maintain its own identity, but has already entered upon that struggle against the Church, out of which the modern individual is to emerge. Within this long drawn-out struggle is produced a literature which is significant as indicating the effective working of the two contrasting tendencies, not only in literature, but in life as a whole. By the end of the twelfth century and the beginning of the thirteenth, mediaeval society was at its height. The long struggle between the Church and the Empire assumed its largest proportions and out of it there issued the most signal expressions of a collective consciousness. The whole national existence had been quickened and deepened by the Crusades and attempts are everywhere made to give expression to the fulness of human nature. Chiv-

¹ God is above all that may be said of Him; He is best known by nescience, best described by negatives. *De Trin.*, VII, 7; *De Civ. Dei*, IX, 16.

² *Ep.*, 120, 20; *De Ord.*, II, 16, 42, 59; *Conf.*, VIII, 10 (Bigg's translation).

alry has become the recognized foundation of public life. "In the Minnesong; in the rejuvenated and transformed German Epic of the Migration period; in the adaptation, through the medium of the French, of the Celtic and Graeco-Roman traditions, the chivalric ideal receives its poetical expression."¹

Throughout the entire period, from the ninth to the thirteenth century, the most striking characteristic is the attempt upon the part of the individual to reach beyond the limits of the culture of the age as contained in the Church and State—a sort of divine anticipation of a new social order. Once more as in the days of Socrates, the individual can no longer find the motives and sanctions of conduct within the community of which he is a member. While corporate life is still the chief concern of the individual there is everywhere to be seen the development of the spirit of self-assertiveness which will later bring about the dissolution of the present régime. "In the directness of the Volklied and its subjectivity; in the sturdy realism of the religious drama; in the glorification of the inner union between God and the soul by the Mystics; in the proclamation by the Humanists of the sovereignty of the individual intellect we see the different phases of that revolt against mediæval society which culminated in the religious Reformation."²

With the twofold movement called on its religious side the Reformation and on its secular the Renaissance, the individual, freed himself from the immediate past. "The sum of the whole matter is" says Nash, "that the individual fashioned by the combined influences of the Graeco-Roman Empire and the Bible, drilled in the monastery, called forth from the monastery by the revival of culture and religion on the one hand and by the growing power of the State on the other, stood free in the open field of history."³ Having thus risen above the ideas that had been handed down to him from the past, by regarding them as material available for personal treatment, the problem of the reconciliation of a dualistic consciousness is once again the urgent problem of speculation. The fact that consciousness

¹ Francke, *Social Forces of German Literature*, p. 45.

² Francke, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

³ Nash, *Genesis of the Social Conscience*, p. 259.

now distinguishes itself from the materials of its manipulation, presents a problem not hitherto found. The atmosphere became one of invention—the search after control over natural forces. The Renaissance placed at the command of the individual the resources of the ancient world which by contributing to the deepening of his intellectual powers, also enabled him to free himself. The Reformation contributed to the quickening of his conscience so that with quickened will and intellect the individual goes forth to create his own world.

The individual thus become self-confident and self-assertive reduces authority to a matter of individual opinion. The external world thus freed from the element of caprice and animation is gradually reduced to an order in which law reigns with mechanical exactness and rigidity. The early Italian philosophers of nature re-stated the pressing and vital problem of metaphysics in terms of nature rather than God—from the standpoint of philosophy rather than religion. Many of them were persecuted by the Church but their influence is to be traced throughout the whole of modern thought.

Along with the pantheistic conception of the physical world there go also the secularization of religion and the deification of the State. The spirit of the Renaissance was concerned with the present order of things and led to deification of both State and Nature. The inner, as the creative self, seeks to embody itself in a new principle of world interpretation and world reconstruction, and as opposed to the religious-philosophical view of the Middle Ages, which is everywhere in process of dissolution, seeks to establish what has been named a natural-philosophical view of the world. "The spirit of the Western people," says Windelband, "has now taken up into itself the entire material which the past offers for its culture, and in feverish excitement into which it is finally put by direct contact with the highest achievements of ancient science it struggles upward toward the attainment of complete independence." One feels the impulsive blood of youth pulsate in its literature as though something unheard of, something which had never before been must now come into being. The men of the Renaissance announce to us nothing less than the approach of a total renovation of science

and of the state of humanity. The warfare between the transmitted doctrines leads to a surfeit of the past; learned research into the old wisdom ends with throwing aside all book-rubbish, and full of the youthful joy of dawning life the mind goes forth into the cosmic life of nature ever young.¹

The outcome of the entire movement of the thought of the Middle Ages was the absorption in the inner world of the life of the soul.² Within the Graeco-Roman world, interest in the inner was determined by its relations to the outer. Throughout the Middle Ages, on the contrary, the fate of the individual was determined by the development of the inner life. The spiritual world came to be regarded as the abode of the individual and to which was ascribed as much reality as to the world of matter. The grand outcome of the whole movement of thought during the Middle Ages, is the bringing forward of the materials and motives of the mind-body dualism, whose reconciliation was at once undertaken, but which was hindered by the lack of a free and comprehensive treatment of the world of Nature.

The religious Reformation of the sixteenth century is to be regarded as the expression of individuality in matters religious. The Church was no longer able to mediate between the individual and the sources of all spiritual values. He now asserted the right to touch the eternal without the mediation of another. Thus as Nash says, "The idea of God came forth in unveiled majesty to wed itself to the idea of the individual."³ This means that the individual is now rated high and has the highest good opened to him. But the Church makes a final attempt to withstand the new thoughts and ideals by fortifying its own traditions and at the Council of Trent made the philosophy of St. Thomas eternally valid and binding. Luther, on the contrary, attempted to re-establish primitive Christianity as against Catholicism and went back to St. Augustine for guidance and authority. Thus by these two tendencies and systems of thought, the metaphysics of the Middle Ages was split in

¹ Francke, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

² Höfding, *History of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. I, Intr.

³ Nash, *op. cit.*, ch. viii.

twain. To dogma is assigned the whole realm of the super-sensuous while the world of experience is reserved for philosophy. But before thought had time to come to itself and to appreciate the problem before it, and the necessary method of solution, the whole Platonic *Weltanschauung* came in and philosophy at once turned from theology to natural science. The epistemological problem which thus presented itself for solution, the problem of the Macrocosm and the Microcosm, was solved in the light of the imaginative conception of the divine unity of the Living All.

In many respects the epistemological problem of the two Platonic periods shows marks of similarity. Then as now the characteristic problem was the merging of two contrasted forms of control in some form of immediacy of consciousness. The symbolism of Plotinus was seen to be an imitative or experimental treatment of materials under definite guarantees of determination with reference to the fulfilment of inner purpose. But after Plotinus, the element of Mysticism was ignored and the ideas of the Graeco-Roman world became the motive and sanction of conduct and thought. But the element of immediacy, as seen in the Neo-Platonic Mysticism, continues its development and is especially seen in the increasing appreciation of external nature which sometimes approaches the modern. Referring to this aspect of appreciation, Bosanquet says, that it "Emphasizes unmistakably a new attitude of aesthetic perception to external nature the like of which we have not found in any Hellenic or Graeco-Roman writer."¹

Defining the epistemological problem of the age as the unification of experience by the reconciliation of the subjective and the external it is at once seen that Mysticism became the organ of world unification and interpretation. In the work of Bruno is to be found the most characteristic products of the period of the Renaissance. In him the enthusiasm for natural beauty which had long been held in abeyance became an all-absorbing passion. The investigations of Tycho Brahe, Copernicus, Galilei and Kepler produced a profound impression upon the

¹ *Hist. of Aesthetics*, p. 129.

human mind and made impossible the holding any longer of the narrow and earth-centered theological views of the universe. The earth is round and moves and God can no longer be conceived as having His local dwelling in the heavens. A wholly new way of looking at the world has now come into the human mind, and along with the conception of a new and vaster universe comes also the conviction that it can be grasped as a whole. The absolute unity of all knowledge and being is, however, inaccessible to human reason and must therefore, become an object of faith. The problem of thought thus becomes the elevating of itself from the confused and chaotic manifold of sense-experience to the unity present in all things. The aesthetic character of the attempted solution of the problem thus presented is to be seen in the Hylozoistic character of the philosophy of Bruno. All nature becomes alive. A world-soul pervades everything. Looking out upon the world, man everywhere beholds the embodiment and working of a power like to himself, 'nearer than breathing and closer than hands and feet,' yet present in the remotest star-spaces and informing all things. The distinction between the human and the divine is no longer tenable. Reality is an eternal spirit, one and indivisible, from which all things flow and of which all things are only images. Within this whole all differences disappear. As opposed to the abstract unity of Spinoza, Bruno insists that God is the whole, present in every individual thing and present as a whole. Man, as an individual, is a mirror within a mirror, whose perception of things is only a reflection of nature which in turn is a reflection of the thought of God.

The problem of knowledge becomes with Bruno the problem of the identification of the microcosm and the macrocosm. How is it possible for any particular aspect of the whole to reflect the whole of which it is an aspect? It is sufficient to indicate that the problem as thus stated was solved by making a sort of subjective leap beyond the actual limits of knowledge. As in the earlier periods, so once more, the individual explains his world by projecting himself into all the phenomena perceived. Reason failing, Mysticism as an immediacy of feeling becomes the sole resource. "The world-joy of the aesthetic Renas-

cence," says Windelband, "sings philosophical dithyrambs in the writings of Bruno and a universalistic optimism that carries everything before it prevails in his thought."¹

In the philosophic thought of Jacob Böhme, as Windelband points out, Neo-Platonic Mysticism is given complete religious coloring. As against the hylozoistic unity of Bruno, Böhme posits a duality from the beginning. Strife is the mother of all things. Things not falling under one or another of these terms are dead. The world becomes thus the conflict between two opposing forces, a conflict ending only at death. Antithesis is the law of being, and in 'yes' and 'no' all things consist. Activity connotes a dualism, but every dualism is harmonized in the divine nature. This struggle is also present within the experience of every individual. Salvation means escape from this struggle which can be secured only by a desire within the soul for God. It is at this point that Böhme makes use of the doctrine of the 'Divine Spark,' a doctrine that at once suggests the Platonic doctrine of 'ἀναμνήσις' only put in Christian language. The moral struggle that characterizes human experience is due to a power within, for 'what could begin to deny self, if there were not something in man different from self?'² Still the self is lost, as it were, in the supernaturally determined order of things. For its freedom from a self-perceived bondage the soul must wait for the time, 'the time of the lilies' as Böhme calls it, when all nature will be delivered. Thus it is to be said with Inge that the "dim sympathy of the human spirit with the life of nature which Plotinus felt but which mediaevalism had almost quenched, has now become an intense and happy consciousness of community with all living things as subjects of one all-embracing and unchanging law, the law of perfect love;"³ and with Höffding that Böhme's thoughts have traveled far from those of a distinctly religious man, so that it is no small wonder that his mythologic fancy completely overpowered his thought at this point.⁴ Despite the far-reaching assumptions found in

¹ Windelband, *Hist. of Philosophy*, p. 368.

² Overton, *Life of William Law*.

³ Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, p. 285.

⁴ Höffding, *Hist. of Mod. Phil.*, Vol. I, p. 80.

the beginning of his speculations, he was unable to carry them through and in common with the thinkers of his age finds refuge from the limitations of thought in an immediacy of consciousness in which by a process of divine illumination the world of opposites as distinguished by thought is united and the individual moves about in a world of his own determination.

The epistemological problem of the age under discussion was the erection of a world in which thought and conduct could find sanction and support in the midst of a world fast slipping from beneath the individual's feet. The self as the inner, organizing principle has risen above the established order of things, because of its increasing failure, and seeks in terms of feeling to erect one more permanent and satisfying. The pantheism of Bruno is wholly hylozoistic, the attempt to unify and explain the world in terms of the self, but a hylozoism characterized by the presence of reflective aspects wholly lacking in the earlier attempts in the same direction. The Mystics assert the immanence of God without qualification. In both attempts there is a complete identification of the two worlds now fallen apart in consciousness. Both attempts are to be regarded as attempted embodiments of the self gradually freeing itself from some aspect of its content. Thus the period of philosophic thought under discussion proceeded from the immediacy secured in Neo-Platonic Mysticism, through the dualism of a Microcosm, with its ideal struggling for realization, and a Macrocosm in which that ideal is conceived as completely realized of the Renaissance, and reached another immediacy through the merging, of a dualistic experience in terms of an aesthetic construction.

CHAPTER VIII.

Modern Philosophy from Descartes to Kant and the German Mystics, as Illustrating the Rise and Development of the Subject-Object Dualism, together with the Use of the Aesthetic Consciousness as an Epistemological 'Postulate.'

Descartes and the Cartesians.

The primary assumption of Descartes, that of the dualism of mind and body, is but the expression of what had already been worked out in the consciousness of the individual. In Greek thought the individual and the universal were wholly identified because of the a-dualistic character of consciousness. Throughout the Middle Ages the attempt was made to retain this old-time immediacy by making the individual wholly dependent upon the universal as organized in the Church. But the attempt to unify the individual with the universal by making the latter transcendent only contributed to the isolation and deepening of the individual. In the attempt to make the general notions of Aristotle sufficient and valid for all eternity, the Church prepared the instruments of its own overthrow. Authority failed finally to compensate the meagerness of ideas. The manipulation of these general notions had reached perfection and it was useless to go over the field again. Thought must therefore find new fields of operation and as Professor Dewey says, Galilei and Copernicus were as truly travelers as Marco Polo and Christopher Colombo. "Inventio rather than judicium, discovery rather than proof, became the burden of the age." The outcome of this search after a method of manipulation was the separation of the individual and the universal, so that by carrying over to the realm of the outer what was once inner and the making of it material for imitative treatment, the inner now possessed of a persistency of its own is also to be

reckoned with as outer, but differing in its content and control from the original outer.

But while Descartes may be said to have generalized the motives of his age he failed to treat the mind term of the dualism as under continuous and ordered change.¹ He did not establish his psychology upon the facts of experience. The poles of the dualism are not distinctions falling within consciousness but are two wholly opposed and disparate spheres of existence. The assumption of mind and body is both realistic and dogmatic. As an individual Descartes is unable to break with the Church and accepts its dogma as it came floating down to him. While he made it the fundamental rule of his life to look within for the criterion of thought and conduct and even boasted of being self-educated, the objective world still finds its guarantee in the veracity of God.

The more positive and naturalistic treatment of the outer world made possible by the advance of the physical and mathematical sciences, with which Descartes shows himself to have been familiar, did not serve, however, to detach the inner from the outer and bring it under like treatment. The advance made by Descartes in the solution of the epistemological problem is to be sought in his assumption of the subjective as the starting point of all scientific inquiry. Immediate consciousness thus becomes the criterion of reality. But his statement must be taken as representing an immediately given datum rather than the validity of judgment. Reflection, as issuing in judgment, must be brought within the judgment process as involving the mutual reference of subject and object. The limitation of Descartes is to be inferred from his surreptitiously introducing the object into the subject, rather than detaching the subject. Thus, despite his efforts to the contrary, the philosophy of Descartes begins and ends with a dualistic consciousness as a datum of immediate experience.

Modern philosophy, dating from Descartes, opens with a subjective note. The individual emptied of all content and given a self-centered and self-dependent isolation can find no

¹ Cf. Baldwin, St. Louis Address, 'Sketch of the History of Psychology,' *Psychological Review*, Vol. XII.

way of relating itself to the necessary object of thought. According to Descartes, to exist is identical with to think. But to think is to think something. A thinking being can become conscious of its own existence and identity as subject, only by knowledge of objects. Thinking involves and implies the relation of subject and object and to assign either an independent existence is to make the problem of knowledge unsolvable. The famous dictum of Descartes, from which modern philosophy is dated, is in reality, false, since it represents a premature plunge into ontology before the way was prepared by an adequate theory of knowledge.¹ Regarding the perceptions and ideas as purely inner, that is, having no reference beyond the mind having them, Descartes prepared the way for a subjective idealism. Nevertheless the ideas are representative of things outside the mind, that is, are symbolic of something beyond themselves, which aspect alone makes them ideas and determines them as either true or false.

It is precisely here that we are to seek for the epistemological problem of Descartes. The problem at once arose as to the reference of ideas to objects or defining the problem in our own terms, 'how can the ideas as unrelated mental facts transcend themselves? It will become evident later, that if we start with a self-contained subject we shall find no justification whatever for the objective reference which knowledge implies and involves. It is evident that Descartes appreciated the problematical character of his attempted solution; but he nevertheless defends the truth of his position by reference to the veracity of God. The abstraction of the thinking substance finds its counterpart in the abstraction of the extended substance. The original whole of consciousness is broken up into two inert entities. The knowledge of either is the result of a sort of mechanical interaction between the two substances at a single point in the brain.

The limitations of the contentions of Descartes are best seen in the attempted solution of Descartes' dualism by the later Cartesians. Occasionalism, which is only Cartesianism carried to its logical conclusion, denied the possibility of any interaction

¹ Seth, *The Scottish Philosophy*, p. 12.

between the two substances. Between mind and matter, the extended and the unextended, there is an impassable gulf which the Deity alone can bridge. Malebranche goes farther and holds that the sole object of knowledge of the material world is the idea of extension which we know only by virtue of our union with God who illumines our minds. The external world is not known to exist but believed to exist on grounds of supernatural revelation. God thus becomes the true cause of our ideas apart from whom we can neither perceive nor will. We see things truly only as we see them in Him. The outcome of the philosophy of Malebranche was the simplication of the Cartesian problem by making matter non-existent, so that our belief in the reality of the objective order is rather an article of faith.¹

It is important to observe in passing that Malebranche distinguishes between sensation, which is of the nature of feeling, and understanding. The former is a subjective process only while the latter is constituted of the clear and distinct ideas which arise on the presentation of sense objects. These ideas are, however, transcendent so far as the individual is concerned and are thus both universal and objective. Still further the ideas have to do only with the essence of things, while the sensations are concerned with the particular existences. For Malebranche the epistemological problem arises in connection with the relation between the ideas and the particular sensations. The question which at once presents itself, is as to the passage from the particulars of sense to the universality and objectivity of ideas. But Malebranche in common with the age looked upon the mind as passive rather than constructive, so that there being no ascent from the subjectivity of the sensations to the objectivity of the ideas such objectivity must be given the mind from without. Here Malebranche, like Pascal and Geulincx, only brings out the latent mysticism of Descartes in insisting that causal efficacy is the prerogative of the Deity only. Hence God is the true cause of all our ideas and in Him all things are to be seen. God therefore is in immediate relations with every thinking soul. The mysticism of Malebranche thus becomes

¹ R. Adamson, *Develop. of Mod. Phil.*, Vol. I, p. 52.

an immediacy of consciousness in which the dualism of sense and idea is transcended by the vision in which all things are seen in God.

Spinoza.

Höfding makes Spinoza the central thinker of the seventeenth century, since his philosophy represents an attempt to reconcile and unify the several tendencies of the thought of the age. His pantheism represents a brilliant attempt to merge the mystical and the mechanical, the scientific and the teleological attitudes of thought which had been developing together during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. If the mysticism of Geulincx and Malebranche represent attempts to solve the epistemological problem set by the dualism of Descartes by merging the two antipodal worlds in an immediacy of consciousness, the pantheism of Spinoza represents a similar attempt by making the content of the two worlds identical. Mind and body are aspects of one and the same reality. The Cartesian presupposition that all things exist only in God becomes the chief corner stone of the doctrine of Spinoza. Extension and thought, mind and body, are not two substances, but ultimate attributes of one substance. These two attributes of thought and extension are regarded as antithetical ways of looking at the one substance rather than antithetical substances.

Descartes held that while the interaction of mind and body was not evident it was nevertheless actual. For Geulincx and Malebranche the interaction was occasional rather than immediate and mediated by the will of the Deity. In either instance it leaves the matter of relation of mind and body wholly inexplicable. Spinoza at once denies the possibility of any interaction whatsoever between mind and body. To admit an interaction destroys both the duality and the substantiality of each. There is only one process of becoming and the material and the spiritual are but two aspects of the one necessary process. Particular things, whether thinking or extended, are but modes of the one eternal, unitary world-ground. Thus, as Falkenberg has pointed out, necessity in becoming, unity in being, mechanism

and pantheism, represent the controlling conceptions in the Spinozistic scheme.

Spinoza's theory of knowledge is comparable to that of Plotinus. The mind's first knowledge is individual and fragmentary. To acquire more perfect and adequate knowledge the mind must pass beyond the individual and particular point of view. To reach the more perfect knowledge Spinoza recognizes two stages: first, that of reason (*ratio*) by the employment of which we come to know the essence of things. This sort of knowledge is obtained by the process of deduction and is therefore *mediate* in character. Rational knowledge is, however, necessarily incomplete, as Spinoza holds, because it enables us to arrive only at a partial view of things and can not lift us to that plane of knowledge at which we behold all things perfectly unified, *sub specie aeternitatis*. To reach the point at which all things are completely unified Spinoza introduces his second stage of knowledge which he calls the intuitive, by which we proceed not inferentially from one particular to another but by taking a comprehensive view of all reality see things in the light of the principle from which they proceed. He who has reached this point of view says Spinoza, "evolves all his ideas from that which represents the origin and source of all nature, so that the idea appears to be the source of all others."

He considers intuitive knowledge the highest, not because it yielded a greater speculative insight into the nature of things, but because it frees the soul by transcending the limitations and imperfections of sense experiences. "He aimed," says Höfding, "at the highest knowledge, that is, the most intimate union of the individual and the universal, of the particular with the sum total of constant relations, and succeeds only by postulating an intuition which reminds us now of the artist's conception, now of the mystic's vision according as the stress is placed upon the individual or the universal moment."¹

¹ *History of Mod. Phil.*, Vol. I, p. 307. Cf. E. Caird, *Evolution of Religion*, Vol. I, pp. 104, 105; and *Ethics* (Elwes trs.), Pt. V, 41 and Scholium.

The British Development.

The empirical movement, which found its largest and freest expression in England, represents a series of attempts to reconcile the same dualism by reducing mind to matter. As opposed to the mystical and theoretical character of Continental philosophy, British philosophy was the rather positive and practical. The thinkers on the Continent were interested rather in the *form* of thought, while the English thinkers from Locke on were interested in the *content* of thought. Modern epistemological inquiry is usually dated from Locke and it is quite true that the *Essay* gave birth and currency to the terms and distinctions of modern philosophy. The *Essay* is also significant as indicating the fact, that the ideas are, for the first time, detached from the presuppositions of belief, and given independent treatment. In Locke we have the first approach to a more subjective treatment of the mind as constituted of a series of ideas. In the fourth book of the *Essay*, Locke attempts a theory of knowledge. His definition of knowledge as the "perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas," leads at once to a subjective idealism. But Locke attempts to save himself by insisting that some of our ideas are 'representative,' in the sense, that they "exactly resemble the modification of matter in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us." These are the so-called primary qualities, which Locke proceeds to enumerate as solidity, extension, figure etc. The patterns of these Locke would say really exist in the bodies themselves. But in the case of sounds, tastes, etc., only an uninstructed mind can suppose that there is anything like our ideas existing in the bodies themselves. These are the so-called secondary qualities which according to Locke are "nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us by certain modifications of their primary qualities."

His real contribution to the philosophic thought of the time is to be seen in his endeavor to apply the critical method of Bacon to the study of the mind. He thus succeeded in reducing the mind to a series of unrelated atoms of sense experiences which neither afford nor justify a reference beyond themselves.

"All general knowledge," Locke repeatedly says, "lies only in our thoughts and consists barely in the contemplation of our own abstract ideas."¹ Still Locke appreciated the fact that knowledge being thus limited we want something else.² This 'something else' he attempts to obtain by the employment of the judgment which he defines as "the presuming things to be so without perceiving it." Locke as an epistemologist at once goes beyond the conclusion of his psychology, and it is to be said that Locke really stopped where the problem of knowledge properly begins; and despite the evident psychological character of his work he inconsistently maintained the spirituality of the soul and the existence of purely spiritual substances.

The general advance made by Berkeley over Locke is to be inferred from his attempt to prove that not the secondary quantities only, but the primary ones as well, are the products of the human mind. The world about us is much more dependent upon the mind than we have hitherto thought. Matter is a mere abstraction, one of those words which serve only to throw a 'veil and mist' between the mind and truth. There is no material substratum of things and *to be is to be perceived*. But as Reid says, "The pillars by which the existence of a material world was supported were so feeble that it did not require the force of a Samson to bring them down." For Berkeley matter is reduced to simple ideas with the notion of some cause.³ Thus at one fell blow Berkeley identifies the objects of knowledge with the ideas of the mind. "The very existence of ideas constitute the soul. Mind is a congeries of perceptions. Take away perception and you take away the mind. Put the perceptions and you put the mind."⁴

Here, apparently, a complete break is made with the external world and the mind's ability to construct its own world vindicated. But Berkeley did not make good his contention. His denial of the existence of matter was made primarily for the sake of refuting atheism and materialism. But with the denial

¹ *Essay*, Bk. I and IV, ch. iii, 14.

² *Ibid.*, Bk. IV, ch. iv, 3.

³ *Treatise*, sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.

⁴ *Life and Letters*, p. 438; also, *Treatise*, sections 68, 75, 80, 19, 20.

of the material world, the question at once arose as to the origin of our ideas, to solve which Berkeley substituted the laws of the Eternal Spirit for the laws of nature.¹ Like Plato, with whom he was familiar, Berkeley came to estimate low the knowledge derived through the senses and in the *Siris* concerns himself with the problem of showing how we may arrive at a higher knowledge of the Eternal Spirit than that afforded by the phenomena of sense.² It is true, he insists, that God speaks in nature to us, but it is only through rational faith in causality, that we come to discern the chain running throughout the whole system of things and only by a process of ascending from the lower to the higher can we reach a knowledge of the Highest Being.³

The consequences of the metaphysics of Berkeley are pointed out by Hume who is the legitimate outcome of British Empiricism from Bacon and Hobbes to Berkeley. With Hume, on the contrary, the mind's break with matter is made complete. His attempt to solve the Cartesian problem is in reality the denial of the problem, by denying substantial existence to both mind and matter. According to Hume, the mind is its contents. These contents are of two sorts, impressions and ideas which are only fainter impressions. These alone constitute the objects of thought. The substantiality of the self is a delusion and what we call the mind is but a heap of perceptions united by certain relations. Causality itself is only the succession of phenomena—relation between our ideas—and arises only from experience.

The outcome of the philosophy of Hume was the reducing of mind as well as matter to mere phenomena and the denial of any causal nexus between cause and effect. There is therefore no permanent element in the world of experience and no valid element whereby thought may justify the objective validity of knowledge. Hume holds, that to form the idea of an object and to form an idea simply, are one and the same thing, the reference of an idea to an object being an extraneous denomina-

¹ *Op. cit.*, Sections 26, 65, 31, 32.

² *Op. cit.*, 90, 91.

³ *Op. cit.*, 148; *Alciphron*, Dialogue IV.

tion of which the idea itself bears no mark or character.¹ It was this complete subversion of the necessary and universal character of knowledge which awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber and gave birth to the common-sense philosophy of the Scottish School.

Leibniz.

Before proceeding to the philosophy of Kant, it is necessary to take note of the attempt of Leibniz to remove the antithesis between mind and matter, without surrendering the aesthetic and religious conceptions which were dangerously threatened by the Empiricists. Leibniz, like Spinoza, appreciates the unphilosophic character of the *Deus ex machina* of Descartes, but likewise appreciates that the *Deus sive natura* of Spinoza solves the problem by a sort of back-door method.

The epistemology of Leibniz is to be regarded as a *via media* between two extremes, of Empiricism which reduced knowledge to a series of sensations externally produced and thus lacking both universality and necessity, and of Rationalism that made knowledge consist only of clear and distinct ideas. Like Spinoza he considers that the notion of substance is the necessary starting-point of metaphysical inquiry, but while the former defined substance in terms of independent existence, the latter defines it in terms of process. "La substance ne saurait etre sans action." Thus while Spinoza attempted to reconcile the dualism of mind and matter in terms of identity of content, Leibniz made a similar attempt in terms of *process*.² According to Leibniz perception and apperception, sense-perception and thought can not be completely sundered. They differ not in kind but in their degree of development, so that body is to be defined as confused soul while soul is body become clear and distinct. Either mind or body represents a meaningless abstraction apart from the other and neither exists apart from the other. Reality is therefore partly material and partly immaterial. The law of continuity demands that the soul always thinks

¹ *Treatise*, I, Pt. III, 8, 14.

² Leibniz, *Monad.*, 66, 67, 69.

and that while sense knowledge precedes rational knowledge they differ in degree only. Whence then the origin of our ideas? In the *Nouveaux Essais*, Leibniz insists, as against Locke, that all our ideas are *innate* but *implicitly* rather than *explicitly* so.¹ The soul is windowless facing the eternal world so that all our knowledge is developed from the possibilities of thought within itself. Ideas as little as anything else are given to the mind from without.² The Monads are simple, indivisible and indestructible units and differ from each other only in the degree of the clearness with which they represent other monads. Each monad however is a little world in itself, a mirror of the whole of reality. Each one has also a dual nature, that is, it is partly active and partly passive, the passive element corresponding to the Aristotelian *matter*, the active aspect to the *form* or *entelechy* of the monad.

Leibniz saves himself from a subjective idealism by his postulate of Pre-established Harmony, according to which the ideas come to possess objective value since the development of the psychic monad is paralleled by the development of the cosmic monad.³ The idea of God, as pure actuality, plays a determining part in the Leibnizian scheme; but he guards against the mechanical necessity of Spinoza, by insisting that of all possible worlds, God chose the best, and even apart from divine choice the best would in the end prevail over all others and become actual. The *lex melioris* by which Leibniz sought to give meaning and beauty to the world-order, is established upon the law of sufficient reason which is both a law of thought and a law of being.

Both in spirit and method the philosophy of Leibniz is strikingly comparable to the Platonic and his attempt at a reconciliation of opposing systems of thought is poetic rather than scientific. According to the programme laid out by the philosopher the dualism must necessarily fall within consciousness and in his defining the epistemological problem as the passage from the realm of unconscious ideas to the realm of the clear and distinct

¹ Cf. *Petites Perceptions, New Essays* (Latta's trs.).

² *Monad*, 78.

³ *Ibid.*, 83, 86.

ideas. It is interesting to note, that in so far as he dealt at all with the problem and place of the beautiful, Leibniz places it on the border-land of the conscious and the unconscious, the active and the passive, aspect of ideas, as partaking of the nature of both and serving as the common ground of both.¹

The Faith Philosophers.

With the recognition of the limitations of reason, there is also to be seen an attempt to vindicate the rights of feeling. Both Rationalism and Empiricism, as final interpretations of human experience having failed, the search of the age is for some 'transcendent notion'² which shall reconcile the unending conflict between the mechanical and the teleological, the material and the immaterial, between the naïve and the ideal concepts of causality. We have indicated the rise of the same problem under different conditions and at different times and have attempted to show that the final interpretation reached in each instance was *aesthetic* rather than *scientific* and *discursive*. At such periods, as Lessing has pointed out, thought must proceed *gymnastically* rather than *dogmatically*. The recognition became a contagion by the middle of the eighteenth century, that the art, science and literature of the past are but idealized expressions of the inner life of feeling and will. Winckelmann (1755) in his *Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Kunstwerke*, showed that Greek life was the source and the prototype of Greek art and literature. Lessing in the *Laokoon* (1766) attempted to point out not only the 'that' but the 'how' of Greek art, and contributed to the casting aside of the false interpretations and arbitrary rules in which a pseudo-classicism had wholly submerged the works of the classic artists and authors. For Lessing, Greek art is essentially the expression and embodiment of the inner vision, and instead of its being a slavish imitation of nature according to certain prescribed rules, it is a free creation, in which the individual lifts himself above nature. The forms of the Greek artists were not born of external con-

¹ Lotze, *Geschichte d. Aesthetik*, p. 275.

² Höffding, *Problems of Philosophy*, p. 100.

straint, but were rather conceived in the sphere of pure beauty which thus awakening no desire, at once transported the mind into a dream of undisturbed immediacy. Therefore Winckelmann concludes, that if we would produce works of art like the Greeks, we must learn to feel and live as the Greeks lived and felt, that is, we must be as true, as noble, as free in our nature as they were.

According to the Faith Philosophers, who carried forward the attempted vindication of feeling, the source of truth is to be sought in intuition rather than in discursive thought.¹ The highest truths are to be *felt* not *demonstrated*. The most detailed statement of the Faith philosophy is to be found in Jacobi and we limit ourselves to a resume of his thought. He held that the understanding alone can not guarantee reality, and in harmony with the conclusions of Lessing and Winckelmann, insists that reality can only be presumed and felt.² Pure reason, as the doctrine of concepts, can lead only to atheism and fatalism. The conditioned can be made intelligible only by means of the unconditioned which lies beyond the reach of reason. It is only by the intuitive knowledge of feeling that we are able to transcend our finite and limited selves, and reach in beauty that perfect union of the parts of being in virtue of which it becomes a symbol of the inner life.

It is also to be noted that with Herder the individualism of the Illumination yields to the conception of humanity as one great individual which has passed through a series of stages in its development, strikingly similar to the stages in the development of the individual himself from infancy to old age. These conceptions of the faith philosophy were carried out in the mystical extravagances of the Romantics after Kant, so that we turn now to a study of the philosophy of the Sage of Königsberg in whom the several streams of pre-Kantian thought met and from whom issued the characteristic tendencies of the philosophy of the modern period.

¹ Vide, Falckenberg, *Hist. of Mod. Phil.*, pp. 310; Also Höffding, *Hist. of Mod. Phil.*, p. 3-18.

² Falckenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 313.

Kant.

The epistemological problem set by the antithesis of mind and matter, sense and reason, which had been the burden of discussion from Descartes to Wolff and from Bacon and Hobbes to Berkeley and Hume remained yet unsolved when Kant came into the field. The two-fold problem as to the origin of our ideas and the validity of their objective reference, which the Empiricists attempted to solve by holding that all our ideas are the result of pure experience, and the Rationalists by making the ideas an original possession of the mind, was clearly appreciated by Kant who at once set himself to its solution. He appears to have fully appreciated the fact, that both parties in the discussion were partly right and partly wrong, since each was concerned with an indispensable factor of all thought; but each was wrong in that thought to be vital and fruitful must be equally concerned with both factors. Perceptions without conceptions, he insists are meaningless, while conceptions without perceptions are fruitless. The Rationalists pursued a wholly analytical procedure and sought to explain all things by subsuming them as predicates under definitely given subjects. But Kant's acquaintance with the results in the field of science revealed the fallacy of evolving a system of reality from a number of given definitions. Still farther the discoveries of Galilei, Newton, Huygens and others were presenting a series of predicates which could not be explained by an analysis of any given subject.

According to Kant, the object of knowledge, is neither making explicit what was already implicit in the mind, nor the chance coming together of impressions from the external world, but the construction of an object within consciousness. The objects of thought can be none other than the product of thought. As to its content the object of knowledge is particular and contingent, while the form, which is of the mind's own contributing lends universality and necessity. The antithesis in knowledge is not between subject and object, as independent substances, but an antithesis between the activity of the understanding and sensuous perception. Thinking, according to Kant is the categorizing of sense data and the categories are the relations estab-

lished by the mind among phenomena. These categories are, however only regulative, and add nothing to experience. They are neither subjective dispositions, nor completely developed ideas, but 'forms' which the mind employs in making articulate an otherwise chaotic manifold of sense-experiences. Their value according to Kant is the making of *synthetic judgments a priori possible*, thus establishing, in opposition to Hume, the objective validity of knowledge.

The criticism has been made of the Kantian conception of the categories, that they were independent of the intuitions of sense, and remained so, as far as the work of Kant goes. But Kant appreciated the nature of the distinction and his doctrine of the 'Schema' represents an attempt upon the part of the synthetic imagination to mediate between the *a priori* forms and the manifold of sense—"an art" as Kant says "hidden in the depth of the human soul, the true sense of which we shall hardly ever be able to understand."¹

But while the categories are *a priori*, that is, independent of the manifold intuitions of sense, they do not extend our knowledge beyond the phenomenal world and can not, therefore, lead to a knowledge of the noumenal world given in sensation. "The understanding *a priori* can never do more than anticipate the form of a possible experience, and as nothing can be an object of experience except the phenomenon, it follows that the understanding can never go beyond the limits of sensibility. As phenomena are nothing but representations, the understanding refers them to a something as the object of our sensuous intuition. This means a something equal to x, of which we do not, nay, with the present constitution of our understanding can not, know anything."² The outcome of the *First Critique* is that there is no transcendent knowledge, that is, no possible knowledge beyond the limits of experience. Reason proposes questions which it is wholly unable to answer.

But the limit of that which can be experienced is not necessarily the limit of that which is or of that which ought to be, or

¹ *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 116.

² *Critique of Pure Experience*, Intr.

in other terms, the practical reason is not necessarily limited because we have found that the theoretical reason is thus limited. We are active and volitional creatures and while we find ourselves unable to know things-in-themselves, we can nevertheless postulate them. The unconditioned, therefore, which makes the conditioned significant and intelligible, must be sought in the Practical Reason. Between things as they are known to us and as they are in themselves, there is, for Kant, an abyss which the understanding can not cross. Thought, therefore, as Caird says, may like a physician, cure the ills of others but can not meet the challenge to heal its own.

But if the *Critique of the Pure Reason* was sceptical toward the ideas which made reason possible, the *Critique of the Practical Reason* sought at once to establish the validity of these ideas from the standpoint of the moral life. Thus once again, though with a material and a technique wholly impossible at an earlier period, the moral consciousness functions as an epistemological postulate. According to Kant the moral consciousness alone can carry thought beyond the phenomenal to the universally valid ground on which all higher truth rests. The active, volitional life outruns the theoretical, and Kant, with a long line of idealists, finds a solution of the epistemological problem in terms of the working will. Upon an analysis of the moral consciousness, he finds that its characteristics are precisely those demanded by his analysis of the epistemological consciousness.

Mediating between the pure reason, which is the faculty of the *a priori* forms of knowledge, and the practical reason, as the faculty of the *a priori* principles of conduct, is the judgment, which is the faculty of the *a priori* forms and principles of the aesthetic feeling. For Kant, therefore, the beautiful, which is the object of the judgment, mediates between the true and the good which are the objects of the theoretical and the practical reason respectively.¹ The judgment as the faculty by which the manifold of sense is unified, and the phenomenal world brought under the principle of design, thus awakening in consciousness the sentiment of the beautiful, becomes the principle

¹ Cf. Bosanquet, *Hist. of Aesthetics*, p. 256.

of world interpretation and unification.¹ But the judgments are two-fold in character: First, the teleological judgment that has to do with the problem of *adaptation* and arises only when the mechanical explanation fails. The teleological concept is, however, only regulative of experience, as appears from the antinomy which Kant treats in the dialectic of the teleological judgment. Thus it is to be inferred that Kant appreciated the limitation of the mechanical view of the organic world which prevailed during the seventeenth and the opening years of the eighteenth centuries. Mechanism and teleology are, as doctrines, irreconcilable and impossible, but as points of view, attitudes toward a presented content, they are both necessary and compatible. Thus Kant appears to have felt, what is more strongly felt in our day, that description and appreciation can not develop independently of each other, and that the theoretical and normative sciences are not developed in entire isolation.

In pointing out the several movements of thought before Kant, the Faith Philosophers were cited as bringing forward and emphasizing the feeling aspect of consciousness which had hitherto been completely ignored, or at least, made subordinate to the other aspects of consciousness. The Empiricists had insisted, however, that it is only in feeling that genuine contact with reality is had and a personal guarantee of truth secured. The attempt was made, therefore, to reduce all things, including beauty, to mere feeling. The Rationalists, on the contrary, characteristically insisted that personality, individuality, truth and reality are meaningless when reduced to brute feeling; and all things were then reduced to thought, and beauty was freed from the element of feeling. Kant's doctrine of the aesthetic judgment, as mediating between these antithetical views of the beautiful at once suggested itself as the necessary and appropriate mediating principle between these two opposed types of theory.

It is interesting to note in the present connection, that in his analysis of the aesthetic consciousness, Kant finds precisely

¹ *Kritik d. Urtheilskraft, Werke 4, 14*; Falckenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 40, ff; Höffding, *op. cit.*, p. 104, ff.; Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, III, p. 543.

those characteristics which the epistemological consciousness demands for the solution of its own characteristic problem. He appears to have appreciated that his discussion in the second *Critique* only pushed the problem farther back and that the problem can be solved only in terms of feeling, which mediates between reason and desire. Neither thought nor conduct can give us a complete object, since each refers beyond itself. Feeling, on the other hand, presupposes a *complete idea* of the object. The problem to which Kant gives himself after concluding that the feelings possess an epistemological significance, is the determination of the *a priori* forms of feeling without which they would possess neither universal nor necessary validity. Are there aesthetic judgments and what are their differentia? The object alike of thought and desire is necessarily subordinated to some end. The new problem to which Kant now sets himself is the determination of those feelings which are motivated by no conscious purpose. Such feelings, Kant finds, make up the content of the beautiful and the sublime. The beautiful is thus distinguished from both the true and the good in that it is the object of a completely disinterested satisfaction.¹ It differs from the merely agreeable in that it is the object of universal satisfaction. It differs further from the good in that it pleases without a concept. The pleasure of the perfect is conceptual, of the good is purposeful, while the pleasure of the beautiful is emotional and hence immediate. The secret of aesthetic construction is, that in it, the mind constructs its own objects without purpose and under its own immediate control.

The object therefore that shall at once reconcile the sensuous and the formal, the mechanical and the teleological, is one that recognizes the legitimacy and the place of the several demands of consciousness and in the construction of which both sense-perception and reason coöperate. As to the objectivity of the object presented by the aesthetic consciousness, Kant was somewhat in doubt, and in the end asserted the existence of a principle of beauty and purpose and goodness hidden in nature which reason

¹ Purposive without the idea of an end,' *Kritik d. Urteilskraft*, p. 87, note.

can not formulate. Nevertheless Kant recognized the epistemological value of the aesthetic consciousness and his analysis of the latter is a faithful reflection of the epistemological problem of the universalization and objectification of experience.

The German Mystics.

The outcome of the Kantian discussions is that the object of thought is thought's own construction. The world that each of us knows is made by him rather than for him, through the activity of consciousness itself. The problem is no longer as to how the world as already organized is carried over into the mind as Locke thought, but rather how we can construct our own world. The object of thought is neither an immediate datum of sense, a brute shock as the Empiricists held, nor a mere predicate analyzed out of an already given subject, but essentially a free construction upon the part of consciousness. In this way Kant thought to be able to strike a balance between the empirical and speculative tendencies of his age. His philosophy must be regarded as an idealism whose peculiarity is to be sought in its attempt to mediate between and reconcile the apparently irreconcilable antagonisms of the philosophy and science of the preceding age. The three *Critiques*, however, lack a principle of unity which shall at once bind them together and thus reduce the entire discussion to unity. The general advance made by Kant is to be seen in the fact, that both the theoretical and the practical reason are given independent treatment, with neither of which is it possible to identify the self as the 'transcendental unity of apperception.' Until Kant, no hesitancy was experienced in identifying the self with the one or the other of its two possible aspects. From Socrates on, repeated attempts have been made to identify the self with the moral consciousness and will has been repeatedly made the postulate of thought and reality. But in each such instance, as has been indicated, the practical reason was resorted to only because the theoretical consciousness could not render the whole content of experience. In the philosophy of Kant, the will may be said to have come to its majority and was brought under the control of the

individual himself. But Kant at once appreciated that after reason and will had worked themselves through, there was still a meaning left over, which he at once identified with the *noumenal*, as that aspect of being lying beyond all thought, but which nevertheless made thought possible. Thus again, as in earlier periods, the problem of the remainder became the problem of succeeding thought.

Kant himself found the principle of world unification and interpretation in the feelings as the judgment of the beautiful and his immediate disciples followed in the wake of the master in their farther search after unity. Their immediate problem was the resolution of the *thing-in-itself*; without it one could not enter the Kantian philosophy, nor with it remain in. Kant himself seems to have appreciated the inconsistency of the noumenal conception, and suggestions are found, in which he identifies the 'thing-in-itself' with the Pure Ego as the inner organizing and constructive principle of the mind. Reinhold raises the point at the outset, as to the failure of the Kantian philosophy owing to the absence of some one presupposition without which philosophy can never be a true science. Philosophy is not possible until the philosopher determines upon some one principle upon which the whole rests and which adds meaning and beauty to the whole. But it is here, as Reinhold remarks, that Kant fails, and at once attempts to surmount the failure by setting up, what he calls, the '*principle of consciousness*.' Consciousness thus becomes the primary fact which makes all thought and conduct possible. Knowledge is made up of ideas which are related both to the subject and the object, so that they must be distinguished from consciousness as well as related to it. In fact, consciousness is only the relating of the ideas to the subject and object, hence it is to be said of Reinhold that he placed greater emphasis than Kant upon the activity and unity of consciousness. The unity of consciousness can not therefore be identified either with subject or object. The various form, of knowledge are only the ways in which this relating process proceeds.

It is thus seen, as Höffding has pointed out, that the Kantian conception of a 'thing-in-itself' has become restricted to a

much narrower sphere than with Kant, from which it follows that neither the object nor the subject can be known in itself, but only the world of consciousness which hovers between the two. The presentation is distinguished in consciousness both from the presented object and the presenting subject, while related to both. The outer and inner conditions of reality, Reinhold insists, must not be confounded. Noumena are neither conceived objects nor things-in-themselves, but the laws which control our dealing with the objects of experience. Failing however to completely isolate the subject as the control factor of thought from the object, while insisting upon the necessity of the unity and activity of consciousness, Reinhold sought to transcend the dualism implicit in all his work by setting up an immediacy of consciousness in which both aspects are merged in an ultimate unity.

Maimon also holds with Reinhold that the two aspects of all knowledge as held by Kant must be given up and that knowledge must be deduced from one common principle. The distinction between matter and form can be relative only. He departs from Reinhold, however, in maintaining that it is impossible to establish a single highest principle. The principle of consciousness as held by Reinhold expresses what is common to all principles, while the special principles are not deducible from it. Assuming the dualistic character of all knowledge, Maimon holds, that running throughout all knowledge, there is an endeavor to reduce the dualism to unity. In fact it is precisely this demand for continuity that makes knowledge possible. Experience is not, therefore, a necessary relation, but the actual continuity of the perceived phenomena. Things, objects exist only in and for consciousness. We understand only what we ourselves construct. The thing-in-itself, whether the subject within or the object without, represents a limiting notion only, which can in no way become an object of knowledge. The problem of knowledge is the apprehension of phenomena through their reciprocal relations.¹ The instinctive desire of all thought is the desire for unity, totality, which finds its locus and

¹ Jacobi and Fichte, 1799.

explanation in the instinctive desire for perfection. But the idea of totality and unity can not be had as an object of thought, while the striving for unity has only ethical value. How then is unity of apprehension to be realized? How can the individual reach beyond the limitations of his present experience and comprehend the chaotic manifold in a single, self-contained experience? Such unity can not be had in terms of thought, Maimon continues, since thought always points beyond itself. In his further criticism of Kant, Maimon suggested a theory of knowledge which would have led beyond the limitations of Kant, but he became involved in the romantic cravings of the age, and in search after unity in terms of imagination as a sort of immediate deliverance of pure feeling. So it can be concluded with Höffding that "The romantic craving for unity, the longing to revel in the absolute, to unite thought with artistic conceptions, was too strong to permit of Maimon's critical and skeptical considerations exciting any permanent interest."

Throughout his whole life Schiller manifested a genuine delight in philosophical matters, a fact which justifies the bringing forward of his name in the present connection. He was an artist, rather than a philosopher, but took to philosophy, as he himself said, in order to prove that the artist alone is the true man and that art as such is the peculiar characteristic of man:

"Die Kunst, O Mensch, hast du allein."

Influenced at first by the ideal of freedom according to nature, an ideal borrowed from Rousseau and the English Empiricists, he finally arrived at the conception of the perfection of the individual through the harmonious development of his own powers, a development however proceeding from within. In the light of such ideal, no power of the individual is to be regarded as unfit and unclean. Nature hath joined the sensuous and the rational and let no man 'put them asunder.'¹ His problem was thus the problem of the age as to how the sensuous and the rational

¹ Vide, *Versuch über den Zusammenhang der tierischen Natur des Menschen mit seiner geistigen.*

could be brought together in some harmonious way. The ideal life can not be reached by leaving the sensuous behind, nor can the highest development of the one be secured by the suppression of the other. The old-time unity between mind and nature, the one and the many, has been lost as a result of advancing culture. The bringing together of these two aspects of human experience represents the problem of the age as Schiller saw it and he sought solution in the aesthetic experience. To play is human and play is the beginning of art. Only as the individual plays is he really human in the sense of reaching a free determination of himself. All other activities of the individual arise from some particular attitude and thus set a limit upon the mind, whereas the aesthetic experience is self-contained and leads to the unlimited. The aesthetic experience is a whole in itself and completes in itself all other experiences, so that in it, the individual feels as if he were snatched out of time, beyond the 'flammatia moenia' of the world, to an experience in which all his powers function harmoniously without being moved or conditioned by external powers or needs. Only by a free play of the individual's own powers can he express himself as a totality, that 'schöne seele' in which the conflict between the sensuous and the super-sensuous is transcended.¹ Artistic activity thus mediates between the lower sensuous impulses and the higher, rational form-impulses and unites the two sides of human nature into a harmonious whole. "In all the years," he says, "art has been the one mirror which held up to men a picture of their real self. To it we must again return if we would find deliverance from the limitations into which thought and conduct alike involve us. Science, philosophy, political and business activities appeal to individual aspects of human nature only. It is art alone that demands the whole man and which can thus restore the inner harmony of primitive nature. Man is only fully man in perceiving and creating the beautiful, which can arise only from the most complete and harmonious blending of the real and the ideal, of matter and form, of necessity and freedom."

The search after unity and totality of experience became a

¹ *Briefen über die ästhetische Erziehung, and Anmut u. Würde.*

passion with the men of the closing years of the eighteenth and the opening years of the nineteenth century. Both in political matters and in thought the unity of the spirit was everywhere seeking a more complete embodiment. As in the past, so again, men looked both to religion and to art as the means of a more adequate expression of the increased richness of life. The Critical Philosophy had left too far apart the several aspects of thought, and their unification in a higher experience became the problem of the age. The period was one of general upheaval. The past was felt to be altogether inadequate and attempts were made everywhere to construct life and thought upon a new basis. The poetry of Goethe and Schiller represent attempts to embody the profound aspirations of the times. The unity and totality which thought found itself unable to attain unto were thus attained in art, and as a consequence there was a general turning to art as a resource from the limitations and embarrassments in which thought found itself. Novalis in an unfinished work entitled *Heinrich von Ofterdingen*, held poetry to be the innermost essence of things which is, as such, a peculiar movement of the human spirit. Philosophy is, after all, only the theory of poetry and in poetry alone is the mystic word which completes and unifies our otherwise dualistic and discordant experience. But poetry was the expression of feeling rather than the embodiment of thought, so that feeling was everywhere regarded as the constructive principle of thought and life.¹ The mind of the poet is free to mould and construct sensuous images as it pleases. The distinction in thought between the sensuous and the super-sensuous is a distinction which the mind itself makes and in turn finds in art the organ of its reconciliation and transcendence. As the outcome of the attempt to throw the entire content of the intellectual life into a connected whole in terms of feeling, light was shed upon many problems and utterance given to ideas which outlived the several attempts themselves. These several movements are the subject of more extended notice in the next chapter.

¹ Cf. Erdman, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, sections, 314, 315; and R. Noy, *Die Romantische Schule*.

CHAPTER IX.

The Development of Modern Thought from the Post-Kantian Idealists to the Present, with Reference to the Rise of the Subject-Object Dualism and its Transcendence by Postulating some Form of Immediacy of Consciousness.

The suggestion of Kant that the thing-in-itself might be identical with the pure ego, supplied a lead, not only for the freeing of thought from the conception itself, but for the determination of the Ego as the subject of all experience. It will be recalled that Kant left a hard and fast line of cleavage between the pure ego and the form and materials of knowledge. The ego, as the 'thing-in-itself,' represents a remainder as yet unaccounted for, and always the problem of the remainder becomes the problem of advancing thought. For Kant the ego was only a negative and limiting conception, but one made necessary by the demand for conscious unity. Because of this limitation, a necessary one, however, the three *Critiques* of Kant remained more or less independent of each other, and whether we agree with McCosh or not, that "Kant was distinguished more as a logical thinker and systematizer than a careful observer of what actually takes place in the mind,"¹ the fact is that he introduced a new point of view for the study of the phenomena of consciousness.

Fichte.

Kant found after the completion of the first *Critique* that his theory of knowledge was incomplete, since it could not of itself supply the transcendent element without which knowledge is impossible. The unconditioned, which lends meaning and relation to the conditioned, can not be reached in terms of pure thought. The forms are valid only in the sphere of the under-

¹ McCosh, *Realistic Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 197.

standing. The three ideas, which are regulative of experience, can not be arrived at in terms of thought. But according to Kant, what the reason can not accomplish the moral life can. The moral consciousness alone can carry thought beyond the phenomenal to that which is objectively valid and universally necessary. The organization of experience must therefore be sought for on the active side of consciousness. Later, Kant found a conflict between these two disciplines and sought their reconciliation in the aesthetic judgment as issuing from the feeling aspect of consciousness. Fichte, however, whose chief concern lay in the sphere of the practical, assumed that out of this conflict and contradiction, this dualism of self and not-self, the principle of knowledge issued. His assumption is that in the moral conflict is to be found an explanation and the source of theoretical knowledge. Kant had already insisted that the object of knowledge is the outcome of our own self-activity. The transcendental ego is the law-giver of the universe. But in either instance, the self as the pure ego was wholly lacking in content. It was mere form and its unity was predetermined. Fichte, on the other hand, whose problem was to bring to clearer consciousness the nature of this free activity of the self in knowledge and conduct, holds that the ego is both form and content. It is precisely in this notion of the self as fundamentally active that Fichte thought to find the unifying principle of philosophy. Accordingly, he insists, in opposition to Kant, that the self is not that which thinks and acts, but is itself the activity. It is, he further insists, an activity which both goes out of itself and returns upon itself. Only in activity can the self be known and only thus can it realize itself. Kant's "thing-in-itself" thus becomes the activity of the self for Fichte, so that by giving it a more positive place in philosophy its farther determination became possible.

For Fichte, the object of knowledge is determined, not beyond consciousness, but within consciousness as that which is necessary to supplement the abstract reality of the ego. The primary assumption of knowledge is not the 'I think' of Descartes, or the transcendental ego of Kant which lies behind the life of thought and conduct, nor the unity of the subjective and

objective of Reinhold, but rather the 'I act,' in which the identity of the subject and object is expressed. But the non-ego, as that which is necessary to complete the ego, is derived from the ego itself, as that which is asserted or demanded by the ego in order that it may have an object against which to assert its own consciousness. We come therefore to believe in an objective world because we have previously willed to do so. For Fichte as also for Schopenhauer and more lately Professor Royce the non-ego, as the object of knowledge, is that which the ego or subject posits that it may become completely conscious of itself. The self and the not-self, the subject and the object, are therefore correlative, since neither exists apart from the other. The ego however must assert its own reality before it can assert the reality of the sense-world. The fundamental principle of all science he says is expressed in the proposition, "Das Ich setzt ursprünglich schlechthin sein eigenes Seyn."¹ Prior to all assertions, the ego must be asserted through itself.² The material of knowledge, to account for which Kant was obliged to posit a 'thing-in-itself,' is thus found in the activity of the self-existent ego. The 'thing-in-itself' is absorbed in the subject, so that instead of the ultimate dualism that obtained from Descartes, we have an *idealistic monism*, and the laws of thought are also the laws of being.

The ego, however, which in its pure conscious activity is ground both of the empirical ego and the non-ego, remains for Fichte the mere unlimited. It is only through the ego that the non-ego is posited and the ego denied. Therefore, the ego both posits and denies itself. Both the ego and the non-ego are to be regarded as objects of an ego, which as yet, lacks determination in the Fichtean theory of knowledge. Fichte's appreciation of this, led to his third principle as an attempted synthesis of the former two. The ego, he says, asserts a distinguishable ego over against a distinguishable non-ego. *Ich setze im sich dem theilbaren Ich ein theilbares Nicht-Ich entgegen.*³

¹ *Wissenschaftslehre*, Vol. I, p. 10.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 5.

³ *Complete Works*, Vol. I, pp. 83ff.

Fichte recognizes three approaches to the Absolute. The first has already been referred to in the third principle of the 'Science of Knowledge' which required an ego over and above the mutual limitations of the divisible ego and non-ego. Since, he argues, the individual self is constantly asserting the not-self, and the not-self, in consequence, is required to take successively higher points of view, there must of necessity be a 'universal principle' which shall at once include all these activities. But he also concludes that this all-embracing principle must be of the general nature of the ego as the form of self-activity to which everything in the universe is referred. Fichte also reaches, in the same way, the conception of an Absolute thought in which all finite processes of thought are made complete. Still further, he conceives of the Absolute as the harmony of freedom and law, in which sense God only is Absolute and therefore the one Reality. The ego is thus identified with God from whom, in a somewhat Neo-Platonic fashion, all reality is derived. In God, therefore, as the Absolute Ego, there is something more than self-consciousness, and only in religion, as the life of blessedness and love, can the individual ego become one with the Absolute Ego.

Schelling.

What Schelling attempted to do represented the next step in the Post-Kantian Philosophy. The conflict which Kant relegated to the world of 'things-in-themselves' is carried over by Fichte into the consciousness of the individual. For Kant, the conflict was both unavoidable and insoluble, and came to an end only in the Infinite. Fichte on the other hand, assumes that out of these conflicts and contradictions the principle of thought and conduct is born. The 'thing-in-itself,' of Kant, becomes the activity of the self for Fichte. The object of knowledge as the non-ego is not as Kant assumed, a substance lying outside of consciousness whose qualities the ego becomes aware of, but the assertion of the ego of that which is necessary for its own realization. The world thus becomes the product of our own consciousness, and the contradiction is to be looked upon, not as a paralogism, but as the postulate of moral con-

duct. Nature is the material of duty, and without limit there would be no moral life.¹ Every presentation involves a conflict, but this conflict is not to be interpreted as coming from an existence determined wholly apart from consciousness, but rather a conflict falling within consciousness, and is in itself the very making of thought and moral conduct. The ego is thus both form and content, and the processes of the world of nature become its own history.

But in addition to the conflict between reason and desire, the self and the not-self, which Fichte brought together in an immediacy of consciousness,² there is also the conflict between the individual and the physical world. The philosophy of Schelling represents an attempt to deal with this problem. For Fichte the not-self is a projection of the self, so that his philosophy represents an attempt to identify the two terms of the dualism by assuming an identity of process. The not-self thus becomes a negative concept very comparable to the 'Ding-an-sich' of Kant. One can not avoid asking, as Professor Royce has asked, why the ego interrupts its unbroken activity in order to posit the non-ego? Why posit the non-ego at all and why posit one that necessitates a struggle upon the part of the ego?³ Finally it must be said that for Fichte, Nature as the non-ego was merely a limitation of the ego and at the most only a means of the exercise of the individual's moral activities. The self is not therefore self-controlling and the not-self of Fichte as that in which the self seeks sanction and support for its constructions remains, like the play object of the child, 'pragmatic' in character.⁴

Schelling, on the contrary, holds that the not-self is given in nature. The self and the not-self are therefore to be identified, not by the assumption of the identity of process but of an identity of presented content. All nature is dual.⁵ Both in nature and

¹ Höffding, *op. cit.* Vol. II, p. 157.

² Vide especially his lectures, *Über das Wesen des Gelehrten*.

³ On the psychology of the 'Dualism of Inner Struggle,' see Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, p. 247f.

⁴ Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. I, p. 119.

⁵ Cf. *System des transcendentalen Idealismus*, p. 190.

spirit the essential principle of development is thought; but while in Nature thought is seen struggling toward and finally reaching consciousness, in Spirit there is the progress from consciousness to the highest reaches of self-conscious thought. Nature, for Schelling, is 'slumbering thought' and exhibits the three great modifications, Mechanism, Light and Organic Life, in each of which is present the fundamental antithesis required for all activity.¹ The Spirit likewise, has passed through a series of similar stages from theoretical thought, through practical, to aesthetic or art-consciousness. In each of these three stages a characteristic antithesis appears, which disappears only with the appearance of a more comprehensive mode of consciousness.

The conflict in the thought of Schelling is one that issues from a single principle which successively appears as nature and spirit. In the second period of his activity he was led to the position that this common principle, while somehow distinct from both nature and spirit, is, nevertheless, the ground of both. The conclusion reached is that there is one principle which manifests itself in the two terms of the dualistic experience. But Schelling was unable to carry out this conclusion, so that the one principle, the substratum of subject and object, which he designates as the 'Identical Basis of all Differences,' is as much lacking in positive content and determination as the 'Absolute Self' of Fichte and the 'Ding-an-sich' of Kant.²

The epistemological problem presented itself to Kant as a conflict between the form and content of knowledge, which was overcome in the aesthetic judgment. With Fichte the conflict was between the concrete individual of the Ego and the Absolute, which was also transcended in the immediacy of the religious consciousness. It is important to note that in both instances the principle of transcendence issued from the affective-volitional aspect of consciousness. It was a resort to the *Gemüth*. The active aspect of consciousness was always running in advance of thought; desire refusing to be held within the limitations of

¹ *Über den wahren Begriff der Naturphilosophie*, Collected Works, Vol. I, p. 85f.

² Cf. Schelling, *Philosophie der Mythologie*.

reason. In the instance of the Romanticists, and even of Fichte, the emotional aspect of consciousness seized and determined the entire field of experience. But every emotional experience tends toward an aesthetic moment, which becomes, for the time, our final interpretation of the universe and our means of evaluation. But since the aesthetic object is not merely the object of thought, its full content must be sought elsewhere than in reason. In the present instance, as in the previous ones, because of lack of content for the construction of the aesthetic object, consciousness turns to the past and uses materials similarly used in earlier periods. Schelling therefore in his search for a more positive filling of his concept of Identity turned to the Ideas of Plato, the Pantheism of Bruno, and the Mysticism of Böhme. To his philosophy of nature and the transcendental philosophy of spirit, Schelling now adds a philosophy of identity in which all things are seen under the Spinozistic 'sub specie aeternatis' and is thus lead back to the Absolute Identity in which all plurality is transcended. In the aesthetic consciousness, he concludes, we are at once both finite and infinite, and our final interpretation of the world is artistic rather than scientific; the beautiful is the perfect realization of the union of the subjective and objective—an identity toward which thought is moving but which art alone can accomplish. In art, therefore, the antithesis between the real and the ideal, between reason and desire, between thought and conduct, disappears, so that art becomes the solution of all the problems of reflection.¹

Hegel.

With Hegel the epistemological problem is opened anew and instead of the postulate of the Absolute Indifference of Schelling, he proposes the Absolute of immanent activity. The Absolute is not substance but self-conscious Spirit, and the unity of consciousness is the principle from which all things issue and to which they are to be referred for their final explanation. From the Cartesian opposition of mind and matter, neither Kant, nor Schelling, nor Fichte, was able to free himself. In

¹ Falckenberg, *History of Mod. Phil.*, p. 456.

each instance the epistemological problem was occasioned by the presence of an extraneous principle, so that the solution of the problem thus presented could be found only in going beyond consciousness. But for Hegel, the conscious spirit is the real presupposition and the ideal end of all things. According to Schelling, subject and object proceed from the Absolute, which is, in succession, nature and spirit, whereas with Hegel, the Absolute becomes successively subject and object, nature and spirit, or in the words of Turner, Hegel's Absolute is a "process rather than a source, an infinite of activity rather than one of static immensity and undifferentiated plentitude, a maelstrom rather than a sea of unruffled rest."¹

Fichte attempted to solve the epistemological problem set by Kant by reducing the 'thing-in-itself' to one of its aspects, while Schelling made the 'thing-in-itself' an Absolute identity. The motive in each instance was to find a common principle from which the dualism of subject and object issued. The limitation of each attempt is to be found in the necessity of seeking the support and sanction of thought and conduct beyond consciousness which could be realized only in terms of some mystical or ecstatic immediacy. The advance in Hegel is to be seen in the making of the Absolute the common source of the ego and the non-ego. In fact Hegel makes the process itself the Absolute.

This movement, however, has its own law and goal. These are not due to the action of some external agency but are immanent in the process. Reason is the law and self-conscious reason is the goal of the process. Reason, therefore, and the Absolute are identical and thought is the source and sum of all reality. Being is only thought realized and becoming is only the development of thought. Philosophy can not transcend rational experience since only the rational is real and philosophy must be in harmony with actuality and experience.²

According to Hegel philosophy starts with the 'idea,' as the system of reason and the sum of reality. This all-comprehen-

¹ Turner, *Hist. of Philosophy*, p. 562.

² Wallace, *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 10.

sive idea follows a law of development whose end is determined within the process and in the course of its development passes through three definite stages which constitute the three divisions of philosophy. In each of these three divisions, there is a further triadic division, so that each constitutes, as it were, a microcosm, while the three make up an all-inclusive macrocosm. It necessarily follows that the first, as dealing with the idea as the whole of reality, will be of the greatest importance in the Hegelian system. Logic, therefore, as the science of things held in thought, and thus identical with metaphysics, has to do with the several stages through which the idea passes, from the earliest stage of immediacy, in which there is no distinction between being and non-being, to the stage in which the idea from the stage of reflection passes back into itself again in another and higher immediacy.

The 'notion,' according to Hegel, is *being* returned to its own immediacy or, as he himself puts it, the notion is the principle of freedom, the power of substance self-realized. As containing all the earlier categories, the notion is the truth of being—the realization of totality and must be regarded as *semblant* since the 'other' of the notion is not really another. The contradiction thus involved between the notion as idea, and that which is not notion, except in a semblant way, disappears in the idea as the absolute notion, which Hegel defines as the union of the notion and its objectivity, of the real and the ideal, of soul and body. Truth is the absolute notion become its own object in the theoretical sphere. The Good is the absolute notion become its own object in the practical realm. But when the notion returns to itself from the limitations of the true and the good, the finiteness of cognition and volition, it becomes the absolute idea. This represents the goal of the logical processes.

In its next stage, the Idea passes into 'otherness and becomes nature, which Hegel defines as 'the Idea in state of otherness,' a state midway between the immediacy of reason as notion, and the reintegrated immediacy of reason as fully realized in the spirit. In nature the Idea has been particularized and externalized and natural science is justified in regarding phenomena as isolated realities and in dealing with the universe in piecemeal

fashion rather than as a whole. But philosophy takes a higher point of view, and represents the Idea as attaining again its unity and identity in man, who is the goal of nature's processes. In the individual, as in nature, the Idea passes through a three-fold stage of development as subjective, objective and absolute Spirit.

By the subjective mind, Hegel refers to the soul, consciousness, and the several psychical processes. The highest realization of this phase of mind is to be found in the "free will as intelligence."¹ But this freedom is acquired only as the mind comes to complete self-consciousness. At the first mind was wholly immersed in nature. When it came to the recognition of itself as the Ego, it divested itself of nature and as theoretical mind made itself the determiner of its own intuitions and thoughts. Then, by means of the impulses, desires and inclinations, it proceeded to determine its own contents thus arriving at a complete self-determination, which is freedom. The entire procedure is, however, purely theoretical, as contrasted with the purely practical character of the manifestations of the objective mind. In both instances, the mind is in a state of otherness, as Hegel would say, meaning doubtless that whatever control the mind exercises in either the theoretical or the practical sphere, is *mediate* in character.

But the Idea passes into a state of otherness, only that it may return enriched and deepened into itself again. The absolute mind, in which the antithesis between the theoretical and the practical, the true and the good, is transcended, represents the complete realization of the world-process. It is for Hegel, a conception of the ideal in which the soul becomes completely unified with all its finite manifestations in a richer and deeper mind. In brief the Absolute mind is the mind with all its meaning realized.

But that in which the mind finds itself fully realized reveals itself as an Ideal under three forms—as the beauty of Art, as Divine Perfection in God, and finally as the Absolute of Philosophy. The Ideal thus becomes the sphere in which the subject

¹ *Encyclopedia*, sec. 481.

knows itself as reconciled both with the world of nature and the world of spirit. Such an absolute experience, Hegel like Schelling finds in the aesthetic consciousness and defines a work of art as the representation of the Idea in sensuous existence, which satisfies alike the demands of theoretical and practical knowledge and elevates the mind above all forms of finitude to the highest enjoyment.¹ But all reality is development and the principle of the true philosophy is neither the abstract understanding, which finds itself limited to the phenomenal world, nor a mystical intuition which attempts to reach the highest knowledge by an easy and quick leap, but reason itself as the faculty of concrete concepts. The reconciliation of the several antitheses of thought, is therefore, neither impossible nor immediate from the outset of thought, but is the result of development. Reason neither sets the opposition nor denies it but proceeds to reconcile the antithesis, which is the necessity of all development. The object of philosophy is the absolute as the living subject which posits distinctions and returns from them to a higher synthesis. Each such synthesis becomes, in turn, the pedestal for a still higher synthesis, a platform upon which higher modes of reality may arise.²

Reality is replete with contradictions, but is nevertheless rational. The contradictions in which thought involves itself are not due to an a-logical *moment* which falls beyond the thought process, but show rather the incentive and possibility of all thought. These contradictions are not to be annulled by a return to a more primitive consciousness,³ but rather to be conserved by thinking the contradictory concepts together in a higher synthesis. For Hegel, the absolute thought, as the merging of the subjective and the objective, passes also through a three-fold stage of development, and art, which is the absolute in sensuous form, the infinite in the finite, must yield to religion in which the sensuous element of the former passes into a higher state of consciousness and becomes the inward life of the

¹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Fine Art* (Bosanquet's trs.), p. 13.

² Cf. Baldwin's 'Theory of Genetic Modes' in *Development and Evolution*, ch. xvii and xix.

³ Falckenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 492.

emotional nature. As art was the reconciliation of the sensuous and the Ideal, a reconciliation in which the sensuous prevailed, so religion is the reconciliation of feeling and thought in which the emotional nature holds the chief place.

But in religion, the contradiction is between thought and the emotional nature, which philosophy alone is able to resolve. Philosophy thus becomes the highest form under which the Absolute manifests itself. There is here a complete return to thought, the circle is made complete, and the process may repeat itself but can not reach a higher stage. The contradiction in the religious consciousness provokes free speculative thought with which logic or the science of thought as it is in and for itself, has to do. Having thus returned to itself, there can be no further development and the process can only repeat itself. The Idea, as the Absolute, is the process of development actualized, and philosophy, as the science of the actualization of the Absolute Idea is, "The highest, freest and wisest phase of the union of the subjective and the objective mind and the ultimate goal of all development."

The absolute Idea as the synthesis of the objective and the subjective notion becomes the platform for a further determination upon the part of the Idea itself. The syntheses thus far effected are to be explained as imaginative constructions from the images and ideas derived from the data of intuition. They are still, as Hegel calls them, more or less concrete, individualized creations. But with the rise of the absolute Idea, thought has been so far perfected as to no longer need help for its intuitions. As reason, its first movement was the appropriation of the immediate datum which makes it universal; but with the attainment of the absolute Idea, it proceeds to give the character of an existent to the materials thus far perfected by the process of 'Auto-intuition.' A construction of such character can arise only when thought has reached that stage of its unfoldment at which its ideas are accepted as its own and which, under its own positive coefficients of control, can be used for the sake of the embodiment of further meanings.

The absolute Idea appears successively as Nature and Mind, thus furnishing the subject-matter of two independent disci-

plines. Nature is the Idea (reason) in the state of otherness—a state mid-way between the immediacy of the notion and the immediacy of reason as fully realized. In nature, the Idea has once more lost its unity, and appears as a series of independent particulars. It passes through a series of stages and at last comes to self-consciousness in the individual. Here once more it passes through the three-fold stages of development. Defining the formal essence of the mind as freedom, Hegel holds that it is only as the mind arrives at complete self-consciousness, that the mind attains perfect freedom. Only by successive acts of knowledge does the mind emancipate itself from foreign control. The recognition of the ego means the attainment of inner freedom of determination. Having assumed the determination of its own ideas, intuitions and thoughts, the mind proceeds by means of the impulses and desires to fashion this content for the sake of the satisfaction of theoretical and practical interests. But freedom thus attained must be realized, perfected, and this can be accomplished only through necessity, as its opposite. For this reason alone, the mind objectifies itself in law, the family and the state. But in the most perfect objectification the mind is limited. The subjective mind can not always find itself perfectly expressed in the objective. The former is always running in advance of the latter and making demands which the latter can not satisfy.

But since the antithesis is of the mind's own making, it can also be synthesized by the mind, so that the mind, having objectified itself, completes the circle of development by returning to itself again, thus becoming identical with itself and as being subject to itself alone, becomes the Absolute Mind, as embodied in art, religion and philosophy. The theory of art has already been dealt with, and it needs only to be added in the present connection, that it again becomes the organ of immediacy and supplies a synthesis of nature and mind, which at once becomes the platform of a higher construction as embodied in religion and philosophy.¹ The latter, however, becomes for Hegel the reconciliation of art in which the sen-

¹ Hegel, *Introduction to Philosophy of Fine Art* (Bosanquet's trs.), p. 13.

suous prevailed and religion in which the emotions prevailed. In both art and religion the truth is revealed symbolically, whereas in philosophy, it is revealed as reason, and is therefore superior to both art and religion.

It has been shown, I think, that the aesthetic consciousness in the treatment of Hegel developed with the epistemological and that it became in every instance the organ of a higher synthesis. In the instance of the epistemological problem of the reflective consciousness, as Hegel regards reflection, the aesthetic consciousness again becomes that phase of experience in which higher aspect of reality is immediately disclosed. Art is thus the Absolute Mind disclosed, not as something behind the sensuous form, but in the sensuous form, giving it its form and meaning. Art, therefore, is not a matter of inference, but something to which to come immediately.¹ In religion also reality is manifested in an immediacy of consciousness. In ethics the mind is always confronted with the knowledge that beyond the present act, lies another, which has to be accomplished. Duty always connotes and involves another, thus illustrating the relationship of the one and the many. The moral consciousness is capable of endless progress and the self could never reach its goal through it. But in religion, which is the surrender of the will of the individual, and the acceptance of the will of God, the self finds its true life, thus ending the moral struggle by the attainment of the end of the moral life in an immediacy of consciousness. But Hegel, whose temperament was wholly idealistic, sees here a contradiction, which can be overcome only in terms of pure thought. Nevertheless one can not read the *Philosophy of Fine Art* without retaining the conviction, that the aesthetic consciousness, as the organ of transcendence, does after all afford the only ultimate view of reality. We do not get rid of our finiteness in our philosophizing, but in art and religion, according to Hegel, we come into immediate knowledge of those deeper aspects of reality which are in their nature ultimate and thus form the very basis of our finite existence.

¹ Ibid., p. 15.

That the rational alone is real, implies that reason has no limitations. Everything real is ultimately analyzable into terms of rational thought. How inadequate this conception of reality is, is to be inferred from the reactions that at once arose against it with their characteristic insistence upon the importance of the non-rational. The attempt to bring the whole of reality under a single principle certainly represents the goal of philosophic endeavor, but such principle can not be reached by neglecting or ignoring either of the several aspects and demands of the conscious life.

It can not be denied that the attempt of Hegel to completely unify the element of the Kantian philosophy represents the most comprehensive view of the problems of philosophy hitherto found. No department of human knowledge was untouched by it and there was none that did not feel its influence. By making thought 'common' rather than purely individual, as it had hitherto been, and by making so large use of the notion of 'development,' his philosophy was made to represent the embodiments of the highest aspirations of the last century.

But his attempt to bring the whole of reality under one principle of the mind brought about its immediate failure. Immediately after his death there arose a certain mystical and pessimistic reaction against his system. The vast and rapid accumulation of scientific knowledge, the increased daring of the human mind and the larger control over the external world during the past century, tended to the weakening of the rationalistic explanation of the universe. Predicates were daily arising that could not be analyzed out of the subject and reality was coming to be felt as larger than thought. Subject and object could no longer be kept upon the same basis of reality in pure thought and the subject at once sought to erect its own object; and since thought has failed resource again is sought in the affective-volitional aspect of consciousness. With Schopenhauer, the Will-activity of the mind, is brought into prominence, as the creator of the world.

According to Schopenhauer, the world is not a mere appearance, as Kant thought, but rather a world whose reality is to be sought in a blind force struggling for self-conscious assertion.

The Will thus becomes the 'thing-in-itself.' Will, not thought, is the ultimate principle of the mind and thought is but the reflection of will.¹ The affective-conative tendencies, as the struggle of inner forces for objective expression, is to be made the true basis of philosophy and the only approach to the Absolute.

Schopenhauer's epistemology is summed up in the expression 'Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung.' The ideas are not to be thought of as given archetypes of an external reality, but presentations created by the subject from the principle of 'sufficient reason' (*zureichenden Grunde*). The innermost reality of the world is to be sought in subjective struggle, as an unconscious force behind the world of appearance. But by insisting that the innermost reality of the Absolute as Will can never be known to consciousness, Schopenhauer, at once reduces his system to a mystic pantheism.²

But having defined the Absolute Schopenhauer attempts a definition of the world of presented fact. This he finds to be only successive modifications of the will. Each successive objectification of the will represents an embodiment of the 'will-to-be.' The world of presentations thus comes to be a reflection of the will and, therefore, dependent upon the subject which perceives it. The subject can not get beyond itself. The object of knowledge is a wholly relative thing, created by the subject under the *a priori* laws of thought.³

But while the world of presentation is wholly determined by the subject as the knower, consciousness nevertheless points to a higher world which does not depend upon the subject. This world, which to Kant remained wholly beyond the limits of experience, is, according to Schopenhauer forced upon us in an act of belief. To know one's own self necessitates the knowledge of things beyond one's self. Neither subject nor object can stand alone. Either would be meaningless apart from the other. The self is, therefore, both the subject and object of thought. "I know myself," he continues, "as the object

¹ *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, Bk. IV.

² Perry, *Approach to Philosophy*, p. 290; Höffding, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 235 ff.

³ *Die Welt als Wille u. Vorstellung*, Vol. I, pp. 3 ff.

of thought of others and thus an object of thought along with other objects." The chasm between thinking subject and objects of thought is thus partially transcended.¹

In making the subject and object of knowledge alike the products of will, Schopenhauer followed in the path marked out by Fichte. He makes will the essence of the world and also the nature of man, so that the world can be known only through man. The common essence of each is however grounded, not in appearance, but in the 'thing-in-itself.' Will thus becomes both the phenomenal and the noumenal. It is precisely here that the epistemological problem of Schopenhauer really appears. How can will, which is known by means of ideas, be identical with the will as the 'thing-in-itself?' He appears to have appreciated, what had not hitherto been appreciated, that the phenomenal and the noumenal can not be separated in any absolute way. But despite the fact that his conception of the will is elementary and his general psychology romantic rather than scientific, Schopenhauer himself realized that the will is dualistic and hence a problem within itself, which the will can not of itself solve. Knowledge is brought into being as the servant of the will but can not in any possible manner influence the will. Moreover the will remains identical throughout all stages of the development of knowledge. Only therefore in a higher type of knowledge can will escape from its characteristic bondage, the *Urphänomen*, in which the will as it is in itself is presented. But since the *Urphänomen* can not be reached in terms of ideas, Schopenhauer turns to the aesthetic experience and finds that it is only in art as the goal of human striving that all pain and suffering cease. Knowledge is always proceeding from one ground to another and will is ever striving anxiously forward after that which it is not, but in artistic contemplation, in which all things are seen *sub specie aeternitatis*, the terrible struggle for existence is ended. Defining the epistemological problem of Schopenhauer as the unification and realization of the will as a dualistic experience, the solution reached was in terms of the aesthetic experience, as an experience of an immediacy of will.

¹ Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 736ff.

It is unnecessary to pursue this historical investigation further, since the characteristic epistemological theories of more recent times are the subject of critical investigation in an earlier chapter.¹ Until the idealistic reaction a half century ago psychology was rather epistemology, and the subject of experience was interpreted in terms of content established apart from the mind perceiving it. That psychology has so long been in the 'gall of metaphysics and the bonds of ontology' is due to the failure to apply to the material with which it has to do the same methods—and in the same spirit—which have for a long time been applied to the treatment of external phenomena. The failure of the current epistemological theories is to be found in the fact that the mind, as the subject term of the currently recognized dualism, is not treated as being under definite and continuous laws of development. As in the earlier periods already discussed, the mind as the inner aspect of the dualism of current discussion remains the 'undigested' element in the theory of knowledge. But our point has been to show that in the earlier dualistic experiences solution was found by carrying over into the inner the coefficients under which the outer was held and guaranteed and thus made material for the embodiment of inner purposes. The failure to follow out such precedent in the treatment of the epistemological problem presented by the subject-object dualism, has motived the setting up of a number of defective and limited theories of knowledge. Within a dualistic experience it is possible always for consciousness to proceed in either of two directions, so that we are to expect materialistic and mechanical theories on the one hand and idealistic and humanistic theories on the other. But the several theories which proceed by emphasizing the one term of the dualistic experience to the exclusion of the other have been weighed in the balance and found wanting, and as after similar attempts at a solution of earlier dualisms, so now, there is a general movement toward a more idealistic solution.² Repeated attempts have been made to identify the self with some content, either intellectual or volitional, and in either instance, it has been found that neither

¹ Chapter iv.

² Cf. Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. xiv.

thought nor volition is able to completely harmonize its own content. The conclusion has thus been reached, that reality as an absolute experience, can be neither thought nor will, but some form of immediacy of experience, in which both alike are completed. So long as thought remains thought it is necessarily less than the whole of reality which it seeks to know, so that reality must always contain an aspect which can not be apprehended in thought. Moreover thought is always general, while reality must necessarily be also singular and immediate. But while thought is always seeking to comprehend the singular, it is found that the singular can not as such become the actual content of thought and so remains as an 'intent' meaning in consciousness.¹

And likewise of the will. For as has been indicated, the will implies the possession of and the motivation by the contrast between existence as it at present is and as it should be for the actualization and realization of ends in experience. It also, like thought, implies a separation of content and its references,² while reality can only be found in an experience in which these two aspects are finally united in an immediacy of will, an experience in which, as Professor Royce says, 'the will wills its own will,' or better, an experience in which the will by willing fulfills its own will. But an object in which the will finds itself fully reflected is necessarily an ideal object and therefore a form of 'intent' rather than content. Hence in the case of the Intellectualists and the Voluntarists alike, reality, as an absolute experience in which thought loses its generality and mediacy and will its privacy and intent of struggle, is not reached. For the one, reality remains a-logical, for the other a-volitional. In short each fails to reduce the term of the dualism embraced by the other.

Both types of epistemological theory agree that reality, as the object of knowledge, must issue from the subject, while the mystical resort in the case of each appears in the attempt to set up an ideal object as an intent meaning, which somehow falls beyond the process to which it makes its exclusive appeal.

¹ See Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. II, chaps. xiv, xv.

² Prof. Baldwin's dualism of 'fact and end,' *Ibid.*, Vol. II, chaps. xiii and xiv.

Such experience may be found in undifferentiated and unrelated feeling, as an experience in which the several aspects of thought and volition are merged in an unbroken immediacy; hence both alike tend to set up some such experience as the type of reality in an absolute experience

Closer analysis reveals the fact that these two types of epistemological theory represent severally aspects of human experience, either of which is meaningless and valueless apart from the other. The apparently empty and meaningless outcome of these several attempts point the way, at least, in which the future solution of the epistemological problem of reflection lies. Both thought and conduct are implicated in any fruitful and significant theory of reality. Some way out must be found whereby consciousness may regain its immediacy, without breaking with its entire life of achievement, and thus falling short of the full meaning of thought and volition. The mystical (in the sense of affectivistic), outcome of the Intellectualistic and the Voluntaristic theories of knowledge and reality, is to be inferred from the fact that neither can reach an absolute experience without breaking with the meanings already acquired in consciousness. But why stop the constructive process at this point? Since the dualism falls wholly within consciousness, is in fact of consciousness' own making, why not look also within consciousness for a higher mode of construction in which the fragmentary and limited meanings are transcended? Moreover it has been the burden of the present attempt to indicate the fact that consciousness has reached the dualism of subject and object only by transcending a series of earlier dualistic experiences. Each such experience found its completion by a process of reading forward of the meanings then present in consciousness. The transcending of the earlier dualistic experiences was not reached by ignoring the meanings then present, so that the resulting construction, represented in each instance, not an empty, but the fullest and richest possible experience. If Mysticism means a theory of knowledge and reality reached and realized only in unanalyzed and undifferentiated feeling, our outcome is not mystical; for the aesthetic experience in the several stages of its development brings unity and

completion to an otherwise incomplete and dualistic experience by setting up, in a schematic way, a farther and richer meaning. In terms of the semblant consciousness a way has been found whereby consciousness may transcend itself without ignoring or breaking with its already acquired meanings. Lacking such method of treatment of meanings already present in consciousness, both Bradley and Royce are driven in the end to set up a form of 'sheer sentience' and 'volitional immediacy' in which the essential character and meaning alike of the Intellect and Will are wanting. The conclusion of the present attempt is, that in the aesthetic experience we have a mode of conscious construction in which the dualistic character of thought and will are transcended without sacrificing the essential meanings of either.¹

Such a solution of the epistemological problem presented by the dualistic character of reflective experience, can be reached only when both types of experience, isolated by the Intellectualists and the Voluntarists respectively for methodological purposes, become the subject-matter of a new and higher mode of conscious construction. Each successive determination of thought has been reached only by an increasing determinateness of its two-fold aspect, content and control. At each higher mode of conscious determination both the content and the control are deepened and furthered, the former by the taking over into the objective, as a sphere of guaranteed content, what had before been inner as the undetermined, the latter by a process of retreating into a further 'inner' whose kernel is the sense of agency and control. The significance of reflection is that it marks that stage in the development of consciousness at which the self, as the presupposition of control, is finally set over against the whole of its content as made up respectively of mind and body. To reduce matter to mind or mind to matter or both to some mystical principle, leaves the epistemological problem unsolved, since the dualism of subject and object remains unmediated.

¹ Vide, Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 413; Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 172; Royce, *The World and the Individual*, Vol. I, p. 42; and Baldwin, *Thought and Things* (Vol. I, Preface, and Vol. II, Appendix, II).

It has been the purpose of this historical investigation to show that thought, alike in the individual and the race, has reached the mode of reflection with its characteristic dualism of subject and object, only by passing through a series of earlier dualistic experiences in each of which the epistemological problem arose anew, while the solution of such experience was sought by a resort to the aesthetic experience. The epistemological consciousness is always dualistic, while the demand of consciousness is for a self-centered and self-controlled world. The unification and objectification of the world, in terms of the inner control factor, became the epistemological problem within each of the earlier dualistic experiences, and remains so when reflection is reached. But, regarding a dualistic experience as an incomplete experience, a conclusion reached both by the Intellectualists and the Voluntarists, it has already been shown that such experience can complete itself only by the establishment of a farther experience, which, while not as yet realized, can nevertheless be accepted and treated as '*if it were already realized.*' The object of knowledge in terms of which our finite and fragmentary experience is completed and interpreted is, as Kant already pointed out, the object of a possible experience, *mögliche Erfahrung*. Knowledge is, therefore, a process of idealization. Thought as mediate and relational, and therefore finite, is always seeking an Other as its own completion. But unless the "Absolute is content with making eyes at itself in a mirror, or like a squirrel in a cage satisfied in revolving in a circle of its own perfections,"¹ the Other must fall beyond the process of thought. Thought and fact are not identical, and for thought to make them so means the destruction of thought itself. Here then is the dilemma of the Intellectualists: How can thought posit an Other, which, while falling beyond present experience, is not independent of all experience? Bradley realizes the precise character of the problem set by a thoroughgoing Intellectualism and reaches the conclusion that "thought to get beyond its relational character and thus reach something more than truth must be absorbed into a fuller experience."

Thought can, therefore, desire a consummation in which it is lost, a whole of experience in which all the elements of finite experience would be contained in an immediacy which is nothing else than 'sentient experience.'¹

The Voluntaristic theory of knowledge as most adequately worked out by Royce is brought face to face with the same dilemma, viz: How can the idea as an internal meaning set up an Other as an external meaning in which the internal meaning is determinately embodied? "In seeking its object," says Professor Royce, "any idea whatever seeks absolutely nothing but its own explicit, and, in the end, complete determination as this conscious purpose embodied in this one way. The complete content of the idea's own purpose is the only object of which the idea can ever take note. *This alone is the Other that is sought.*" "What is, or what is real, is as such the complete embodiment, in individual form and in final fulfilment, of the internal meaning of finite ideas." The Other of thought thus becomes a further meaning in which all partial and fragmentary meanings are completely embodied, but the fact remains that Professor Royce has nowhere shown how it is possible for the ideas as finite meanings to set up a completed experience and to treat it '*as if it were completely present.*'² Thus despite the difference of the premises from which they start, both the Intellectualists and the Voluntarists arrive at the same conclusion, viz., that experience whether of the intellectual or volitional type can complete itself only in a further experience; but lacking a method whereby present meanings may be treated for the sake of further meaning both arrive at a more or less empty and meaningless type of reality as an absolute experience.

But the extremity of the intellectual and the voluntaristic becomes the opportunity of the aesthetic, which appears with the epistemological, and functions always as the organ of world-transcendence and world-completion. In the instance of the earlier dualistic experiences, reconciliation and completion were secured, not in terms of meanings already acquired, but always

¹ Ibid, ch. xv.

² Royce, *The World and the Individual*, Lecture VII, on 'The Internal and External Meaning of Ideas.'

by a schematic treatment of meanings already present for the sake of further meaning. Each such reconciliation and unification represents an increasing determinateness of the two aspects of thought already distinguished as content and control, and the resulting immediacy of experience is due to the erection of a 'semblant' object under the presupposition of 'inner' control with which the 'inner' as the subject of experience identifies itself by a process variously named but coming into general recognition of 'Einfühling'¹ (Lipps), 'absorption'² (Mitchell), and 'sympathetic or semblant projection'³ (Baldwin).

With the rise of reflection, and the subject-object dualism, the subject term functioning in each instance as presupposition of a control, there is a re-distribution of contents for the sake of common reflection. Two types of meaning are present and issue respectively in two types of judgment as the embodiments of the theoretical and the practical interest respectively. But it has been pointed out that in both thinking and acting the subject is more than either thought or conduct. Neither type of experience is able to render the whole of its own peculiar meaning, while at the same time it tends to minimize the meaning peculiar to the other. The essential point in the present connection is that both types of experience are dualistic and remain so, so that to destroy this dualistic character means to deprive both of whatever meaning they have acquired. Any postulate of reality as an absolute experience reached by such procedure will necessarily be a-dualistic, whether expressed in terms of logical identity or mystical contemplation.

But our contention has been, and here the matter must end, that consciousness has developed from its first immediacy, as an a-dualistic experience, to the full-fledged dualism of subject and object, only by a process of semblant construction, in which the two aspects of thought are merged in a new and higher immediacy. The 'that' and the 'what,' the existential reference and the related content, have arisen and developed together. The resulting epistemological problem becomes the reconcilia-

¹ Lipps, *Raumästhetik u. geometrisch-optische Täuschungen*.

² Mitchell, *Growth and Structure of the Mind*, Lect. viii.

³ Baldwin, *Unpublished Lectures on Aesthetics*.

tion of these two factors of thought; but it can not be reached by assigning the primacy to either. It is precisely in such procedure that we are to seek for the rise of the partial and inadequate epistemological theories of the present time. The conviction is thus forced upon us that the epistemological problem can be solved only by the setting up of a mode of conscious construcion in which the two aspects of thought are reconciled and thus unified. Such mode of conscious determination is found in the aesthetic experience, hence the conclusion is reached that the epistemological and the aesthetic have arisen together and that the latter has functioned always as the organ of world unification and completion, thus satisfying the demands of the two-fold aspect of all thought.

From this point of view, the aesthetic experience becomes an absolute experience, but not in the sense that it is a static and meaningless experience. Here I think is found the fruitfulness of the present point of view in contrast with the Intellectualistic or Voluntaristic or pure Affectivistic. New dualisms will continue to rise but as Professor Baldwin has shown, such dualisms will be those of fact and not of meaning.¹ Both types of meaning are now objective to the self as the presupposition of control, so that we can conclude with the statement of Professor Baldwin that with the rise of the aesthetic experience consciousness has a way of finding its dynamics intelligible as a truthful and so far a static meaning, and also of acting upon its established truths as immediate and so far dynamic satisfactions; thus reaching the only tenable absolute as an experience in which all contrasted meanings as relative and instrumental are removed. If we define the epistemological problem as the problem of 'transcending the subject,' of 'constituting the totality which we call the real world,' of "forming the idea of an absolute experience in which phenomenal distinctions are merged, a whole become immediate at a higher stage without losing any richness," or finally "the complete embodiment, in individual form and in final fulfilment, of the internal meaning of finite ideas," and further define the aesthetic experience as a mode of

¹ Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, Vol. II, Appendix, II.

conscious determination in which a higher mode of immediacy is reached by the merging of the dualisms and relativisms of thought, light is at once thrown upon the resort to the aesthetic experience in the history of the development of the thought of the race; and the thesis here presented, that the aesthetic has arisen with the epistemological and functions as the epistemological principle of world-completion and interpretation is confirmed.

1. The first part of the paper is devoted to the study of the properties of the function $f(x)$ defined by the equation

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EDITED BY

HOWARD C. WARREN, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

IN B. WATSON, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY (*Review*)

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ARTHUR H. PIERCE, SMITH COLLEGE (*Bulletin*)

The Philosophy of John Norris of Bemerton

BY

Flora Isabel MacKinnon, M.A.,
Wellesley College

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PREFACE

This study of the philosophy of John Norris was presented as a master's thesis to the faculty of Wellesley College. It has been somewhat shortened but otherwise little altered. The primary reason for publishing the essay is the fact that modern histories of philosophy contain such slight references to Norris and his work. A Rostock doctor's dissertation on the "Philosophy of John Norris" was published in 1894 by Fred Powicke. But this monograph is, apparently, little known, and I did not come upon it until my work was nearly done. It deals, moreover, rather with the general aspects of Norris's philosophy than with its sources. Besides this, I have found in English only the occasional references to Norris, which occur in connection with the study of Cartesianism and of the theories of the Cambridge Platonists.

I am glad to have this opportunity to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Mary Whiton Calkins, who suggested this subject and who has given constant help and unfailing encouragement.

F. M.

WELLESLEY COLLEGE,
June, 1910.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN NORRIS, OF BEMERTON

INTRODUCTION

Among the men in all the ages who have been 'lovers of the sight of truth,' there are some whose interest for later generations lies not in great discoveries of new aspects of that truth, nor in bringing to expression the half-thoughts of those who were before them, but rather in the meaning of their failure, in the significance of what they did not attain. Of these is John Norris of Bemerton. A follower of Plato and the Schoolmen, yet with a quick interest in the science and mathematics of his own day, he attempted to give an account of reality which should reconcile philosophy and science with religion, but succeeded only in making clear the difficulties of his chosen theories, and in helping to point out the way which later philosophies were to take. From one point of view Norris is the last upholder of the tradition of Platonic idealism, from another he is the forerunner of modern idealistic theories. Revealing the inadequacy of the one by his very insistence upon it, he is blinded to the possibility of the other. Not through timidity, for he adopted Malebranche's theory in spite of the scorn with which it was received by some of his contemporaries, but rather through a too great reverence for the past, he fails to make any real advance, and leaves to others the task of determining the future.

A stern yet gentle rector in a country village, he reads and studies with an enthusiasm which is the ruin of his individual thought, and sets forth his Theory with modesty and self-depreciation. "And yet as much as I have thought, and as well as I seem to have consider'd of these things, yet being not unmindful of Human Infirmary in general, and my own in particular, as also of the Sublimity and Singularity of

my argument, I would not (however through Imprudence I may happen to express myself) be understood to be so positive in anything; but that where I deliver my sense with most assurance 'tis always *Salva meliori disquisitione*, not barring myself the Liberty and Advantage of after Thoughts, or the Information of better judgments, which I shall always be ready to receive with a thankful Submission, even to the Retracting of the most Fundamental Notion here maintain'd upon due conviction of its Falsehood, as designing only to find that Truth which I inquire after, and not to establish any Notion of my own, purely as such."¹ All through Norris's books, essays and discourses written while still a student at Oxford, sermons preached before country folk of the Bishop of Bath, and the two volumes of the *Theory*, we find this same spirit, of devotion to the Truth as he sees it, of conviction without dogmatism, of confidence without arrogance. If sometimes one suspects that he would have reached a more adequate philosophy if he had stood more strongly by his own earlier ideas, and had been less swayed by those whom he delighted to call his Masters, it is yet true that this very devotion to the thought of the past lends a quaint charm to these books, even as it reveals certain characteristics of the man, for which a more consistent theory might not make complete compensation. It is the mingling of old and new, of the scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas with the 'new philosophy' of Descartes, that gives the *Theory of an Ideal or Intelligible World* its distinctive quality. Here are many warring elements and one occasionally wonders whether the conflict between them, which to our eyes is obvious, was simply unnoticed and ignored by Norris, or was overcome in a wider comprehension which he lacked the power to express.

That sense of mystic oneness with God, which he shares with Plotinus, and in which all earthly knowledge is dross and vanity, is nowhere made compatible with the enthusiasm for exact science which was more characteristic of his own day.

¹ *An essay Toward the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World*. Vol. I., To the Reader V. Hereafter this work will be referred to as *Theory*.

He finds good in both and cares not to question their relation to each other. With a practical and somewhat prosaic mind, Norris combined a faith in the reality of unseen things, and a singular ability for making abstractions serve as the object of religious devotion. A certain despair of the things of this world makes him seek elsewhere for truth and reality but he has not the deeper insight which can see this world also as a part of the Ideal, and only occasionally suggests the demand that it should be so seen. While emphasizing the necessity for 'clear and distinct Thought'¹ as the criterion of truth, he also asserts the 'Efficacy of Purity of Heart and Prayer'² in the search for Truth, and even in the book in which he explains his philosophy, declares the comparative futility of such speculation, "considering how short sighted and fallible we all are. And as for such Truths as are above the pitch of our present comprehension, them let us have at least the Prudence not to employ our search about, studying only what is intelligible by us in this imperfect state, and leaving the rest to that great and shining Day when the Light of the falsely learned shall be turned into Darkness, and the Darkness of those who sincerely and humbly apply themselves to the inquiry of Truth, and the practice of true Righteousness, shall be turned into Light."³

¹ *Theory*, II, p. 167.

² *Conduct of Human Life*. Second Reflection.

³ *Theory*, II, p. 6.

THE LIFE OF JOHN NORRIS

We know really very little of the life of Norris. There are no stirring events, we catch scarcely an echo of any life beyond that bounded by his parish, his books and his friends. Born in 1657 in a village in Wiltshire, he had his education, as he himself says¹ "in a very eminent school, that of Winchester, where I made no small Proficiency in Classick Learning as 'tis called." This Classic Learning was apparently for the most part Homer and Hesiod. "Poetical Stories, Dreams and Fancies," Norris calls them some years later, in a criticism of the public schools for spending so much time and labor in learning 'such things as are of no standing constant use,' when so many 'excellent and useful things might be learnt in the Mathematicks and other ingenious and profitable sciences.' In 1676 Norris entered Exeter College, Oxford, and in 1680 received his degree and a Fellowship in All-Souls College. Here he remained for nine years, studying, writing and preaching an occasional sermon, for he was ordained in 1684. It was a peaceful contented life and we find Norris referring to it later with a suggestion of regret that it is past, for² "Those who enjoy abundance of leisure and are retired from the noise of the world and have their Time at their own disposal, as Fellows of Colleges may, if they have any genius for it, do great things, even what they please."

From the books written by Norris during these years we gain a fairly clear idea of his reading and find there the same interests and tendencies which have more complete expression later. He refers to Plato and to Aristotle, to Boethius and Seneca, and occasionally to Horace and Pindar. Among modern writers he speaks with greatest admiration of Des-

¹ *Reflections upon the Conduct of Human Life*, The Third Reflection. *Reason and Religion*, p. 253.

² *Theory*, II, preface.

cartes and Dr. Henry More, and with a certain touch of contempt of the 'author of the Leviathan,' as in declaring that the wise man is,

"Not he whose busy pate
Can dive into the deep intrigues of state,
That can the great Leviathan control
Manage and rule 't as if he were its soul."¹

The most distinctive characteristic of these essays is the strong note of Platonism, perhaps more marked because of the absence from these earlier books of all reference to Malebranche, whose authority is so often quoted in the later ones. In the collection of *Poems and Discourses*, first published in 1684, there is an Essay² in the form of a Letter, 'On the Platonic Ideas and Platonic Love,' which shows that Norris was at that time a devoted student of Plato. He is arguing against the supposition that Plato believed universal abstract ideas to exist by themselves, such as 'man in general.' What Plato really taught is, he insists, that the world is the 'effect of an Intellectual agent,' that there must be a Form in the Mind before the work of Creation, and that these eternal Forms, existing in the Mind of God, are what Plato meant by Ideas; "as for Ideas subsisting out of Divine Mind, I know no good reason to believe that Plato ever maintained any such Ghosts of Entity."³ These Ideas which are the causes of things and 'Measures of their Truth,' "are not any real essence distinct from the Divine Essence, but the Divine Essence itself as it is variously participable by Created Beings."

Other significant parts of the *Miscellanies* are the argument for the existence of God from the nature of Eternal Truth, to be discussed later; the plea for religious toleration,⁴ the theory that sin is not something positive but a loss or privation of good, a conception which Norris may have taken over from St. Augustine, and the sermon on Freedom.

¹ *A Collection of Miscellanies*. London, 1706, p. 63.

² *Miscellanies*, p. 303.

³ *Miscellanies*, pp. 306-307.

⁴ The gist of the argument for toleration is in the sentence, "Since God has required nothing of us but what is agreeable to our reason, why should man?" *Christian Law*, p. 201.

The dedication of this sermon is one of the signs of the friendship between Norris and Henry More of Cambridge, which had its beginning at about this time. More was one of a group of scholars and divines, known at first as Latitude men, because of their religious toleration, and later as the Cambridge Platonists.¹ The school may be said to have begun with Whichcote, of whom it is recorded that "he set young students much on reading the ancient philosophers, chiefly Plato and Tully and Plotinus."² United with him or following his leadership were such men as Ralph Cudworth, author of the *True Intellectual System of the Universe*, and the *Treatise on Eternal and Immutable Morality*, John Smith, noted for the eloquence of his discourses,³ Richard Cumberland, who wrote a *Philosophical Disquisition on the Laws of Nature*,⁴ Joseph David, who attacked materialism by offering evidence for ghosts and apparitions, Nathanael Culverwell, Bishop Patrick, Henry More, and others more or less closely connected with these.⁵ They were united by a common religious ideal of spiritual insight and purity of life, and by their devotion to the ancient learning, particularly to the study of Plato. The object of all their labors of writing and preaching was the reconciliation of Christianity and philosophy, the demonstration of the connection between religion and reason. That Norris shared with them the conception of religion as essentially rational is shown by his constant emphasis on the value of his Ideal Theory for religion. His confident assertion, that "every revelation of God will bear a rational sense and interpretation,"⁶ is closely in sympathy with Whichcote, who expresses almost the same thought in his sermons, saying in one place, "To speak of natural light or the use of reason in religion is to do no disservice at all to grace, for

¹ See John Tulloch, *Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century*, 1872, Vol. II.

² Burnet's *History of His Own Time*, I, 187.

³ *Dictionary of National Biography*.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ See Appendix, note I.

⁶ *Theory*, I. To the Reader, XIV.

God is acknowledged in both."¹ In the same tone John Smith says, "It is a fond imagination that religion should extinguish reason, whereas religion makes it more illustrious—and they that live most in the exercise of religion shall find their reason most enlarged."² Norris is at one with the Cambridge Platonists also in his adherence to Plato and Platonic idealism as they conceived it, and in opposition to materialism as a form of atheism. For all of them Plato is very nearly equal to the Bible in authority, and the interpretation of Scripture in accordance with the Platonic Philosophy is their common inheritance.

Although Norris was thus in agreement with the spirit of this school of Cambridge Platonists, his personal knowledge of them seems to have been limited to his friendship with More, and an occasional reference to Cudworth,³ and Cumberland.⁴ So far as I know he does not refer to any of the others. His correspondence with More which was carried on at intervals between 1683 and 1686 is published in Norris's *Essay on the Theory and Regulation of Love*. More himself, 'the most interesting and most unreadable' of the Cambridge Platonists⁵ was a Fellow of Christ's College, where he had remained since his graduation in 1655. He was of a strongly mystical temperament, and though originally a follower of Cartesianism had rejected it almost entirely. His *Enchiridion Metaphysicum* is for the most part an attack on the mechanical principles of Descartes. Norris's admiration of More is clearly shown in spite of their occasional differences of theory. In

¹ Whichcote, *Sermon on the Exercise and Progress of a Christian*. Quoted by Tulloch *Rational Theology*, Vol. II, p. 99.

² John Smith, *Discourse II*. Tulloch, *Rational Theology*, p. 185. One possible reason for the influence of St. Thomas Aquinas and his scholastic philosophy on the Cambridge Platonists is suggested by the following passage from St. Thomas: "The natural dictates of reason must certainly be quite true; it is impossible to think of their being otherwise. Nor again is it permissible to believe that the tenets of faith are false, being so evidently confirmed by God. Since therefore falsehood alone is contrary to truth, it is impossible for the truth of faith to be contrary to principles known by natural reason." Thomas Aquinas, "*Summa contra Gentiles*", Bk. I, Ch. VII.

³ *Theory*, I, p. 401.

⁴ *Miscellanies*, Discourse concerning Perseverance in Holiness, p. 214.

⁵ Tulloch, *Rational Theology*, II, p. 303.

the second letter, for instance, he says, "Indeed I cannot but look upon it as an infinite obligation that a person of your age, worth and character in the World, should vouchsafe an answer (and that so candid a one) to such a green student as myself; one that just begins to climb that tree of Knowledge upon whose utmost bough you sit."

The letters begin with Norris's questioning of the doctrine, held by More, of incorporeal extension, and are continued as a discussion of certain ethical questions and of the theory of free will. More maintained that all that was extended was not necessarily body,¹ since that would mean that the soul was 'nowhere.' Norris asks for an explanation of this point, but is apparently unconvinced, though the subject is dropped. On the question of freedom they are agreed in the conviction that man's will must be free, for otherwise God would be the author of sin. More, however, dissents from Norris's treatment of the question in a recent sermon.² The latter had there maintained that freedom could not lie in the activity of the will, since we desire only what is perceived by the understanding, nor in the intellect, since we have no power of framing new ideas, but must lie solely in the power of directing our attention. Norris defended his position with strong conviction, but without losing his reverence for the learning and wisdom of Dr. More.

About this time it is probable that Norris also carried on a correspondence with Damaris Cudworth the daughter of Ralph Cudworth, afterwards Lady Masham, and a friend of Locke. He later dedicated to her his book on the *Theory and Regulation of Love* and *Reflections on the Conduct of Human Life*, but she disagreed with his philosophical ideas, and was offended by his reference to her weakened eyesight,³ so that their friendship was not of long duration.

During the last years of his residence at Oxford Norris became acquainted with the writings of Malebranche, who

¹ Cf. *Letters*, and More's *Divine Dialogues*. London, 1713, I, XV, pp. 50, 54, 58.

² *Miscellanies*. Discourse on the Nature of Sin.

³ Locke's *Works*. London, 1801. *Letters*, Vol. IX, pp. 400-404.

exercised so great an influence on his later work.¹ He shows no signs of acquaintance with Malebranche's books until after the publication of the *Miscellanies* in 1687. In the *Theory and Regulation of Love*, published in 1688, there are a few references to Malebranche, to the *Traité de la Nature et de la Grâce* and to the *Recherche de la Vérité*, while the *Reflections on the Conduct of Human Life*, published the next year, are filled with references to Malebranche, which have all the zeal and enthusiasm of a new disciple. The *Reflections* are in the form of letters to Lady Masham (Damaris Cudworth) and have many such expressions as, 'your deservedly admired Monsieur Malebranche,' 'your beloved Malebranche,' than whom 'I cannot recommend you to a better Tutor.' And in reference to the rules of thinking given by Malebranche in the *Inquiry after Truth*, the second part of the Sixth Book, Norris says: "If an angel had been engaged in the undertaking, he could not have given better."² From the fact that Lady Masham afterward wrote a book³ in criticism of some of the ideas which Norris holds in common with Malebranche, it would appear that his enthusiastic admiration was an expression rather of his own attitude than of hers. In the later books Norris makes frequent, and in some places continual, reference to Malebranche, and quotes at length from the *Recherche* and the *Entretiens*, but not with the eagerness of a fresh discovery. This makes one believe that these two books were written under the impulse of a first reading of the French Father. We have no direct knowledge of the beginning of Norris's acquaintance with Malebranche, but it is rather interesting to note that the first English translations of Malebranche's works were published by the same S. Manship who published Norris's earlier books.

About this time Norris seems to have read extensively the works of St. Augustine and the Schoolmen. There are very few notices of them in the early books, and these merely general

¹ See note on Malebranche in Appendix, p. 98.

² 'Conduct of Human Life,' in *Reason and Religion*, p. 209.

³ *Concerning the Love of God*. 1696.

references, but in *Reason and Religion* there are many specific references both to St. Augustine, and to Thomas Aquinas, with quotations from their writings. In both Norris found many conceptions congenial to his mind, and his respect for their teaching and authority, particularly for that of St. Augustine, seems to have increased constantly. In quoting St. Augustine's support for the Ideal Theory, it is, "not because I have no other, but because I know no greater,"¹ and again, "I think it may be properly remarked that, as no Man has said greater things than he, so none has expressed them more happily than he oftentimes does."²

In 1689 Norris married and was appointed rector at Newton St. Loe, a small country village near Bath, where he found the 'Solitude and Retirement'³ that suited his thoughtfulness and 'invited Meditation'. Of his personal life we know only that he had children, for whom he wrote a manual of *Spiritual Counsel*. Like his sermons, it is disposed in a logical manner, with nicely balanced divisions; and its advice is rather stern and puritanical though not without a certain gentleness and spiritual insight. In advising what books should be read, he recommends, beside the Bible, Bishop Taylor's *Holy Living and Dying*, and Thomas à Kempis, and urges the children to spend their time on the 'Cartesian and Experimental Philosophy', rather than on Plays and Romances. "Not that I think the reading of such Books absolutely unlawful; but only that there is a great Deal of Danger and Corruption in them."⁴ But, "if you would have a Book that is alone a *Library*, and an ever-rising and flowing spring of Knowledge—let me recommend to you *M. Malebranche, De la Recherche de la Vérité*."

While at Newton St. Loe, Norris published two volumes of *Practical Discourses*, one of which contained his criticism of Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding*. The *Essay* was published in 1690 and apparently some one sent it to

¹ *Theory*, II, p. 525.

² *Ibid.*, p. 526.

³ *Conduct of Human Life*. First Reflection, I.

⁴ *Spiritual Counsel*, XLIII.

Norris, asking his opinion on it, for the criticism is in the form of a letter. (In the later editions of the book there is included a series of comments on the replies of the 'Athenian Society' to these criticisms, but these add nothing to the discussion). Norris criticized Locke for giving no definition of 'Idea,' for the inconsistency of his arguments against Innate Ideas (Norris himself refused to admit Innate Ideas, but for different reasons), and for speaking of Ideas as impressed on the mind by external objects. But though far from agreeing with Locke, he always speaks of him with respect and admiration, as one who was really seeking the truth, and in the end of the discussion of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*, he writes, "Notwithstanding these few Errata, I think it to be a very extraordinary Performance and worthy of the most Publick Honour and Respect."¹ The rather frequent references to Locke's book in the *Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World*, are in the same tone, but show rather a fair-minded willingness to appreciate the *Essay* and its author, than any deep understanding of Locke's position. For Norris suggests that Locke may have meant, not "that sensible objects do send or convey Ideas from themselves to our minds by the mediation of the Senses," but "that sensible Objects do by the Impression which they make upon our outward Senses, serve to excite Ideas in our minds, so that we are beholding to them as the *occasions* of our having such Ideas," and this "we may without scruple, in great measure, allow him."² Locke, however, had no great patience with the ideas of either Norris, 'an obscure enthusiastic gentleman'³ or of his teacher, Malebranche.

This same volume of Sermons on the Beatitudes, involved Norris in another controversy. The discourse on 'Blessed are the Peacemakers' charges the Separatists with schism because they withdrew from the Church of England, while still admitting the possibility of remaining within it. This accusation

¹ 'Reflections upon a late Essay concerning Human Understanding', p. 30. In *Christian Blessedness*.

² *Theory*, II, pp. 371-372.

³ Letters between Locke and Molyneux. Locke's *Works*, 1801, Vol. IX, p. 404.

aroused a 'great clamour,' because of the recent Act of Toleration. Norris replied to the letters attacking him in an anonymous 'Letter to a City Friend,' called 'The Charge of Schism Continued. Being a Justification of the Author of Christian Blessedness for his charging the Separatists with Schism.' He defends the accusation on the ground that "if they had just cause for their Separation, then they would be excused from Schism without a Toleration,"¹ and that all "a Toleration does or can do, is only to remove the Penalty where there is an Established National Church."² He insists that "if the Separatists from the Church of England were guilty of Schism before the Toleration (which, whether they were or no, depends on other Grounds, and is not now to be disputed over again) they are as much guilty of it now;"³ and concludes with the advice to the Separatists that they apply themselves "seriously and deliberately, impartially and sincerely—to consider and examine the State and Constitution of our Church, and the Laws of her Communion, whether they are lawful or no."⁴ "If it be still your unhappiness verily to be persuaded in your Consciences that the Communion with the Church of England is unlawful—in the Name of God abide where you are—I would not for a World persuade you to communicate with the Church of England (as excellent as she is) against the real Sense and Persuasion of your Consciences."

Norris's religious toleration, though broad beyond that of his time, seems however to have stopped short of the Quakers, whose ideas appear to an observer in many ways so close to his own. The Quakers apparently interpreted some passages in his 'Conduct of Human Life,' as signalling his connection with them. But this he vigorously repudiated, both in the Postscript to a later edition of this book, and in *Two Treatises Concerning the Divine Light*, published in 1692. These are written in answer to a *Letter of a Learned Quaker*, which he calls 'A Just Reprehension to John Norris of Newton St. Loe,

¹ 'The Charge of Schism Continued.' In *Reason and Religion*, p. 289.

² *Ibid.*, p. 291.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 288.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 339.

for his Unjust Reflection on the Quakers.' Norris objects to the identification of his 'Ideal World,' with the Quakers' 'Light Within,' or the 'Divine Light,' on the ground that the Quakers consider it as a 'Divine Communication,' a sort of 'Extraordinary Inspiration,' and a 'Special Privilege' of—their own party, while for Norris it is 'the very Essence and Substance of the Deity—intimately united to our Minds,' and the Natural and Ordinary way of Understanding.¹ The controversy was carried on with a certain bitterness and intolerance on both sides, for Norris was offended at having his metaphysical speculations confused with what he considered the 'Grossness of the Quakers' notion;' and Mr. Vickris, for the Quakers, was equally indignant at Norris's refusal to admit the likeness between them.

As his religious toleration, though unusual for a man of that age, seemed to give only an added severity to his dissent from the Quakers, so Norris's philosophical receptiveness refused to admit the conclusions drawn from his own premises in the teachings of Spinoza; for whether he had read Spinoza himself or not,² Norris was certainly familiar with a theory very like that of the Dutch philosopher, which he characterizes as 'that stupid conceit of taking the world for God.'³ His criticisms of Hobbes, whom he also refuses to consider worthy of serious refutation, are from ethical rather than metaphysical reasons, and show a certain inability to grasp any intellectual position essentially different from his own.

In 1691 Norris was made Rector of Bemerton, near Salisbury, and spent the rest of his life there, in the rectory which had been occupied by George Herbert. Here he evidently had a busier life than at Newton St. Loe, with less time for meditation. In the Preface to the *Theory* he speaks of the 'disadvantageous circumstances' under which it was written.

¹ 'Two Treatises Concerning the Divine Light', in *Reason and Religion*, pp. 365-366.

² There is no means of proving from Norris himself that he was familiar with Spinoza, but it is at least suggested, and gains a certain probability from the fact that his friend Henry More attacked Spinoza's philosophy in his *Enchiridion Metaphysicum* and refers to it occasionally in his other works.

³ *Theory*, I, p. 176.

"We who have Parochial Cures to attend upon, whose Hands are full, whose Engagements great, whose Interruptions many, who live in Noise and Hurry, much to others, and little to ourselves—must do not as we would, but as we can."

Some few years after settling in Bemerton, Norris published a 'Correspondence' between himself and Mary Astell, 'the Author of the Proposal to the Ladies,' on the subject of the Love of God. The lady appears to have been learned but eccentric. She wrote to Norris asking further explanation of his statement, in the 'Sermon on the Love of God,' that God should be loved to the exclusion of all created beings because He is the sole cause of all our pleasures.¹ This does not seem to explain the reason for pain, and Miss Astell wished to know whether or not God should be considered as the author of pain. Norris replied that God is the author of pain as of all other sensations, but that pain is always for the sake of some greater good. The question is discussed at some length through a dozen or more letters, but without much addition. Miss Astell is a devoted admirer of Norris's philosophy, and her attitude in the letters is that of one asking guidance from a master. Another correspondent was Lady Wharton,² who wrote under the name of Corinna. Norris's letters to her were more personal, advising her in her studies and sending her a copy of his *Theory*.

Norris lived at Bemerton until his death in 1711. According to R. A. Wilmott,³ he had "exhausted his strength by intense application and long habits of severe reasoning." Wilmott adds, "On the south side of Bemerton Church a marble tablet commemorates his piety and his genius. The words of the epitaph are melancholy and appropriate—'Bene latuit.'"

¹ *Letters Concerning the Love of God*. Bet. (Mary Astell) and J. N. 1705. Letter I.

² Letters published in R. Gwinnet's *Pylades and Corinna*. Vol II, 1731.

³ R. A. Wilmott. *Pictures of Christian Life* (1841), C. VII, p. 119, et seq. Quoted in Grosart's *Fuller's Worthies*, (1871), Vol. III, p. 154.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NORRIS.

The book of John Norris which contains his Philosophy in its final and most complete form is *An Essay Towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World. Design'd for Two Parts. The first considering it absolutely in itself, and the second in relation to Human Understanding*, By John Norris, Rector of Bemerton near Sarum. The first volume was published by S. Manship, at the Ship in Cornhill, near the Royal Exchange, London, in 1701, and the second in 1704.

This, however, is not the form in which Norris had originally intended to set forth his theory. In the Preface to the Reader we are told, "'Tis true, indeed, that some years ago, when I had the Honour to be one of the Fellows of All Souls College in Oxford (which God forever bless and prosper), I began a Treatise upon this Subject in Latin, whereof I there finish'd two chapters, with a good part of a third. But whether discouraged by the Difficulty of the Undertaking, or diverted from it by other Associations, so it was that I went not farther; but laid it, and almost the Thoughts of it, quite aside, without meddling with it for many years.'" It seems altogether probable that this Latin treatise as then planned would have been in most of its essential points identical with the *Theory* as later published, and that the dependence of Norris's thought on that of Malebranche has been somewhat exaggerated. Norris, as has been shown, does not appear to have known Malebranche's books until after the publication of the *Miscellanies* in 1687. Moreover, Malebranche's *Recherche de la Vérité*, which was published in 1674-8, treats rather of psychology and of method, than of philosophical theory. It is in the *Entretiens sur la Métaphysique*, which was not published until 1687, that we first find definitely worked out the idealistic theory which is the basis of Malebranche's conception of 'Seeing all things in God'. For Norris it is the first, the 'Abso-

lute Part of this System,' the 'account of the Intelligible World purely as in itself consider'd,' which is of supreme importance. That part of his theory which has to do with human understanding in its relation to the Divine Ideas, he expressly offers only as "an Hypothesis, that exhibits a very rational and conceivable Account of the thing, and such as every way appears to be the most reasonable and consistent of any that has been yet advanced, or that the Mind of Man can frame to itself."¹

Now there seem to be good reasons for believing that the first or absolute part of his Theory was fully developed by Norris while he was still at Oxford, and that the second part was at least vaguely in his mind. It is even possible that if he had not happened on Malebranche's more thoroughly worked-out doctrine of the 'vision in God', Norris might have gone on in his own way and worked out his theory to a more consistent conclusion. In the first place, we have Norris's own statement to the effect that the theory, that we see and know all things in God, was the result of his independent thought. "This is a Notion which I very early lighted upon, by the Natural Parturiency of my own mind, before I had consulted with any Author that might imbue me with it. But afterwards I met with some that *confirm'd me* in it. For it is a Notion very frequently touch'd upon by *Platonists*; by *Plotinus*, by *Proclus*, by *Marsilius Ficinus*, by *St. Austin*, by the late French Philosopher *Du Hamel*, in his Book *De Mente Humana*, and is sometimes glanced at by *Aquinas* himself; but by none that I know of so copiously, so profusely and so dexterously managed as by the incomparable Monsieur *Malebranche*, who, I think, has established the truth of it beyond all cavil or exception, as well as reasonable doubting."²

As support to this statement, there is in Norris's collection of *Miscellanies*, published in 1687, *A Metaphysical Essay toward The Demonstration of a God from the Steady and Immutable Nature*

¹ *Theory*, II, 514.

² *Reason and Religion*, Part II, Contemplation II, 5.

of Truth."¹ This was apparently written some time before 1687, for in the Postscript to the first edition Norris says, "This Essay has lain by me a considerable time, and I have lately review'd it with all the *coldness* and *indifference* of a *stranger*." The 'Essay' begins with a brief discussion of Descartes's proof for the existence of God from the Idea of God, and then proceeds to Norris's own argument, which, he says, he cannot be sure is altogether 'new and unblown upon', but which he has never seen treated with the fulness it deserves. The argument is based upon the definition of Truth as 'immutable relations of objects.'² "Whoever denies the existence of Truth contradicts himself."

Since there are eternal truths there must be 'eternal essences of things.' 'Of nothing there can be no affection', and since the things 'are eternally related, therefore they eternally are.'³ Now it is admitted that things as they are in Nature are not eternal, therefore they must 'exist eternally in their Ideas.'⁴ Ideas must be in some understanding, and since 'eternal essences cannot exist in a temporary understanding', they must exist in an Eternal Mind which is God, "an Eternal and Universal Being, who is Infinite in Being and—has the perfection of all other Beings in himself, whereby he becomes Universally Representative of all other Beings."⁵ From this it is clear that Norris had in his mind, before 1687, the outlines of the theory which he afterwards developed. The references which occur in *Reason and Religion*,⁶ to the *Metaphysical Essay* abundantly justify this statement. The reality which we know in science is made up of the simple essences or ideas in

¹ *Miscellanies*, pp. 153-166. References are to the 4th edition, London, 1706. This has been compared with the British Museum copy of the 1st edition of 1687, with which it agrees except for the omission in the 4th edition of some references to Plato and some personal details which occur in the 1st, the insertion in the 4th edition of some longer discussions of minor points, some additional references to scholastic philosophy, and some changes in spelling, punctuation, and arrangement.

² *Miscellanies*, p. 156.

³ *Miscellanies*, p. 154.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Secs. V and IV.

⁶ *Reason and Religion*, Part I, Contemplation I, XVII.

the mind of God, with the relations between them. This is Norris's understanding of Platonic idealism, modified to constitute an argument for the existence of God. Its connection with Plato is evident not only from the general context but from particular references to Norris's 'Letter on the Platonic Ideas' which was written earlier though published in the same book.

Beside setting forth his theory in this 'Essay' and suggesting it by slight remarks in his various sermons, Norris explained it at greater length in *Reason and Religion, or, The Grounds and Measures of Devotion, Consider'd from the Nature of God and the Nature of Man*. This is dedicated to his Grace the Duke of Ormond, Chancellor of the University of Oxford, and was evidently written while Norris was still there, since he speaks of 'our University', saying that "The accomplishment of our Intellectuals and Morals is the peculiar designation of this Place and our proper and almost only business in it."¹ This, though much shorter than the *Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World*, is the same in substance, and resembles it closely in arrangement and even in phrasing, many passages apparently having been taken over with slight changes into the later book. There are, however, occasional points of difference between the *Theory* and *Reason and Religion*. These will be noticed in the discussion of the *Theory*, and, for the most part, show the stronger influence of Malebranche on the earlier book.

The *Theory*, published in 1701-04, is by far the longest and most elaborate work of Norris. Every point which appears to him to be open to criticism is carefully worked out in its minutest detail, while some larger questions are passed over with scarcely a word. We would willingly have spared the long discussions of the nature and value of the syllogism, and of the souls of animals,² for the sake of some definite expression of the relation between finite minds and the mind of God.

It is possible that unfavorable criticisms of his theory, as suggested in the earlier books, impelled Norris to write it out

¹ *Reason and Religion*. 'The Epistle Dedicatory'.

² *Theory*, II, Ch. II.

at length, for in explaining how he came to write the book, he speaks of "the frequent Intimation that I had occasionally given of these things in my writings—which lighter touches without a more explicit account of the thing would have served only as so many Amusements to the common sort of Readers," and adds, "Tho' whether the Presentialness of an Ideal World to our minds be really such Platonick Gibberish, there is a certain Person that may now be concerned to consider."¹

Norris's own suggestion of his chief authorities for the *Theory* is a fairly accurate statement of its different sources. "And as to the Rightness of the Notional Part, I am inclined to have the more Confidence of that, because tho' I am not everywhere consistent with the Doctrine of the Schools, yet I follow the Authority of St. Austin, which is so greatly and justly revered by them; as I shall do also in the remaining Part of this Theory, which is that Scene of the Intelligible World which *M. Malebranche* has open'd and where I expect from him the greatest assistance."²

The three main points of Norris's philosophy are, the existence of the Ideal World, the identification of this Ideal World with the mind of God, and its connection with our minds as the source and object of knowledge. The first shows the origin of Norris's philosophy in that of Plato, the second its close connection with Neo-Platonism and the theology of St. Augustine, and the third, its particular relation to the theory of Malebranche. The question of the existence of matter is for Norris a subordinate issue, though it is the point at which he is most closely connected with the philosophy of his time and with that of his successors. These three lines of thought are obviously not separate, but closely interrelated. The arguments for the existence of an Ideal World are bound up with the arguments for nature and existence of God; and the theory of knowledge by means of the Divine Ideas is

¹ *Theory*, I. Preface to the Reader, p. II. It seems probable that this reference is to Locke, but Locke's criticism of Norris was not published until 1720, and I have not been able to find any earlier record of Locke's opinion.

² *Theory*, I, Preface, XV.

dependent on both doctrines. But it is still possible to treat these conceptions separately, since the superior reality of Ideas or Forms, which are the archetypes of natural things, could well be acknowledged without identifying this realm of Ideas with the mind of God; and this identification was accepted by many mediæval scholars without the further conclusion that this Ideal World in the mind of God is the direct object of our knowledge and perception.

Though it is to Plato and the Platonic School, to St. Augustine and Malebranche, that we look for the sources and original expressions of Norris's ideas, in many cases the particular form which he gives them is due, at least in part, to his opposition to contemporary theories, particularly to those of Locke and of Hobbes. The long discussion 'of that great question whether Matter can Think,'¹ seems to be in reference to Locke's arguments against the conception of God as material.² There are frequent references in the *Theory* to the *Essay on the Human Understanding*, to 'Mr. Locke's principle of sensation,'³ and an occasional remark which seems directed against Hobbes.⁴

Since Norris's philosophy is here discussed in an order differing somewhat from that of the *Theory*, it will perhaps be well to give a brief summary of the latter work:-

Part I. The State of things distinguished into Natural and Ideal (Ch. I). Argument and authorities for the distinction, and demonstration of the reality, of the Ideal World (Ch. II). That the Ideal World exists in the Mind of God and is identical with the essence of God (Ch. III). That the Existence of the Intelligible is more certain than of the Natural World. Consideration of the arguments to prove the existence of the Natural World (Ch. IV). The relation of the Divine

¹ *Theory*, II, Ch. I.

² Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. IV, Ch. X, pp. 14-16.

³ For instance, *Theory*, II, p. 516. "For to say with Mr. Locke that we have them (Ideas) from our senses. gives me no satisfaction at all".

⁴ "Whether that something (the Soul) be a Substance in its whole kind distinct from what we call the Body, or only a Body of a finer mould and contexture than the other—can be known only by our *Thinking*—must be determin'd on this Principle—The utter Incapacity that Matter has to think," *Theory*, II, pp. 6-7.

Idea to the Mind of God (Ch. V, Sec. I, II). The Divine Ideas considered as the archetypes of the Natural World (Sec. III). Reply to possible objections to the theory of the Ideal World, as inconsistent with the Simplicity, Immateriality and Infinity of God (Sec. IV). The Doctrine of Eternal Truths, their reality and their relation to God and to the Divine Ideas (Ch. VI). The relation between the essences of things in God and their existence out of Him (Ch. VII). Of the Beauty of the Intelligible World, and the Happiness of those that have their conversation in it. With some concluding Reflections upon the Advantages of a Retired and Contemplative Life (Ch. VIII).

Part II. A Preliminary Consideration of the Principle of thought, and discussion of the question, Whether Matter can think (Ch. I). Concerning the Souls of Brutes (Ch. II). Of the distinctions of Thought, formal and objective thought, direct and reflex, perception and volition, active and passive thought, simple and complex, clear and confused, abstract and concrete, pure and impure, Idea and Sentiment (Ch. III). A Distribution of the objects of thought into their several kinds (Ch. IV). That some immaterial objects are seen by themselves (Ch. V). That all material objects, and some spiritual ones, are seen by the mediation of Ideas (Ch. VI). That the Ideas by which we understand are the Divine Ideas, with arguments against other hypotheses (Ch. VII-XII). How far this Hypothesis is confirmed by St. Austin and the Schools (Ch. XIII).

I. THE IDEAL WORLD

a. The Ideal World distinguished from the Natural

The fundamental position of Norris's philosophy is the existence of an Ideal World which is timeless and changeless, a realm of absolute ideas independent of the natural world. "I consider . . . that there is a twofold state of things, *Natural* and *Ideal*. By the *Natural* state of things I mean that state which they have in *rerum natura* as we speak, that is, as they exist according to those Natures or Essences which were in

time Created or Produced out of nothing by the Free and Arbitrary Will of their Almighty Cause. The Collection of which Beings is what we call the *Natural World*, or Universe, which is not a self-Existent, Eternal, Immutable Nature, no, nor yet an effect necessarily produced, but a contingent, temporary Thing."¹ "By the *Ideal* state of things I mean that state of them which is necessary, permanent and immutable . . . containing in it eminently and after an Intelligible Manner, all that is in the Natural World . . . whereof all things in the Natural World are but as the Prints and Impressions, I might say the Shadows."² "This is the World of Original and Essential Beauty, where Order itself, and very Reason and Proportion dwell."³ When we call this the "*Intelligible World*, the meaning is not as if it did exist only in our conception, and had no real being out of it...but 'tis therefore so called, partly because 'tis the first and only proper *Intelligible* . . . partly because 'tis a World of a nature purely Spiritual and Intellectual, and such as is not Sensible, but *Intelligible* only . . . but chiefly is it so call'd because it is the *Idea* of this Sensible World, as being truly representative and expressive of it to the Understanding."⁴ The Natural World is "Darkness and Obscurity,"⁵ but the Ideal World is "Beauty, Order and Light."⁶

This distinction of the Sensible from the Ideal World is clearly not original or novel. It is taught by Plato; and has its adherents and opponents all through the Middle Ages, especially in the long controversy between Nominalism and Realism. Norris himself attributes to Plato the origin of the distinction. "As the ground for the Distinction of an Intelligible World in opposition to that which we call Natural or Sensible is abundantly laid in Plato (for I do not remember that he uses the express Terms of *Intelligible World*), so the

¹ *Theory*, I, p. 7.

² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

³ *Theory*, I, p. 9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, pp. 12-13.

⁵ *Conduct of Human Life*, II, p. 31.

⁶ *Theory*, I, pp. 433-435.

Distinction itself in the very formality of it is frequently used by retainers to his School, particularly by *Philo Judaeus* in his 'Cosmopoea,' *Plotinus*, and *Marsilius Ficinus*, nay, 'tis used by St. Austin himself, and that with approbation."¹ And in more specific reference he says, "The simple essence of things—are what we are taught in the Platonic School to call Ideas. These in the Language of the Divine Philosopher are *πρῶτα νοητά*, the first Intelligible, and *ἀεί ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα*, things which are always the same and unchangeable, and *τὰ μὴ γιγνόμενα ἀλλ' ἀεί ὄντα*, things that are not generated but are always, and again *μῆτε γιγνόμενα, μῆτε ἀπολλύμενα*, that were neither generated, nor will be destroyed."² The distinction made by Norris is exactly copied after Plato, and the characteristics assigned the two classes or 'states of things' are almost the same. One might multiply quotations, but the following may suffice to illustrate this point: "We made two classes—one which was assumed by us to be a pattern intelligible and always the same; and there was a second, which was only the imitation of the pattern, generated and visible."³ "The many as we say, are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but not seen."⁴ "Is that idea or essence which...we define as essence or true existence...whether essence of equality, beauty or anything else; are these essences, I say, liable at times to some degree of change? or are they each of them always what they are, having the same simple, self-existent and unchanging forms, and not admitting of variation at all, or in any way, or at any time? They must be always the same, Socrates, replied Cebes. And what would you say of the many beautiful—whether men or horses or garments or any other things which may be called equal or beautiful—are they all unchanging and the same always, or quite the reverse? May they not

¹ *Theory*, I, p. 180, also *Ibid.*, I, p. 34. "St. Austin makes use of the Ideal Hypothesis as a kind of *Clavis Mosaica*, and unlocks by it some of the most Metaphysical Abstrusities that concern the History of Creation."

² *Reason and Religion*, Contemplation V, XX, p. 49.

³ *Timaeus*, 49, A.

⁴ *Republic*, VI, 507, B.

rather be described as almost always changing and hardly ever the same, either with themselves or with one another? The latter, replied Cebes, they are always in a state of change."¹

In reference to Plotinus, as agreeing in 'this Distinction of a twofold World', Norris says, "'tis the very burthen of his Philosophy."² There are many statements in Plotinus, in support of such an assertion. "Whatever appears in the phenomenal world as form is contained in the Intelligible World,"³ "if sensation be of sensible objects, thought is of intelligible objects."⁴ "For in the intelligible world real existences are immutable (Whereas the things of this world are mutable) and being without extension reside in themselves, without need of space, and have an intellectual and self-sufficient kind of existence. But the nature of corporeal things wants preservation by something outside itself."⁵

St. Augustine, writing for theological rather than for metaphysical purposes, lays less emphasis on the formal distinction of the ideal from the natural world, than on other characters of the Ideal World, but it is continually implied in his words, for example, in these which follow: "As the mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things by the senses of the body, so of incorporeal things by itself."⁶ "In that eternal truth, therefore, whence all temporal creatures are, we see with our mind's eye the form according to which we are, and according to which we execute truly and rightly anything which we do, either in ourselves or in corporeal things."⁷

¹ *Phaedo*, 78.

² *Theory*, I, p. 14.

³ 'Plotini Enneades cum Marsilii Ficini interpretatione castigata.' F. Creuzer et Georg Henricus Moser, Parisiis, MDCCCLV, V, Lib. 9, Ch. 10; Charles M. Bakewell, *Source Book in Ancient Philosophy*, 1909 (XXII Plotinus), p. 360.

⁴ *Enneades*, IV, Lib. 7, Ch. (8 Bakewell, p. 345), *ei αἰσθητῶν μὲν ἡ αἰσθησις, νοητῶν δὲ ἡ νόησις*.

⁵ *Enneades*, V, Lib. 9, Ch. 6 (Bakewell), p. 359.

⁶ Sancti Aurelii Augustini, *Opera Omnia*, J. P. Migne, 1841. *De Trinitate*, IX, 3. "Mens ergo ipsa sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit, sic incorporearum per semetipsam." Cf. Plato, *Theaetetus*, 185E; 186.

⁷ *De Trinitate*, IX, 7. "In illa igitur aeterna veritate, ex qua temporalia facta sunt omnia, formam secundum quam sumus, et secundum quem vel in nobis vel in corporibus vera et recta ratione aliquid operamur, visu mente aspicimus."

The ground of this distinction into two separate worlds, beyond the natural desire for an 'abiding city,' is for Norris, as for Plato, the division of the mind, or rather of the understanding, into the two separate faculties of Intellect and Sensation. Since the knowledge of the Intellect must be of absolute reality, while sensation is temporary and illusory, there will necessarily be a sharp distinction between the objects with which they deal. For Norris this separation is emphasized by the psychology of Descartes and Malebranche. In his earlier books the division of the mind into faculties is not only ignored, but is in one place opposed, since even the Will and Understanding are not to be considered as 'Faculties;' but "the soul does immediately will and understand by its self without the intervention of any Faculty."¹ But in the *Theory*, though still admitting that in the case of Vision there is a 'constant and undivided concomitance' between Ideas and Sentiment, Norris for the most part follows Malebranche's strict distinction between Ideal Perception, the perception of 'something that is without us and distinct from us,' and Sensible Perception, 'the inward feeling we have, of ourselves.'² In another discussion of the same point, he adds, "'tis very apparent that hardly any two things are more distinguishable, tho' *M. Malebranche* be the first philosopher that I know of that ever formally made this distinction."³ For Malebranche the distinction is very clear and definite. The 'pure understand-

¹ Sermon on Romans, 12, 3. *Miscellanies*, p. 237. Cf. *Letters Concerning the Love of God*, p. 41. It is true that in the *Recherche de la Vérité*, "Eclaircissements" II, Malebranche says, "Il ne faut pas s'imaginer que les diverses facultés de l'âme . . soient des entités différentes de l'âme même." But his emphasis is clearly and strongly on the distinction between these faculties, rather than on their connection in the "unity of the soul." (From this point on, this part of the *Recherche* will be cited simply as *Eclaircissements*. Page references are to the edition of Garnier Frères, Paris.)

² *Theory*, II, p. 124. Cf. Cudworth, *A Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*, 1731. "Sense is Local Motion impressed upon the nerves from the objects without," p. 76, "not mere local Motion . . but a cogitation and consciousness of these motions," p. 78. "Knowledge consists in the awakening and exciting of the Inward Active Powers of the Mind" (p. III).

³ *Theory*, p. 207.

ing' is 'the faculty of knowing objects outside ourselves,'¹ while sensation is a 'modification of the soul,'² or is perception 'by means of the bodily organs.'³ His main argument, quoted by Norris,⁴ for the validity of this distinction is that intellect and sensation must be different faculties because it is possible for God to have the 'Knowledge of Pain without having the Sentiment.'

"THEODORE: Think you that God feels the pain which we suffer?

ARISTE: No, without doubt, for the Sentiment of Pain makes unhappy.

THEODORE: Very well. But do you believe that he knows it?

ARISTE: Yes, I believe he does, for he knows whatever happens to his Creatures. The Knowledge of God has no Bounds, and to know my Pain does not render him either miserable or imperfect. On the contrary—

THEODORE: Oh, oh, Ariste! Gods knows Pain, Pleasure, Heat and the rest, and he does not feel these things. He knows Pain, because he knows what that modification of the soul is in which Pain consists.—To know Pain, therefore, is not the same as to feel it."⁵

From this distinction of intellect and sense, it easily follows for both Malebranche and Norris, that their objects must be different, that the pure understanding is concerned only with Ideas and that sensation has to do in some way with the natural world. As the two faculties, or divisions of the understanding, come to receive separate treatment, the two worlds which correspond to them grow farther apart, so that Malebranche can say, "If our bodies move about in a corporeal world, our spirit, for its part, passes over constantly into an intelligible world,"⁶ and Norris accuses men of taking "the Shadows of

¹ *Recherche de la Vérité*. Bk. III, Pt. I, Ch. I, Oeuvres, III, p. 340. "La faculté qu'a l'esprit de connaître les objets de dehors." The page references to the works of Malebranche are to the edition edited by Jules Simon (Paris, Charpentier), excepting the references to the *Eclaircissements*, which form the last part of the *Recherche*.

² *Recherche de la Vérité*. Bk. III. Pt. I, Ch. I, pp. 346-7. "La lumière, les couleurs, les odeurs et les autres sensations sont des modifications . . . de leur âme." (All references to the *Recherche* are to tome III of the edition cited in the last note.)

³ *Ibid.*, Bk. I, Ch. I, p. 6: "par les organes du corps."

⁴ *Theory*, II, p. 208.

⁵ Malebranche, *Entretiens sur la Métaphysique*, III, p. 44.

⁶ *Entretiens*, I, 9: "Si notre corps se promène dans un monde corporel, notre esprit, de son côté, se transporte sans cesse dans un monde intelligible." Cf. *Entretiens*, I, 9. "Il y a plus de différence entre le bureau que je vois et celui que vous croyez voir qu'il n'y en a entre votre esprit et votre corps."

this Natural World for most Real and Solid Things" because though united to the Ideal World by their souls, they are united "by their bodies to this Sensible World—and this latter Alliance makes them insensible of the former."¹

b. Arguments for the Existence of the Ideal World

Besides these more general reasons, Norris gives several specific arguments for the existence of the Ideal World. In the first place, he accepts, 'from my own Reason as well as the general Reason of Mankind,' the belief that the World is not Eternal, but that it was created by God.² But God, a Being of infinite Wisdom as well as power, could not act 'unthoughtfully.' He must 'think and consider what he does.' That is, the plan of the World was 'objectively present to him,' "for as he could not make it without fore-thinking of it, so neither could he think of it without having something to terminate that thought, which must be the Nature or Essence of the thing that was to be made."³ This object of thought cannot have been the Natural World, since it was not yet created and the "Divine Understanding cannot see that which absolutely is not," and also because, as Norris implies, but does not here state explicitly, the Natural World cannot be in itself the object of thought. "The nature, therefore, of his Work was objectively present to his Mind, and since it could not be so in its Sensible or *Natural self*, which then was not, it must be so in its *Ideal* or *Intelligible self*, in which the whole Reason and Essence of it was really and substantially contain'd, and in conformity to which it was actually made, and set forth upon the Stage of Nature."⁴ Since the world was thus made according to a Model, "it follows that all things were both beheld and made according to some other Preëxisting Nature, which by reason of its *Intelligible Multi-*

¹ *Theory*, I, p. 11.

² *Ibid.*, I, p. 18.

³ *Ibid.*, I, p. 27 f. *Reason and Religion*, p. 50: "For 'tis impossible that God should make a World with Counsel and Design, unless, he make it according to something," etc.

⁴ *Theory*, I, p. 27-28.

formity was really Exhibitive and Representative of them. Which is what we understand by the Ideal World."¹

This argument can be traced all through previous idealistic philosophy, from Plato to Malebranche. In the 'Timaeus,' where Plato discusses the origin of the world, he declares first that it was created, not eternal, and then asks: "Which of the patterns had the artificer in view when he made the world, the pattern which is unchangeable or that which is created? If the World be indeed fair," he answers, "and the artificer good, then, as is plain, he must have looked to that which is eternal.—Everyone will see that he must have looked to the eternal, for the world is the fairest of creations and he is the best of causes. And being of such a nature, the world has been framed by him with a view to that which is apprehended by reason and mind and is unchangeable, and if this be admitted must of necessity be the copy of something.—For the pattern of the universe contains in itself all intelligible beings."² The argument is referred by Norris to Philo Judaeus, in his *Cosmos*, where the formation of the natural world, according to the Pattern of the Intelligible, is illustrated by a comparison, taken from the building of a city.³ Plotinus gives this argument in very nearly the same form as that of Norris. "For the willing is not without reason (*ἄλογος*) or by chance."⁴

¹ *Ibid.*, I, p. 37.

² *Timaeus*, 29-30. This, though less an argument for the ideal world than an assumption of its reality, is sufficiently close to the form of the argument to have suggested it to later writers.

³ *Theory*, I, p. 29. The reference is to Philo, *Creation of the World*, IV: "When any city is founded through the exceeding ambition of some king or leader . . . then it happens that some man coming up who . . . is skillful in architecture, seeing the advantageous character and beauty of the situation, first of all sketches out in his own mind nearly all the parts of the city which are to be completed. . . Then having received in his own mind as on a waxen tablet, the form of each building, he carries in his heart the image of the city, perceptible as yet only by the intellect, and, still further, engraving them in his mind, like a good workman, keeping his eyes fixed on his model, he begins to raise the city of stones and wood, making the corporeal substances to resemble each of the incorporeal ideas. Now we must form a somewhat similar opinion of God, who having determined to found a mighty state, first of all conceived its form in his mind, according to which form he made a world perceptible only by the intellect, and then completed one visible to the external senses, using the first one as a model." (Translation by C. D. Yonge, London 1854.)

⁴ *Enneades*, VI, Lib. 8, Ch. 18, Sec. 10.

"Again, if there must needs be a maker of this universe he will not think of what does not exist in order to create it. The forms of things then must exist prior to the world."¹

Malebranche and Cudworth suggest this argument without giving it any great prominence. In explaining his theory of seeing all things in God, Malebranche says, "To understand this, one must remember that it is absolutely necessary that God should have in himself the ideas of all things that he has created, since otherwise he could not have produced them."² Norris appears to have considered this his most convincing argument, for he gives a summary of it in the second volume as a "short hint for the satisfaction of anyone who should happen to be a stranger to the other part (which I can by no means advise) or should have forgot it."³

Norris's second argument for the existence of the Ideal World, from its necessity as a 'Rule and Measure of created things,' is very like the first argument. He starts now from the fact that things of the same species are of approximately the same size and shape, and insists that this 'Determinateness' could not result from the arbitrary will of the Creator, "but must be resolved into Infinite Will and Power as Conducted, Govern'd and Directed by certain Ideal Models or Standards according to which they were all formed in *Number, Weight, and Measure*."⁴ Norris discusses at length the objection to this argument drawn from the existence of 'Monstrosities in Nature,' accounting for such irregularities by the principle of the 'great simplicity and fewness of those Laws by which God acts,'⁵ 'the same principle that M. Malebranche uses up and down in his works.'⁶ He does not, however, even consider that one might question the division of all things into clear

¹ *Ibid.*, V, Lib. 9, Ch. 5. (Bakewell,) p. 358. "εἰ δὲ καὶ ποιητὴν δεῖ εἶναι τοῦδε τοῦ παντός, οὐ τὰ ἐν τῷ μήτῳ ὄντι οὗτος νοήσει, ἵνα αὐτὸ ποιῇ. Πρὸ τοῦ κόσμου ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι ἐκεῖνα, οὐ τύπους ἀφ' ἑτέρων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχέτυπα καὶ πρῶτα καὶ νοῦ οὐσίαν.

² *Recherche de la Vérité*, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. VI, p. 398.

³ *Theory*, II, p. 415.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, Ch. II, pp. 39-40.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I, p. 42.

⁶ Malebranche, *Entretiens*, X, XIII. *Méditations Chrétiennes*, V. *Œuvres*, ed. Simon. Tome II.

and distinct 'species,' and uses the likeness between squares and the likeness between men as perfectly coördinate illustrations.

The third argument is one that Norris used in his criticism of Locke's *Essay*. We must see perfect circles, perfect squares, etc., for the demonstration of their "necessary properties and affections—proceed upon the Supposition of their most absolute perfections."¹ But in the natural world we do not find these perfect mathematical figures, but only imperfect and inaccurate ones. Moreover, the figures "that I contemplate are *Immutable Natures*—but the other figures that are the Objects of my *Sense*... are mutable and changeable... and may by Manual Operation be made more or less perfect." Those figures with which we deal in Mathematics, then, are not these "Sensible ones" although we may "point to these figures for Illustration sake when we make our Demonstrations,"² but are "Intelligible Circles and Intelligible Squares." "So that even Geometry itself, the most perfect and satisfying of all the Sciences, and which in all Ages has stood as an invincible Mound and Bank against the overflowing Tides of Scepticism, has, you see, its Basis and Foundation in the Ideal World."³ This conception of the objects of Mathematics Norris attributes to the Pythagoreans on the authority of Suarez,⁴ and to St. Austin.⁵ It may have been suggested by Plato's discussion of equality,⁶ and forms an important part of the argument of Malebranche in a somewhat different connection.

The next argument in proof of the existence of the Ideal World is the same as the argument for the existence of God

¹ *Theory*, I, p. 54.

² *Ibid.*, p. 57. *Reason and Religion*, p. 56: The Ideal World is necessary not only before things exist in nature "but even when they do. For Propositions concerning them are not verified according to their natural, but according to their Ideal subsistencies."

³ *Theory*, I, p. 59.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 60. St. Augustine, *Soliloquy*, Bk. II, Ch. 18.

⁶ 'Phaedo,' 74, A. "And shall we affirm that there is such a thing as equality not of wood with wood, or of stone with stone—but equality in the abstract? But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone or other material equals? Are they equal in the same sense as absolute equality? Or do they fall short of this in a measure? Yes, he said, in a very great measure, too."

in the *Metaphysical Essay*.¹ That there are Eternal Truths must be admitted. Even those Sceptics who "disown Truth and Science in the general—confute themselves rather than their adversaries."² "For when they say that there is no such thing as Truth or Science, but that every proposition has some other of equal force and moment to counterbalance it—especially if they allege arguments from Reason and the nature of things to defend it—'tis plain that they advance their Scepticisms as an opposite Position or Assertion, and so do indeed as really Dogmatize as their adversaries. For they suppose themselves to be in the right and their adversaries in the wrong, which yet they cannot be if there be no Truth, since Errour is a departing from Truth."³ There is therefore Absolute and Necessary Truth, and 'whatever is Necessary must be Eternal.'⁴ Now 'objective⁵ truth' means 'certain Habitues or Relations of things to one another.'⁶ If these relations are Eternal, those simple Essences, Natures or Things whose relations they are, must also be Eternal, for all Relations are the Relations of something to something and cannot exist 'Separately and Independently by themselves.'⁷

Norris here interposes a long discussion of the 'Device found out by the Systematical Men,'⁸ to avoid the conclusion that eternal essences really exist. Their theory is that the relations are affirmed of things 'not absolutely but only ex Hypothesi, upon supposition or condition of their existing.' But this would 'deny the connection to be actual and real,' and if

¹ See p. 27 *et seq.*

² *Theory*, I, p. 62.

³ *Ibid.*, I, pp. 62-63. Cf. Plato, *Theatetus*, 171. The argument follows that of Aristotle (*Metaphysics*, Γ, 3) but Norris gives no references for it. He apparently either did not know or did not admire the *Metaphysics*, for the few references he makes to it are in regard to Aristotle's opposition to Plato. Cf. *Theory*, I, p. 126; and 'Discourse on Christian Prudence,' (1710) p. 75, where Norris quotes Aristotle's authority, "which I confess to be of greater weight with me in Ethical than Physical Matters."

⁴ *Theory*, I, p. 65. Cf. Malebranche, *Entretiens*, III, p. 43.

⁵ *Theory*, I, p. 310. Objective, 'of the *thing*,' as opposed to subjective, of the 'understanding.'

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 67-68. Cf. Malebranche, *Entretiens*, IV, p. 83, VIII.

⁷ *Theory*, I, p. 68.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

things are not 'actually related,' how can they be said to be related at all? The eternal essences, therefore, do exist and the question is of the place of their existence. They cannot exist in the Natural World, which is constantly changing, and must therefore exist in some other manner. Since 'this Sensible World is a Temporary Production,'¹ these eternal essences must have their existence not in the State of Nature but in the Ideal State. "Not as if by Eternal Essences we meant the very things themselves that exist in Nature as having also an Eternal Existence (for that were a contradiction), but only such degrees of Being and Perfection as correspond to them and are truly expressive and representative of them, and are therefore said to be their Essences." And since the Ideal World is thus the necessary basis of Eternal Truths, "what less can be concluded from these Premises, but that the Intelligible World is as true and certain even as Truth itself?"²

The argument which Norris calls the fifth is a combination of the two preceding arguments.³ Everyone confesses 'that there is such a thing as Science,' meaning by Science, 'a mediate perception of Ideal relations, or . . . a knowledge acquired by Demonstration.' It is also "obvious in itself, and no less confessed than the other" that "all Science is concerning things that have a necessary and immutable nature." "Things in their Natural State are neither necessary nor immutable, but Mutable and Contingent." "Therefore things in their Natural State cannot be admitted as the objects of Science. Therefore Science must be of things as they are in their Ideal or Intelligible State. . . . The Ideal State of things is then as certain . . . as Science itself." Norris says that the schoolmen should have accepted this argument, since they admitted that science was 'not of singulars but of universals.' But most of them, following Aristotle, 'opposed the doctrine of Eternal Essences,'⁴ and give no satisfactory account of the objects of Science.

¹ *Theory*, I, p. 125.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 126-127.

³ *Theory*, I, pp. 127-131; II, pp. 323-324.

⁴ *Theory*, I, p. 126.

Aristotle himself, however, Norris elsewhere¹ insists, "after all his zealous opposition of Platonic Ideas, has in the fourth of his *Metaphysick* come about to him again." In support of this statement, Norris quotes Aristotle's assertion that there must be "another essence of things besides the sensible, to which belongs neither motion nor corruption nor any generation at all."² Cudworth, beside quoting this same passage from Aristotle,³ uses this argument as a basis for his theory of morality. His formulation of it is rather more clear and vivid than Norris's, and suggests more original thinking. "No individual Material Thing is always necessarily the same with itself, but Mutable and changeable. And our Sensible Perceptions of them, are nothing but Passions or Affections in our Body caused by them; which Passions also are a Kind of Motion in the Soul, whereby we do not Comprehend the Immutable *Ratio* or *Essence* of anything. But Intellection and Knowledge are the Active Comprehension of something, and have always a necessary Identity with itself. For that which is not one Steady and Immutable Thing, cannot as such, be an Object of Intellection or Knowledge, neither can the Mind fix itself upon it; for it must needs mock and delude the Understanding, perpetually Gliding and Rolling away from it, when it Endeavors to grasp or comprehend it. Neither can it be the Basis or Subject of any scientific Theorem or proposition. For how can anything be certainly, constantly and Immutably affirmed of that which is no one certain Thing, nor always Immutably the same with itself? Whence it plainly follows, that the Immediate Objects of Intellection and Knowledge cannot be those Individual Material Things as such, which our Senses are Passively affected from, but must of necessity be something else."⁴ This argument is clearly based on the theory of knowledge which both Cud-

¹ *Reason and Religion*, pp. 57-58. Cf. *Theory*, I, p. 401, where Norris refers this statement about Aristotle to the authority of Cudworth.

² Cf. *Metaphysics*. A, Ch. VI, 1071b.

³ *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, The first part, by R. Cudworth. London, MDCLXXVIII. Pp. 730-731.

⁴ *Eternal and Immutable Morality*. Bk. IV, p. 237.

worth and Norris had learned from Plato. "Knowledge which is stable and pure and true and unalloyed is that which has to do with the things which are eternal and unchangeable and unmixed;"¹ this would serve as a motto for the philosophy of Malebranche and Norris, and for Cudworth's theories of ethics and religion. And while they all insist that knowledge implies a knower, yet Malebranche and Norris clearly hold that it must be entirely independent of all created minds.² This characteristic of knowledge, its independence of the human mind, comes out clearly in the argument as formulated by Malebranche. For him the decisive point is, "I find nothing necessary or immutable in myself."³ Since therefore truth is not in my mind it must be that I know it in another mind.

From all these arguments Norris concludes that we have greater certainty of the existence of the Ideal World than of that of the Natural World.⁴ We cannot say it is more certain in itself, for one thing cannot be said to be more true than another, but it is more certain as to us, for we have "more and better Reasons to assure us of the Truth and Reality of its Existence."⁵

c. Ideas and Eternal Truths as Constituting the Ideal World

Assuming with Norris that we have proved the existence of the Ideal World, we must consider a little more closely

¹ *Philebus*, p. 59c.

² *Theory*, I, p. 107; II, p. 382. "The examination of Locke's Essay": "If Eternal Truths are pre-existent, their eternity does not consist in their being understood."

³ *Eclaircissements*, X, p. 372. "Je suis certain que des choses sont immuables, et que les vérités et les lois éternelles sont nécessaires, il est impossible qu'elles ne soient pas telles qu'elles sont. Or je ne vois rien en moi d'immuable ni de nécessaire." (Page references of the *Eclaircissements* are to the second volume of the *Recherche* edited by M. Bouillier, Garnier Frères, Paris). See also St. Augustine, *Confessions*, VII, 17: "For examining what caused me to admire the beauty of bodies celestial or terrestrial,—I had found the unchangeable and true eternity of Truth above my changeable mind."

⁴ *Theory*, I, pp. 185-186.

⁵ *Theory*, I, pp. 185-186. Cf. Malebranche, *Entretiens*, I, p. 10: "Il est bien plus facile de démontrer la réalité des idées, ou—la réalité de cet autre monde tout rempli de beautés intelligibles, que de démontrer l'existence de ce monde matériel."

just what is included in it, and then discuss the relation in which it stands to God and to the Natural World. It has already been described as eternal, unchangeable, self-existent and necessary.¹ It is according to Malebranche 'an enchanted region, a world made up entirely of intelligible beauty.'

The world thus existing beyond the material world is made up of Ideas and Eternal Truths. Norris's first definition of Idea is 'an image or similitude' of anything, and generally he uses the word simply in this sense. Ideas are 'any Forms, Representations or Similitudes of Things,'² or Idea 'in the strict sense is that whereby we perceive any being, as by its Intelligible Representative.'³ This corresponds to Malebranche's definition of Idea as 'the immediate object of the mind when it perceives any object.'⁴ By saying that an Idea is an Image, however, Norris does not mean that it is necessarily a copy of the material thing. These eternal Ideas which we have been discussing are "Originary and Archetypal Forms representing things not as Images do their Originals, but contrarywise as Originals do their Images or Pictures."⁵ The 'Idea' in this sense is something purely static; "the Idea of a thing is intelligibly that thing."⁶ In this sense of the word, then, as Norris admits, there would be no ideas of any but material things. The word 'Idea' has however a larger sense in which it means simply 'the thing that is thought upon.'⁷ In this use of 'Idea' we may have an idea of immaterial things, 'even of God himself.' The first meaning, however, is the one which Norris prefers, and which, as he says, 'we have hitherto used.'⁸ He frequently uses the word 'Ideas' to mean ideals

¹ See p. 22. Cf. Malebranche, *Entretiens*, I: "Les idées ont une existence, éternelle et nécessaire" (p. 10); "les dimensions intelligibles (idées) sont immuables" (p. 13); "ils ont une réalité véritable" (pp. 14, 17).

² *Theory*, I, p. 230.

³ *Ibid.*, II, p. 370.

⁴ *Recherche de la Vérité*, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. I, p. 373. "Ainsi par ce mot *idée*, je n'entends ici autre chose que ce qui est l'objet immédiat, ou le plus proche de l'esprit quand il aperçoit quelque objet."

⁵ *Theory*, I, p. 231.

⁶ *Theory*, I, p. 13.

⁷ *Ibid.*, II, p. 370.

⁸ *Ibid.*, II, p. 370.

or principles, 'eternal reasons,' as of beauty and truth. This he apparently takes over from Plato's discussion of absolute beauty, justice and the like,¹ without reconciling it with the other meaning of Idea as an image. For it is clear that when Norris speaks of the 'Idea' of a circle, for instance, he does not mean the law by which a circle is formed, but he means an actually existing circle, which is seen by the intellect, and exists eternally.²

Beside these 'Ideas' or 'Eternal Essences,' the Intelligible World contains also the Eternal Truths, which are the relations between the Ideas. Truth is of three sorts, the relation between created things, the relation between the Eternal Ideas, and the relation between the Ideas and the creatures.³ Only the relation between the Ideas themselves are eternal and necessary. Other truth is contingent as having to do with temporal and contingent beings. Norris's continual assertions that truth is 'real,' 'actual,' 'substantial,'⁴ though in harmony with the general attitude of Malebranche, seem opposed to the definite statement in the *Recherche de la Vérité* concerning the nature of Truth. "For the ideas are real, but the equality between the ideas, which is the truth, is not anything real."⁵ In his efforts to demonstrate the actual existence of truth, Norris finally identifies it with the Ideas. "In the reality of the thing, these Eternal Truths are the same with Ideas, as all Relations are with their Subjects and Terms."⁶

d. The Relation of the Ideal World to God

1. THE IDEAL WORLD AS IN THE MIND OF GOD

When we ask where this Ideal World is, 'or where the Seat of it is to be placed,'⁷ the first answer is that it is everywhere,

¹ As, for instance, 'Phaedo,' 65; 'Phaedrus,' 247; 'Symposium,' 211.

² *Theory*, I, p. 100.

³ *Theory*, I, p. 327.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 102-105.

⁵ *Recherche*, Bk. III. Pt. II., Chap. 6, p. 406.

⁶ *Theory*, II, p. 431.

⁷ *Theory*, I, p. 134.

even as Truth is 'Omnipresent as well as Eternal.' "But now," Norris continues, in more explicit account, "Consider, can there be anything that is Necessary, Eternal, or Omnipresent out of the Superlatively excellent and adorable Nature of that infinitely perfect Being who is Necessary, Self-existent and Independent?"¹ "To this Question all the Reason and all the Philosophy in the World answers directly, *No*.—And therefore since there is no such way of Existence possible out of God, I think I need not scruple to conclude that our Intelligible World, or World of Ideas, that has been proved so to exist, is really in God." Norris speaks of the Ideal World sometimes as 'in the mind of God,' sometimes as being identical with the 'essence of God,' making no distinction between the two expressions. It is not, however, identical with the essence of God, in the sense of being the whole nature of God—, for the Ideal World is purely intellectual while the nature of God includes Will as well as Understanding.²

This doctrine of the existence of the Ideal World in the mind of God, Norris, in common with the Cambridge Platonists, attributed to Plato. "Nor do I doubt but that I have herein concurring with me the general suffrage of the *Platonic* School, not excepting the *Head Master* of it."³ It is to be noted however that Norris's Platonism, like that of all the Cambridge Platonists, is throughout rather a Neo-Platonic doctrine, or interpretation of Platonic teaching, than a representation of Plato's own statements. It is not that they put Philo or Plotinus above Plato, the 'Divine Philosopher,' but that they consider Neo-Platonism as practically identical with Plato's theory, and the Neo-Platonic writings as of equal authority with Plato's own Dialogues in its interpretation. Thus Norris quotes Plotinus as an illustration of 'the Principles of the purest and most Genuine Platonism.'⁴ Though they usually simply accept the Neo-Platonic interpretation of Plato, Norris and Cudworth do occasionally argue against what they con-

¹ *Theory*, I, p. 137.

² *Ibid.*, I, pp. 39, 261, etc.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

⁴ *Theory*, I, p. 287.

sider the misinterpretation of Plato which regards the Platonic Ideas as separate from the mind of God. Cudworth insists that if there are "Eternal Intelligibles or Ideas and Eternal Truths . . . these Truths and Intelligible Essences cannot possibly be anywhere but in a mind." For Ideas are not self-existent substances but modifications of mind, 'not modes of matter, for matter is mutable,' and could not have eternal modifications.¹ Norris's early defence of this interpretation has already been noted,² and he criticizes Thomas Aquinas for supporting "the vulgar mistaken supposition concerning Plato's Ideas, as if they were out of God."³ Occasionally, but not always, Norris attributes this misinterpretation to Aristotle. "There is, I know, a certain Traditional Presumption (whereof it is not so easy to trace the Original as to prove the untruth) that has been handed down among some Learned Men from one to another, I know not well how or why, as if *Plato* should place his Ideas out of God, representing them as so many abstract and universal Forms or Essences separately existing from the Divine Nature. Which must be very gross Philosophy if really *Plato's*, but I think (and find there are a great many Learned Men that think the same with me) that it is indeed none of his, and whoever can but keep himself awake while he but Reads over his *Timæus* will, I believe, find reason to think so, too, viz., That by his Ideas he meant no such Abstract and Separated Forms or Essences as is vulgarly imagin'd but only the *Exemplaria rerum in mente Divina*, the Original Forms or Patterns of things in the Divine Understanding, and accordingly that he placed his Ideas nowhere else but in God."⁴

¹ *The True Intellectual System of The Universe*, pp. 736-737.

² See p. 5.

³ *Theory*, I, p. 267. Aquinas says, "Plato supposed forms of intellect to be separately existing substances." *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Bk. II, Ch. 74. Translation by Joseph Rickaby, London, MCMV.

⁴ *Theory*, I, p. 138.

2. ARGUMENTS FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE IDEAL WORLD WITH THE MIND OF GOD

According to Norris, it follows inevitably from the "Eternal Existence of our Ideas, together with their ubiquity," that they must exist in the mind of God, "out of whom there is nothing but what is Temporal, Mutable, Limited and Contingent."¹ To this general consideration he adds arguments to prove the principle "that God has in himself the Ideas of all things."

The first argument is based on the 'general Perfection of the Divine Nature.'² Assuming that God is an infinite Being it must be true that He is infinitely remov'd from *not Being*, that is, "that he must have all possible degrees of Being in himself." It then follows that God must have in Himself 'the Intelligible order and kind' of every being that exists out of God. Norris gives the argument of Aquinas "that whatever Perfection is in the effect must also be found in the effective cause—and therefore there can be no Perfection either in the whole or in any part of it but what is in God."³ Norris's other demonstration of this principle is from the *Wisdom* of God. It must be granted that God knows all things that are possible. But that which is known has some sort of real being, or 'entity,' since 'an absolute and pure nothing cannot be known.'⁴ That is, God must, in some way, know all the objects which He has the power to create, since otherwise He could not will to create them. But these objects which do not at present actually exist in themselves, 'in the natural state' can not be known in themselves. Therefore, if God knows them, he must know them not 'in themselves,' but 'in himself.' He must know them by their intelligible ideas exist-

¹ *Theory*, I, p. 149.

² *Ibid.*, p. 142.

³ *Theory*, I, pp. 143, 145. The argument is given by Thomas Aquinas in the *Summa Theologica*, Bk. I, Quaestio IV, Art. II: "Respondeo dicendum, quod in Deo sunt perfectiones omnium rerum.—Primo quidem per hoc quod quidquid perfectionis est in effectu, oportet invenire in causa effectiva vel secundum eandem rationem—vel eminentiori modo.—Cum ergo Deus fit prima causa effectiva rerum, oportet omnium rerum perfectiones praexistere in Deo secundum eminentiorem modum."

⁴ *Theory*, I, p. 148. Cf. Plato, 'Republic,' V: 476 E: "How can that which is not ever be known?"

ing eternally in His own mind.¹ From this it plainly follows that God "has the ideas of all things Possible in himself, and so produces nothing without but what he has first within." Norris applies the same argument to actual things by saying it is impossible that "God should know his creatures one way before and another way after their existence."² He also argues that if God knew the Creatures in themselves instead of in His own Ideas, the Creatures, being the immediate objects of God's understanding, would enlighten Him and perfect His being, which is inconsistent with the Self-sufficiency and Independence of God.³

In beginning his discussion of the principles that the Ideas of all things are in God, Norris says, with good reason, "and now were I disposed for the way of Quotation and to plant my Margent thick with authorities, I need not desire a better opportunity for it than is at Present offer'd me."⁴ He dwells particularly on the agreement of the 'School-Writers' with his position, because they at the same time deny the 'Doctrine of the Eternity of Essences.'⁵ Leaving the question of the nature of the Platonic Ideas, we see clearly that in Philo⁶ and Plotinus the Ideal World is identified with the Intellect or Mind of God. For Plotinus the Ideal World is the second stage of reality. It is intellect (*νοῦς*), which proceeds from the absolute 'One,' and in turn is the cause of the existing world. The Ideas are the principles of form which bring order and life into the chaos of formless Matter. The 'One' is God, as self-existent and complete, the Intellect is also God, as cause of the World. Plotinus has many specific statements, asserting the identity of the Ideas with God, such as, "Seek nothing out of God, but all things in him,"⁷ "the intellect

¹ Cf. *Reason and Religion*, p. 60; Cudworth, *Intellectual System*, p. 732, where the same argument is used as a proof of the existence of God.

² *Theory*, I, p. 156. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, Bk. I, Ch. 48.

³ *Theory*, I, p. 157.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

⁵ *Theory*, I, pp. 141, 142, 145, etc.

⁶ See p. 28.

⁷ *Enneades*, VI, Bk. 8, Ch. 18. Καὶ οὐ ζητῶν μηδὲν ἔξω ζῆται αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' εἰσω πάντα τὰ μετ' αὐτόν. αὐτὸν δὲ ἕα.

thinks itself," or "will itself be the object of its thought."¹ "Clearly the intellect being real existence must think and support the world of real existences. It is then the real existences."² "The forms of things then must exist prior to the world, not indeed as impressions struck from other things, but as archetypes and originals (πρωτα), and the very essence of the intellect. If however, some people talk of seminal reasons as sufficient, evidently they must be talking of the eternal reasons. But if the reasons are eternal and impassible, they must exist in an intellect (νοῦς), and in an intellect such that it is prior to conditioned existence, nature and soul, seeing that these have a potential existence."³ "The intellect then is all real existences thought as not external to itself."⁴ "We grant then that the intellect is real existence and contains all the real existences in itself, not after a spatial fashion, but as though they were its own self, and it were one with them."⁵

St. Augustine also identifies the Ideal World with the mind of God, both by constant implication and in many explicit statements. "For neither are there many wisdoms, but one, in which are untold and infinite treasures of things intellectual wherein are all invisible and unchangeable reasons of things visible and changeable, which were created by it. For God made nothing unwittingly.—But if He knew all that He made, He made only those things which He had known."⁶ "For there are ideas, certain principal forms or steady and immutable reasons of things which themselves were not made, and which endure always and eternally in the same manner. These are contained in the divine intelligence, and, though they themselves neither are produced nor perish,

¹ *Enneades*, V, Bk. 9, Ch. 5 (Bakewell, pp. 357-358): εἰ δὲ παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ νοεῖ, αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ νοεῖ.

² ἡ δὲ ῥησις, ὅτι νοῦς ὢν ὄντως νοεῖ τὰ ὄντα καὶ ὑφίσταται.

³ *Enneades*, V, Bk. IX, Ch. 5; Bakewell, p. 358.

⁴ *Enneades*, V, Lib. IX, Ch. 5. ὁ νοῦς ἄρα τὰ ὄντα ὄντως, οὐχ, οἷά ἐστιν ἄλλοι, νοῶν.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Ch. 6; "Νοῦς μὲν δὴ ἐστὶν τὰ ὄντα, καὶ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὡς αὐτὸν ἔχων, καὶ ἐν ὧν αὐτοῖς." (Cf. Bakewell, pp. 359, 360.)

⁶ *De Civitate Dei*, Bk. XI, Ch. 10. *Opera Omnia*, Ed. s. P. Migne, 1841. Translated by Rev. Marcus Dods, 1861, Vol. I.

according to them all perishable things are said to have been made, and all that are created and destroyed."¹

Norris further identifies the Ideal World with the Second Person of the Trinity. He explains the text of St. John's "All things were made by Him, and without Him was not anything made that was made," as meaning that God made all things according to the Ideas of His Eternal Wisdom, "which wisdom was his co-essential Son."² "And how did he make all things by him, if not as by an Exemplar, or Intelligible Measure?" Norris supports this view by reference to St. Augustine³ but "would not be understood positively to affirm it."⁴ It seems to have been one of the accepted beliefs of the Cambridge Platonists that the Neo-Platonic divine triad of 'the One,' 'the Intellect,' and 'the World Soul,' is identical with the Christian Trinity.⁵ Norris apparently believed that he was following St. Augustine in thus identifying them, but St. Augustine himself seems to show a much clearer realization of the differences between the Christian conception and that of Plotinus. As, for instance, when addressing the Platonists, 'particularly' Plotinus, he says, "You proclaim the Father and His Son, whom you call the Father's intellect or mind, and between these a third, by whom we suppose you mean the Holy Spirit, and in your own fashion you call these Gods—but you will

¹ *De Ideis*, 2. "Sunt namque ideae principales formae quaedam vel rationes rerum stabiles et incommutabiles, quae, ipsae formatae non sunt atque per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo se habentes, quae in divina intelligentia continentur, et quum ipsae neque oriantur neque intereant, secundum eas tamen formare? Dicitur omne, quod interire potest et omne, quod oritur et interit."

² *Theory*, I, pp. 102, 237, 240; Preface, p. 10; *Reason and Religion*, I, p. 5; II, p. 41.

³ Norris refers to 'De Gen. ad lit.' 2, Lib. 5, Cap. 15, and to St. Augustine's 'Exposition upon St. John,' Tract. 1. In this treatise St. Augustine writes: "*All things* therefore, brethren, *all things* whatever were made by Him, and without Him *was nothing* made. But how were all things made by Him?—I will explain myself, as well as I can, beloved. A carpenter makes a chest. First of all he has the chest in his *theory* of art; for unless he had it, whence should he get it to bring it out in practice?—Thus, then, dearly beloved—the Wisdom of God, by which all things were made, doth in respect of art or theory contain all before it forms all." Dods, *Library of the Fathers*, 'St. Augustine on St. John', Vol. I.

⁴ *Theory*, I, Preface, p. 14.

⁵ See Cudworth, *Intellectual System*, Ch. IV.

not acknowledge the incarnation of the Son of God by whom we are saved.—You see in a fashion and from a distance the country in which we should abide, but the way to it you know not.”¹

St. Thomas Aquinas, though he interpreted Plato as holding that the Ideas were self-existent and independent did not himself so conceive them. He asserts their identity with the mind of God, by arguments which are like those of Norris and may have suggested them. “Nor can there be posited any separate existence of these intelligible forms, which seems to have been the position of Plato,” for “God’s perfection would depend on another being than Himself, which is impossible.”² Again, “whatever is beyond the essence of God is caused by God,” but the Ideas are uncreated. “The divine understanding, then, can comprehend whatever is proper to each being in its essence, by understanding wherein each thing imitates the divine essence.”³

In Malebranche we find not only a clear statement of this conception, but also arguments practically the same as those of Norris, though less elaborately developed. “All our clear ideas are in God, in their intelligible reality. It is only in Him that we see them. They exist only in the universal reason, which by them illumines all minds. If our ideas are eternal,

¹ *De Civitate Dei*, Bk. X, Ch. 29: “De incarnatione Domini nostri Jesu Christi, quem confiteri Platoni eorum erubescit impietas.” “Praedices Patrem et suis Filium quem vocas paternum intellectum seu mentem; et horum medium, quem putamus te dicere Spiritum sanctum, et more vestro appellas tres deos. Ubi, etsi verbis indisciplinatis utimini, videtis tamen qualitercumque, et quasi per quaedam tenuis imaginationis umbracula, quo nitendum sit: sed incarnationem incommutabilis Filii Dei, quo salvamur, ut ad illa quae credimus, vel ex quantulacumque parte intelligimus, venire possumus, non vultis agnoscere. Itaque videtis utcumque, etsi de longinquo, etsi acie caligante, patrem in qua manendum est, sed viam qua eundum est non tenetis.”

² *Summa contra Gentiles*, Bk. I, Chs. 48, 51.

³ *Ibid.*, Ch. 34. Cf. Cudworth, *Treatise on Eternal and Immutable Morality*, London, 1731, Bk. IV, Ch. VI, p. 284: “Where it is affirmed that the Essences of all Things are Eternal, and Immutable—this is only to be understood of the Intelligible Essences and Rationes of Things, as they are the Objects of Mind. And that there neither is nor can be any other meaning of it, than this, that there is an Eternal Knowledge and Wisdom, or an Eternal Mind or Intellect, which comprehends within itself the Steady and Immutable Rationes of all Things and their Verities, from which all Particular Intellects are derived and on which they do depend.”

immutable, necessary, you will see clearly that they cannot be found except in an immutable nature—in God himself.”¹ “God sees all things in himself.”² “It is certain that God has in himself, in an intelligible manner, the perfections of all the beings that he has created or can create, and that it is by these intelligible perfections that he knows the essence of all things.”³

3. THE IDEAL WORLD NOT DEPENDENT ON THE WILL OF GOD

The Ideas, then, exist in the mind of God, but this statement requires further explanation to guard it against misconception. The Ideal World, though existing in the mind of God, is not to be considered as dependent on the will of God. In this Malebranche and the Cambridge Platonists are united in opposition to the teaching of Descartes.⁴ Though Henry More is inclined to doubt that Descartes seriously intended to say that God could make “the angles of a right triangle not equal to two right angles,”⁵ the others refer this doctrine unequivocally to him.

Norris’s first argument against the conception of the Ideal World as dependent on the Will of God is from the nature of Ideas. They cannot be created by the Will of God, because “they are not in themselves of a *producible Nature*. ‘For whatsoever is produced is Temporary, Contingent and Mutable,’⁶ and the Ideas are Eternal, Necessary and Immutable. Moreover, if the Ideas were created by God, they must be made according to other Ideas already existing, “since God cannot will what he has no conception of,” and those again by others and so on, “which chase, whoever shall run for a while, will at length find himself so out of Breath, that he will find it

¹ *Entretiens*, I, p. 20.

² *Ibid.*, V, p. 102: “Dieu voit en lui-même toutes choses.”

³ *Eclaircissements*, X, p. 378.

⁴ *Reason and Religion*, p. 55. *Theory*, I, p. 340; II, p. 382. Descartes, *Meditations de prima philosophia*, Responsio ad sextas objectiones, 6.

⁵ Henry More, *Divine Dialogues*, London, MDCCXIII, p. 65. More continues: “And yet there are some of his followers who philosophize in this manner,” and refers to Poirett, *Cogitat. Rel.* Bk. 3. Ch. 10.

⁶ *Theory*, II, pp. 381, 392.

necessary to stop in some Ideas, which tho' the Patterns according to which all things are made, yet themselves are made according to none, nor indeed made at all."¹

The other arguments against the dependence of the Ideal World on God's will are from the standpoint of the Eternal Truths. For, in the first place, if truth be dependent on the will of God, then before He decreed it "there was no truth and consequently no knowledge,"² "and so we must suppose God to have acted unintelligently;" and, in the second place, if truth be only the result of a 'free decree of God,' then all truth is contingent, not necessary, and is subject to change. This, however, would 'undermine the foundation of Science,' which depends on the necessary connections of things, and also of Morality and Religion.³

Philo had treated the ideas as the effect of God's will, considering that the account in Genesis was of a double creation, first of the Ideas and then of the Natural World. "For God—when he had determined to create this visible world, previously formed that one which is perceptible only by the intellect."⁴

Plotinus, however, said of the relation between the Intellect and the Ideas, "The intellect then is all real existences thought as not external to itself. They are neither prior nor subsequent to it, but it is, as it were, the primal law-giver, or rather the law itself, of existence. The saying then is correct that thinking and existing are one and the same thing, and that the knowledge of immaterial entities is the same as the things themselves."⁵

Malebranche also argues that if truth were dependent on the will of God, there could be no real science.⁶ The necessary truths and the ideas which they connect, though inde-

¹ *Theory*, I, p. 237.

² *Conduct of Human Life*, in *Reason and Religion*, pp. 179, 180. *Theory*, I, p. 342.

³ *Theory*, I, pp. 346-347.

⁴ Philo Judaeus, *Creation of the World*, IV. Trans. C. D. Yonge, 1854.

⁵ *Enneades*, V, Lib. IX, Ch. 5 (Bakewell, p. 358). 'Ο νοῦς ἀρα τὰ ὄντα ὄντως, οὐχ, οἷά ἐστιν ἄλλοθι, νοῶν, οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οὔτε πρὸ αὐτοῦ, οὔτε μετ' αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ οἷον νομοθέτης πρῶτος, μᾶλλον δὲ νόμος αὐτὸς τοῦ εἶναι. . . . Καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀνευ ἑλθῆς ἐπιστήμη ταῦτόν τῳ πράγματι: καὶ το ἑμαυτὸν ἐδίζησάμην ὡς ἐν τῶν ὄντων.

⁶ *Eclaircissements*, p. 374.

pendent of the will of God, can be said to be dependent on the understanding of God, on the mind of God as 'Intelligible or Exhibitive,' 'on the Ideality of God.'¹

For both Malebranche and Norris the result of these arguments is to reinforce the conviction that truth and the whole ideal world, since they are not dependent on the will of God, must be of the very essence of God Himself. According to Malebranche, "Truth is not dependent on God. God cannot act except in accordance with this reason.—But God consults only himself, and consequently this reason is not distinguished from God himself."² Norris develops the argument in syllogistic form. "Whatever is not the Effect of God is God. Necessary Truth is not the Effect of God. Therefore Necessary Truth is God."³ And again, "What is there that God cannot change but Himself, or what is there absolutely Necessary and Immutable besides him?"⁴

4. ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

Since the Ideal World, if it exists at all, is identical with the mind of God, it is necessary here to discuss the arguments for the existence of God. It seems rather unlikely that Norris would have raised this question for himself, but because of the prominent part assigned to these proofs in Descartes's philosophy, they formed a necessary part of any system founded on Cartesianism.

The first argument here offered by Norris for the existence of God is the same as that of the *Metaphysical Essay*. Assuming the existence of eternal truths, which are relations between Ideas, we must believe, according to Norris, that the simple Ideas which they unite have a real and eternal existence. Ideas, however, can exist only in a mind, and eternal Ideas only in an Eternal Mind, which is God. Norris appears to

¹ *Theory*, I, pp. 356, 357. Leibniz, also in some places, expresses this view of the relation between necessary truths and the mind of God. See *Monadology*, p. 46.

² *Eclaircissements*, p. 374.

³ *Theory*, I, p. 336.

⁴ *Theory*, I, p. 361.

have considered this argument original, for he makes no reference to any authority and speaks of it as new.¹ It does appear, however, in Cudworth's *Intellectual System of the Universe* in very nearly the same form. "It is generally acknowledged and cannot reasonably be denied by any *that there are Eternal Verities*;" as for example, "such common things as these, *that Equals added to Equals make Equals*, that the *Cause* is in the order of Nature *before the Effect*, etc." "Now if there be *Eternal Truths* which were never made and could not *But Be*, then must the *Rationes Rerum*, the *Simple Reasons* of things also, or their *Intelligible Natures* and *Essences*, out of which those Truths are compounded be of necessity *Eternal* likewise," and, "if therefore there be *Eternal Intelligibles* or *Ideas*, and *Eternal Truths*; and *Necessary Existence* do belong to them; then must there be an *Eternal Mind* *Necessarily Existing* since these Truths and *Intelligible Essences* of things cannot possibly be anywhere but in a *Mind*, for *Ideas* are not "very substances but modes of substances." This mind must be "*Senior to the World* and all *Sensible* things, and such as at once comprehends in it the *Ideas of all Intelligibles*, and their *Necessary Scheses* and *Relation*." This, therefore, is the "*Mind of an Omnipotent and Infinitely Perfect Being*."²

There is, however, Norris continues, a certain difficulty in the argument which may deserve to be here considered and cleared.³ We have said that God "is the Foundation of the *Intelligible World*, and consequently of *Truth* which does so depend upon him that without him there would be none. On the other side it seems as necessary that the *Being of God* should also be founded upon *Truth*, or else how shall it be proved that there is one?" This seems to be a circular argument, and consequently not satisfactory. We also see that Descartes, "as clear a writer as he is," was "entangled in a confusion very like this," when he makes the "truth of all Science to depend on the knowledge of God," and yet "demonstrates the *Being of God a priori* from Rational Premises

¹ See p. 16. Cf. *Reason and Religion*, Contemplation V, p. 42.

² R. Cudworth, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, pp. 728, 736-737.

³ *Theory*, I, pp. 403, 404.

or Principles—whereof he that uses them must be supposed to be certain.”¹ The solution of the difficulty lies in the fact that it is only our knowledge of God which is dependent on the Eternal Truths. Truth depends on God in reality, but we derive our ‘*Knowledge and Certainty*’ of the existence of God from the consideration of these truths.

Norris criticises Descartes’s argument for the existence of God as cause of the idea of God, by saying it is not true that we have an *idea* of God.² By changing the form, however, he uses this argument as a basis for what seems to him a more satisfactory demonstration. Descartes had said that we have an ‘Idea of an Immense Objective Reality,’ that “all that is in the Idea Objectively or Representatively, must be in the Cause really, either in the way of Formality, or in the way of Eminence,” and therefore, “we must conclude that there is some Archetypal Being answerable to that Idea, that is, which has really all that Perfection which the Idea has Objectively.”³ In the *Metaphysical Essay* Norris said that Descartes had gained this argument from St. Austin and the Platonists, but here he retracts that statement, saying he knows not “any just ground” for it. Descartes’s argument, as it stands, cannot, he thinks, be admitted, since we do not perceive God as we do other things, “by an idea that is distinct from him.”⁴ If instead of an ‘idea’ of God, Descartes had said a ‘Notion or Perception of God,’ it might be allowed; for all discourse concerning God supposes this.⁵

Norris’s own argument, however, is based on his assertion that we perceive God not by an Idea, but immediately. Since we perceive him immediately by himself, it must necessarily follow that *He is*, since otherwise he could not possibly be perceived by us.”⁶ Malebranche, though he also declares

¹ *Theory*, p. 404.

² *Ibid.*, II, p. 290.

³ *Ibid.*, II, p. 291, and Descartes, *Meditations*, III.

⁴ *Theory*, II, p. 293. See the discussion of the knowledge of God, pp. 66 et seq.

⁵ *Ibid.*, II, p. 294.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 295.

that we perceive God immediately, does not infer that this interferes with our having an idea of him. For he says that the first and best proof of the existence of God is "the idea which we have of the infinite. For it is unquestionable that the mind perceives the infinite—and has a very distinct idea of God."¹

The other argument used by Norris in proof of the existence of God is also found in Cudworth. This is from the possibility of God's existence to His actual existence. "If God be a possible Being, that is, whose Nature or Essence implies no Contradiction or Repugnance that he should be, then it necessarily follows that he actually is, since if he were not, it would be utterly impossible that he should ever be. Here the possibility plainly and immediately infers the act; and perhaps 'tis the only case wherein it evidently does so."² This use of the argument immediately suggests that it is a development of the ontological argument of Descartes and Anselm, and in Cudworth's more elaborate formulation it is so, explicitly. Cudworth criticises Descartes's argument, that the Idea of God includes necessary existence, and God therefore exists, on the ground that it is an argument from an hypothetical premise to an absolute conclusion.³ "But from the Impossibility that the Perfect Being should be non-existent, the proof is more reasonable." For the Idea of God contains no contradiction; it is therefore possible that God (should) exist, and the Idea of God includes necessary existence. "Therefore God exists, because if not then it would be absolutely impossible that he should ever have been."

5. THE NATURE OF GOD

In discussing the nature of God, Norris, for the most part, simply takes over the traditional attributes by which God had been characterized by theologians and philosophers, having, as he says, "no more to offer than what is commonly taught in the Schools."⁴ In great measure also, he follows the very

¹ *Recherche de la Vérité*, III, Pt. II, Ch. 6, p. 402.

² *Theory*, II, pp. 413, 414.

³ *Intellectual System of the Universe*, pp. 721-726.

⁴ *Reason and Religion*, p. 33.

words and expressions of Malebranche and Descartes. God is a perfect Being,¹ simple, immaterial, without extension, infinite in power, wisdom, and goodness.² For Malebranche and Norris, God is both the Creator of the World, and the real object of all our knowledge, love and will.

In *Reason and Religion*, Norris follows Malebranche in holding that to say God is infinite means He is pure being, absolutely undetermined, 'Being in general.' He objects to the teaching of 'Cartesius and Henry More,' that the essence of the idea of God "is absolute perfection, because perfection as such is an attribute or property," and the real essence of God can be nothing but 'Being itself.'³ This is even more precise than the statement of Malebranche that God is "the infinite, the undetermined Being, the being without restriction, in one word, the Being."⁴ In the *Theory*, though without retracting his former statement, Norris emphasizes the infinity of God rather as inclusive of all perfections, as 'all-being.'⁵ For "if infinite in Being then is he infinitely removed from *not Being* or *Nothing*—then he must have all possible degrees of Being in himself, in other words, he must be *all Being*."

Norris's argument for the Wisdom of God is from the 'admirable Order, Beauty, Contrivance and Geometry' of the World. For as God "had need have an Infinite Power to make a World, so he had need have an Infinite Wisdom to make such a World."⁶ The imperfections which appear in the world Norris explains by the simplicity of the laws by which God acts, saying that it is evidence of greater wisdom

¹ *Theory*, I, pp. 294, 297. Malebranche, *Entretiens*, II, *Oeuvres*, ed. Simon, Tome I, pp. 27, 28, 31. (All references to the *Entretiens* are to this volume.)

² *Theory*, I, p. 142; II, p. 170. Malebranche, *Entretiens*, II, p. 27; IV, pp. 83, 87; VI, p. 139. Cf. Descartes, "By the name, God, I understand a substance infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which I myself, and every other created thing that exists if any such there be, were created. (*Meditations*, III.) Cf. Cudworth, *Intellectual System*, pp. 720, 723, etc., and More, *Immortality of the Soul*, I, Sec. CVI., The Idea of God is "that of an essence absolutely perfect."

³ *Reason and Religion*, pp. 8, 13, 62.

⁴ *Entretiens*, II, pp. 28, 29.

⁵ *Theory*, I, p. 143.

⁶ *Theory*, I, p. 20.

to govern the world in accordance with a few fundamental laws, than to regulate each detail by a particular decree. Both Malebranche and Norris assert that the immateriality and the simplicity of the nature of God are not inconsistent with the theory that God contains in Himself the ideas of all things. In this case, as in others, Malebranche suggests the idea which Norris works out in logical form. Malebranche's assertion that "The divine substance, in its simplicity, includes an infinity of intelligible perfections,"¹ and his description of God as the Being "at the same time one and many, composed of an infinity of perfections,—and so simple that in him each perfection includes all the others without any real distinction;"² these are in Norris's account not only repeated but further explained and defended. "For nothing is contrary to simplicity but the union of Things different and distinct from one another."³ But the Divine Ideas are "neither Things nor modes really distinct from the Divine Nature, but the very same Divine Nature itself, as it relates to Things out of himself."

In response to the objection, brought by Arnauld against the theory of Malebranche, that if God had in himself the Ideas of all things including that of matter, he must himself be material and extended, Norris gives the same answer as Malebranche had given, and refers his readers to Malebranche's *Letters to Arnauld*, for 'more particular satisfaction.'⁴ The reply given by him is that "Things are not in God as they are out of Him," but that He contains only the intelligible representation of their perfections. "The intelligible extension, for instance, does not occupy any space, the bodies are locally extended, because of the limitation essential to Creatures." Norris ends the discussion with the admission that, though it is necessary that God should have an idea of body, yet, "if a farther inquiry be made concerning the mode of this, how an Idea purely spiritual can represent Body, I must confess myself unable to explain the very precise manner of it."

¹ *Entretiens*, II, p. 28.

² *Ibid.*, p. 31.

³ *Theory*, I, p. 294.

⁴ *Theory*, I, pp. 295, 296.

Another character of God, very important for Malebranche and Norris, is His intelligibility. He is the 'most intelligible object,' the only one whom we can know 'by Himself' or 'immediately.'¹ This character will be more conveniently discussed later in connection with the consideration of other forms of knowledge.²

II. THE NATURAL OR MATERIAL WORLD

a. *Its Existence*

Since the universe has been divided into the Ideal and Natural Worlds, of which only the first has been proved to exist, it is necessary now for Norris to consider the question of the existence of the Natural World. To begin with, Norris assumes its existence as a matter of course. It is only too certain that there is a sensible world, for men are so attached to it that they can barely be persuaded to attend to the Ideal World, which is so much more worthy of their thought.³ But, Norris declares, the existence of this Natural World is really much less clearly evident to our minds than that of the Ideal World.⁴ For, in the first place, since the sensible world is not a part of the absolutely existing essence of God, as is the Ideal World, but only the 'free and contingent effect of His will and power,'⁵ we cannot prove that there must be such a world, but can only argue to it as cause of certain effects. For both Norris and Malebranche, this insistence on the con-

¹ Malebranche, *Recherche*, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. 7, p. 411: "Il n'y a que Dieu que l'on connait par lui-même. . . que nous voyions d'une vue immédiat et direct."

² See p. 123.

³ *Theory*, I, Ch. I.

⁴ *Theory*, I, p. 185.

Ibid., p. 189. Cf. Malebranche, *Entretiens*, VI, p. 129: "The notion of the infinitely perfect Being does not include any necessary relation to created beings. God is fully sufficient unto himself. Matter then is not a necessary emanation of the Divinity.—The existence of bodies is arbitrary. If they exist, it is because God has willed to create them.—But one cannot give an *exact demonstration* of any truth except by showing that it has a necessary connection with its principle.—It is not possible then to prove strictly that there are bodies." Cf. also Cudworth, *Intellectual System*, Ch. IV, pp. 765, 766.

tendency of the world resulted from the emphasis on the self-sufficiency of God. Needing nothing to complete His perfection, He could only have created the world because of a free and arbitrary desire. The great prominence given this doctrine in all mediæval theology may have come to it in part from Plato, through the teaching of Plotinus about the 'One.' "For he must be the sufficient and self-sufficing, and free from wants of all things.—The One seeks nothing in order that it may exist or be happy, nor yet anything to support it."¹

Secondly, it is clear that certain knowledge, such as that of the mathematical sciences, has to do not with the particulars of sense, but with the abstract universals of reason. Sensible knowledge, therefore, is not rightly called knowledge,² since it is neither certain nor demonstrable. The greater certainty of the Ideal World is not based simply on the superiority of reason over sense, since sense alone does not judge of existence at all. Upon feeling certain sensations, we do indeed judge that there are bodies, but this is the evidence of reason, not of sense.³ And though our sensations themselves may be very clear, our reasoning upon them is often confused and erroneous, since the connection between the sensation and the conclusion drawn from it is less close, and less evident than in reasoning 'upon an Intellectual Principle.'⁴ This shows the misunderstanding involved in all the controversies about the erroneousness of sense. Sensation itself, Norris urges, "can never deceive nor be deceived," since "there is no such thing as judgment any way belonging to it." It is the reasoning upon sense which may be incorrect and deceptive.⁵

¹ *Enneades*, VI, Lib. IX, Ch. 6 (Bakewell, p. 369). Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, Bk. Z, 1028a.

² *Theory*, I, p. 194. Cf. Cudworth, *Intellectual System*, p. 637: "The Evidence of Particular Bodies doth necessarily depend upon the *Information of Sense*—but the certainty of this very evidence is not from *Sense* alone, but from a *Complication of Reason and Understanding* together with it." Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, Bk. Γ, Ch. 5.

³ *Theory*, I, pp. 199, 200.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

⁵ Cf. Malebranche, *Recherche de la Vérité*, I, Ch. 14, p. 120: "L'erreur ne se rencontre que dans les jugements que nous faisons. C'est ce jugement qui renferme un consentement de notre liberté qui est sujet à l'erreur."

I IMPOSSIBILITY OF PROVING THAT THE MATERIAL WORLD EXISTS

When he has thus proved that the Natural World has less certainty for our minds than the Ideal World, Norris is compelled to raise the question whether it exists at all or not. Now knowledge, as he says, is either 'Intuitive' or 'Demonstrative,' and the existence of material bodies must be known, if at all, by our directly perceiving them, or by arguing for them upon rational principles.

In many different parts of the *Theory*, Norris contends that we do not have immediate perception of bodies. We perceive only our own sensations "When I touch a coal of fire, 'tis not the Fire I feel, but *Pain*.—So that there is no such thing as Sensation of *Bodies*, but only simple Sensation."¹ Norris repeats the argument brought by Malebranche against the possibility of direct perception of bodies. He refers to "the Reasons assigned by Descartes, taken from the Errors of the Senses, and the Imagination, which we have of many non-existing things in our sleep;"² but these considerations are of less importance in his mind than the arguments of Malebranche.

Material objects are not immediately perceived; first, because they are outside the mind.³ "For since there is a necessity of some union between the act, or rather the Power acting and its Object, 'tis plain that whatever is perceived or understood, must be some way or other present to the mind."⁴ Now, material objects, by hypothesis, are things existing out of the mind, "therefore they are not by themselves immediately perceived." Moreover, these material objects are 'disproportionate to the mind' and consequently cannot be directly united to it. "How there can be any such union

¹ *Theory*, I, p. 199. Malebranche, *Eclaircissements*, X; Cf. Cudworth, *Intellectual System*, p. 635: "Sense is not Knowledge and Understanding nor the criterion of Truth as to *Sensible* things. . . perceiving its own *Passions*—rather than the Things themselves." pp. 719, 723, et seq.

² *Theory*, II, p. 28.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 310. Cf. Malebranche, *Recherche de la Vérité*, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. 1; *Entretiens*, I, p. 13.

⁴ Norris here quotes Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Pt. I, Quaest. 12, Art. 2: "Non enim fit visio in actu, nisi per hoc quod res visa quodamod' est in vidente."

between a thinking Being and an extended Being is not, I think, to be conceived."¹

To these arguments of Malebranche, Norris adds two others. The first is based on the contingency and lack of necessity in the material world. All his masters and teachers had emphasized this character of sensible things, and Norris argues that if these were the things which we immediately perceive, we could have no science of physical nature.² For science, as he many times repeats, deals with necessary and immutable things, and if we can affirm any truth concerning physical objects, it must be because we see them in their Ideas and not in themselves. The other consideration added by Norris is from the scholastic doctrine that the object of perception is 'perfective of the mind.' If, then, the material objects were immediately perceived, they would be perfective of our minds, 'and consequently superior to them,' 'which Matter cannot be allowed to be.'³ The conclusion from these arguments is that Matter is not seen or understood in itself, that it is 'utterly Dark, Invisible and Unintelligible.' We cannot, then, draw any argument for the existence of Matter from immediate perception.

It has been held that Matter, though not immediately perceived, must exist as the cause of our ideas and sensations, but this Norris cannot allow. Matter, being entirely distinct from Spirit, cannot act upon it. Norris does not here argue as Malebranche did that Matter is absolutely incapable of being the cause of anything. He asserts, indeed, that God is the cause of all things, but does not carry out this principle to the extent of denying that one body may affect another.

¹ *Theory*, II, p. 313. Cf. Malebranche, *Recherche de la Vérité*, III, Pt. II, Ch. I p. 376: "Material things certainly cannot be united to our souls in the way which is necessary for perception; because since they are extended and the soul is not, there are no relations (*rapports*) between them."

² *Theory*, II, pp. 313, 317.

³ *Theory*, II, pp. 318, 320. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, I p. 48: "The understanding is in potentiality in regard to its object, in so far as it is a different thing from that object.—A thing understood is the perfection of him who understands it: for an understanding is perfected by actually understanding, which means being made one with the object understood."

Malebranche declares that since nothing can be moved contrary to the will of God, therefore nothing is moved except by the efficiency of His will. Therefore "it is contradiction to say that one body can move another."¹ Norris, however, sees no difficulty in saying that "Body can act only on Body,"² or that bodies may be the cause of impressions made on our bodies. His argument, which is also employed by Malebranche,³ is based solely on the difference between mind and body. "Bodies have nothing in them but Figure, Motion, etc.—these as they cannot rise up to Thought in the Bodies themselves, so neither is it possible they should be able to produce it in us, unless we could suppose that a cause might produce an effect which is of more noble order than itself."⁴ Again, "Body can act only upon Body; for it can act only on what it touches and it can touch nothing but Body."

We cannot, then, prove the existence of Matter, either as the immediate object of our perceptions or as the cause of them. Descartes's argument for the existence of matter from the veracity of God, though it may be accepted as sufficient, is not a strict demonstration. Malebranche's argument, that the Natural World is revealed by Faith, ultimately depends upon the 'information of sense,'⁵ since whether it be by minds or by the Bible it must be by sense the revelation is received, and consequently religious doctrines can no more be received as a proof of the existence of matter than any other reasoning from sensation.

¹ *Entretiens*, VII, p. 157. See also Cudworth, *Intellectual System*, p. 667: "Motion is not essential to body. The cause of all motion is God."

² *Theory*, II, p. 223. Norris also agrees with Malebranche in saying that the soul is not the real cause of motion in the body (p. 226).

³ *Entretiens*, VII, p. 143.

⁴ *Theory*, II, p. 221.

⁵ *Theory*, I, p. 189. Malebranche's argument is contained in *Entretiens*, VI. One is inclined to echo the words of Ariste in the later part of the dialogue: "Oh! Théodore, vous avez toujours recours aux vérités de la foi pour vous tirer d'affaire. Ce n'est pas la philosophie." (*Entretiens*, IX, p. 211)

2. THE EXISTENCE OF THE MATERIAL WORLD NOT TO BE DENIED THOUGH
INCAPABLE OF PROOF

In spite of the lack of proof for the existence of matter, Norris would not be 'so much a Sceptic' as to doubt it altogether.¹ Though he will not admit that Revelation is any proof of the existence of bodies, yet he does insist that to distrust our senses altogether in this matter would be to destroy 'Reveal'd Religion.' He agrees with Malebranche that our senses were not intended to "instruct us in the Exactness of Truth, but rather to serve us for the common uses of Life,"² but insists that in general they "do assure us of the existence of a sensible world." He falls back upon Descartes's argument that to say there is no material world is to doubt the goodness of God, since we seem compelled to believe in its existence.³ He would say with Henry More, "It is as incongruous to deny there is a God, because God is not an object fitted to the senses, as it were to deny there is matter or Body, because that Body or matter in the imaginative Notion thereof lies so unevenly and troublesomely in our Fancy and Reason."⁴

The Natural World, though not the actual or direct cause of our sensations, may be called the 'occasional cause.' This conception is the natural result of Norris's own theory, but in its precise formulation and expression is due to Malebranche. The apparent connection between our bodies and our spirits and the influence which material objects seem to exert over our sensations, are due, according to Malebranche, simply to "those laws of the union of soul and body, according to which God acts unceasingly on these two substances,"⁵ so that whenever there is a change in one there is a corresponding change in the other. "You press the corner of your eye, and you have a certain sensation. It is because He who alone can act upon the spirit has established certain laws by

¹ *Theory*, I, pp. 186, 187.

² *Ibid.*, p. 188.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

⁴ *Antidote against Atheism*, London, MDCCXII., Ch. VIII, p. 13.

⁵ *Entretiens*, IV, p. 79: "Les lois de l'union de l'âme et du corps selon lesquelles Dieu agit sans cesse dans ces deux substances."

which the body and the soul act and suffer reciprocally."¹ "You know, Ariste," Malebranche says in the *Entretiens*, "that man is composed of two substances, spirit and body, of which the modalities are reciprocal in consequence of general laws—and that these laws are nothing but the constant and always efficient acts of will (*volontés*) of the Creator."² "God does all things, He is the true cause, the general cause. But beside this general cause, there are an infinite number of particular causes, which should be called occasional causes."³ When a body is in motion, it has certainly the force to move another, in consequence of the laws of motion which God continually follows.—It is not by any means the real cause of the movement. It is nothing but an occasional cause."⁴ "The moving force of bodies is the all-powerful action of God who preserves them at successive moments in different places."⁵ Norris, though he does not explicitly carry the doctrine of 'occasional causes' so far as this, uses the same principle. It has been demonstrated that body cannot be the cause of our sensations, "and yet, that we *regularly have them* upon their Impressions, is as plain, by experience, as the other is by Reason. It follows, then, that they are only positively annex'd to them by the settled Will and establish'd Order of some other Being. That is, in other Words, that Bodies are only the Conditions or Occasions of our Sensations, but that some other Being is the Cause of them."⁶ And, in more particular explanation, he adds, "the senses are the Occasions of our having Ideas: that is, that God has established a certain Order and Connection between such Impressions made upon our Senses and such Ideas. Not that these Impressions do cause or produce these Ideas, but that they are Conditions at the presence of which God will . . . Exhibit them to our minds."⁷

But, though it is thus a condition of our sensations, the Nat-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 78: "Agissent et souffrent réciproquement."

² *Entretiens*, XII, p. 299.

³ *Méditations Chrétiennes*, V, *Oeuvres*, ed. Simon, Tome II, V, p. 59.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁶ *Theory*, II, p. 224.

⁷ 'Remarks upon the Athenian Society's Reply to the Examination of Locke's Essay.'

ural World is not a necessary condition. Both Malebranche and Norris insist that, though the world were annihilated, God could still give us the sensations and ideas which we now have. "It is not really your room which I see when I look at it, for I could still see that which I see now even if God had destroyed this room."¹ "I can easily conceive that God can if he pleases raise the sensation of pain in the soul though no change be made in the Body, nay though there be no body at all."² This doctrine of Occasionalism aroused considerable criticism. It apparently had been formulated long before the time of Malebranche and Norris, for Thomas Aquinas brings against it the same objections later brought against their use of it. "Some have taken occasion of going wrong by thinking that no creature has any action in the production of natural effects—thus that fire does not warm, but God causes heat where fire is present. It is contrary to the notion of wisdom for anything to be to no purpose in the work of the wise. But if created things in no way work to the production of effects, but God alone works all effects immediately, to no purpose are other things employed by him."³ Locke repeats this criticism and adds the objection that if matter cannot act on our spirits it is unreasonable to say that it acts upon the mind of God. For if the natural objects are the 'occasions' of His action, this can mean only that they somehow affect Him.⁴

b. The Nature of the Material World

I. THE ESSENCE OF BODY: EXTENSION

The Material World, then, is not immediately perceived, not known by reason, not the cause of our sensations. Furthermore, it must not be supposed to be like our sensations.

¹ *Entretiens*, I, pp. 12, 13.

² 'Letters Concerning the Love of God,' p. 42. Cf. Cudworth, "*Treatise on Eternal and Immutable Morality*, p. 111: "There may be a true sensation though there be no Object at all Really existing without the Soul."

³ *Summa contra Gentiles*, Bk. III, p. 69.

⁴ Locke's Letters, *Works*, Vol. X, p. 254.

Of the so-called 'sensible qualities' of objects, extension alone, in our perception, corresponds to anything really existing in the object. Extension, however, is not a 'sensation,' but an idea, perceived by the intellect. In this, Norris follows Malebranche, as Malebranche had followed Descartes. "The nature of body," Descartes had said, "consists not in weight, hardness, color and the like, but in extension alone—in its being a substance extended in length, breadth and depth."¹ "Nothing remains in the idea of body, except that it is something extended."² "Bodies," Malebranche repeated, "have no other qualities than those which result from their shapes."³ "All the possible properties or modalities of extension are only the shapes and the relations of distance. Our senses tell us that the fire sends forth heat and light. We see clearly that these faculties are not simply figure and motion, and we judge accordingly. . . that there is something in bodies beside extension whose only attributes are figure and motion. But let us consult our reason, the clear idea which we have of bodies. . . and we may discover that we are attributing to them qualities and properties which belong not to them but only to ourselves."⁴ Norris devoted a long chapter to the question of whether matter can think,⁵ and returns many times to the discussion of the nature of sensations, but what he says is little more than a repetition of what Descartes and Malebranche had taught. "Now of this [Matter] I think the most simple and genuine Idea that will offer itself to the mind that attentively considers it, is that of an *Extended Being*. . . and all those characters which are or can be further added, will be found to be either *Properties* belonging to Bodies, or such Sentiments which we have in ourselves upon their Occasion."⁶ "I conclude therefore that none of these sensible Qualities which the Philosophy of the Vulgar is pleas'd to attribute to

¹ *Principles of Philosophy*, Pt. II, Prop. IV.

² *Ibid.*, Prop. XI.

³ *Recherche de la Vérité*, I, Ch. 10, p. 83. *Entretiens*, I, pp. 12, 13.

⁴ *Entretiens*, III, pp. 53, 55.

⁵ *Theory*, II, Ch. I.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

Bodies, such as Heat, Cold, Sweetness, Bitterness, Smell, Tastes, nor even Colour . . have any real existence in Bodies. And since they are not Modifications of Bodies (which if our Ideas of them are true, are capable of no other than Figure and Motion) it follows that they are indeed Modifications of our Minds, or Sentiments."¹ The arguments given by Norris for this conclusion are: first, that pain is like other sensations and yet no one considers it to be in the object,² and, second, that in considering the idea which we have of body, we find nothing in it but extension.³ "For if we examine the Nature of Bodies either by our Senses, or by our Understanding, we shall find there none of those things which upon their impression we feel in ourselves. We call one Hot and another Sweet, etc., yet 'tis plain that these and the like Denominations can signify nothing really in Bodies,⁴ but only such a *Contexture* of Parts as is naturally apt to make such an Impression, not as has any Likeness or Congruity with such a Sentiment, but with which, according to the positive establishment of that Almighty Being at whose disposal we stand, such a Sentiment is annex'd. Thus Heat as it is in the Fire, is not such a Heat as we feel (for then we must suppose it to have sense and Perception), but only that which occasions that Heat which we feel." The basis of Norris's opposition to identifying sensation with the qualities of body, appears to have been, at least to a certain extent, the conviction that this would so undermine the distinction between body and soul as to make it impossible to prove the immortality of the soul. "If matter can think⁵ . . how can I prove from my thinking that I have any such Principle in me distinct from matter, as I call my soul . . and if material it (the soul) will be divisible and so mortal or corruptible."⁶

¹ *Theory*, II, p. 250.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 238, 239.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 240.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 240. "I will not say, with the Author of Humane Understanding, nothing but a Power to produce these Sensations in us, it being as clear and evident as anything can well be in Philosophy that they have no such Power."

⁵ *Theory*, II, p. 56. 'Sensation is a kind of thought.'

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 7, 9, 55.

Matter then is invisible and unknown, and its existence cannot be proved. It is, however, indivisible, and 'Naturally immortal.' "Indeed as Immortal signifies only *imperishable*, and is opposed to *Annihilation*, so all things have a Natural Immortality, Matter as well as Spirit, from something to fall to nothing, or from nothing to rise to something, being equally above the Force of Natural Causality."¹ When Norris speaks of God 'as producing extended being'² it seems more reasonable to interpret him as meaning a particular natural object formed out of this original matter, rather than matter itself.

In his conception of matter, Norris is following the Platonic teaching with modifications derived from Descartes. Plato said of body that it is 'unintelligible, multiform, dissoluble and changeable.'³ For Plotinus, matter is the absolutely formless substratum 'one and continuous and without quality. "In addition to qualities like colors and heat and cold, we ought not to attribute to it lightness or heaviness or density or rarity or structure, and hence not even extension. It must also not be compound but simple and one in nature. For in this wise is it empty of all attributes."⁴ Norris in attributing extension to Matter, is clearly following the Cartesian rather than the Platonic teaching, but, at the same time, his arguments for refusing to attribute to bodies other qualities than the modifications of extension, are based on the 'idea' of matter, and not by any means on matter itself, since it is in itself unknown.

Contemporary English philosophy for the most part agreed with Norris in his conception of the Natural World. Locke also deprived Matter of all secondary qualities, leaving it only extension and solidity, though he denied the validity of Norris's argument. "Of Extension and solidity," he says in a letter to Anthony Collins, "we have the ideas of them, and see that cogitation has no necessary connection with them, and

¹ *Theory*, II, p. 9.

² *Ibid.*, p. 36. "A thinking Being and an extended being are separately produceable."

³ *Phædo*, 80.

⁴ *Enneades*, II, Lib. IV. (Bakewell, p. 379).

therefore is not a proper affection of them, . . . but how doth it follow from hence, that it may not be made an affection of, or be annexed to that substance which is vested with solidity and extension?"¹ And Hobbes, though opposed to the whole tendency of which Norris's theory was an expression, was so far in agreement with him as to hold that sensible qualities are in the subject, not in the object.² Henry More differed from the Cartesian philosophy in holding that Matter consists of indivisible particles which have no figure,³ and that motion also is not a necessary property of matter.⁴ The first point he argued from the assertion that all figure or shape includes parts and so is further divisible, and the second from various physical phenomena which, he declared, could not be explained upon mechanical principles.

2. THE MATERIAL WORLD A COPY OF THE IDEAL WORLD

In his treatment of the Natural World as a copy or image of the Ideal, Norris follows rather the guidance of his Platonic teachers than that of Malebranche. For the world, Plato declares, "must of necessity be the copy of something."⁵ Philo made the image still more explicit. The world is "a copy of the powers of God, a created image of an uncreated and immortal original."⁶ "The powers which you seek to behold," he imagines God as saying to Moses, "are altogether invisible and appreciable only by the intellect—such that the outward senses could not attain to them, but only the purest intellect. And though they are incomprehensible in their

¹ Locke, 'Essay Concerning the Human Understanding,' *Works*, London, 1801, Vol. X, p. 284.

² Hobbes, *Concerning Body*, Pt. IV, Ch. XXV: "Light and color, and other qualities which are commonly called sensible are not objects, but phantasms in the sentient." Both object and subject in Hobbes's view were of course material.

³ *Immortality of the Soul*, Preface. In *A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings of Dr. Henry More*, London, MDCCXII.

⁴ *Andidote against Atheism*, Pt. II, Ch. I.

⁵ *Timaeus*, 29, B.

⁶ *Life of Moses*, II, p. 112. See p. 28. "Powers of God" is used by Philo as synonymous with "ideas of God" in harmony with his allegorical interpretation of the references to angels in the Hebrew Scriptures.

essence, still they show a kind of impression or copy of their energy and operation, as seals when any wax is applied to them, make an innumerable quantity of figures and impressions. And some, speaking with sufficient correctness, call them ideas."¹ In the same sense Plotinus speaks of mind as the cause of the world, "the archetype and model and eternal support." "The forms of things then must exist prior to the world, not indeed as impressions struck from other things, but as archetypes and originals and the very essence of the intellect."² Very like this is Norris's statement, "By the Divine Ideas we are to understand Originary and Archetypal Forms, representing things not as Images do their Originals (for so other things imitate and represent them) but contrary-wise as Originals do their Images or Pictures."³

Not only is the Ideal World the original pattern according to which the Natural World was made, but it is also the real nature or essence of things as at present existing. This conception of 'participation' can be found in most of Norris's sources, from Plato to Malebranche. In Plato's philosophy the particular object is "beautiful in as far as it partakes of absolute beauty."⁴ In Plotinus also, "Phenomena exist as definable objects through participation, in that their substratum gets its form from without."⁵ St. Augustine has the same expression, "The soul itself will be wise by participating in the unchangeable wisdom which it is not";⁶ and Malebranche occasionally refers to this relation between the Ideal and the Natural Worlds, but without further explanation. "All particular beings participate in Being, but no particular being can be equal to it."⁷ Norris merely follows what he has learned from the 'Platonick School' in saying, "there may

¹ *On Monarchy*, I, 6. Translation by C. D. Yonge, 1854.

² *Enneades*, V, Bk. IX, Ch. 5 (Bakewell, p. 356).

³ *Theory*, I, p. 231. "The ideas are Exemplars, patterns, archetypal seals, Intelligible moulds." Cf. pp. 257, 259, 289.

⁴ *Phaedo*, 100 C.

⁵ *Enneades*, V, Bk. IX, Ch. 5 (Bakewell, p. 359).

⁶ *De Civitate Dei*, Bk. XI, Ch. X, "Anima . . . participatione tamen incommutabilis sapientiae sapiens erit quæ non est quod ipsa."

⁷ *Entretiens*, VI, p. 29.

be many particular Beauties by the various Participation of Beauty itself."¹

The Ideal World is also the source of all our knowledge of the Natural World, which has been shown to be in itself unknown, but this point can be more conveniently considered after the discussion of our knowledge of God and finite spirits. The final result, then, of Norris's conception of Matter or the material world, is that it is invisible, unknown and unnecessary. It exists, apparently to no purpose, and even this bare existence can not be proved.

III. THE OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE

The last part of this discussion of Norris's theory must deal with the relation of the Ideal World to our minds, as it appears in his theory of knowledge. Knowledge meant for Norris, as it had meant for Plato and his followers, something absolutely fixed and stable. It has to do with eternal things which have no variableness. One of the arguments for the existence of the Ideal World is, as we have seen, based on this demand that nothing which changes or disappears should be called an object of knowledge. More specifically, knowledge is concerned with Ideas and with Truth, which is the relation between Ideas. "Knowledge is the Perception of Truth, or of those Ideal Relations, wherein Truth consists."² That the object of knowledge is not corporeal but incorporeal is the obvious conclusion from the doctrine that material things in themselves cannot be known; and all the teachers whom Norris delighted to follow had taught that knowledge, the knowledge of the philosopher, is of the 'eternal and unchanging.' Sensation, therefore, is not and cannot be knowledge; so far from being a help, it is a hindrance.

So said Plato³ and Plotinus,⁴ and Norris follows their teach-

¹ *Reason and Religion*, pp. 37, 100.

² *Theory*, II, p. 143.

³ *Phaedo*, 65, C, for example: "He attains to knowledge of them [absolute beauty and good] in their highest purity who goes to each of them with the mind alone, not allowing . . . the intrusion of sight or any other sense."

⁴ *Enneades*, IV, Bk. VIII, Ch. 2 (Bakewell, p. 387).

ing, opposing the theory of Locke that ideas come to the mind originally through sensation. Norris followed Malebranche in holding that sensation is merely a 'modification of the soul,' a 'state or manner of the soul's being,'¹ 'a modification of our soul in relation to the changes in the body to which it is united.'²

a. Knowledge of God

The possible objects of knowledge are of three classes. We may have knowledge of God, of finite spirits, including ourselves, and of material things. Norris holds, with Malebranche, that God is 'perfectly intelligible,' 'the only self-intelligible object'³ that 'we are united directly and immediately only to God.'⁴ We see God in Himself, without the intervention of an Idea. For God knows Himself immediately, or 'by himself,' and therefore is perfectly intelligible.⁵ He is not to be understood by something 'distinct from Him,' since for anything to be 'Intelligible in and by itself,' is a greater perfection than to be understood by the mediation of an Idea. God then as most perfect must be most intelligible. Moreover, "God is essentially, and therefore most intimately, present to our souls— for in Him we Live and Move and have our Being;"⁶ so that there is no need of an Idea to represent Him to our minds. It is impossible that there should be an Idea of Him, "for the Infinite cannot be represented by a finite idea." "Above all things," said Malebranche, "understand that God or the Infinite is not visible by an idea which represents Him. The Infinite is its own idea. It has no archetype. It can be known, but it can not be made. It is only the creatures, only particular beings that can be made, which are seen by the ideas, which represent them even before they are made. One can see a circle, a house, a sun, without its

¹ *Theory*, I, pp. 197, 199; II, pp. 193, 241, etc.

² Malebranche, *Recherche de la Vérité*, Bk. I, Ch. 12, p. 103.

³ *Theory*, II, pp. 281, 324, 416.

⁴ *Entretiens*, VII, p. 169.

⁵ *Theory*, II, p. 281.

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 284.

existing, for all finite things are seen in the Infinite which contains all their intelligible ideas. But the Infinite can be seen only in itself, for nothing finite can represent the Infinite."¹

There is, however, a rather significant difference here between the theory of Norris and that of Malebranche. Malebranche always insists that though we know God, we do not know Him absolutely, as He is or in His essence. "Truly you may then see the divine substance, for it alone is visible, or able to enlighten the mind. But you do not see it in itself, or as it really is. You see it only in its relation to material beings, only in so far as it is participable by them or represents them. Consequently, properly speaking, it is not God himself whom we see."² Norris opposes this, though not, it must be said, with any great force. "If it did follow that we see the Essence of God, I know not where the real inconvenience would be . . . there is no absurdity that I know of in the consequence itself. On the contrary, I think it to be (rightly understood) a certain, and demonstrable truth."³ For Malebranche the conception of God as perfectly intelligible could not be carried to its logical conclusion, because of its being in essential contradiction with his strongly emphasized description of God as purely undetermined Being. Norris, however, held that God instead of being the most abstract is the most concrete reality, including in Himself all possible characteristics, instead of none, and for him, therefore, the conclusion that God might be known as He really is, carried no great difficulties. He does not seem to have realized that this position is significantly different from that of Malebranche, or that if consistently carried out it would involve modifications in the rest of his theory.

¹ *Entretiens*, II, pp. 29, 30.

² *Entretiens*, II, pp. 27, 28: "Dieu nous éclaire sans se faire voir à nous tel qu'il est." Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, Bk. III, Ch. 55: "The divine substance is seen but not comprehended by created intelligence."

³ *Theory*, II, p. 504.

b. Knowledge of Ourselves and Other Finite Spirits

To the question of our knowledge of ourselves, neither Malebranche nor Norris gives any definite and consistent reply. Malebranche says that we know ourselves not by an idea, for in that case we would know ourselves more clearly than we do, but merely by an 'inner sentiment.'¹ This does not appear to mean however that the soul knows itself directly or immediately, as it knows God. For Malebranche says, "The substance of the soul is not intelligible to the soul herself."² He does not, however, explain whether the sentiment by which we know ourselves is the same as the sensations which are 'modifications of the soul,' or something different. As for other finite spirits, Malebranche concludes that since we do not know them in themselves or by ideas, and cannot have that inner sentiment of them which we have of ourselves, "it is manifest that we know them only by conjecture.—What we feel in ourselves we imagine them to feel, . . . and can judge of them only by the sentiments which we have of ourselves."³ Norris, though in his explicit statements he follows Malebranche's doctrine that we cannot really know either ourselves or other spirits,⁴ occasionally suggests that there may be another side to the question. Admitting that knowledge of ourselves is difficult, he questions whether it is "that the Soul has no Ideal View of its own substance, as knowing itself by a conscious sentiment rather than an Idea," or simply because it sees itself by "Reflection, and that Reflex way of Perception [is] attended with peculiar Difficulties and Disadvantages, by reason of the real Identity and Indistinction

¹ *Recherche de la Vérité*, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. 7, p. 413: "Nous ne la [l'âme] connaissons point par son idée; nous ne la voyons point en Dieu—nous ne la connaissons que par conscience—ou par le sentiment intérieur." See also *Entretiens*, II, pp. 37, 43, 46.

² *Entretiens*, V, p. 104: "La substance de l'âme ne soit pas intelligible à l'âme même et ses modalités ne puissent l'éclairer." Cf. Descartes, *Principles*, I, XI: "The knowledge we have of the mind not only precedes, and has greater certainty, but is even clearer, than that we have of the body."

³ *Recherche de la Vérité*, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. 7, pp. 416, 417: "Nous ne les connaissons que par conjecture."

⁴ *Theory*, II, pp. 7, 111: "That [my soul] I know only by sentiment."

of the Faculty and of the Object."¹ He is almost persuaded to admit that there may be direct perception of other finite spirits also, since they are "more proportionate to our Minds than such as are Material."² But there is the difficulty based on the nature of Science or Knowledge. "For tho' 'tis confess'd they are far more Noble and Excellent Beings than Bodies, yet it must be confessed too, that as creatures they are not less Temporary, Contingent and in themselves Mutable, than the other," and cannot be allowed, therefore, to be real objects of knowledge unless perceived by Ideas.

c. *Knowledge of the Natural or Material World*

1. THE SOURCE OF IDEAS

In knowing God, Norris suggests, it might be admitted that we know the Divine Ideas and Eternal Truths which are His essence. This would carry with it the conclusion that it is only in knowing God we know the material world. But this conclusion is not readily admitted, and the last eight chapters of the second volume of the *Theory* are devoted to its proof. Here Norris follows almost entirely the argument given by Malebranche in the *Recherche de la Vérité*, merely making occasional additions and rearrangements. From arguments previously given it appears certain that material objects are not perceived in themselves,³ "and therefore we must see and perceive them as they are in their Ideas."⁴

¹ *Theory*, II, p. 3.

² *Theory*, II, p. 325. According to Cudworth we know our souls because we are conscious of "cogitations," and on the principle that "nothing cannot act," we must believe our souls exist. Concerning other spirits he says, "their existence is manifest to us from their effects upon their respective bodies, their motions, actions and Discourse." *Intellectual System*, pp. 637, 638. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, Bk. III, Ch. 46: "Therefore of itself it [the soul] knows concerning itself that it exists.—But it cannot be said that the soul of itself knows concerning itself what it actually is."

³ Malebranche, *Recherche de la Vérité*, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. 1.

⁴ *Theory*, II, p. 317.

(a). Refutation of Suggested Hypotheses

The question now is of the source of these Ideas, or "what those Ideas are by which these *mediately* Intelligible Objects are perceived by us."¹ Several Hypotheses concerning the "way and manner of the Human Understanding" have at various times been offered, and of these "M. Malebranche has laid out a very just and comprehensive division." "It is absolutely necessary, that those Ideas which we have of Bodies, and of all other Objects, which we do not perceive by themselves, should come from those very Bodies, or from those Objects: Or that Our Soul has a power of producing those Ideas: Or that God has produced them with the Soul when he created it: Or that he produces them whensoever we think upon any Object: Or that the Soul has, in herself, all those Perfections which she sees in those Bodies: Or, finally, that she be united with an all-perfect Being who includes in himself all the intelligible perfections of all the ideas of created beings."²

Malebranche's arguments against the first, or 'Peripatetic' Hypothesis, are: first, that the objects cannot send forth 'species' or images from themselves, for these 'images' would be material, and therefore impenetrable, and it would be impossible for several images to exist at the same point.³ Second, the images change in size according to our distance from the object, and this would be impossible if they were produced by the object itself.⁴ For the object must remain identical with itself. Third, the object would necessarily send forth images resembling itself, but this is contradicted by the laws of perspective, for in looking at a figure which I know to be a perfect cube, I do not see its sides equal, and in looking at a table, I see it oval in shape, though I know it is round.⁵ Lastly, it is inconceivable that a Body constantly sending

¹ *Theory*, p. 326.

² Malebranche, *Recherche de la Vérité*, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. 1, p. 377.

³ *Recherche*, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. 7, p. 379. *Theory*, II, p. 333.

⁴ *Recherche*, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. 2, p. 380. *Theory*, II, p. 336.

⁵ *Recherche*, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. 2, p. 380. *Theory*, II, pp. 336, 337.

forth from itself such Species would not be diminished in size.¹

To these, Norris adds some further considerations. First, that it is impossible to believe that material objects made of different sorts of substances could send forth simultaneous images of all their parts, "entirely and simultaneously strip and uncase themselves of their outer Coats or Membranes."² There is also the argument, previously considered in another connection, that looking at circles or squares drawn on paper, we may have ideas of perfectly exact mathematical figures, which would be impossible if the Ideas came from the material objects.³ And, finally, if we do suppose that Bodies send forth 'Species,' these would be corporeal, and so incapable of being perceived. For it has been proved that "Matter cannot be perceived by itself, or be the immediate Object of Mind."⁴

To the Scholastic hypothesis of an 'Intellectus agens' which transforms the corporeal images, impressed on the senses, into Intelligible Species, perceived by the mind, Norris offers the following Objections.⁵ We are not conscious of any such faculty in ourselves; it is contrary to our conception of the 'understanding' for it to have any such active power; and if it were so transformed it would be merely a 'spiritual accident' and could not represent a material substance. As for the Scholastic maxim that "there is nothing in the Understanding but what was first in the Sense."⁶ it cannot be admitted, even if interpreted as meaning merely that the sensation is the occasion of the Idea, for we have many Ideas for which we have had no corresponding sensations, as, for instance, the Idea of God, and the Eternal Truths.⁷

The second explanation that has been given of the source of our Ideas, is that the soul produces them by her own power.

¹ *Recherche*, III, Pt. II, Ch. 2, p. 380. *Theory*, II, p. 337.

² *Theory*, p. 338.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 343.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 346, 347.

⁵ *Ibid.*, II, pp. 348, 354.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 373.

⁷ Cf. Cudworth, *Intellectual System*, p. 636.

This is regarded by Malebranche and Norris as a wild and chimerical hypothesis, hardly worth considering. For "Ideas are true Realities," and this Hypothesis assigns to man the power of Creation which belongs only to God.¹ Also, it is as impossible for the Mind to "make an Idea of an Object, whereof it has already no Ideas," as for a painter to "draw a picture of an unknown creature."² Norris adds the additional argument that Ideas are not of a 'producible Nature.'³ For whatever is produced is Temporary and Contingent, whereas the Ideas must be 'Necessary, Eternal and Immutable.'

The third supposition is "that the Ideas whereby we understand are created in us by God."⁴ But, in the first place, we can think of an infinite number of things (differently shaped triangles, for example) and it is not likely that God would have put this infinite number of Ideas into our minds, since there is a more simple explanation, and it must always be true that God acts in the simplest way possible. Moreover, even if the Soul did have this infinite number of Ideas continually present to her, she would not be able by her own power to choose the Idea that would correspond with the sensations of the body.⁵ That God creates in us at each moment the requisite Idea is also an unreasonable hypothesis, since we are able at all times to think of anything we will, and must therefore have in our minds at every moment the Ideas of all things. The argument that Ideas are not of a producible nature is also brought by Norris against this supposition.⁶

The fourth opinion is that the soul sees all things in contemplating her own perfections or modifications. But since man is a finite being, it must be admitted that he does not contain all beings in himself. He can however know all things, and therefore must know them somewhere else than in his

¹ *Recherche*, Bk. III., Pt. II, Ch. 3. *Theory*, II, pp. 378-379, 383.

² *Recherche*, Bk. III., Pt. II, Ch. 3, p. 385.

³ *Theory*, II, p. 381.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Ch. IX. *Recherche*, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. IV.

⁵ *Recherche*, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. 4, p. 392. *Theory*, II, p. 389.

⁶ *Theory*, II, p. 392.

own soul.¹ This supposition confuses our Ideas with our sensations. The latter are modifications of the soul, but in considering our Ideas we always contemplate them as something distinct from ourselves. They represent actual beings, and can not therefore be themselves mere modalities. Another argument against this opinion, Norris finds suggested by St. Augustine. The truth, which is eternal and unchangeable, does not belong to any one person, for every one can see it. "That truth which we all see, each by his own mind, is common to us all,"² or as St. Augustine said, "Since therefore our two particular minds see one and the same truth, can it be in either mind; is it not common to us both?"³ But the modalities of our souls are 'proper and particular to them.' And therefore it is necessary that Ideas and Truths, which are the relations between Ideas, should be 'something else than our own proper modalities.'

(b). The True Explanation of the Source Ideas

Since these various explanations of the origin of our Ideas have been shown to be inadequate and impossible, it must be that the real nature of our Ideas is that set forth by the fifth hypothesis suggested. We see all things by their intelligible representatives existing eternally in the mind of God. Norris introduces his discussion of this hypothesis by showing that it is not in itself impossible.⁴ In the first place, it has been previously demonstrated that God has in Himself the Ideas of all things. These Ideas, being of the essence of God, are in themselves most intelligible, and have an intimate union with our minds, so that nothing prevents our perception of them.⁵ Moreover, since the Ideas are 'essentially represent-

¹ *Theory*, II, p. 399. Cf. *Recherche*, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. 5, p. 394.

² *Theory*, II., pp. 404, 405.

³ Norris's reference is to St. Augustine's 'De libero Arbitrio, Lib. II, Ch. 10: "Quod ergo unum verum videmus ambo singulis mentibus, nonne utriq' nostrum commune est?"

⁴ *Theory*, II, Ch. XI.

⁵ *Id.* pp. 415, 417.

ative' of all things, if we do perceive them, we shall understand by them all other things, so far as they may be understood. These considerations prove it not impossible that we should understand all things by the mediation of the Divine Ideas.

The first argument given by Malebranche in support of this position is from the simplicity of God's methods.¹ Since God does nothing uselessly, He will work always in the simplest way possible. Since God can make all things visible to men's minds simply by willing that they should perceive in Him the Ideas which represent the things outside Him, He would not take the longer way of creating with each spirit an infinite number of Ideas. Another argument is from 'the manner of our perceiving things.' We find by experience that we can think of anything we wish; but we could not wish to think of anything unless we had at least a confused Idea of it already.² This, however, is possible only because God is present to our spirits and all things exist intelligibly in Him. The argument from the nature of Truth is again brought forward in support of this position. For the Reason, of which man partakes when he knows the Truth, is Universal, Immutable, Necessary and Infinite. This can be only the Wisdom of God. Norris quotes one more argument from Malebranche "which," he says, "with those that are used to the abstracter ways of reasoning may perhaps pass for a demonstration."³ It is impossible that God should create anything for any object but Himself. But if our knowledge were directed toward any thing but God himself, it would be created for that object. Therefore we must think that "as we love nothing but by that necessary love which we have for God, so we see nothing but by that natural knowledge which we have of God. And so all the particular Ideas which we have of creatures are no other than Limitations of the Idea of the Creator, as all the Motions of the Will for the creatures are only Determinations of that Movement which we have towards the Creator."⁴

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 446, 448. *Recherche*, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. 6.

² *Recherche*, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. 6, p. 401. *Theory*, II, p. 453.

³ *Recherche*, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. 6, pp. 403, 404. *Theory*, II, pp. 455, 460.

⁴ *Theory*, II, p. 456. Malebranche, *Entretiens*, II, p. 27: "Nothing is visible at all except the divine substance."

Assuming that Norris's arguments are valid, and that we do see the Ideas of all things in the essence of God, we must ask more particularly about our perception of a particular object. In our perception of a tree, Norris makes answer, 'we have both an Idea and a sentiment.'¹ The sentiment is caused, as we have seen, directly by God, in accordance with the laws by which He unites our souls and bodies, on the occasion of some external body making an impression on our brain. The Idea is not caused in us by God, in the same sense of cause. It is continually existing in His mind, and by an act of will, He permits us to see it, at the moment when the sensation is aroused in our soul. The Idea, however, is simply of extension and its modifications, all other attributes are merely sensation. In our perception of a tree, for example, there are involved three distinct acts or processes. In the first place, there is sent off from the object a 'fine and subtle Evolution' of Particles,² which, striking upon the Retina, communicates an 'impression of Movement to the Brain.' This motion in the Brain is accompanied by sensation of color, which is the particular 'modification of the soul,' that is united to that movement of the brain. It is not caused by the movement, except as 'occasional cause,' but is caused directly by God, in accordance with His laws. Beside the excitation of the brain and its accompanying sensation, we have also in our perception of the tree, an 'Idea' of its shape, and size, and spatial relations of all kinds. The Idea is purely intellectual, unmixed with sensational elements. It is an Idea of extension only, and is the Idea of extension in the mind of God, according to which the object was originally made. There is, then, a closer connection between the Idea and the object, than there is between the sensation and the object. The first must, at least in some sense, resemble the object, since it is the 'Intelligible pattern' of the created thing, while the sensation is purely subjective, and is connected with the object only by means of the preëstablished harmony between

¹ *Theory*, II, p. 501. Cf. Malebranche, *Entretiens*, V, p. 100.

² *Theory*, II, p. 355.

the modalities of bodies and the sensations of the soul. Just what the connection or relation is between the 'Idea' and the object, Norris declares himself unable to state.¹ Whether there are in the Ideal World archetypes of each particular thing, or only of different classes of things, he cannot say. Malebranche had said that we see different objects by the varying application of the Idea of extension to our minds, but Norris does not explicitly follow him here. "I leave each one," he says, "to conceive of that as he can."

¹ *Theory*, II, p. 109.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

I. NORRIS'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE SOURCES OF HIS PHILOSOPHY

This study of the sources of the philosophy of John Norris is incomplete without some suggestion of his way of using those sources, and his attitude toward previous systems of philosophy. This, of course, depends in great measure upon his conception of philosophy itself, for the value and place of authority and tradition in thought will vary according as the emphasis is on the practical or purely theoretical side of philosophical speculation. From the syllogistic form, and the emphasis on argument and demonstration of Norris's *Theory*, one might be inclined to think it the result of a process of systematic reasoning, almost unbiased by personal temperament. But there seem to be strong indications that his actual proceeding was otherwise, that the argument is not so much the process by which the conclusion is reached, as a support introduced for the sake of upholding a theory already formed. For Norris, though anxious to have his theories in accordance with reason, and sometimes inclined to draw out his arguments to an unnecessary length, is not always willing to accept or reject a conception solely on its logical merits. This is shown most clearly in his refusal to deny the reality of matter, in spite of having denied the validity of all arguments brought to prove its existence.

The reasons for this apparent inconsistency are not far to seek. In the first place it is clear that, for Norris, philosophy is not something independently to be desired. It is valuable only in so far as it supports or explains the truths of religion and morality. It must fulfill a certain function beyond itself, and is to be judged finally not by its inner consistency, which is merely a means to an end, but by the degree in which it suc-

ceeds in making clear the truth which has been attained by other methods. The evidences of this attitude are found all through Norris's work, in the 'Aids to Devotion' appended to each of the Reflections in *Reason and Religion*, in the prayers and exhortations introduced at appropriate points in the *Theory*, and in the emphasis laid on the fact that this theory is not inconsistent with received religious doctrines. The contempt for learning, expressed in the *Reflections on the Conduct of Human Life*, which is apparently due, at least in part, to the influence of Malebranche, is another expression of the same attitude. Norris seems never really to have considered the possibility of any other theory than his own. His criticisms of Locke and Hobbes, and his acceptance of Malebranche's theory, all show the same tendency to judge philosophical systems rather by their accordance with his own convictions than by a close consideration of their logical force. After formulating a philosophical theory which met the demands of religion and of morality as he saw them, Norris found no reason for any further change or development. A possible exception to this statement is the difference previously noted in the conception of God. In *Reason and Religion*, Norris, like Malebranche, insists that God is absolutely undetermined, without attributes, while in the *Theory* he sets forth the conception of God as an all-inclusive being, absolutely determinate, 'all that can possibly be.'¹ In other points the later books show greater intricacy of argument than the earlier ones, but very little modification of thought. For these reasons it seems not unfair to say that Norris's philosophy was in great measure the outcome of his temperament, that his theory was less the result than the starting point of his arguments.

The effect of Norris's conception of philosophy as completely subordinate to practical values is clearly shown in his attitude toward his sources. He seems to have had no realization of any development, either in the race or in the individual, and no conception of a philosophical theory as an organic whole. In quoting or referring to any author, his concern is to find

¹ See p. 50.

words and phrases that seem to express what he wishes to say, rather than to consider the relations of these parts to the complete thought of their writer. Thus, in quoting St. Augustine he pays no attention to the different phases of his thought, or to the distinction which St. Augustine himself makes between his own beliefs and those of the Platonists. Again, Norris apparently does not realize the almost irreconcilable difference between the Christian doctrine of the Trinity and the Neo-Platonic theory of the One, the Intellect and the World Soul. Because St. John and Philo both say that the World was made by the Logos, he unquestioningly assumes that they taught the same doctrine, not considering that for Philo and Plotinus the word Logos seems to have meant purely abstract and impersonal intellectual forms.¹ It is perhaps not to be wondered at that Norris did not realize the incompatibility of this conception with the Christian doctrine, since he seems to have held them both in his own mind. These instances are perhaps sufficient to show that Norris made use of his various authorities rather as storehouses of isolated passages than as expressions of different philosophical conceptions.

II. SUMMARY OF THE SOURCES OF NORRIS'S PHILOSOPHY

Apart from his emphasis on the practical, rather than the purely theoretical, value of metaphysical speculation, there were, as has been shown, three main factors which determined the form of Norris's philosophy. These were the idealism of Plato, as traditionally conceived, the theory of Malebranche and contemporary English philosophy. We here need simply to summarize the comparisons previously made to see what part was taken by each of these influences in forming his theory as a whole.

In the first place, the Platonic or Neo-Platonic theory of an Ideal World was obviously the starting point for Norris, as it had been for so many others. He found there a conception that seemed the fulfillment of his own developing thoughts.

¹ Cf. John Watson, *Philosophical Basis of Religion*, Glasgow, 1907, Lecture Ninth.

It is true that he did not distinguish between Plato and his followers, between early and later Platonists, between Platonism as a form of Greek Philosophy and Platonism as an element in Christian theology. This absence of any historical or genuinely critical attitude, however, only makes more evident the close dependence of Norris's philosophy on that of the Platonic School. To the influence of Plato must be attributed the division of the world into natural and ideal, the doctrine of knowledge which demands that the objects of knowledge shall be necessary and universal, and therefore ideal realities, the conception of the ideal world as the 'pattern' of the sensible world, and, at least to Norris's interpretation of Plato, the doctrine that the ideal world is in the mind of God. These last conceptions were, of course, enforced and emphasized by his reading of Plotinus and of St. Augustine, as also by his adherence to Malebranche. In the writings of the Neo-Platonists and St. Augustine, Norris found the method of reconciling the Ideal Theory with the teachings of Christianity and some suggestion of that theory of immediate union with God, which held so large a place in the theory of Malebranche.

The second important influence on Norris's thought was the philosophy of his own time. English philosophy of the late seventeenth century included two clearly differentiated tendencies, each of which had its effect on Norris's thought. The first was that scientific, empirical attitude, which, originating with Bacon, found both expression and encouragement in the development of science, and was represented primarily by Locke and by Hobbes. With the demand for clearer thinking and for escape from superstition and authority which was the basis of this movement, Norris had great sympathy, but its apparent results aroused only opposition and distrust in his mind. The effect of this tendency of thought on Norris was therefore chiefly negative. His theories were developed in opposition both to sensationalism and to materialism, as well as in response to more congenial influences. The representatives of the other aspect of English philosophy, the Cambridge Platonists, influenced Norris mainly by their common devotion to Plato, though it is also true that imbedded

in the mass of erudition and dissertation that forms Cudworth's *Intellectual System*, we find several of the specific arguments used by Norris in defense of his theory.¹ Norris and the Cambridge Platonists were united by their opposition to empiricism as well as by their common idealism, and by the tendency to mysticism, which was most marked in Henry More, but appears also in varying degrees in the other members of the School.

In the theory of Malebranche, Norris found already combined most of the principles which he considered of fundamental importance. Here was a philosophy of an Ideal World, existing in the mind of God, of which the material world is only an imperfect copy. Here, also, there was an explicit account, clearly and concisely demonstrated, of the relation of that Ideal World to human minds. It is no wonder that Norris eagerly accepted Malebranche's doctrines, and that the likenesses between them are many and striking. Very nearly the whole of the second part of Norris's *Theory* is taken directly from Malebranche, with the addition of some explanation and argument, and of a few criticisms. The differences between Norris and Malebranche are, however, more numerous than at first appear. The hypothesis of the vision in God, which for Malebranche is the point on which his whole system turns, is for Norris merely the most reasonable hypothesis. He adopts it unequivocally, but does not insist upon it. This difference in emphasis is connected with a difference in method. Malebranche, like Descartes, is interested in the road to truth as well as in the goal. He begins with psychology, and develops his philosophical theory partly as the completion of his psychological conceptions, partly as the connection between them and his religious beliefs.

Another important difference between Malebranche and Norris is shown by the answer of each to the question, whether matter exists. Norris, as has been shown,² does not assent

¹ See pp. 31, 47.

² See p. 56.

to Malebranche's statement that the existence of material objects is proved by Revelation. His final conclusion is, that though matter does exist, its existence can neither be known nor demonstrated. A third difference between the two lies in the very part of Norris's theory which is most closely connected with, and dependent upon, that of Malebranche. They are agreed that we see all things in seeing God, and that we perceive God immediately, by the union of our spirits with His, not by means of an idea. But while Malebranche insists that we do not see God absolutely as He is, or in His essence, Norris holds that, though we do not see God completely, we may see Him as He really is.¹

Other points in which Norris departs from the teaching of Malebranche are, the conception of God as not undetermined,² and the more complete formulation by Norris of the theory of psycho-physical parallelism. Malebranche had declared it impossible for bodies to be acted upon by other bodies or by spirit. Norris assumes without hesitation that one body may act upon another, though he denies the power of body to act upon spirit, and questions the power of the soul to act on the body. Since we do not understand the mechanism of our own bodies, it seems to him reasonable, "to conclude that the motion of my Finger does indeed follow upon my willing that it should be moved; yet that my Will is not the true and proper cause, but only the Occasion or Condition of that motion."³ For Norris the world is thus divided into the two classes of spirits and bodies, with two parallel series of events, while in Malebranche's theory this distinction was blurred by the teaching that every particular body and spirit is affected only by God, so that there is no more connection between bodies or between spirits than there is between body and spirit.

¹ See p. 67.

² See p. 50.

³ *Theory*, II, p. 227.

III. THE RELATION OF NORRIS'S THEORY TO THE DOCTRINE OF HIS IMMEDIATE SUCCESSORS

Some ten years after the publication of Norris's *Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World*, there appeared the two books in which his arguments were carried to their logical conclusions.¹ *The Principles of Human Knowledge*, by George Berkeley, is recognized as forming one of the turning points of philosophical history, and Arthur Collier's *Clavis Universalis*, while less well known, is an equally definite and uncompromising exposition of the idealistic theory.

It is not impossible that Berkeley may have read Norris's books, and though apparently without external evidence, the suggestion is at least interesting.² Berkeley did know the works of several of the Cambridge Platonists, for he refers to Dr. Cudworth in *Siris*, and several of the books of Cudworth, More and Cumberland are among those that he presented to Yale University.³ The theories of the two writers show marked similarity in many points, combined with just those differences which make Berkeley the originator of a new line of thought, while Norris is still under the old tradition.

One significant difference between the theory of Berkeley and that of Norris lies in one of their fundamental definitions, that of the word 'Idea.' For Norris an 'Idea' is purely an object of the intellect, with no mixture of sensation. It is a perfectly fixed and definite conception existing eternally in the mind of God, and has no qualities except those of extension and motion. For Berkeley, however, the term 'Idea' stands for something much more concrete. It includes sensational elements, or qualities, and is equivalent to percept or image, not an abstract 'Idea,' but a concrete object as it actually exists.⁴ Berkeley, although he rejects the sharp

¹ Cf. Dugald Stewart, *Dissertation Exhibiting the Progress of Metaphysical Ethical and Political Philosophy*, ed. Sir Wm. Hamilton, 1854, Pt. II, p. 349.

² See Berkeley, *Works*, edited by A. C. Fraser, 1871, Vol. IV, p. 20.

³ *Papers of the New Haven Historical Society*. Vol. I.

⁴ See p. 35; Berkeley, 'Dialogues,' III, *The Works of George Berkeley*, ed. Alexander Campbell Fraser, Oxford, 1871, Vol. I, p. 327. Open Court ed., pp. 93, 95.

distinction made by Norris between idea and sensation in our perception, retains it in his discussion of God's perception, urging, in somewhat the same terms as Norris had used, that it is impossible to conceive of God as feeling pain. "That God knows or understands all things, and that He knows, among other things, what pain is, even every sort of painful sensation, and what it is for His creatures to suffer pain, I make no question.—But, that God, though He knows and sometimes causes painful sensations in us, can Himself suffer pain, I positively deny."¹

Other points of contrast between Berkeley's teaching about God and that of Norris are in the arguments for His existence, the doctrine of our knowledge of God, and the explanation of natural evils. Both argue for the existence of God from the existence of ideas. The things that I immediately perceive are ideas; ideas can exist only in a mind; these ideas have an existence exterior to my mind and must therefore exist in an 'omnipresent eternal Mind,' that is, in the mind of God.² There is a slight difference, however, in the two arguments, in that for Norris the proof that the ideas exist in some other mind than my own is from the eternal and immutable nature of ideas, while for Berkeley it is from their independence of my will. Berkeley, moreover, does not accept the conclusions drawn by Norris and Malebranche from the existence of ideas in the mind of God. He criticises, with specific reference to Malebranche, the theory of 'seeing all things in God.' "I do not understand how our ideas, which are things altogether passive and inert, can be the essence . . of God, who is an impassive, indivisible, purely active being." "This hypothesis . . is liable to all the absurdities of the common hypothesis, in making a created world exist otherwise than in the mind of a Spirit . . Besides which—it makes that material world serve to no purpose."

¹ See p. 26; Berkeley, 'Dialogues,' III, Fraser ed., Vol. I, p. 336. Open Court ed., p. 105. Cf. 'Siris,' Sec. 289., "God knoweth all things as pure mind or intellect, but nothing by sense."

² 'Dialogues,' II, Fraser ed., Vol. I, p. 304. Open Court ed., pp. 65, 66; 'Dialogues,' III, Fraser ed., Vol. I, pp. 325, 330, 335. Open Court ed., pp. 91, 97, 104.

The similarity in expression between the teaching of Berkeley and that of Norris concerning our knowledge of God, is particularly interesting, because this is one of the points of difference between Norris and Malebranche. Malebranche said, as did Descartes, that we have a clear idea of God, but Berkeley, like Norris, insists that "I have properly no *idea* of God or any other spirit." "I have a notion of spirit, though I have not, strictly speaking, an idea of it."¹ Berkeley, like Norris, attempts to answer the question of the origin of natural evil, and of the imperfections of the world by use of the principle of the 'simple and general rules,' according to which God works,² and attributes to these 'established methods' the uniform connection between our ideas and sensations which enables us to 'regulate our actions for the benefit of life.'³

The last, and most interesting comparison to be made between the theories of Norris and Berkeley is in regard to the doctrine of matter. Here Berkeley's arguments are very much like those of Norris, with the simple, though supremely significant, difference that he accepted the conclusion to which they led. Like Norris, Berkeley first asserts that matter must be known to exist, if at all, either by sense or reason. But neither faculty is able to prove the existence of a material world. For, in the first place, matter, or material objects, supposed to exist independent of consciousness, cannot be immediately perceived. "What do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations?" "Things immediately perceived are ideas; and ideas cannot exist out of the mind."⁴ Berkeley also uses the argument of Descartes, Locke, and Norris for the subjective character of sensible qualities, from the nature of pain. There is, however, a slight difference, in that where

¹ See p. 48. Berkeley, 'Dialogues' III, Fraser ed., Vol. I, p. 327. Open Court ed., pp. 93, 95.

² See p. 50. Berkeley, 'Principles,' Sec. 57, Fraser ed., Vol. I, p. 185.

³ See p. 58, 59. Berkeley, 'Principles,' Secs. 30, 31, Fraser ed., Vol I, p. 170.

⁴ See p. 54. 'Principles,' 14; Fraser ed., Vol. I, p. 146. 'Dialogues,' III. Fraser ed. I, p. 324. Open Court ed. p. 90. 'Siris,' Sec. 251: "It hath never been explained, nor can it be explained, how external bodies, figures and motions, should produce an appearance in the mind."

Norris says that since pain is like the other sensations, if it is not in the object, the others cannot be, Berkeley goes farther and identifies pain with intense heat.¹

Matter, according to the accepted meaning of the term, is 'an inert, senseless substance,'² and Berkeley and Norris give nearly the same arguments against the supposition that such a substance can be proved to exist. In the first place, matter cannot be proved to exist because there is no "necessary connection between it and our ideas." "It is granted on all hands—that it is possible that we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though there were no bodies existing without resembling them."³ It cannot be urged, Berkeley continues, that external bodies are the cause of our ideas, for body, by hypothesis, is inert, and cannot therefore act upon spirit. "How can that which is *Inactive* be a *cause*; or that which is unthinking be a cause of thought?"⁴ In *Siris*, Berkeley, like Norris and Malebranche, employs the conception of 'secondary causes.' Mind or spirit is the real cause of all things, but God, as original cause, works by means of other secondary causes in order to secure the regularity and order of the world.⁵ He also asserts with Norris, as opposed to Malebranche, that the existence of matter cannot be proved from the Scriptures, though his argument is not from the dependence of such evidence upon sense, but is directed simply toward showing that "what the philosophers call *Matter* is neither mentioned in the Scripture, nor necessary for its interpretation."⁶ Berkeley, however, criticises the doctrine which Norris had held of matter as occasional cause of sensation, for to say that that which is inert and imperceptible is the 'occasion' of our ideas, is a meaningless assertion, while to say that matter is perceived by God, and is to Him an 'occa-

¹ See p. 54. 'Dialogues,' I, Fraser ed., I, p. 267. Open Court ed., pp. 14, 15.

² 'Principles,' 9, Fraser ed., I, p. 160.

³ 'Principles,' 18, Fraser ed., I, p. 164. See p. 59.

⁴ 'Dialogues,' II., Fraser ed., I, p. 309. Open Court ed., p. 71. Cf. 'Dialogues,' III, Fraser ed, I, p. 331, Open Court ed., p. 99.

⁵ 'Siris,' Secs. 150, 160.

⁶ 'Principles,' 82-84, Fraser ed., I, pp. 197, 198. See p. 56.

sion for arousing ideas in us' is to reject the conception of matter for that of an immediately perceived idea.¹

The other work in which Norris's arguments are carried to their obvious conclusions, Collier's *Clavis Universalis*, is clearly and openly influenced by those arguments, if not based on them. It begins where the *Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World* ends.

Arthur Collier was born in 1680, entered Oxford in 1697, became rector of Langford Magna in 1704 and lived there until his death in 1732. In 1713 he published the *Clavis Universalis, or a New Inquiry after Truth, being a Demonstration of the Non-existence or Impossibility of an external World*. It is divided into two parts, the first "to show that the visible world is not external,"² and the second to demonstrate "that an external world is a being utterly impossible."³ In the first part Collier shows that things which appear to be external, such as imagined objects, 'lights and colours,' hallucinations and illusions, are not necessarily outside the mind (Chap. I. Sec. 1), and that what we mean by saying a visible object exists, is simply that it is seen (Chap. I. Sec. 2). In the second part he argues that an external world cannot be proved by reason (Pt. II, Chap. I), and is therefore unknown; that it would be useless, since it is 'incapable of being an object of vision,'⁴ (Chap. II.)

Collier thus denies the validity of the reasons given by Norris for believing in the existence of the Material World. He does not, however, repeat Norris's argument⁵ against the teaching of Malebranche that the existence of the Natural World is revealed by religion. Norris had declared that even revelation was ultimately dependent upon sensation, but Collier argues that the text "In the beginning God created

¹ 'Principles,' 68-70, Fraser ed., I, pp. 191, 192. 'Dialogues,' II, Fraser ed., I, pp. 312, 313. Open Court ed., pp. 75, 77.

² *Clavis Universalis* in Dr. Parr's *Collection of English Metaphysical Tracts of the Eighteenth Century*, London, 1837, p. 3. Open Court ed., 1909, edited by Ethel Bowman, p. 13.

³ Parr, p. 13; Open Court ed. p. 13.

⁴ Parr, p. 44; Open Court ed. p. 56.

⁵ See p. 56.

the heaven and the earth" does not imply that the created world is external to mind.¹ Against the objection of Descartes and Norris that, since men have a natural inclination to believe in the existence of an external world, its non-existence would be inconsistent with the veracity of God—he urges that no one has naturally the "least inclination to believe the existence of an external world supposed to be invisible."² What men believe in is the existence of the actual objects that they see and feel, not that these have some material existence which is neither seen nor known. In concluding his argument against the 'extra-existence' of the external world, Collier considers at some length the inconsistency of Norris's attitude. "The late judicious Mr. Norris," he says, "who—purposely considered this question of an external world—declares it to be errant scepticism to make a serious doubt or question of its existence."³ Norris's arguments, he justly says, 'contradict his censure,' for it is not clear whether Norris meant the 'extra-existence' of matter, or only the simple existence of the sensible world. If the first, it is contradicted by his demonstration that the existence of the Natural World is less certainly known than that of the Ideal World. If, on the other hand, the scepticism which Norris repudiated was doubt of the existence of the sensible world, then, Collier urges, what he says does not affect the present theory, however inconsistent it may be with Norris's own arguments.⁴

IV. CRITICISM OF THE THEORY OF NORRIS

This brief consideration of the relation of Norris's theory to the doctrines of Collier and of Berkeley will perhaps serve to suggest its place in the evolution of philosophical thought. But before attempting a closer determination of this point, it is necessary to consider other criticisms that have been or may be brought to bear on the theory itself.

¹ *Clavis Universalis*, Part II, Ch. X.

² Parr, p. 81; Open Court ed. p. 107.

³ *Clavis Universalis*, Parr, p. 83. The reference is to the *Theory*, I, pp. 186, 188.

⁴ *Clavis Universalis*, Pt. II, Ch. X, Objection 3.

The theory of the 'vision in God' was severely criticised by Locke, first in a paper called 'An Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God,'¹ and later in a short pamphlet, 'Remarks upon some of Mr. Norris's Books, wherein he asserts P. Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God.'² Locke criticises this theory for its inconsistency, and for its inadequacy as an explanation of perception. It is inconsistent with itself because the supposition that we see all things in God is not in harmony with the alleged simplicity of God's methods. One of the most strongly asserted principles of both Malebranche and Norris is that God does everything by the simplest and shortest way, 'never does anything in vain.'³ But on this principle, it is impossible to reconcile the theory of Malebranche and Norris with what we know of the 'curious structure of the eye and ear.' This, of course, is practically the same as the criticism of the doctrine of occasional causes. For if we see everything in God, then the physiological basis of vision must be considered useless.

Moreover, Locke says, the theory does not give any more adequate explanation of perception than the theory which holds that we see actual external things. "For what difference a man finds in himself, when he sees a marygold, and sees not a marygold, has no difficulty and needs not be inquired after; he has the idea now, which he had not before. The difficulty is, what difference is made in his mind, what changes that has in itself when it sees what it did not see before, either the divine idea in the understanding of God, or as the ignorant, think, the marygold in the garden. Either supposition as to this matter is all one; for they are both things extrinsical to the mind, till it has that perception, and when it has it, I desire them to explain to me, what the alteration in the mind is, besides saying, as we vulgar do, it is having a perception, which it had not the moment before—a difference of fact agreed on all hands: which wherein it consists, is for aught I see,

¹ *Works of John Locke*, London, 1801, Vol. IX, p. 211.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. X, p. 247.

³ *Reason and Religion*, Pt. II, Contemplation II, 17.

unknown to one side as well as the other; only the one have the ingenuity to confess that ignorance: and the other pretend to be knowing."¹

Locke also criticises Norris's arguments, denying that they prove what they are said to prove. For the argument for this theory from the principle that God made all things for Himself, proves only that God has power to produce in us ideas.² The argument from the nature of knowledge and science is based, according to Locke, on a false conception of universals. These should not be considered as actually existing things, but only as abstractions formed by the mind from the comparison of many particular objects. "Doth any universal nature therefore exist? Or can anything that exists anywhere or anyhow be other than singular?"³ And the 'immutability' of essences, so strongly asserted by Norris, means, Locke, urges, only that the same sounds stand for the same ideas.⁴

The criticisms made on Norris's theory by his contemporaries must, I think, be sustained. It is true, as Collier said, that to insist on the existence of matter as something invisible, unknown, and useless, is an obvious inconsistency.⁵ We must also agree with Locke that Norris's theory, as it stands, does not offer an adequate explanation of perception, and that his arguments are not always conclusive.⁶

This criticism, however, suggests a more fundamental difficulty in Norris's theory. Norris never explains the relation between God and finite spirits. His references to this point in various parts of his writings are indefinite and inconsistent. He quotes with approval, "God is the place of spirits as space is of bodies,"⁷ but insists that "Things are not in God as they are out of him, neither body nor spirit."⁸

¹ Locke, 'Familiar Letters,' *Works*, Vol. X, pp. 248, 249.

² *Ibid.*, p. 252.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 253.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. X, p. 256.

⁵ See p. 87.

⁶ See p. 89.

⁷ *Conduct of Human Life*, p. 181. Cf. *Theory*, I, p. 3.

⁸ *Theory*, I, p. 296.

It should be noted, also, in connection with this last quotation, that the complete separation of material existence from God involves a certain difficulty in the conception of the Ideal World as existing in the mind of God. For the ideas are the 'essences,' the real natures of the created things, and must therefore, it would seem, be in some sense out of God.

Norris's conception of the relation of the material world to God is also difficult to determine. He certainly does not hold that things as they are in Nature are contained in God, "as indeed who can be so extravagantly absurd as to imagine that they should,"¹ but he does not make clear what is meant by "such degrees of Being and Perfection as are equivalent to them, and representative of them, and so virtually the same with them." Nor does he explain how the existence of things 'out of God' is consistent with the characterization of God as 'All-Being.' Perfection, in the sense of 'degrees of perfection,' is clearly equivalent to reality, and Norris offers no explanation of the existence of material reality outside of the inclusive reality of God. Norris, moreover, gives no consistent account of what he means by 'Matter.' He seems to have confused the conception, held by Plato and Plotinus, of matter as the absolutely formless substratum, with that of Descartes, for whom matter meant simply material objects, extended and moving, though without other qualities. Matter, for Norris, is that in the world of existence which corresponds to the Idea of extension. Particular objects are formed from matter by the Will of God, in accordance with the preëxisting Ideas, but matter itself, that invisible and unknown somewhat, simply exists, never created and yet eternally a copy of a divine Idea.

A final difficulty in Norris's theory, which, however, may perhaps serve as an explanation of one of its inconsistencies, is his conception of an Idea, 'in the strict sense,' as being necessarily a copy, or image, of something which is not an Idea. This may be the real reason for his insistence on the existence of the material world, of reality independent of

¹ *Theory*, I, pp. 141, 125.

consciousness. For material being is the only existence which things may have 'out of God,' and if there were no material existence, there would be nothing of which the Ideas would be the images. Norris does not, himself, suggest this argument, but it would seem to be a possible explanation of his position.

There are several minor inconsistencies in Norris's theory. He complains that men do not seek to know the Ideal World, that they study natural sciences, and material things, but do not attend to the world of Ideas; yet he insists later that the Ideal World is the only reality that can be known, that it is the necessary object of all science and perception. Again, one of the arguments for the existence of the Ideal World is that in comparing sensible objects with ideas, we find the shapes of the sensible things less accurate than the 'Ideal' figures. How the comparison is possible if the ideal figures are really the only ones we can see, Norris does not explain.

V. THE VALUE OF NORRIS'S PHILOSOPHY AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE TRANSITION FROM DUALISM TO IDEALISM

If we ask what there is in Norris's philosophy which makes it of real interest and worthy of our attention, the answer must be found in its value as the expression of certain characteristics of its age, and of the approach toward later idealistic theories. It is not because of Norris's influence on later thought, for the only direct influence which we can trace is on the philosophy of Collier. The real interest which the *Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World* has for us lies in the fact that it is the only clear expression in English of the philosophy of the transition between dualistic and idealistic conceptions.

The philosophy of Norris, because of its internal inconsistencies, cannot be accurately classified as either idealism or dualism. Its whole tendency is obviously toward a system of absolute idealism. The rejection of all arguments for the existence of matter, and the insistence on the intimate union of every finite mind with the mind of God, go far in that direction. But Norris's refusal to give over the accepted and traditional

opposition of mind and matter, and the conception of consciousness as necessarily representative of, though unconnected with, something that is beyond consciousness, keep his theory tied to the systems of Descartes and Locke, and burden it with all the difficulties of an uncritical realism.

This opposition appears also in the writings of Cudworth and More and the other Cambridge Platonists, but is much less clearly marked, hidden by the mass of superfluous learning in Cudworth's *Intellectual System*, and by the mystical vagaries of the books of Henry More. In Norris's doctrine the contrast is clear-cut and unmistakable, between the conceptions which were to form the basis for the philosophy of the future, on the one hand, and on the other, those which the past had even then found inadequate. His theory is not an isolated specimen of thinking, but is an expression of the intellectual movement of his age. In the theories of Collier and Berkeley we find the step in advance which distinguished the thought of the eighteenth century from that of the seventeenth. In the theory of Norris we find the tentative trying of the ground, which was the necessary preliminary to that advance. Looking back from the present standpoint, the next step seems inevitable and clearly defined; to Norris it was a leap in the dark which he was not quite ready to take.

In such wise, then, do we of a later day judge this philosophical essay of the early eighteenth century, endeavoring to accord to it the 'candid as well as considerate perusal,' for which its author pleads, and recognizing that, with all its inconsistencies, it is a sincere expression of that spirit which can find contentment only in the vision of the ultimate truth.

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee.

2.

3.

APPENDIX



BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

I.

THE CAMBRIDGE PLATONISTS

BENJAMIN WHICHCOTE (1607-1683), *Discourses and Sermons*, published posthumously.

NATHANAEL CULVERWELL (died 1651?), *The Light of Nature*. (A doctrine resembling Cudworth's.)

RICHARD CUMBERLAND (1631-1718), *De Legibus Naturae Disquisitione Philosophica*. (A utilitarian theory of Ethics.)

JOSEPH GLANVIL (1636-1680), *Sadducismus Triumphatus*.

SIMON PATRICK (1626-1707), *The Parable of Pilgrims*. (An allegory resembling Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*.) *A Brief Account of the new sect of Latitude Men* (?).

JOHN PORDAGE (1607-1681), *Truth appearing through the clouds of undeserved scandal*, 1655. *Theologia Mystica*, 1683.

S. WORTHINGTON (1618-1671), Master of Jesus College, Cambridge, Translation of Thomas à Kempis, *De Imitatione*, 1655. *The Great Duty of Self-Resignation to the Divine Will*, 1675.

JOHN HOWE (1630-1705), a friend of Cudworth and More, *The Living Temple of God*, 1675.

EDWARD FOWLER (1632-1714) wrote a discourse in defence of the Cambridge Platonists, or "Latitude Men," 1670.

THOMAS GALE (1635-1702) edited a number of Greek and Latin books, among them the works of Iamblicus and Herodotus.

GEORGE RUST (died 1670), *Discourse of the use of Reason in Matters of Religion*, against "Enthusiasts and Deists," 1683.

RALPH CUDWORTH (1617-1688), Master of Christ's College, Cambridge, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, Part I, 1678. This was "intended as a Discourse concerning Liberty and Necessity, against the Fatall Necessity of all Actions and Events." (Preface, 1.) It was to have had three parts:

1. Democrattick Fate or the Material Necessity of all things without a God.
 2. Good and Evil dependent solely on the will of God, as also all our actions.
 3. Good and Evil exist of themselves, but all actions controlled by necessity.
- Of these only the first part was written, but the discussion of material necessity leads to so many different subjects, as to involve the criticism of nearly all previous philosophical systems and the working out of Cudworth's own theory.

Chap. I. Brief account of Atheistical systems of philosophy.

Chaps. II, III, IV. Reply to Atheistical doctrine. That men have an idea of God. Discussion of pagan polytheism to prove that Greek philosophy acknowledged only one God. That the genuine Trinity of Plato agreed with that of the Orthodox Christians (p. 612). Idea of God is not the "Figment of Civil Sovereigns."

Chap. V. Existence of Spirit proved by apparitions and Miracles. Refutation of the Atheists' argument "That God could not be Creator since nothing could be made from nothing." This contradicts itself in making matter cause of all things. "Though all corporealists be not atheists, yet atheists universally are corporealists" (p. 769). Proof of Existence of God from impossibility that all things should be made from Dead and Senseless Matter" (pp. 764 ff.). Discussion of Immortality. Souls of Brutes. Arguments for Providence (Sec. 5).

The *Treatise on Eternal and Immutable Morality*, 1731, may have been intended to be the second part of the *Intellectual System*. In this work Cudworth argues for the Existence of Ideas from the necessity of them for knowledge. These Ideas are modes of the Eternal Mind, and Truth is the relations between them.

Cudworth also wrote a discourse on Free Will, published after his death.

HENRY MORE (1614-1687), was the son of parents who were strong Calvinists. He took a deep interest, even while very young, in theological questions, but never accepted the Calvinistic position. His best known work is the *Divine Dialogues*, 1688, a series of conversations about God, His attributes and Providence and kindred subjects, which take place in a garden arbor and are reported by one of the members of the group. The most important philosophical points discussed are More's doctrine of non-corporeal extension, and the arguments for the existence and goodness of God from the "Design of the World, and the universal consent of mankind." The *Dialogues* have a strong tendency toward mysticism and are filled with allegory, particularly in the interpretation of the Bible, and the discovery of the 'vital' principle of the universe by the symbolism of a dream. Other books by More are:

1653 *Conjectura Cabalistica* (in which More sets forth his theory of the origin of all philosophy in the 'Cabbala').

1659 *The Immortality of the Soul*.

1667 *Enchiridion Ethicum*.

1671 *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*.

1716 *An Antidote Against Atheism*.

More's Letters to Norris were published in Norris's *Theory and Regulation of Love*.

II.

NICOLAS MALEBRANCHE (1638-1715)

La Recherche de la Vérité, 1674-78. This is primarily a discussion of the various 'faculties' of the soul, of the errors into which they lead and the method of avoiding these errors. Malebranche's philosophical theory of the 'vision of God' is formulated in the second part of the third book, which treats of the intellect or 'l'esprit pur.'

Entretiens sur la Métaphysique, 1687. The *Entretiens* deals with the larger philosophical questions which are implied in the teachings of the *Recherche*, the reality of the Ideal World, the nature and existence of God, the existence of matter, and the mysteries of the faith.

Traité de la Nature et de la Grâce, 1680.

Méditations Chrétiennes, 1683.

Traité de Morale, 1684.

Traité de l'Amour de Dieu, 1698.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

WORKS OF NORRIS

Arranged in Chronological Order according to the Date of Publication

The date starred indicates in each case the edition consulted. Lists are added of libraries in which each book may be found. The following abbreviations have been used:

Ath.....	Athenaeum Library, Boston
B. M.	British Museum
B. P. L.	Boston Public Library
B. Mawr	Bryn Mawr College
Chi.....	University of Chicago
Col.....	Columbia University
Cor.....	Cornell University
Har.....	Harvard University
J. H.....	Johns Hopkins University
Lib. Con.....	Library of Congress
U. Ill.....	University of Illinois
V.....	Vassar College
Well.....	Wellesley College
Yale.....	Yale University

(A. Wood) indicates that the book or edition is attributed to the given date on the authority of Antony Wood's *Athenæ Oxoniensis* but that I have not found a copy of it.

The British Museum Library is the only European library to which reference is made. The authority for the books by Norris in the British Museum is the Catalogue in the Boston Public Library. The lists of American libraries are doubtless incomplete, but information was obtained from most of the libraries of the larger universities and colleges, and many city libraries.

1. *Picture of Love Unveiled*, by Philoconerus. A Translation of *Effigies Amoris* by Robert Waring (1649). 1682, B. M. 1744, B. M.
2. *Hierocles upon the Golden Verses of the Pythagoreans*, Translated immediately out of the Greek into English. With a Preface concerning the Morality of the Heathen in Theory and Practice. 1682, B. M. *1756, B. P. L.
3. *Tractatus adversus Reprobationis absolutæ decretum novo methodo et succentissimo compendio adornatus et in duos libros digestos*. 1683 (A. Wood).

This "is a Declamation spoken in the Schools a little before for the degree of M. of Arts" (A. Wood).

4. *A Murnival of Knaves, or Whiggism plainly displayed and (if not grown shameless) blasphemed out of Countenance*. 1683 (A. Wood).
5. *An Idea of Happiness*. 1683, B. M. Reprinted in *Poems and Discourses*, and in the *Miscellanies*.

6. *Poems and Discourses Occasionally Written*, by John Norris, Fellow of All Soul's College in Oxford.

"Nec vos dulcissima Mundi
Nomina, vos Musæ libertas otia libri,
Hortique Silvaeque anima remanente relinquam."

London. Printed by J. Herfinch at the Kings Arms, without Temple Bar. MDCLXXXIV, *1684. B. M., Har., Yale.

7. *Translation of the last four books of the Institutes and Life of Cyrus the Great*, by Xenophon of Athens. 1685, B. M.

8. *The Theory and Regulation of Love*. A Moral Essay, In Two Parts, To which are added Letters Philosophical and Moral between the Author and Dr. Henry More. 1685, Chi. 1688, B. M. *1694, B. M., B. P. L., Har., Lib. Con.

9. *A Sermon (on Romans XII: 13) preached before the University of Oxford, March 29: 1685*. 1685, B. M., Yale. Reprinted in the *Miscellanies*, 1687.

10. *A Collection of Miscellanies, Consisting of Poems, Essays, Discourses and Letters*. 1687, B. M., Yale. *1692, B. M., Yale, Ath. 1699, B. M., U. I. *1706, B. M., Chi., Col., Har. 1710, B. P. L., Har., Princeton. 1717, B. Mawr. 1749, B. P. L.

See note (1) p. 17. A copy of the second edition (1692) is also in the possession of the writer.

11. *Reason and Religion or the Grounds and Measures of Devotion*. 1689, Lib. Con. 1694, B. M. 1724, B. M.

Reprinted in *Reason and Religion*, etc., 1697.

12. *Reflections upon the Conduct of Human Life, (with a) Visitation Sermon preached July 30, 1689*. 1689 (A. Wood). 1690, B. M. 1691, B. M. 1808 B. M., (5th ed.). Reprinted in *Reason and Religion*, 1697, and in Wesley's *Christian Library*, 1819.

13. *Christian Blessedness, or Practical Discourses upon the Beatitudes, (with) Cursory Reflections upon a Book Call'd an Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. 1690, B. M. 1691, Lib. Con. *1692, Har.

Practical Discourses upon the Beatitudes—With three other Volumes of Practical Discourses upon Several Divine Subjects. 1694, B. M. (Vol. I). 1699, B. M. (Vol. II). 1693-99, Ath.

14. *The Charge of Schism Continued*. 1691. (A. Wood.)

Reprinted in *Reason and Religion*, 1697.

15. *Two Treatises Concerning the Divine Light*. 1692, B. M.

Reprinted in *Reason and Religion*, 1697.

16. *Spiritual Counsel or the Father's Advice to his Children*, 1694 (A. Wood). "His name is not set to it, only Report makes him the Author."

Reprinted in *Reason and Religion*, 1697.

17. *Letters Concerning the Love of God*. Bel. (Mary Astell) and J. N. 1695, B. M., Lib. Con. *1705, Ath., B. M., Har. 1710, Har. (in Norris's Works, Vols. 7 and 8).

18. *Reason and Religion, or Treatises upon Several Subjects*. 1697, B. M., U. Ill. *1698, Ath.

19. *An Account of Reason and Faith in Relation to the Mysteries of Christianity (written in reply to John Toland's "Christianity not Mysterious")*. 1697, B. M., B. Mawr. *1728, Har. (13th ed.). 1740, B. M. 1790, B. M.

Reprinted in *The Scholar armed against the Errors of the Time*. Vol. I, 1812.

20. *Of Religious Discourse in Common Conversation*. 1702. B. M., 1735, B. M., Reprinted in *Practical Discourses*, 1707.

21. *An Essay Toward the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World.* *Vol. I, 1701. *Vol. II, 1704. Ath., B. M., B. P. L., Cor., Har., J. H., Lib. Con., Princeton, Well., Yale, Univ. of California, Univ. of Minnesota.
22. *Practical Discourses upon Several Divine Subjects, (with) An Admonition Concerning two late Books call'd a Discourse of the Love of God.* Vol. I and II, 1728 (Norris's Works, Vols. 1 and 2), Har. *Vol. III and IV, 1707, (Norris's Works, Vols. 3 and 4), Har.
23. *A Practical Treatise Concerning Humility.* 1707, Ath., Har., B. M., Lib. Con.
24. *A Philosophical Discourse Concerning the Immortality of the Soul. (With a letter to Mr. Dodwell.)* 1708, B. M. 1732, B. M., Lib. Con.
25. *A Treatise Concerning Christian Prudence.* *1710, B. M., B. P. L. 1724 (Extracted from J. Norris by Mr. Wesley), B. M. 1749, 3rd ed., B. M. 1808, 5th ed., B. M.
26. *Letters between Norris and Corinna.* (Lady Wharton.) In *Historical Letters*, 1727, Ath., and in R. Gwinnet's *Pylades and Corinna*, *Vol. II, 1731, Har.
27. *An Effectual Remedy against the Fear of Death.* 1733, B. M.
28. Translation of Sheffield's *Essay on Poetry.* B. M.
29. The *Poems* of John Norris of Bemerton, for the first time collected and edited, with Memorial Introduction and Notes, by the Rev. Alexander Grosart. 1871.
A Collection of Divine Hymns and Poems (by Mr. Norris, etc.). 1709.
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FREEDOM AND PURPOSE

An Interpretation of the Psychology of
SPINOZA

By

JAMES H. DUNHAM, PH.D.

Professor of Philosophy, Temple University, Philadelphia

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PREFACE

The following essay is an attempt to interpret Spinoza's ideas of human consciousness in terms of modern psychology. It is extremely hazardous to project the feelings and methods of one age into the mental habits of earlier thinkers. The difficulty is of a peculiar kind when we examine the shell of scholastic formulae from which the author never wholly released himself. Nevertheless, the consensus of opinion has given him a place second to none among the progenitors of the scientific study of mind. Indeed, he is held by some, and with good reason, to be the unwitting founder of the historic school known as Parallelism. Be this as it may, it is certain that no man before the rise of empirical methods understood as well as he the meaning and scope of psychic conation. The structural phenomena of the organism were hidden from his view, but their functional values, which we now subsume under the rubric of teleology, were grasped with an accuracy that astonishes the inquirer.

We submit the results of our study not as a complete account of the Spinozistic philosophy—for the inquiry is limited to a particular field—but as a practical solution of a problem which has persistently vexed the reader of the *Ethics*. Freedom, in whatsoever manner described, reveals a network of unexplained difficulties. The mesh grows thicker and more tangled if we treat Spinoza's problem in the cavalier fashion usually accorded it. Either freedom vanishes altogether, or its terms become tantalisingly vague. The form of argument which we have adopted allows room for the scientific verification of material. Its virtue, if any, lies here.

We cannot undertake to list the array of authorities consulted,—on the one side the direct expositors of the text, on the other the standard works on the meaning of consciousness. It is not invidious, however, to single out two books, which have measurably affected the framing of our conclusions, viz., Joa-

PREFACE

chim's *A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza* and Hobhouse's *Development and Purpose*.

One word of personal acknowledgment should be added. For the initial suggestion of subject and repeated counsels in its unfolding, the writer is indebted to Professor Edgar A. Singer, Jr., of the University of Pennsylvania.

The references in the body of the essay are from the *Ethics*, except as otherwise noted, and are cited by book and proposition. When the page is named the reference is to the authoritative Latin text of VanVloten and Land. It will appear that the English translation by Elwees in the Bohn Library has been freely used, as being in most cases substantially correct.

Philadelphia,
January 1, 1916.

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF SERVITUDE

The philosophy of Spinoza is first of all a transcript of his own experience. He found himself confronted with a serious problem, and he set about solving it to the best of his ability. He was conscious of two facts, the inflexibility of the natural order, together with his own inevitable place therein, and a well defined sense of freedom. Could these two facts be reconciled? The method proposed has been variously appraised by succeeding thinkers. Some have scorned it; others have altered its terms, so as to bring it into agreement with their own views; a third group have enthusiastically accepted it as a new Gospel. But whatever be the critical attitude of his readers, for him it was sufficient, and for him it became a genuine confession of faith. Let us understand at the outset his idea of human servitude.

I

The world in which we live, viewed as extended substance, can only be conceived as one and indivisible. For if it could be divided as sense-perception avers, then each segment would or would not possess all the properties of substance. If it did, infinity, e.g., could be predicated of each, and we should have an infinite number of infinite segments; if it did not, then the whole of substance having been divided into finite parts must surely lose its original character. Both alternatives, however, are absurd.¹ To prove the same thing from another angle, let us suppose that a particular segment is destroyed, the other parts remaining unchanged in position. Immediately a vacuum is created; but as this is abhorrent to nature, all its parts being *obliged* to seek a junction, we conclude that quantitative divisions are inconceivable. From this point of view nature is a continuum; and all objects, such as water, which the individuat-

¹ I, 12.

ing eye distinguishes as separate, are only modal variations, undulations on the unbroken sea, by means of which fundamental unity is expressed.²

But it is extremely difficult for the mind to grasp the idea of unqualified substance, inured as it is to the presence and activity of individuals. Let us approach the case from the opposite direction. We deal at once with simple bodies, exhibiting the most primary properties, viz., rest and motion. These may be compounded with one another, the aggregate maintaining a due relation in its parts, even though the modes of motion be changed. If now we advance another step and combine compound individuals, the product will include a great variety of possible modifications, let us say organic reactions, or orbital movements, without working any change in the new nature. By continuing this process to infinity, we at length reach the conception of the whole of nature, *tota facies mundi*, an individual whose parts undergo an infinite and infinitely complex variety of changes, without endangering the unity of the whole.³ Nature as thus conceived is not a dreary waste of substance, with nothing upon which the mind can seize; it is stocked with bodies of different degrees of "animation", that is, with different meanings as related to the whole.⁴ The upshot of this view is that the world cannot be conceived without its parts,⁵ the smallest organ and the most fleeting idea having their appointed place in the universal system, because they form the modes by which the attributes of God (or nature) are expressed in a fixed and definite manner.⁶

Given, then, a world whose continuity is not interrupted, but defined by its modal parts, we inquire next how the parts are related to one another. That relationship is causal. Everything that exists, exists either through itself or something else.⁷ If it exist through something else, it will be the effect of a cause.⁸ Thus, a body at rest cannot supply its own impulse to motion; it

² I, 15, Scholium (=Sch.).

³ II, Lem. 7, Sch.

⁴ II, 13, Sch.

⁵ IV, 2.

⁶ I, 25, Corollary (=C.).

⁷ I, Ax. i.

⁸ I, Ax. iii.

must be moved by another body. Nor can a body in motion come to rest without the interposition of a second body.⁹ In measuring the exact amount of work done we must take account of the texture of bodies in contact, hard, soft, or fluid. If the impinging body fails to move a body at rest, the effect of the motion is measured by the recoil of the first object, the path of the subsequent motion being determined by the angle of incidence.¹⁰ Again, the constitution of compound bodies is a more intricate application of the same principle. For the constituent parts are determined to their relative positions by the "compulsion" of other bodies and their reciprocal motions preserve a fixed ratio among themselves.¹¹

If now we examine the world as a whole, we find the un-deviating dependence of one individual upon another. Every thing is determined to exist or to act by another thing determined in the same way, in a regress that goes to infinity.¹² Take an example. A stone is dislodged from its place on the roof, and falls to the ground, killing a passing pedestrian. The cause of the event was a tempestuous wind that came in from the sea. The wind was raised by the agitation of the sea on the preceding day. The agitation of the waves was produced by a definite cause, a mechanical series thus beginning which cannot be closed until its every member has been ascertained. But inasmuch as the number of links in the chain is infinite, we can never reach the ultimate cause of a particular act, and must simply say that all things which are, are in God (or nature) and so depend on Him; that without Him they can neither be nor be conceived. We do not thereby give up the pursuit of a mechanical ideal as an explanation of the world, and take refuge in the "sanctuary of ignorance", the will or purpose of God. Final causes cannot explain how a particular thing is determined in space and time. For in the first place the dogma reverses the actual order of events, taking the cause from its position of priority and making it the effect. It removes, also, the element of perfection from the world as immediately constituted and argues that perfection

⁹ II, Lem. iii.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Ax. i, ii.

¹¹ II, Lem. iii. Definition.

¹² I, 28.

can only be attained when purpose is realized. "If the immediate creations of God were made with a view to His attaining a certain end, then the last things for which the first were made must be the most excellent of all".¹³

Mechanism on the other hand insists that everything is determined to existence, and to a particular state of existence by God, that is, by the laws of nature. It affirms that a definite effect always follows a definite cause, the essence in each being the same,¹⁴ that the only way to estimate the power of a cause is to compare the essential natures of the affecting and affected bodies.¹⁵ Thus, if man be the effect, we must look for the cause not in the lifeless stone, but in the germinating seed. If the nature of the tree be the cause, we must look for the effect not in articulate sounds, such as men utter, but in umbrageous foliage or luscious fruit.¹⁶ Moreover, the principle of causality concerns not only the nature of the bodies, but their numerical status. To account for a group of similar individuals the determination of the essence, e.g., man, is not enough; we must also determine why there is a prescribed number of them. Let us posit twenty men, existing simultaneously and without mutual relationship. They possess the same properties and can be understood by the same formulas. But the definition of finite things does not involve existence;¹⁷ the nature of man does not require that there should be twenty units of the class at the same time. Hence, we are forced to seek a causal nexus for each one in turn, in order to understand why he exists.¹⁸ In other words, mechanism lays its grip upon every element in nature, forces it into an infinite regress of causes, and sets upon it the inerasable mark of necessity.¹⁹ There is nothing contingent in the wide spaces of the universe; nothing, that is to say, which is dependent on the operation of causes whose entrance into the sphere of influence we cannot positively determine.²⁰

Still another fact confronts us; the rule of causality can not be broken. When a body has been endowed with certain prop-

¹³ I, App.

¹⁴ I, Def. 4.

¹⁵ V, Ax. ii.

¹⁶ I, 8, Sch. ii.

¹⁷ I, 24.

¹⁸ I, 8, Sch.

¹⁹ I, 29.

²⁰ I, 33, Sch. i.

erties, and conditioned to act in a certain way, it can never disavow its condition; it can never act in a different fashion.²¹ The most conspicuous interruption to the natural order is alleged to have occurred in the miracles of religion. They have woven themselves so intimately into the faith of the masses and are so manifestly the instruments of priestcraft for cementing its authority, that any one who attempts to examine them as natural phenomena, links in the causal chain, is branded as an impious heretic. Nevertheless we are warranted in inquiring into their character, proceeding on the assumption that the order of nature is immutable, as the being of God.²² It will then appear that a miracle has no meaning, except in relation to the opinion of men. For it reflects not an activity in the mechanical world, but the limits of human knowledge. It is an event whose cause cannot be explained by those principles which natural reason has deduced from observed phenomena. In many of the recorded miracles an uncritical age declined to institute a search into causes, a search which would doubtless have removed once and for all the unusual character of the event. The necessity of mechanism remains unimpaired.²³

From a different point of view the application of this rule is denied. Men allege there is a break in the observed order. Sensations pressing thick and fast upon consciousness give us the impression of a confused, unarticulated mass. They do not conform to the sequence and order with which we have hedged natural phenomena. Disharmonies in sights and sounds, fetid, decomposing matter, bitterness or insipidity in taste, disease, inequalities in social condition,—these are to us evidences of an unbalanced scheme of nature; we are wont to charge it up against the inadequacy of the governing rule, forgetting that our “order” is simply a synthesis of the sensuous manifold, a concept of the understanding. In nature there is no “order”, there is nothing but irresistible law.²⁴ Everything is determined to act in a particular way, and in that way it must act. More than that, it is the only way in which it could act; that is to say, the world in

²¹ I, 27.

²² I, App.

²³ Trac. Theol. Pol. I, 446.

²⁴ I, App.

which we live, and all its constituent parts, could have assumed no other form, developed no other causal series, than that which science reveals. The argument adduced by Spinoza to prove this point is strictly scholastic; you could not make a new nature without making a new substance, which would mean the constructing of two infinities, an absurd proposition. But there is an empirical basis for his contention; for, granting the physicist's principle, the conservation of energy, we are assured that however much you may alter the relations of individuals you cannot reduce the actual amount of force at work within the world. Hence, all speculation as to what might have happened is on the face of it inept. The fact remains inevitable and emphatic,—the rule of causality is universal.

II

To the rule as thus formulated the body of man does not present an exception. It follows in every detail the laws of physics and chemistry. Man comes into existence through the medium of a necessary cause, that is, by the action of another body, and is determined to his particular form and function by forces over which he has no control.²⁵ His corporeal constituents are precisely the same as those which enter into the making of a purely mechanical body, e.g., a planet. Like it his organization is not simple, but a congeries of minute and infinitely diversified bodies. Like it, too, his component parts reveal the usual variety of texture, hard, soft, fluid. He is affected by the same impact of foreign bodies, while all the organs and functions within the compound sustain an undeviating relation to one another.²⁶ The vegetative system requires the introduction of bodies from without for its constant "regeneration"—a fact which apparently unique to organic structure may yet be paralleled by magnetic influences in unorganized bodies. Again, the human body receives impressions through the sense-organs, in such a way that the impressions endure after the stimulus is removed, by virtue of the fact that the fluid parts of our body impinge on the softer

²⁵ I, 17, Sch.

²⁶ Cf. II, Lem. vi.

parts of the same and register there an effect, undisturbed until a new reaction is set up. This transaction is subject to the common calculus of chemistry.

Man has also a reciprocating power; he can "do work" on his neighbor; he can "arrange" external bodies in various ways, especially by bodily motion, or change of place.²⁷ It is therefore true to say that man is conformed to nature in an almost infinite number of ways,²⁸ that he is inexorably a part of nature, and cannot undergo any changes save such as are determined by the laws of physical activity, his own body as well as outside forces being examined;²⁹ and that his every act mirrors the general constitution of the world and not exclusively the properties which make him a man.³⁰ In this way he fulfills the universal axiom that there is in nature no individual thing which is not surpassed in intrinsic strength by another individual, and which consequently is liable to destruction by it.³¹ The axiom is empirically verifiable, and in no case more clearly than in the life of man. Man thus becomes a member of the causal series, which grows ever more powerful in its regress. The slightest experience proves to him that his own power is infinitely exceeded by the power of external causes.

But the account of man which we have so far given has made no reference to intellect as the special endowment of our subject. This is the element which is thought to distinguish him from other objects in nature, even conscious animals. It must be his certificate of freedom, if he have any. We therefore ask, how mental processes arise and what relation they bear to body. The primary fact is, that the order and nexus of ideas is the same as the order and nexus of things.³² For every individual in the world there is an idea in the mind of God, since he is both thought and extension; that is, everything has a "mind".³³ But man alone of all modes is able to express his ideas in language; hence his experience must be studied in order to ascertain the relation between mind and body. Now the first element in con-

²⁷ II, Posts. i-vi.

²⁸ IV, App. vi.

²⁹ IV, 4.

³⁰ IV, 37, Sch.

³¹ IV, Ax.

³² II, 7.

³³ II, 13, Sch.

sciousness, the fact which first makes us aware that there is such a thing as mind, is the idea of an existing object, viz., the body.³⁴ The relation between them is indestructible. The moment a reaction, even of the most rudimentary kind, takes place in body, the mind registers its image as an idea. Mental action corresponds point by point with physical changes; the concomitance is exact.³⁵ Hence, the finer the articulation of the organs of body, and the acuter the senses to receive and co-ordinate their perceptions, that is to say, the greater the reactive power of body, the more fitted will mind be to work the sensuous manifold into a conceptual system. In other words, percept and concept are inevitably joined; there is no distinction between them.³⁶ The mind is not a plastic surface, a *tabula rasa*, on which images are successively engraved. It is another aspect of body, just as body is another aspect of mind. What happens to one happens simultaneously to the other, whether the "happening" be viewed from the standpoint of ideas or their objective equivalent.³⁷

Now we know what happens to body, and from these data we can judge what happens to mind. When the body is affected by external forces, the impact of the affection is registered in consciousness. The mind, however, does not perceive the nature of the impinging body, except as it is mediated through the constitution of its own body.³⁸ Thus, Peter's idea of Paul will be different from Paul's idea of himself, inasmuch as the one passes through the sense-organs of the observer, while the other is the product of a man's experience with his own organic system. The modification of body determines the image in the mind.³⁹ When, then, two or more sensations occur simultaneously in the mind, the return of one of them will induce a modification, kindred to that sustained when both were present. This is possible because the body retains the impression of an external agent even after its withdrawal, and until such impression has been effaced by a new sensation. On this basis memory cannot be an originative act of the mind; it is the sequence of images, caused

³⁴ II, 11.

³⁵ II, 12.

³⁶ I, 14.

³⁷ V, 1.

³⁸ II, 16, Cor.

³⁹ II, 17, Sch.

by corresponding reactions in the body. For example, the soldier sees the prints of the horses' hoofs in the sand and at once conjures up the image of a horse, a horseman, and the tumult of battle; while a farmer observing the same tracks would think of the plow, the furrow, and the hard-working animal. In this way, too, objects which have no natural affinities are joined together; as when a Roman hearing the word *pomum*, would at once think of the fruit bearing that name, the two images having nothing in common except the fact that both had at the same moment produced modifications in the percipient's senses.⁴⁰ One conclusion alone can be deduced from these considerations, viz., that the mind is framed to think in a particular way, by a definite cause, which in turn is subject to a like determination, until a causal series develops in the operation of mind, parallel to, and as rigorous as, that which governs the affections of body.⁴¹

But to many students of human nature such a conclusion is obnoxious. They cannot understand how the laws of physics or chemistry can be the sole and originating "causes of pictures, buildings, and all things of that kind, which are produced only by human act." They affirm that the body of man, unguided by the mind, is incapable of unfolding the genius, enshrined in a classic temple. We answer that no one has as yet explored the resources stored within the body's confines. The fineness of texture, the complexity of organization, far transcending the products of art, are such that they may of themselves account for many esthetic achievements, which we have hitherto ascribed to deliberate intent. Nor has anyone gained so complete a knowledge of the structure of organs, or of the bundle of nerves which now we call the motor-sensory system, as to explain adequately their functional offices. There are many performances in sub-conscious life, e.g., somnambulism, which throw us into surprise when we waken, and which when we are awake we should not venture to repeat. Animal psychology discloses certain instincts, leading to action, which in sagacity quite excel the voluntary efforts of man. Again, it is averred that the body remains inert and passive, so long as the mind is in no condition to think.

⁴⁰ II, 18, Sch.

⁴¹ Cf. II, 48.

But we answer, the state of body has much to do with the capacity for mental exertion. If the body be sunken in sleep, the mind is torpid; if the body suffer from fatigue or disease, or if the nerve-centres be subject to some particular stimulation, the mind cannot adjust itself to think on a given theme.⁴² These illustrations are adduced to prove, not that body is superior to mind, but that mind and body are one and the same individual, conceived now under the aspect of thought, again under the aspect of extension.⁴³ There is no interaction; the mind cannot change the functioning of bodily organs, nor can the body give to mind the power of thinking; they act with a united impulse.⁴⁴

The relation of mind and body as thus sketched is diametrically opposed to that adopted by Descartes. He held the rules of physics to be inviolable until man is reached. The instincts of sentient creatures are mere automatisms, combinations of physical and chemical elements. Man however is of a different fibre. He possesses thought *and* extension, soul *and* body. Descartes agreed with many less critical thinkers in "conceiving man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom." The bearer of intelligence does not passively follow the natural order; he interrupts and often shatters it. To trace the emotions of body to their primary causes was one of the secure triumphs of this philosopher. But he did it only to assure to man an absolute dominion over them. Hence his question was, how the transit from soul to body, from thought to motion could be effected. Preestablished harmony, as afterwards worked out by Leibnitz, would be a poet's dream, not a scientific hypothesis. The single substance of Spinoza obliterated the agelong division, accepted by religion and philosophy as final. A solitary alternative remained to the exponent of Rationalism: man must break into the mechanism of nature, he must master his physical environment. How shall he do it? By translating volition into mechanical action. The pineal gland in the "midst of the brain" furnished the point of contact. All the diverse agitations of animal spirits impinge upon it, and from it receive in turn the impulses which drive them back to the state of equilibrium. Probably in

⁴² III, 2, Sch.

⁴³ II, 21, Sch.

⁴⁴ III, 2.

infancy this connecting gland dealt with a single thought, let us say the most rudimentary reaction; but in time it became associated with the great complex of thought and motion, and at length stood out as the fulcrum by which a man could lift himself above the murk and bondage of circumstance on to the level of independence.⁴⁵

To Spinoza such a transgression of mechanical law was unthinkable. Man is not a privileged being in a world of determined bodies. He may acquire a lordship over nature, if he will; but he can win it not by overriding her precepts, but by obeying everyone to the uttermost. The device proposed by Descartes was a childish invention, unworthy of a mind which had deliberately shivered the idols of Scholastic occultism. For if the uniting gland be equally agitated by impinging passion and volitional decision, the one neutralizing the other, it can yield no assurance that decision will not be checked and perhaps destroyed through the excess of passion. Nor does this theory answer the objection that there is no common denominator between idea and motion, and hence no basis for comparing their relative powers. For how shall I find out the strength of the mental assertion required to lift the arm in the act of felling an opponent, when my instrument of measure is practically unknown to me? When however we understand that the emotions of body follow from the necessary order of nature, that they can be traced back to determinate causes, that they involve no defect in nature, such as is described by the terms *pain* and *vice*, but rather register a little known aspect of her perfection, then we shall not decline to exhibit them in geometrical fashion, as we do lines, planes and solids, believing that by such a survey we shall be driven to oppose and conquer the restraints which have been forced upon us.⁴⁶

III

Having accepted the thesis that man shares the causal relations of mechanism, we proceed to inquire how they find expression in his emotional life. His body, as we saw, comes into

⁴⁵ V, Pref.

⁴⁶ III, Pref.

being wholly without his connivance. Inasmuch as mutually destructive elements cannot operate within the same body, we must attribute to man as to other individuals the endeavor to preserve his own existence. This endeavor can be nothing else than the essence or constitutive nature with which he makes his entrance into the world.⁴⁷ Hence the Conatus is a determined quantum, an appetite governed solely by the laws of chemical reaction. It is a something which we cannot change. We cannot, for example, do injury to ourselves with a view to ultimate benefit. To hate an object, and sustain thereby a distinct loss of emotional vigor, expecting to attain later a degree of mental "perfection" hitherto unknown, is a type of sacrifice utterly repugnant to natural law.⁴⁸ Moreover, the same impulse, even when associated with consciousness and called *desire*, receives not a shred more of self-initiating power than it formerly had. Desire is not an outreaching for a benison which we would make our own. We do not desire a thing because it is good; a thing is good because we desire it; that is, because the organic function responds most readily to the stimulus. Now the realisation of a good, or more strictly, the functioning of desire, brings with it an increase of the body's powers and a corresponding increase of the mind's capacity. The movement is purely reflexive; it springs from the properties of our nature. We could not be men if we did not pursue a conduct like this. Thus, the emotions of love and hate are not careful discriminations on the part of an agent, as many moralists contend. They are mental registrations of physical facts. The forces of body are enlarged or diminished, and the mind cultivates or shrinks from a conception of the same.⁴⁹ Hatred and envy do not in the first instance imply deliberate intent. They are impulses which record an automatic revolt against any interference with a man's comfort, or his right to live. Parents have often fed the fires of such emotion by inciting their children to virtue, precisely for the sake of eclipsing the prestige of a neighbor's family or neutralizing their efforts. But all the training born of ambition would have been fruitless and dead except for the tendency already implanted in

" III, 7.

" III, 44, Sch.

" III, 13, C.

the youthful nature.⁵⁰ Whatever be the emotion that struggles for utterance, we may be sure that it forges one new fetter upon hands already heavily loaded with the tokens of human enslavement.

We have nothing to do with the rise of emotion; we have as little to do with its development. This consideration accounts for the wide variation of types in a given society, a measurable difference here, an extraordinary contrast there. Whence comes such diversity? The answer is: Elemental passions depend altogether on the way a body receives its modifications through the medium of external forces.⁵¹ That our emotional nature is stirred to activity in this way only, is the common testimony of observers.⁵² Thus, the child is constrained to laugh or cry when similar phenomena are found in the behavior of its attendants,⁵³ an imitative reaction which in later life develops into a determinate attempt to emulate the word, look or dress of one whom we love.⁵⁴ Again, the tremor of lip and the pallor of brow are traceable directly to a nervous shock administered by some foreign body of higher potency than ours. These are emotional experiences which every man involuntarily repeats; pieces of "fossilized intelligence" (Lamarck), not drafts on the mind, as the reservoir of thought.⁵⁵ Another group of emotions distinguish one agent from another. These admit of a diversity of intellectual judgments; and yet these, too, are based upon the empirical fact that every man tends to react to given conditions in certain well defined ways. Thus, courage and fear are first of all physical phenomena; a man does not make himself brave or timid; he is that, by the tendency of his nature. More than that; no man can form an opinion on a particular act involving hardihood, without revealing at the same time his own emotional synthesis. "I shall call a man intrepid when he makes light of an evil which I am disposed to fear; and if in addition I consider the fact that his desire of injuring his enemy and benefiting his friend is not restrained through fear of danger, I shall call him audacious." The value of my judgment depends on

⁵⁰ III, 55, Sch.

⁵¹ III, 56.

⁵² III, 13, Sch.

⁵³ III, 32, Sch.

⁵⁴ III, 27.

⁵⁵ III, 59, Sch.

my personal idea of courage, and that can be appraised only in terms of the physical power which I myself feel in face of evils.⁵⁶

Individual peculiarities, then, instead of guaranteeing independence, serve only to prove how deeply entrenched in private experience are the rigorous laws of organic life. We are subject to an external constraint which we can neither throw off nor reduce. We are forced to be whatever our sensory reactions make us; and they in turn are shaped by the stimulating bodies about them. We are a prey to passion. For, in last analysis, drunkenness and avarice are not merely changes in a particular body. The words imply correlatives. If a man be drunken, it is because he has been lured by the cup and has imbibed its contents. If a man is avaricious, it is because he has conceived the possibilities wrapped up in the possession of gold. "They proclaim," says Spinoza, "the nature of each affection through the objects to which they sustain the most intimate (i.e. causal) relation."⁵⁷ In general, sympathy and antipathy, words introduced by certain authors to indicate an occult property in things, really describe our emotional life; we are victims of passivity, whether for good or for ill. Nature has driven her thongs into man's flesh and heart.⁵⁸

The servitude of man is further strengthened by his vacillation in face of conflicting emotions.⁵⁹ The sensory nerves cannot always communicate the same steady vitalizing power; there must be alternations of uplift and depression. This situation, so familiar in purely organic experience, stands typical of the entire emotional career of man. Consider for example the person whose temperament is antithetical to our own, who yet strongly resembles in face and behavior a third person, counted among our dearest friends. In our mind two distinct and contradictory emotions are aroused, attraction and repulsion, love and hate. Two attitudes strive for ascendancy, and we are unable by untrammelled choice to adopt either.⁶⁰ The situation

⁵⁶ III, 51, Sch.

⁵⁷ III, 56, Sch.

⁵⁸ III, 15, Sch.

⁵⁹ III, 41, C.

⁶⁰ III, 17.

finds a parallel in the sphere of imagination. The mind is simultaneously affected by two images, because two several impressions concur in the sensory system. When one image returns the other is automatically called up. If now the first image be associated on another occasion with a third object, its fresh appearance will superinduce a conflict of expectations: will Y or Z follow X? The percipient is incapable of rendering a decision.⁶¹ In the sphere of emotion the fluctuation arises not from the mere concurrence of sensations, but because the causes operate differently in producing the effects. In the case just cited, hatred is the result of a direct clash of antagonistic natures, while the feeling of love is engendered by the presence of another cause. Generally, however, both emotions may be incited by the same cause, by virtue of the extraordinary diversity of our sensory reactions. Furthermore, in the last analysis, contradictory desires will be found to be variations of the same emotion, as *e.g.*, avarice and luxury of self-love; the one expressing greediness for personal gain, the other lavish expenditure for personal gratification.⁶²

IV

Such is the situation which meets every man, even the most advanced and experienced. What will be the outcome? What shall determine the issue? The man himself by "decree of mind" cannot settle the case once for all. That is out of the question. The settlement takes place by a change in tone of one or both of the contrary passions.⁶³ A new "state of mind" then exists. Thus, when hunger has been appeased by food, the digestive organs are no longer in the same condition of susceptibility. What appealed strongly before, now palls on the taste. We could not if we tried excite the sharp appetite which a moment ago craved for satisfaction.⁶⁴ But such a quick adjustment is not always to be expected. There are certain conditions which nature imposes, and which she insists should be met. The whim or alleged volition of the agent has no part in effecting the

⁶¹ II, 44, Sch.

⁶² IV, Def. v.

⁶³ V, 1.

⁶⁴ III, 59, Sch.

change. Emotions with the stimulating cause present exceed in strength emotions whose cause has disappeared. Emotions respecting future objects are fainter in proportion to the remoteness of attainment. Emotions conceived to be necessary make a far deeper impression on the mind than those which are contingent on unknown circumstances.⁶⁵ An intelligent grasp of the principles of good and evil cannot of itself overcome the effect of impulsive desire. We may be thoroughly convinced of the advisability of a certain course, we may have carefully estimated its ethical advantages, we may have worked up a genuine enthusiasm for its virtuous possibilities; but when a sudden impulse, yielding immediate results, fastens upon us, all the fervor of intention expires like a dying flame, and we are left with the dead ashes of a natural passion.⁶⁶ Indeed, it is true to say that the violence of the conflict exhausts a man's power of activity, and confirms the word of Sacred Writ: "He that increaseth knowledge, increaseth sorrow." Thus our boasted freedom turns out to be a hidden chain, binding us with links of steel back to the tyranny of unrationalized appetite.⁶⁷ Appetite, sensation, stimulus, fetters of sense, signs of bondage, from these we shall struggle in vain to win release.

Having this convincing array of facts before us, we wonder how men will venture to affirm their independence. The paradox arrests attention. It is not a sporadic challenge, here and there. It is the judgment of many dispassionate observers. How can we dispel the illusion? We might compare man to a flying stone, which has been set in motion by an external force. If it becomes conscious during transit, it would regard itself as free in determining its direction and would think of the impulse which carries it along as the product of its own action.⁶⁸ This parable suggests two things; first, a definition of the will, and next a discovery of the actual cause of mental exertion. The will is not, as Cartesians hold, a separate faculty, by which a man executes his ideas. It is the same as intellect, composed of conscious units, each one of which answers to a particular change in the

⁶⁵ IV, 9, 10, 11.

⁶⁶ IV, 16.

⁶⁷ IV, 17, Sch.

⁶⁸ Epis. 62.

organic structure. If a mind cannot perceive a thing, it cannot will it. That which we call will is the sum of volitions, nothing more.⁶⁹ Yet it is a convenient term under which to group determinate acts, in the same way that we classify certain individuals under the term *man*, or abstract a common quality, *lapidity*, from several particular *stones*. Now the common property in volitions, the residual fact in all exertions of mind, is consciousness; it is this fact which awards to us a constructive part in the making of conduct. For instance, the impulses of childhood, desire for food, flashes of temper, instinct to run from danger, the maudlin behavior of an intoxicated man, the delirium of the fevered patient, the inconsequential loquacity of gossiping women, are thought by their subjects to be free decisions of will, just because they are conscious of a change in sensation. As a matter of fact, such activities express no freedom whatsoever; they register only the functioning of physical appetites. Trace the volition to its source and we see how helpless the agent is to hew his own way. The man who is caught in the cross-currents of incompatible impulses yields to uncertainty and doubt and cannot conceive a moral policy steady enough to steer him to safety. The man with no commanding emotion, no love, no hate, no ambition, no honor,—an anemic and undefined complex of sensations,—will be the buffet of circumstances, a prey to every inconsiderable fancy that meets his eye. Each man is conscious of his subjective states; he cannot make a single one of them permanent by a free decision of mind.⁷⁰

Hence, volition as an originaive power is a delusion. As well hold that we can by act of will recover to conscious thought the name or fact which has dropped into the abysm of forgetfulness—as well maintain that the thrilling events of the dreamworld are acts of deliberate intent, as suppose that the most refined hypothesis of the philosopher is palpitant with any other energy than that which courses through the arteries of nature. The laws of thought are the same as the laws of matter; they belong to the same substance.⁷¹ To suspend judgment is to disrupt the order of ideas, an impossible procedure. Judgment cannot be

⁶⁹ II, 49, C.

⁷⁰ III, 2, Sch.

⁷¹ II, 36.

suspended, for the attempt to do so is itself a judgment, and the sequence of thought is inviolably preserved. Nor can a man exercise the power of contrary choice, that is, decide upon a thing in contravention of all prior motives; for such an act would have no constitutive cause, would be a spar cast upon an uncharted sea, with its origin a mysterious blank.⁷² "Wherefore," says the author, "these decisions of mind arise in consciousness by the same necessity as the images of things which exist in the phenomenal world. Hence, those who believe that they speak, or keep silent, or perform any action by the free election of mind, do but dream with their eyes open."⁷³

By this definition of will, too, we understand how error takes hold upon the mind of man. For error is not a real fact, but a privation of knowledge. Thus, we conceive the sun to be about two hundred feet from the surface of the earth. If we decline to test our sensuous experience by the principles of scientific inquiry, then, it may be said, we acquiesce in what is false. For knowledge unverified by true standards cannot be certain; we may have no doubts as to its correctness; but we can never affirm its universal validity. In the case mentioned, another man might estimate the distance to be three hundred feet, because the rays of the sun were less potent to his senses. But when knowledge is sure, when we have ascertained by exact computation the relation of the sun to its planets, then error is eliminated; and private acceptance of the fact counts for nothing in establishing its validity.⁷⁴ The lesson which this experience teaches is that much of man's vaunted knowledge is derived from the falsifying impressions of the body. We are driven into ignorance by the involuntary reactions of sense-organs. Intellectual judgments as well as reflex actions proclaim the depth of our captivity.

⁷² II, 49, Sch.

⁷³ III, 2, Sch.

⁷⁴ II, 49, Sch.

CHAPTER II

PURPOSE THE MARK OF FREEDOM

The case is now closed, and a unanimous verdict is rendered on the basis of convincing testimony. Man is the bondman of nature. He dwells in a world whose every atom is immersed in an inflexible causal series. His ideas are governed in origin and development by a necessary coördination of mind. His emotions are aroused, shaped and swayed by rigid contact with external bodies. The hypothesis that he can change his behavior or environment at will is a fatuous mistake, due to ignorance. Yet in face of such cumulative evidence confirming the enslavement of man, Spinoza hears thrilling through his being the note of freedom. He beholds his body weighted with the chains of matter; but he is not satisfied. His soul is struggling with a mighty hope. Can it be released? Can the fact of servitude so rigorously enforced be offset by another fact, which reflects the rule of freedom? This is the problem. He is unhesitating in its solution. Man is in part free, in part not free. To demonstrate man's right to freedom is the business of the *Ethics*. Is the proof conclusive? Various opinions have been handed down. We select two historic criticisms, one denying freedom utterly, the other granting a limited kind to human nature, as he defines it.

Jacobi denies that rational freedom can be found in Spinoza's treatment of man.¹ The structure of the self, he avers, is strictly mechanical; its one and only duty being to preserve the power of existence. The desire stirring in man is typical; it knows no genus, species or sex. Yet it is individualized in the conscious self, and being endowed with intelligence appears to act by volitional intent. It is, however, subject to exact determination by physical causes, both in its organic and ideational

¹ Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza. Werke; 4. Band, erste Abt.; S. 17, u. fg. Leipzig. 1819.

forms. The conatus alone explains the personal feeling which organizes reflective thought and irrational impulses into a coherent whole. Hence the genius of Newton can be reduced to the terms of organic reaction. The practical life of man is in like manner shaped by its control. If constituent desires conflict, they will eventually be harmonized by the action of the same basic endeavor. The result will be a more perfect type of character, that is, one more highly developed; for there is nothing intrinsically bad in nature. Being necessary, nature must be the best. So what man secures for himself must be the best. His very assumption of freedom is proof of his integration into the common order of mechanism, and springs from a subjective interest in his own condition; just as we might watch a valuable plant unfolding, knowing that we could assist it only by giving its chemical formulas the best field in which to work out their applications. Freedom like this is nil.

One special point in the doctrine is cordially condemned, *viz.*, the exclusion of Liberty of Indifference, or the power of contrary choice. There are three possible attitudes towards moral ability: physical necessity, the operation of the machine; moral necessity, the choice of the best; unrestrained freedom of the will. The first only is agreeable with Spinoza's premises. The second resolves itself into the first; the third is explicitly denied. Will is a succession of mental acts, each one of which is duly caused by antecedent conditions. It cannot therefore exercise the power of choosing a course when different paths are open. In fact, the mind is confronted with an alternative. The privilege of rejecting every proposed motive and pursuing an independent course, is excluded by the nature of man. The only power possible in human life is the play of appetite, which is another aspect of mechanical force, and the freedom felt in the exertion of power, instead of being self-originated, is simply the obverse of necessity.

Another and quite different judgment is pronounced by a commentator like Kuno Fischer.² Freedom, he says, as defined by Spinoza is a real experience; but freedom in such a system

² Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, Bd. II, S. 415 u.s.f.

has nothing to do with the framing of conduct. It is not an ethical fact; it is a predicate of intelligence. To be free we must endeavor to fashion clear and distinct ideas of all emotions; and since ideas are the organ of mind, we can realize freedom only in knowledge. Now we know first of all our own body and the physical objects which touch it. But we only know that they exist; we cannot understand by organic reactions the infinitude of their parts and relations. The same thing is true of the mind; the single image, or the sum-total of consciousness, is very imperfectly apprehended. But we are prone to accept part-knowledge as authoritative; hence we frame misleading concepts, like freedom, purpose, and generic notions. We can make our ideas clear and our knowledge adequate by tracing each image, each reaction, to its cause. By this method we perceive the relation of each object to the "common order of nature" and find that ideas and things are one and the same, expressing eternal substance under different attributes. The result will be that men are no longer deceived by the representations of sense. Reason has universalized the individual, and eventually intuitive knowledge will open up the essence of all things, that is to say, the being of God.

At this point the ethical implications of the system of knowledge begin to emerge. Emotion is the key to character. It is at first entirely passive, an organic fact. But it may become active by being idealized, that is, by being understood in its relation to the common order. Desire and volition belong to the sphere of reaction; they are marks of subjection until we find their cause, stamp them with reason, and lift them to a place of supremacy in mental experience. Clear ideas, following necessarily from our nature, constitute virtue and command the assent of will. They alone give freedom, for they alone register our growing independence of desires that are fed by sensuous experience. Hence, we must sharpen in thought the distinction between good and evil, falsity and truth. Moral perfection being the highest emotion is won by adequate knowledge. Men are deceived now; they fancy themselves free; they are in the bitterest bondage. Let them perceive the order of nature and

come into conceptual relations with the world-laws. Then the claims of sense are silenced, and reason, pointing to virtue, guides their hesitating steps to perfect knowledge. The spirit of this imperative, not its form, says Fischer, is communicated by Spinoza's theory. For ethics, as taught by him, is not a categorical command, but a mathematical demonstration. It does not issue precepts, it conceives the laws of life. Hence, knowledge cannot be defined as a purpose, but as the analysis of man's essential nature. Hence, too, the attainment of knowledge will be the realization of his perfect freedom.⁸

The first of these interpretations places Spinoza in an unenviable light before the eyes of history. He stands no longer as a figure to the rejected but as a dreamer so grossly deceived as to be an object of pity. At one moment he maintains with convincing detail the thesis: Man is not free; the next, he announces a program whose key note is: Man ought to be and is free. Does he mean by freedom the same thing in each case? If he does, the judgment of Jacobi is true; and the book which so many eager spirits have fed upon becomes a tissue of contradictions. If he does not, then we ask, What are the two senses in which we may use the word, one of which may be denied, the other asserted with perfect consistency? That man is free, as some fondly fancy, to change the course of nature or disregard her laws,—this is the sense which Spinoza vehemently denies. Man in this respect is not free. Is he also in some respect free?

The second interpretation finds his freedom in the winning of clear ideas. The reflective part of man is free, the part by which he rises to the contemplation of the whole of nature. But the part which is free proves on this view to be so very small as well nigh to elude our quest, and so difficult to develop that it exerts no influence in the life of ordinary men, but belongs if to any one to the intellectual saint. On the other hand the freedom which Spinoza means is not prohibitive in its terms. It is embodied in every, even the simplest purposeful act, and is exercised by man at every moment of his life. Every act is in

⁸ *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*. Band II, S. 540.

part free, in part not free. It is not free, insofar as it is conceived as the outcome of the action of physico-chemical forces. It is free, when it can be clearly understood through the properties of man's nature.⁴ We may arrange such acts in a series in which the degree of freedom increases and which has for its limit the fascinating but baffling concept of an absolutely free soul.⁵ Thus the development of human life includes, first, the recognition of primary or typical impulses, next the weaving of these into a systematic whole called character, and finally the conceiving of a Self which interprets its purpose and unity by the purpose and unity of the world. Our present duty is to ascertain how the purposes belonging to the type *man* afford a basis for freedom.

I

We begin by pointing out that the order of nature is not fully explained by the category of mechanism. That category answers the question, *how* a thing is done. If we ask *how* a body performs the actions which we assign to it, we must examine its structure, its material properties, the kind of force at work, molecular attraction, elasticity, chemical reaction and the like. The examination will show that one element depends upon another by rigid necessity; that *this* result could never have been obtained apart from *that* combination of conditions.⁶ Thus, to take a simple example, the seizure and assimilation of food is a serial relating of cause to effect. Every movement which grasps the prey and conveys it to the body can be estimated in terms of physical force. The digestive apparatus which is set going as soon as food is at hand, is a group of organs, extremely intricately appointed in some species, whose every reaction records a definite amount of power in the stimulus. So too, there are fixed formulas, to which may be reduced all the chemical fluids which enter into the activity of the organ. Hence it is possible to calculate precisely how much work is done in changing an organism from the state of hunger to the satisfaction of an appeased appetite.⁷

⁴ III, Def. ii.

⁵ II, Def. vii.

⁶ I, 28.

⁷ Cf. III, 59, Sch.

But our account so far has paid no heed to certain facts which do not answer the question, *How*. They are as essentially connected with the frame of the world as the others and must be duly explained if we are to leave no problem standing. These facts invite us to determine *why* a thing is done, to what end a given act tends. They do not ask how a thing is constructed, or under what laws or by what means it has attained its position. To set out the several structural stages by which the pinch of hunger is subdued, may be sufficient for the demands of physiology. The student of vital phenomena, however, believes his work only half done. *Why* the cells and tissues combine to form an organ which reacts to definite stimuli, is the problem before him. Mechanism does not yield an answer. It cannot yield any. The problem is not of structure, but of function. The same materials are under review, but they are differently appraised. Heretofore we asked how they operated; now we ask what they do. It is the idea, the *mind*, the conceptual being of a thing (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), which is expressed in the new definition.⁸ On the level of intelligence, where man fashions his conduct to suit his needs, we have no hesitation in calling the idea teleological.⁹ Closer reflection will convince us that every act, whether of impulse or reflection, has its inherent purpose. We may carry the test further and hold that the frame of the world bears the marks of purposive coordination, not in the sense that a governing Mind has conceived an end to which all nature is inexorably driven,¹⁰ but in the sense that the several parts into which it is critically broken up cannot be understood save as contributing to the meaning of the whole.¹¹

Everything, then, possesses an idea or "soul," and between idea and object, that is, between purpose and structural arrangement, there is a point-to-point correspondence.¹² To rank the category of teleology side by side and of equal authority with that of mechanism, is to offer an exhaustive explanation of all facts in the field of nature. Brute force is not the only vehicle of causality. It is found as a cause in planet and organism, in

⁸ II, 7, Sch.

⁹ IV, 24.

¹⁰ I, App.

¹¹ Cf. I, 15, Sch.

¹² II, 7, 13, Sch.

the speck of dust and the undeveloped germ. It is *allgueltig*, but it is not *alleinguelteig*.¹³ The force of a thing's essence, the purpose of its existence, exercises a causation just as valid and just as universal.¹⁴ But in the organic world the teleological principle can be more readily identified than among purely physical forces. Life, the peculiar mark of the organism, can not be seen, felt or weighed, and yet no organic body can be defined without it. Life is the *idea* of the thing called, say, man; himself certainly a compound of gases, liquids and solids,¹⁵ a cluster of cells, that never deviate in action from the prescribed rules of chemistry; yet at the same time a "force" which insists on viewing the structure as a whole. To say that an organism *lives*, is to read its constituents from the standpoint of their purpose. Since life belongs by definition to it, we are bound to regard purpose as a cause evincing the same efficacy that we find in the mechanical order.¹⁶

But it may be alleged that teleology is a concept of the observing mind and has no real place in the course of nature; that it is an epiphenomenon, imposed by us on familiar facts, but incapable of exerting any influence on their adjustment. We study now the conscious body, for man, our particular subject, finds his purlieu here. If the objection implies that to be effective teleology must be a new material force ushered in to counteract mechanical forces already in operation, we grant it at once. Teleology has no power to frustrate the movements of mechanism. Nor, conversely, can physical laws interfere with the true application of purpose. They are different aspects of the same phenomena, viewed, as Spinoza says, now under the attribute of thought, and again under the attribute of extension.¹⁷ If the objector conceives that teleology is designed to throw new light on the workings of mechanism, he misconstrues the doctrine. Purpose is not brought in to piece out an explanation which mechanical formulas cannot complete. It deals with factors in organic life which mechanism does not contemplate. Mechan-

¹³ Cossman. Die Elemente der empirischen Teleologie.

¹⁴ II, 45, Sch.

¹⁵ III, 57, Sch.

¹⁶ II, Post. ii.

¹⁷ III, 2, Sch.

ism, we say, considers the attachment of one term to its immediate antecedent. Teleology asks how the term or terms are related to the whole; that is to say, how they conspire to effect an end. Parts and whole, means and end are at base statements of the same thing. Thus, parts in a whole, when that whole is organic, cannot be merely quantities added together. Adding the number of organs and the weight of cellular tissues would never produce a total organism. Even when we reckon up the mechanical units of work which the combined parts could do, we are no nearer the goal. To assess the value of the parts, we must find what is common between them and the whole. Spinoza calls this conceiving an object adequately.¹⁸ This can only mean that the action of the part is conditioned on the action of the organic whole. The particular act of an organ is not like the flight of a stone, which being projected by the hand comes to earth again and sustains no further connection with the force that gave the impulse. The organic act is inevitably construed in terms of the structure of the body in which it occurs. When the arm is raised and the fist clenched, and a violent expulsion of physical force made through the sensori-motor system, we construe the movement as perfectly harmonious with the frame and power of the body.¹⁹ The parts have combined into a unity. They possess the common elements binding them to the organism. The same effect may be demonstrated by negative proof. For suppose a certain reaction, *e.g.*, for drink, were greatly heightened and threatened to become the controlling impulse in conduct. Its ascendancy would disturb the due proportion of power as between part and whole, and in damaging the whole would react upon itself to its own disadvantage,—an impossible condition, as we shall see.²⁰

But the connection of part and whole goes even deeper than this. It is possible to conceive of a machine so subtly contrived and put together that its parts would contribute infallibly to the working of the whole. Such parts, successful as they are when together in realizing the purpose of the mechanism, are by themselves colorless bits. They do not body forth the composite

¹⁸ II, 38.

¹⁹ IV, 59, Sch.

²⁰ IV, 60.

meaning of the whole. Organic interaction is different. Every organ not only has properties in common with the organism; it is so constructed that we can find the motives of the body's action in the action of a part.²¹ Thus, the sex-impulse is a mirror of the lust for life. For not only does it serve as the medium for the preservation of species; its exercise duly restrained inures also to the health of the organism, and in the case of man to his ethical uplift.²² The same is true of every other organic reaction. Hence we have an infinitely varied and complex network of impulses, each one participating in the nature of the organism, or as Spinoza puts it, every desire being derived from the primary appetite which affirms the existence of the individual.²³

The relation of means and end may be treated in the same way. An organ acts toward a defined end. Its function is determined by the result to be achieved. Hence, an organic act must be sharply distinguished from one simply mechanical. We must interpret it in terms of its effect, not of its cause. The most rudimentary impulse, *viz.*, for food, stands over against the end subserved, the preservation of the body. Hunger and life are correlated facts; they too go hand in hand. But how can an effect, as yet unaccomplished, mould the character of the cause? How can a future goal determine a present course of action? Have we not committed the fallacy of *hysteron proteron*, the effect before the cause, as the older teleology persistently did?²⁴ Are we not deliberately making volition an instrument for re-arranging the members of the mechanical series? We answer, It is precisely this last step that we have not taken, and cannot take. Every analysis that makes purpose a term in efficient causation is mistaken. The end we mean is not dramatically conceived as an object of quest; it is implied in the nature of the organism. There is a "good" which every impulse realizes, must realize potentially, if not in concrete effect; it is bound up with the processes of the body's life.²⁵ The tendency involved in a given impulse may or may not arrive at its goal. In many

²¹ II, 16.

²² III, 11, Sch.

²³ IV, 68, Sch.; *cf. infra*, pg. 116-7.

²⁴ I, App.

²⁵ III, 9, Sch.

cases the attempt at functioning is abortive. Means are not at hand of sufficient strength or precise quality to stimulate reaction. The "end" is never reached.²⁶ But such a lapse does not destroy the values of the function. They remain, in effect, persistent elements in organic experience. Torn tissue and deteriorated organ do not proclaim the failure of the teleological scheme; they cut still more clearly the issue between it and mechanism. For if a cleft appear in the physical series, we must either revise the data upon which induction was based, or confess that we have thus far missed the secrets of mechanical law.²⁷ On the other hand purpose, in order to support its character, does not need to reach an objective goal.

Purpose, then, evinces a tendency in which the nature of the end is mirrored. Spinoza adopts for his central term a word which signalizes this fact. He calls the individual a *Conatus*, an endeavor, a complex of related impulses which unite in a common end.²⁸ The business of man is to strive with all his powers to realize his appointed end as fully as possible; that is to say, develop to the best of his ability his particular organic impulses. Take the instinct of gregariousness, held in common with many members of lower species. Can we rightly call it a propension of matured humanity? Suspicion, hatred, warfare argue strongly for the opposite conclusion. Hence, satirists have praised the life of pastoral simplicity, or compared men to beasts, to the obvious disparagement of the former. But the facts of experience do not bear out the stricture. Whatever be the origin of the coalescing instinct,—desire for warmth, ties of blood, protection to life and limb, a crude distribution of economic labors,—it is true that human beings cannot live permanently apart without serious injury. Men need the clash and friction, the sympathy and help of their kind, both for individual growth and racial progress.²⁹ The instinct which works its way into the most refined type of government is, at the start, a natural impulse seeking outlet. It is a tendency that must be interpreted by reference to the end in view. Thus, it can never

²⁶ IV, 3.

²⁷ I, 29.

²⁸ III, 7.

²⁹ IV, 35, Sch.

be satisfied by contact with inarticulate animals. They belong to one order of reality, man to another. They may evince a kind of affection and elicit from us a genuine feeling of regard.³⁰ But tendencies move only on horizontal lines. They are gauged by the nature of the organism in which they operate, such organism being coincident with the end proposed. We are therefore brought back to the first principle of organic character, *viz.*, that the part will inevitably reflect the properties of the whole, and vice versa.³¹ But we get an advance in thought from a static to a dynamic point of view. We see now the continuous unfolding of the individual's powers. The conation, the push, the strong aggressive principle of organization in man, animal and plant, sharpens the division between facts which show purpose and facts which express the mechanical ideal. Purpose as a cause is conditioned in result by its own impulsive type.

The world, then, to which man is introduced is two-faced. It looks out upon a scene throbbing with the activity of force. Man is under constraint. He is bound hand and foot to the wheel of law. His every act bespeaks the uniformity of nature, from whose dominion he cannot withdraw. The same world presents another view, not to contradict but to expound the first. Here man is free. He has not put off the garments of serfdom; he has transfigured them with a new meaning. Cells and tissues and physical reactions are not the whole tale of his life. They could be of no value to him, could not constitute him a man, apart from an organizing principle. Chemical formulas do not include it; it is teleological. So conspicuous a fact we may not venture to neglect. Hence, we ask, How does purpose moving in conation insure freedom? Or rather, if purpose be the mark of freedom, what kind of freedom shall we get? It cannot be the kind of freedom which Jacobi invokes. That springs full-orbed from an unpurposed mind, a kind of mental vacuum. Freedom, says Spinoza, is generated from within.³² Man, we know, is not free on the plane of sense-perception. He responds to stimulus, whether he will or no. But on the other hand can the unguided exertion of will yield freedom? Deeper still, can

³⁰ IV, 37, Sch.

³¹ II, 38,

³² II, 29, Sch.

the mind ever give birth to thought without sufficient cause? Thinkers like Fichte have accepted a *formal* freedom,⁸³ which selects its point of departure. But on examination it turns out to be nothing but an ideal, standing at the end of a dialectic indefinitely continued. Real freedom has its direction determined and moves within bounds; like the rushing river, whose definition prescribes a channel beyond whose limits it may not pass; like the triangle, whose interior angles must be equal to two right angles or it ceases to be triangular.⁸⁴ Hence, we are guilty of error if we set "necessary" and "free" over against one another. They are not contrary terms. For if they were, God would know himself freely, but not by necessity,—which would drive the wedge of chance into the divine nature. *Pari passu*, if a man wills to live and love, he acts by unpremeditated thrust,—a sort of spontaneous combustion of soul. The will is a property of the understanding, subject at all times to its laws. Freedom is not unleashed volition; freedom is determined.⁸⁵

But determined by what? What is the thing which requires the interior angles to make a particular equation? What fact of body submits its several qualities to a searching test, with a view to ascertaining their relations?⁸⁶ We answer, The *nature* of the individual determines the field of freedom. An organism can do just that for which it is fitted by the structure and coherence of its parts, and nothing more. Its grade of freedom corresponds to the type of purpose involved. To seek the kind of action belonging to an insect in the body of a horse is palpably absurd.⁸⁷ To interpret the mind of man by the data of animal psychology is to misjudge the office of purpose and hopelessly confuse our ideas of freedom. To attribute to vegetable life the functions which only the highly intellectualized nature of man can exercise shows gross ignorance of the idea of cause.⁸⁸ Yet while this is true, it is not the whole truth. There are certain type-purposes common to all branches of the organic kingdom. Man is heir to these, and so are the oak, the lily, and the

⁸³ Wissenschaftslehre, 1801. 2. Teil, sect. 31.

⁸⁴ Cf. II, 49, Demonstration (=Dem.)

⁸⁵ Epis. 56.

⁸⁶ II, 29, Sch.

⁸⁷ IV, Pref.

⁸⁸ I, 8, Sch. ii.

blade of grass. There are other conations which find a place only in conscious life. Man shares his treasures here with the amoeba, the insect and the dog.³⁹ There are still other purposes which are found in the type man, and these determine the grade of freedom peculiar to reason. But freedom does not wait for its sceptre until the highest grade is reached. It follows the line of purpose. For wherever purpose appears, at that point appears too the "power to begin by itself."⁴⁰ Thus, given the same conditions in either case, the reaction is set up when life is present; when life is extinct there is no reaction. Hence we conclude that freedom is not a predicate of reflective mind alone; but may be applied also to the simplest impulse of organic life;—which means that every emotion in the sphere of human conduct, whether elementary or refined, is ultimately a fit subject of ethical valuation.⁴¹

II

What are the type-purposes which man has in common with all organized beings? To answer this question we must examine the field in which they are at work. Confining ourselves to the grade of consciousness, we discern in each body a certain equipment which it has had no part in producing.⁴² This individual man, brought into existence by natural causes,⁴³ is a complex of appetites, each one being determined to its own activity by a calculable modification of its organ.⁴⁴ Life then is impulsive in the sense not only that it is acted upon, but that it acts. The organism is the seat of power.⁴⁵ But power is not merely a complex of mechanical forces moving as we conceive them to move in, e.g., an electric charge. Power here is coupled with the idea of purpose, an end to be pushed towards. Hence, physical force emerging in bodily reaction is appetite or purpose at work. By a phenomenon which organization alone exhibits, beginning and end are joined. "That for the sake of which we do anything is desire."⁴⁶ If now the power of an organism be

³⁹ III, 28.

⁴⁰ III, 57, Sch.

⁴¹ III, Def. Emot. i.

⁴² Kant, *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, § 65.

⁴³ III, 12.

⁴⁴ IV, App. xxx.

⁴⁵ I, 17, Sch.

⁴⁶ IV, Def. vii.

appetite, it must be subject to variations in intensity, since every new approach to an object changes the attitude of the agent and sets up new reactions. The change in attitude is a readjustment of the relations of motion and rest within the body,⁴⁷ that is to say, in the sensori-motor system. It follows from the satisfaction of a definite appetite.⁴⁸ Thus, in the example already cited, hunger is the impulse, and food the means for gratifying it. When food has entered the body and been assimilated, instantly an agreeable feeling is superinduced, and the body affirms a new state of perfection.⁴⁹ When the emotion is not periodic, but a steady experience, we call it love; and the wish accompanying it is not, as some think, a deliberate aim conceived in the mind, but the contentment incident to the reaching of its end.⁵⁰ When we rise to the consideration of psychic states, we may compare the impressions made by images of things present and things past or future, and weigh their respective pleasures,—being warned, however, that memory is apt to bring contrary images in its train, disturbing and perhaps paining the mind.⁵¹ These are samples of the increasing degree of gratification, parallel to the kind of purpose at work. The greater the scope of gratification, the greater the capacity for freedom.

Impulse defines the nature of life and blocks out its stadium. But what is its content? Is it a single, comprehensive, sovereign impulse, a universal type-purpose, or is it broken into constitutive bits? "Everything," says Spinoza, "insofar as it is in itself endeavors to persevere in its own being."⁵² This is the first and fundamental truth: there is nothing prior to it.⁵³ The mechanical analogue of this truth lies in the fact that two forces, contrary to one another, e.g., fire and water, cannot coexist in the same body;⁵⁴ the teleological, lies in the definition of organism, which includes a tendency at least ideally to reach the end.⁵⁵ The actual lasting-time of the body cannot affect the application of the law. Just so soon as an infant draws its first breath, it has

⁴⁷ II, Lem. ii.

⁴⁸ III, 11, Sch.

⁴⁹ III, 59, Sch.

⁵⁰ III, Def. Emot. vi.

⁵¹ III, 18, Sch. i.

⁵² III, 6.

⁵³ IV, 22, C.

⁵⁴ III, 5.

⁵⁵ III, 7.

affirmed the will to live. If we adopted the point of view of Schopenhauer, we might say that finite things, insofar as they express universal reality, cannot be destroyed.⁵⁶ Will, impulse, purpose are permanently real. Their embodiment in person or thing is subject to decay. Spinoza accepts the eternity of type-character, or essence,—“so careful of the type”; but type-character can no more be defeated or obscured, when residing in the individual, than when thought of as a logical principle. Thus, we cannot and will not lift a finger to compass our own death. The regimen laid upon us by entrance into the sphere of purpose forbids it. When a man takes his life, we argue that constraint was put upon him,—physical force, moral obligation as when Seneca died at the emperor’s command, or mental rupture. He could not by voluntary consent defy and degrade the dominant type-impulse of human nature.⁵⁷ It is here that Spinoza parts company with Schopenhauer. The will to live cannot be disannulled, even in face of its crumbling tenements. For after all the only experience we have with the universal precept is in the body, our own individuality. To give up that for absorption in the world-will is unreal and impractical, and offers no room for the progressive apprehension of freedom. The man who knows himself to be free guides his course by the familiar maxim that discretion is the better part of valor.⁵⁸

That the primary impulse holds the key to the meaning of an organism, is proved by the fact of its untimed duration. “The endeavor wherewith a thing endeavors to persevere in its being, involves not a definite but an indefinite time.”⁵⁹ Life has no date. In this respect it differs from a term in the mechanical series. The swing of a celestial body about its orbit can be calculated to the fraction of a second; but who has ever reckoned with such precision the life-span of a man? “If we knew all the terms in the series, we could predict to the moment the event of death.” The argument from ignorance is worth just what it says, and no more. It is here that the type-purpose yields a clear

⁵⁶ I, 21.

⁵⁷ IV, 20, Sch.

⁵⁸ IV, 69.

⁵⁹ III, 8.

guaranty of freedom. To follow a course that is unpredictable means that at some point, here or there, the agent may exert its "power to begin by itself." The clash with forces outside and foreign to the body's nature furnish the necessary occasions. They produce, if unchecked, a lowering of the bodily temperature.⁶⁰ This is pain. Pain could not exist if every reaction were explained by the needs of organic maintenance. And if pain, the crush of greater forces, did not exist, life would go on undiminished in power and must prove itself infinite.⁶¹ The history of the world is directly against this hypothesis. Not only is every individual surpassed in power by another, organized matter included, but the actual status of any reactive capacity at a given moment is defined not by its intrinsic character, but by the value of the impressions made upon it from without.⁶² Thus, the instinct of defense is affected by the degree of contiguity of the aggressor, on the principle that every emotion whose cause is apprehended as nearby, is stronger than if the cause is conceived as remote.⁶³ Even when the stimulus has only a resemblance to, and is not identical with the sworn enemy, the feeling of resentment is awakened and drives the organism to remove the intruder from the field of influence. In man this same impulse becomes a resolute attempt to repay in kind an injury which has been undeservedly inflicted.⁶⁴

Instances like these throw into sharp relief the individual's struggle to perpetuate itself against great odds, amid many defeats, and facing eventual extermination. They assure us for one thing that alien forces, vigorous as they are, cannot put an end to organic initiative so long as life lasts. Such initiative is ingenious and diversified. The human body, for example, can determine the place of neighboring bodies and arrange them in a variety of ways. Every such arrangement receives a new definition. It is no longer read simply as a collocation of physical elements. The mechanical ideal is undisturbed, but upon it a new term has been superimposed. Yonder house is a composite of materials and forces, obedient to fixed rules. Is that a full

⁶⁰ III, 13, Sch.

⁶¹ IV, 4, Dem.

⁶² IV, 3, 5.

⁶³ IV, 9.

⁶⁴ III, 16, 28, 40, C. ii.

account? Is this structure one that has tumbled into place like a heap of rocks lying at the mountain's base? No; a new factor is added. We call it purpose. Now purpose is always connected with an organic system. A house, a nest, a honeycomb is teleological, because it springs from a system that has the power of adapting means to an end. The house can express the organic character of the builder, and nothing else. Hence, it is insufficient to say we build our house as a place of residence, as though to conform our action to an extra-organic scheme. The builder conceives the "conveniences of household life," and finds germinating in his mind a desire to realize them in a house of his own. Translated into teleological terms, this means that the impulse of self-preservation drives us to mould the resources of nature into shapes agreeable to our end.⁶⁵ In short, the type-end is fixed, although the means vary in proportion to the reactive capacity or degree of freedom attained. The end being defined by the appetite belongs to the system; it cannot be sought without. For if one tried to continue his existence for the sake of something else, he would destroy the organizing principle, leave his body a prey to conflicting stimuli and defeat the very purpose, hypothetically proposed, *viz.*, maintenance of life for the sake of another.⁶⁶

Again, the means adopted must be harmonious to the system whose end they are to subserve. Every system responds to its own kind of stimulus, and to no other. The habits of the ant are different from the habits of the bird; hence, their homes are different, although the instinct governing the making of hill or nest is the same. It follows that any object which fails to set up reaction in a neighboring organism can be of no benefit to it. They do not agree.⁶⁷ Or, if a reaction is set up, but is accompanied by a feeling of depression, the harmony of the system suffers impairment, temporarily at least. Thus, envy and jealousy lessen the power of body, by revealing our own ineptitude in comparison with another's triumphs. The balance can only be redressed by misconstruing the actions of other men, or unduly magnifying our own. In either case, the harmony is

⁶⁵ IV, Pref.

⁶⁶ IV, 25.

⁶⁷ IV, 31.

of a shadowy sort and soon vanishes.⁶⁸ To insure exact adaptation of external objects to organizing purpose, we must fix upon those which contribute to organic growth. This is the one and sure test. The law upon which we proceed reads thus: "In proportion as a given body is more fitted than others for acting and being acted upon in many ways at the same time, in that proportion is its mind more fitted than others' to receive many simultaneous perceptions."⁶⁹ Growth, in other words, is the increasing capacity for receiving and correlating the impressions of the outside world.

Now correlation demands a something to which impressions are necessarily related,—not a substratum in which sensuous qualities inhere, but a teleological principle explaining *why* perceptions fit into the movements of the system. For this reason growth cannot be measured by bulk, shape, movability or chemical reaction. Otherwise a stone would possess the same correlating power as the body of man. Those properties are common to all physical objects and do not offer a basis for comparison.⁷⁰ To correlate perceptions is to add a term not included in the mechanical estimate, *viz.*, the end in view. They must affirm the value of the conation, our power of activity.⁷¹ If the functional discharge be below the threshold of consciousness, its purposive character is just as real as though we had deliberately begun, *e.g.*, to breathe or digest our food.⁷² If the action be purely reflexive its correlative force is equally valid. Thus, we draw away the hand from a hot iron by a sudden exertion of muscular power which allows the mind no time to form a resolution. So intricate and far-reaching does the reflex become in highly organized structures, that we imitate the sudden removal of another's hand, although we ourselves have felt no pain. The eye automatically correlates the motion, perhaps with previous experiences now crystallized into habit, perhaps with the type-impulse of repeating the "emotion" of another.⁷³

Particular capacities for responding to external stimulus vary with different organisms. In one group the capacity is entirely

* III, 55, Sch.

* II, 13, Sch.

" IV, 32, Sch.

" III, 54.

" III, Def. Emot. i.

" III, Def. Emot. xxxiii.

instinctive. The power to act appears to be full-grown at birth. At any rate the instinct, *e.g.*, of a spider to weave his web is not better fitted to realize the end after a dozen exertions than at the start.⁷⁴ On the other hand the human species passes through perceptible changes from infancy to old age. The child is extremely limited in the use of his type-impulses; bright color, motion, unusual sounds, certain tactual sensations like tickling fill his repertory. Time and practice, change of environment, acquired traits transform him into a being responsive to a myriad stimuli which are eventually conceived as making for a common purpose.⁷⁵ Potentially, we may say, in germ, man has his faculties complete at birth. Actually, he takes many years to unfold what ant and spider can exercise at once. Hence the mode of development becomes a matter of surpassing interest.⁷⁶

How does the growth of sense-perception take place? The principle of association is the first instrument at hand. "If the mind," says Spinoza, "has been affected by two emotions at the same time, it will in the future when affected by one be also affected by the other."⁷⁷ A certain type-perception, *e.g.*, of the eye, could never progress in efficiency, could never lead to true knowledge, if it consisted of a succession of unrelated images, set up as reactions to adjacent objects. To satisfy the purpose of the primitive appetite, the lust for life, perceptions of different sense-organs must be exactly and immediately correlated. For example, the hunger of the dog, the rabbit once tasted, the sight of similar prey on the succeeding day, the juxtaposition of the percepts of sight and taste, this is the law of association, which Spinoza lays at the foundation of his psychology.⁷⁸ The progressive application of the law under ever more complex conditions constitutes the growth of an organism, and in the course of ages also the development of a species.⁷⁹

Again, the principle of acquired traits is central to this scheme. "Anything can by accident [*i.e.*, not necessarily included in the

⁷⁴ Cf. III, 57, Sch.

⁷⁵ V, 39, Sch.

⁷⁶ IV, 38.

⁷⁷ III, 14.

⁷⁸ Cf. Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose*.

⁷⁹ III, 14.

impulse] be the cause of pleasure, pain and desire."⁸⁰ Not what a certain function does in its usual discharge but what it effects when a new stimulus acts upon it, is oftentimes the determining fact in organic life. It is thus that the house-dog is trained by successive correlations to follow the chase, and the hunting-dog no longer to react to the scent of the hare.⁸¹ The polarizing of type-reactions into differentiating habits is the sure way of marking the growth of a particular impulse. For one emotion may be fixed so deeply in the organic structure as to overcome all countervailing emotions⁸² and even reproduce itself in the offspring. Then a new line is cloven, the curve of progress is shaped. This successful organism has received and correlated at one time more sense-perceptions than its nearest neighbor.⁸³

Still further: the principle of opposition plays an important part in developing the individual. Pain, depression, fatigue are bound to enter the scheme of life, since power is graded. But pain is contrary to the elemental conation and cannot be indolently harbored. Hence, the effort to remove it must be proportionate to the intensity of suffering.⁸⁴ The more desperate the body's plight the more determined will be the output of strength to rescue it or any part from dissolution. The curative and compensatory appliances of organic nature, *e.g.*, growth of new skin, or the heightening of the sense of touch when the optic nerve has been destroyed, prove decisively how far it has gone from the mere mechanical control of forces.⁸⁵ Such a remarkable psychological correlation as is witnessed in the animal's endeavor to remove the instrument of pain from the presence of its young shows the possible extent of the principle.⁸⁶ Indeed, for all organized creatures there can be no surcease of effort until equilibrium be restored, the body exerting its type-reactions in face of every possible stimulus, the mind correlating every experience into a conscious whole.⁸⁷ We conclude that an organism whose fundamental tendency unfolds in a series of harmonious acts and habits is heir to a freedom none the less defined than that of the reflective mind of man. Whatever acts by purpose is free.

⁸⁰ III, 15.

⁸¹ V, Pref.

⁸² IV, 6.

⁸³ III, 56, Dem.

⁸⁴ III, 11, Sch.

⁸⁵ III, 37, Dem.

⁸⁶ Cf. III, 22.

⁸⁷ IV, 45, Sch.

III

Thus far we have analyzed the principle of self-preservation. We have found that it expresses the nature of an organism, *viz.*, the adaptation of means to end, that it accounts for the changes incident to growth, that it unifies all reactions, no matter from what stimulating causes, and organizes them into a system. We have seen, too, that apparently separate type-impulses, like resentment, association, imitation, are reducible to this. There remains another appetite universally at work, that of reproduction, and this we must for a moment consider.

The supreme test by which organism and mechanical contrivance are distinguished has by some been set up here.⁸⁸ Can this bundle of physical properties perpetuate its kind? If it can, its teleological character is unquestionably demonstrated. Spinoza recognizes the importance of this impulse, and argues that while the specific nature of living bodies is different, while we define a horse in other terms than those applied to man, insect or bird, the procreative instinct is the same, a power which all possess by virtue of their common organic heritage.⁸⁹ The point now to be determined is, whether the impulse is independent of the will-to-be,—a competitor for equal rank in the affections of the race; or whether it must be subsumed under the first as contributing to its realization. Spinoza, we do not hesitate to say, took the second view. The organism, insofar as it is active, can accept no stimulus save what tends to promote its lust for life. If the racial instinct entails disastrous consequences, as it frequently does, it is excluded as a key to the knowledge of its terms. To many this view, when applied to ethics, grafts the grossest kind of impiety and selfishness on the character of man.⁹⁰ Their mistake arises from equating the two impulses as of primary and therefore competitive value. The source of all teleological values, Ethics included, is utility,—what will secure the individual welfare. Thus the functioning of the sex-impulse, as of others, is estimated in terms of pleasure.

⁸⁸ Cf. Kant, *Urtheilskraft*, § 80. ⁸⁹ IV, 19, Sch.

⁹⁰ III, 57, Sch.

Now pleasure is not simply an empirical fact; it is involved in the nature of the impulse. We endeavor to affirm concerning ourselves everything which we conceive to affect us favorably.⁹¹ The racial instinct carries with it an idea of gratification, a heightening of the bodily feeling. Hence, the organism seizes upon the object which promises to effect that end.

At this point the acquisitive faculty lends its aid. The animal not only desires food, but takes steps to procure it. The child not only conceives an interest in what his neighbor has, but makes a bold effort to appropriate it.⁹² The mature man seeks to acquire both the property and so to say the *personality* of his fellowmen. He does his best to make other men live according to his scheme of social order.⁹³ In no field is this instinct so inveterately urgent as in the relations of the sexes. The male desires his mate, not as in the reflective stage of human life for the propagation of the species, but solely for the nourishing of the particular organ, without whose proper satisfaction the equilibrium of the body could not be maintained.⁹⁴ Individual desires incidentally foster the interests of the race; but this is not their primary purpose.

Does this account seem to reverse the natural order? Must we not rather think of a *Welttrieb* moving through the several strata of biologic history, an energy which *this* insect or *that* man did not create and could not refrain from objectifying? We answer, Purpose as defined by the reproductive impulse is present to us only in the individual. There is no Man, there is no Organic System, except as we find their properties at work in an infinite number of single bodies.⁹⁵ To know what an impulse is, we must know what it can do; and the theatre for every world-tendency is an organized body. In the organism, certainly of the truly conscious kind, reproduction is subordinate to self-preservation, the species to the man. Hence, we conclude that the nature of an organism is not changed by emphasizing its secondary instinct; and that it is still free to pursue the type of purpose embodied in its particular form.

⁹¹ III, 25.

⁹² III, 32, Sch.

⁹³ III, 31, Sch.

⁹⁴ IV, App. 20, 27.

⁹⁵ II, 40, Sch. i.

IV

Freedom, we have seen, is confined within the structural limits prescribed at birth. But freedom must have degrees, inasmuch as conscious life is infinitely diversified. To what extent is the ant free, to what extent the horse? How does the freedom of these species fall short of that exercised by man? In general, what rule can we deduce for determining the increase of free acts? Freedom, we reply, is in direct ratio to the mind's capacity for correlating perceptions. It goes without saying that the mature man possesses a freedom which the unweaned child does not know. Yet the human mind, even in its infancy, has within it certain "adequate" as well as "inadequate" ideas. An idea is adequate, when it reflects an exertion entirely appropriate to its body's powers, as, *e.g.*, when it seeks for food or cries out in pain. Though purely reflexive, such acts are free.⁹⁶ We may then infer that the elementary reaction, if it and none other emerges, will be sufficient to classify its bearer as the first term in the teleological series. For that conation it must have, in order to come under the term "organic." From such a beginning the evolution of life proceeds by the multiplying and crossing of reactions till man is reached. We must not expect to find in Spinoza a scientific order such as modern biology has conceived. He recognized its general divisions, and distinguished the psychical factor as the same in each.⁹⁷ The genetic relations of the several groups, their origin in a common ancestor, especially the phenomenon of arrested development, were matters beyond the ken of his times. But whatever his deficiency in detail, he seized the cardinal principle of change, which is not deviation in shape or structural equipment, but a new way of reacting to a given stimulus. In brief, he writes a psychology, not a treatise on physiology. He does not analyze the complex forms of organic evolution; he asks how such evolution takes place in view of the end to be gained. Hence, when a new type-reaction appears, we know that the body has accommodated itself in some new way to its environment. To that extent the

⁹⁶ III, 1.⁹⁷ III, 57, Sch.

freedom increases, and by this means the series is to unfold step by step until a new and untried factor comes above the surface in the reflective mind of man.⁹⁸

Every new type of response to environment carries with it, we may believe, a feeling of increased power. When the reaction is of such a character as to modify radically the structural life of the organism, an entirely new species is broken in. It is then that gratification attending functional discharge is most keenly felt. "When the mind contemplates itself and its own power of activity it experiences pleasure; and the pleasure is greater in proportion to the distinctness by which it conceives itself and its power."⁹⁹ It follows that type-reactions in a complex structure provoke a finer kind of gratification than those, say, of the purely vegetative organs.

To project human feelings into the experience of the lower forms may be precarious; yet it is extremely suggestive. If we select two widely separate impulses, one common to man and Infusorian, the other common to man and mammal, *e.g.*, dog, compare them in our own body, and project that experience into the parallel organisms, we might get a basis for judging the relative feelings. The satisfaction of hunger and the pleasure of associating images in mind, both effects of appetite, are cases in point.¹⁰⁰ The contrast is even more glaring when we take a single impulse and run out its forms on the different levels of consciousness. Thus, the endeavor to convey an "idea" to a neighbor, to "make ourselves understood," varies as to intensity of gratification with the order of mind affected. The dog barks, the ape gesticulates, man speaks. For man there is a real pleasure in the functioning of the vocal organs. He gives it the best title in his lexicon, *viz.*, freedom, not knowing that he is acting out a type-purpose of his kind. But his very self-complacence goes to show how much more reactive value attaches to articulate speech than to shrug of shoulder or movement of hand.¹⁰¹ These facts are summed up by Spinoza in a general rule: "The emotion of a given individual differs from that of

⁹⁸ Cf. V. Pref.

⁹⁹ III, 53.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. III, 2, Sch.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

another only insofar as the nature of one differs from the nature of the other."¹⁰² The pitch of progress and the degree of freedom are determined by the number and complexity of the mechanisms set up in the cortical centres. But these in higher orders of life are so delicately framed and intricately interlaced as to make analysis impossible. We can only take the typical reactions, and judge the rest by them.¹⁰³

We have spoken of correlating sense-perceptions, co-ordinating the elements of experience; just what does this mean? What is the principle by which the mind gives continuity to its images? We call it consciousness, the regarding of several things at once and the discriminating of their stimulating values.¹⁰⁴ To be conscious is not to add a new force to the assemblage of mechanisms, guiding them to their proper coalescence. It is to express their relations by a new term, hitherto called purpose, now called conscious purpose. With it as correlating principle, bodily actions operate together in a system; the organism acts in its own right. We may define consciousness as the *idea* of the mind, its distinctive essence, conceived as mode of thought, and not involving physical motion.¹⁰⁵ It tells us what the sensations mean as they are transmitted by organs of the body. It assesses the value of every reaction and ultimately of every stimulus. It leads us to reject *this* stimulus as repugnant to organic growth and accept *that* as in line with our needs. The finer the structural apparatus, the more delicate will be its distinctions. The more varied the environment, the more diversified will be the sense-perceptions, and hence the more expert the work of consciousness in correlating them into a system. This integrating tendency in the march of evolution renders the organism less and less dependent on external stimuli, more and more competent to live its own life.¹⁰⁶ But since body always requires the support of body, conscious independence can never be reached. The limit of the series can only be an Ideal.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, the emerging of consciousness on the level of human intellect introduces a new phase of correlation and makes possible a new

¹⁰² III, 57.

¹⁰³ III, 59, Sch.

¹⁰⁴ II, 29, Sch.

¹⁰⁵ II, 21, Sch.

¹⁰⁶ II, 13, Sch.

¹⁰⁷ IV, 18, Sch.

degree of freedom. It remains for us to consider what additional type-purposes enter into the definition of man.

V

The first of these is the forming of judgment, the setting of the concrete data of experience into relations. Every perceptual act is in a certain sense a judgment. It includes something more than an image framed "at the back of the eye or in the midst of the brain." Reality is asserted or denied. Or, to put it another way, perception fixes the object in relations of time and space. The mind has a tendency to effect such co-ordination; it cannot be mind if deprived of that principle.¹⁰⁸ Nor can mind exist without the tendency to revive perceptual images on the reappearance of appropriate stimulus. We cannot act in the most casual way, *e.g.*, speak a word, without remembering that we have done so. Bodily modifications guarantee that. Now, memory is a renewal of previous sensory judgments.¹⁰⁹ Such judgments, however, being reflexive, deal with objects immediately before the mind,—objects to which the mind inevitably reacts, whether approved by antecedent experience or not. Intellectual judgments state a new term, discharge a new function, *viz.*, that of understanding. They make a synthesis of the sensuous manifold. The mind begins to think, and that is its highest office.¹¹⁰ Intelligence as a type-purpose comes into clear light when we relate it to the conational efforts of man. For it is characteristic of Spinoza's philosophy that he does not stop with determining logical categories as such, but goes on to affirm their empirical values. Now the end of action is not defined in terms of impulse, but is dramatically set down as an idea to be aimed at. The intellect exercises a strict vigilance over the impulse life of men. It trains and directs the particular appetites and restrains them from excess; not by playing one impulse off against another,—a process which must go on indefinitely,—but by representing an ideal purpose, a reflective choice. Thus the instinct of imitation, vigorous as we have seen in all organized bodies, may be checked by exposing the

¹⁰⁸ II. 48, Sch.

¹⁰⁹ III. 2, Sch.

¹¹⁰ IV. 28, Dem.

results of indiscriminately repeating the habits of another;—an antithesis between ends common to man and beast and the intellectual principle unique in man.¹¹¹ It is the precise difference between a sensuous judgment: the hand strikes,—and the judgment of the understanding: the hand strikes to hurt; the one an act expressing the body's nature, the other an act enforcing an ideal end.¹¹²

It is in the functioning of intellect that ethical implications appear. Physical appetites involve no difference in quality. They are always good. Whatever interferes with their free and normal activity is bad. Since, however, we may experience serious damage by reacting to every passing stimulus, it is of great importance to men to have a "type-character" before the mind, a definite mould into which tendencies may be cast. The framing of a Type is proof-positive of man's advance beyond the pale of purely perceptual judgment. He can now plan, and every plan carries him away from the sphere of automatic reaction.¹¹³ The end *qua* end may be native to him and his unspeaking neighbor. For instance, both are driven by self-preservative instinct to build dwellings and lay up in store for future needs. But intellect re-arranges surrounding material in a planful manner, which insect and rodent cannot imitate. It does not keep man's body from reacting differently to changed environment; it selects from stimulating forces those, *e.g.*, which when *naturally* acting cause death, when *ideally* composed inure to his highest advantage. We must be careful not to think of this synthetic principle as a new mechanical force moving amongst the nerve-tracts of the brain. It is not that; it is rather a new reading of bodily modifications which have now reached an unprecedented grade of executive refinement.¹¹⁴ But with such refinement emerges the capacity for affirming, This way is better than that. That is to say, teleological values take their place in the reflective life of man.

If now the environment be not hard, unfriendly matter, which only extremely high skill can conquer, but the flesh and blood

¹¹¹ IV, App. 30, 13.

¹¹² IV, 59, Sch.

¹¹³ IV, Pref.

¹¹⁴ IV, App. 7.

of our own kind, intellect is alert to create values of a different sort. It devises an instrument for communication, language, and into it pours the wealth of conceptual judgment.¹¹⁵ Man becomes to man his most useful accessory. He can understand thought, and return in kind. Henceforward, intercourse is not on the basis of impulsive gesture, but of the progressive interchange of ideas. Love or mutual appetite is no longer a static force; it passes into friendship, which is not content with gleam of eye or clasp of hand, or other automatic sign. It demands freedom of soul, one mind entering another. Interests now become common; men can desire and have the same thing, which however is not tangible, but the product of an idea,—justice, equity and harmony. And this is possible just because the mind is so constituted that it can conceive a term which does not answer to the empirical returns of sense.¹¹⁶

But mind must not only correlate perceptual impressions; it must define the laws by which they can be brought into synthesis. It must, in other words, make an examination of itself; or as Spinoza puts it, it must separate emotions from the thought of an external cause and connect them with true, *i.e.*, universally valid, ideas.¹¹⁷ Thus, the conceptualizing tendency has two general forms: resemblance and continuity. Several figures pass before us and leave their impressions on the mind. By the law of intellect we are bound to note the points of similarity. Different observers are affected by different stimuli,—height, walking on two feet, explosive sounds called laughter, exchange of communications indicating reason. But whatever be the type-reaction induced, the percept gets permanent value solely from the fact that the mind puts two or more instances together and says, They are like. Every such judgment is an application of the constitutive principle of mind.¹¹⁸ The second form may be illustrated in this way. The child sees a succession of figures for the first time: Peter in the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening. The next day, at the rising of the sun, he will think of Peter, Paul and Simon in order as parts of the

¹¹⁵ Cf. *De Intel. Emend.* pg. 11.

¹¹⁶ *IV*, App. 9, etc.

¹¹⁷ *V*, 4, Sch.

¹¹⁸ *II*, 40, Sch.

day's projected experience. Should one, however, say Simon, fail to appear, and James take his place, the third day will show a modified program, with Simon and James alternately occupying the third point in the series. Perceptual association has expanded into the principle of continuity, which the mind forces upon the observer. Now because the mind can take two percepts and standing apart from their objects say within itself: "These are alike, these follow one another," eventually it sees itself as the judge of concepts, the subject over against object; it gets the idea of the consciousness or identity of self. Then the supreme purpose of mind, *viz.*, self-realization, comes into view, and man's proper freedom is assured.¹¹⁹

How can he reach the goal?

¹¹⁹ IV, App. 4.

CHAPTER III

THE QUEST OF CHARACTER

We have thus far examined the concept of purpose as embodying the freedom which we may claim for man in a world of mechanical law. Man is not free to break the bonds of physical force. They gird him as closely as they do the motions of a planet. To act at all he must act within the sphere of body, which obeys inevitably the rules of exact determination. Nevertheless, he is not like a bar of steel or flying meteor, subject only to the interpretation of mechanism. He is organic. His bodily parts combine into a unity. He is so constituted that his actions tend to a fixed end or result. In this respect he is on equal footing with all organized bodies, occupying the field of mechanism, but displaying certain properties which mechanism does not explain. Their common mark is purpose. Purpose in its typical form belongs to every creature which reacts to its environment; more restrictedly to those which possess the element of consciousness, or, as we should say, are equipped with a nervous system. Hence, the human species cannot assert here any primordial rights. The most general purpose, defined by Spinoza as the thing's essence, is its endeavor to persist in its own being. Annexed to this, and in the view of some of equal value, is the desire for the perpetuation of the species. Still other purposes developing from the first distinguish the steps of organic order, and define the degree of freedom. The highest of all type-purposes, *viz.*, the powers of intellect, are found in man and guaranty to him the greatest range of freedom.

The acts of man follow strictly from the appetites of body and the habits of mind. They constitute a class, being repeated by a multitude of individuals of the same nature. Thus, when the agent discharges any functional energy, *e.g.*, when he reaches his hand in quest of food, when he shrinks from some object which threatens to limit or destroy his ability to survive, when

he frames a concept and articulates it in speech, he is by that act obeying the mandate of his kind. But obedience to universal impulse, so far from branding him as a slave, really forms the first element in his freedom. Freedom consists at root in fulfilling the purpose of our nature. It is beside the point to complain that the channels of activity are charted for us; that the lines of organic life are inexorably drawn. On the higher ranges of human experience we do not hesitate to say that the man is not free who degrades his physical desires to the uses of an animal existence. Conversely, it must appear that he who carries out the purpose embodied in the common course of nature, who performs such actions as are of primary importance in life and reflect his chiefest desire, will *eo ipso* exercise freedom, though it be as yet only of a generic kind.

I

But purpose must be studied not alone as the expression of a type. We must seek out its values in the careers of individuals. Men do not conduct their business, perform their social duties, ponder on the deep things of philosophy, as though they were satisfying the impulses of the race. Race consciousness is the end, not the beginning of reflective thought. We act in the first instance always as individual persons. It is essential to understand what we mean by the term.

Theoretically conceived, the individual is an abstracted part of the whole. It cannot exist as separate substance, as one of the factors into which matter is divided. The drop of water may appear to be distinct from other drops, from the flow of the river, the depth of ocean, or the unmeasured expanse of the atmosphere. In reality it is extended substance, which the mind regards as individualized for its own critical purposes.¹ In the same way an organism sustains a partitive relation to the whole of nature. It exists as body, but in a modal, not real sense. It must be examined in the same way that we examine the lines, planes and solids of geometry, *viz.*, as segments of extended

¹ I, 15, Sch.

space.² Since we cannot comprehend infinite substance by itself, we must discover its meaning through the relations in which individuals stand to one another and the whole.

Let us observe then that man is an individual in the world of extension, and that as such he is subject to reactive changes which are determined first by the nature of impinging bodies, and secondly by his own nature.³ To fix upon an individual purpose we must meet both these conditions. This man, whom we now look upon, has his own environment and cannot disentangle his body from the network of its influence. Not a single sensory current passes through his system, of which he is the unconditioned cause.⁴ To be individuated by the coordinates of time and place, far from setting him apart, serves rather to cement more firmly his position in the common order of nature. Thus, as we shall see, percepts given by nearby objects are indefinitely more vivid than when the cause of excitation is somewhat removed. Impressions derived from contingent bodies, *i.e.*, bodies dependent for action on secondary causes, are fainter than those instilled by necessary things.⁵ If a man could withdraw himself from the toils of mechanism he might live his life without fear of decay or extinction. But this could only be done by giving him infinite power, or forcing nature to subserve his elemental impulse continually,—both of which are impossible.⁶ So long as a man remains an individual in a universe of individuals he cannot escape the fate incident to his place. That he must maintain his place here, is deduced by Spinoza from the fact that nature as a whole cannot be conceived without her constitutive parts.⁷

The purpose of the man, whom we single out for study, will be in part determined by the milieu in which he finds himself. But stock, stone and man come impartially under this rule. Hence, there is a second condition. The body affected undergoes just such changes, and no others, as are compatible with its nature. Here again, the rule is universally valid. Stock, stone and man evince structural changes corresponding to the

² III, Pref.

³ II, 16.

⁴ IV, 4.

⁵ IV, 9, 11.

⁶ IV, 4.

⁷ IV, 2.

particular manner in which the principle of molecular attraction operates in each. Only, a serious difference now appears. In the first condition, the type of environing influence did not vary; at least we could posit its substantial sameness. In the second condition, we are forced at once to recognize two divergent forms, one being acted upon, the other reacting. The nature of man is different from the nature of a stone, and cannot be derived from it.⁸ The difference lies not in the kind of chemical constituents, but in the former's tendency to adapt all influences to the maintenance of his own life. In the sphere of organism the individual does not wait, so to say, for the external impact to be made; he invites it; he goes out to meet it. The absorptive power of the organism makes its attitude toward inanimate matter entirely unique. But once again we meet divergences, not in kind but in degree. How far can the organism *absorb* its environment? Or, what sort of stimulus awakens reaction in each case? Evidence shows that a common impulse may prevail, but different objects set up response in different organisms. Thus, horse and man are distinguished equally by the desire of procreation; but the desire partakes always of the specific nature of the organism.⁹ Evidence shows, too, that within the species or family group divergent traits appear. Each individual, notably among species of more complex form, is just a little different from its neighbor of the same order. We do not mean that the primary appetite has changed. The horse remains a horse, and the dog a dog.¹⁰ But one particular element in its organic equipment has been developed; for example, the dog has been trained to follow the chase; or he belongs to a breed trained through several generations to this particular reaction. We cannot hold that it is mere environment that makes his scent keen and hearing acute; the house-dog may be subject to the same stimuli, but is certainly at first dull of response.¹¹ There is an *essence* in each, a habit or mode of reaction, which differentiates him from every other of the same organic species. This is not the same as the principle of succession,—one in a

⁸ I, 8, Sch. i.

⁹ III, 57, Sch.

¹⁰ IV, Pref.

¹¹ V, Pref.

series of units. Individuality is more than bodily separateness; it is the nucleus of character.

The fact we have just noted is attested by the nature of the gratification enjoyed. It is wellnigh impossible, as we have shown,¹² to represent to ourselves the feelings of inarticulate organisms. We can only say that they differ in intensity according to the degree of reticulation of the nervous system. Hence, we hesitate to affix the term "character" to the dog. For, so far as we can determine, he has no power of sitting in judgment on his own reactions; he has no tendency to compare their several values, as denoted by the accruing pleasure.¹³ With man the case stands otherwise. Differentiation is the key to experience. The lofty look of the philosopher and the besotted leer of the drunkard express antipodal natures, whose diversity even the clogged brain of the latter cannot fail to understand. A character has developed. On what basis? Not alone by virtue of the presence of varying stimuli. The reason goes deeper. The individuals themselves are not agreed in their original tendencies. The one finds himself emphasizing certain impulses which depend on a foreign source for support; the other seeks to eliminate perceptual images, and bathe himself in the glow of ideas. Being men, they occupy a coign of vantage; they can study their own experience and detect the "special" points in which they differ from others. The pleasure of our human species consists at times in realizing that in this quality or that we excel some less favored companion; and conversely, we sink into depression when we find another exulting in perfections which are denied us.¹⁴ Again, the process of characterization may be examined from the standpoint of some particular emotion. Thus, love as a permanent impulse assumes several forms, the affection of husband and wife, the care of children, the broad communal interests of society. Each one of these is subject to special treatment in the lives of different agents. The types of character are infinitely diversified, the brutal father, the kind father, the indulgent father, each type being necessarily corre-

¹² *Supra*, pg. 42.

¹³ III, 57, Sch.

¹⁴ III, 55, Sch.

lated to the nature of the individual under review.¹⁵ We conclude that men as individuals differ, not because they are identified by different spacial coordinates, but because they behave in different ways towards surrounding forces.¹⁶

II

The way is now cleared for inquiring how a man develops the form of behavior which we have settled to call his character. We note that judgments of mind are affirmed in the same manner as perceptions of sense. They are purposeful acts, definite exertions of power. Every time we analyze a concept, try out a mathematical formula, criticize the technique of a picture,—highly speculative modes of thought,—we discharge the function of mind. An idea is not an inanimate symbol devised by logic to interpret the meaning of conduct; it throbs with the red blood of living men. It is an act of will, recording a real change in the experience of the agent.¹⁷ But as an intellectual term it does not stand alone. It is the final member of a series, and cannot be explained apart from the preliminary steps. Every decision depends on an adequate cause.¹⁸ Hence, Jacobi's definition of a free agent as one who can initiate a course of conduct directly opposed to, or not included in the content of proposed motives, is baseless. Every act is precisely fortified with actuating reasons; for, as Leibnitz pointed out,¹⁹ when we reject competing incentives, we do not relieve the mind of constraint, but rather introduce a new force, *vis.*, the caprice of judgment.

But what shall we say of a situation where we cannot decide—where impulses are evenly balanced, and reflection coming to our aid cannot by closest computation determine which side ought to prevail? Here we are volitionally at a standstill, like Buridan's ass, and must nullify our power to act, that is, to exist,—unless we strike off at a tangent and act without sufficient cause. The picture, however, is not true to life. There is no calculus in practical conduct, with debit and credit exactly

¹⁵ Cf. III, 56, Sch.

¹⁷ II, 43, Sch.

¹⁶ II, 13 Sch.

¹⁸ II, 48.

¹⁹ *Nouveaux Essais*, Bk. II, Ch. 21, Sects. 25, 39.

even. Action proceeds on regular lines by denotable stages to a particular end. It is determined at first by purposes of the type; it reaches at length the level of reflection, where a man marks out his path, recognizes his character, increases his degree of freedom, and presses steadily towards a goal.²⁰

It will appear, then, that the system which reflective consciousness develops is defined by purposive action. Freedom cannot be a matter of ideas, conceived as a body of categorized facts. The inadequacy of the view which calls a man free because he has made out a list of universal laws, is well illustrated in Fischer's conclusion that Spinoza has analyzed the laws of human life, but given no ethical imperative. There is no imperative when a man is invited to see the good, but not apply it. True knowledge as such is of no value in checking emotion; it must enter the current of daily life as an impulse to action. Mere theoretical differences of good and evil, presented as ideals to the mind, cannot influence the choice or direction of an emotion in the slightest degree.²¹ Emotion can only be controlled by emotion.²² In short, truth cannot fashion conduct until a man strives to adapt his course to the harmonious activities of nature. To do this he need not be a scientific observer or a sage versed in the secrets of the ages. He who deliberately follows the purpose of his mind will exercise his individual freedom untrammelled. Still, he must not be surprised to find his free flight interrupted, even stopped altogether by the tumultuous rush of commonplace reactions.²³ The pleasing fancy that critical analysis of this or that appetite will engender an invincible resolution, is entirely misleading. For such resolution is itself a discharge of purposeful energy, and must take its place along with similar organic tendencies. If these be stimulated in a definite direction, if, *e.g.*, the mind be excited to hope for eventual triumph in a particular crusade because of momentary successes, shall the cool warning of Experience that the elements conducive to the end in view are not present, serve to abate one jot or tittle the

²⁰ II, 49, Sch.

²¹ IV, 14.

²² IV, 7.

²³ IV, 15.

ardor which has seized upon body and soul?²⁴ But if reason can retain its place amid the crush of sensory impressions, we may take it to be a sure gauge of character. May we not in our mature practice verify the crucial formula: "Every emotion aroused by the senses can also be determined by the reflective mind?"²⁵ If that be true, then it is likewise true that to live and to live rightly are one and same thing. Virtue is the exact fulfilment of purpose; virtue is behavior.²⁶

But how are we to discover the teleological value of an act? The answer is, By its effect on behavior. The rule is inflexible, the same for all species. How much did the act increase or diminish the power of the organism? Did it produce pleasure or pain? Since man's unique purpose is intellectual, we ask: What was the state of mind after this perception or that argument? Was his body of knowledge enlarged? Was analytical insight quickened? Is he better able to shape his conduct by the laws of universal necessity? The residual feeling denotes the value of the reaction.²⁷ Hence, we seek the state of mind known as Self-approval, where all emotional threads are woven into a consistent whole after the order of nature; where a man's character by its very coherence defines the value of each impending reaction.²⁸ Thoughts bred by hatred, envy, pride are excluded, because they invariably defeat the work of the organizing principle. On the other hand, sentiments of veracity and benevolence stimulate the mind and mark out the way to orderly conduct. We feel the steady march in the construction of character, all our habits conspiring to one end.²⁹

Again, if pleasure be the test of good, pain must be the ground for our rejection of an injurious stimulus. Very careful discrimination is needed at this point. Certain emotional traits have crept into the company of moral excellences which have no right there. Thus, humility is held by some to be a virtue, but is in reality the equivalent of pain. It springs from a man's contemplation of his own weakness, and is accompanied by a loss of power. For how shall we obtain intellectual vigor by

²⁴ IV, 47.

²⁵ IV, 59.

²⁶ IV, 21, 24.

²⁷ IV, 26.

²⁸ IV, 52.

²⁹ IV, 73, Sch.

studying what depresses our mind below its par? We need to grasp ideas which surpass our own in sweep and complexity. In that way only can we widen our scope of action.³⁰ We must deal with anticipations of evil in the same heroic manner. Fear is concern in face of something which we cannot fully understand.³¹ It may automatically connect itself with a pleasurable image which excludes the existence of the pain-giving object; so that when it occurs as revived idea or new sensory experience the other idea is necessarily present. Thus, men delight to rehearse the dangers of the past, from which they have made good their escape, pleasure exceeding pain in the final account.³² But fear will continue to obtrude its depressing touch until we have extinguished its force through a knowledge of its cause, or faced the actual dangers frankly and conquered them. It is easy to see how men differ from one another in their attitude towards objects, or events which have excited their apprehension.³³ In no case is the test so exacting as in the anticipation of death. Violent efforts are made, every available resource subsidized to ward off the end. Tastes and habits of a lifetime are shattered. In their extremity men accept food and medicine, which their soul loathes. But the protest is vain. Man must die. How shall he meet the final hour? The wise man knows the meaning of death and its certainty. His duty is not to meditate on its inevitable approach, but on the true profits of a free and harmonious life.³⁴ Pain then passes into pleasure, and the equilibrium of character is maintained.

We conclude that the state of mind succeeding reaction registers both its intensity and the power of the stimulating object.

III

The process which we have called *characterization*, and may define as the working of type-purposes into an individual system, pursues its end by the adoption of means. The agent and the environment conspire to determine what the means shall be. These two are so commingled in the drive of action as to be

³⁰ IV, 50, Dem.

³¹ III, 47, Sch.

³² III, Def. Emot. xiii.

³³ IV, 69, Sch.

³⁴ IV, 63, 67.

virtually inseparable, except by way of analysis. The rule is simple; nothing which is different in its properties can in any way affect us for good or harm; and conversely, whatever agrees with our nature is useful to us, that is, sets up reaction in our organism.⁸⁵ For example, inorganic matter cannot nourish the human body, since it has no element that corresponds with the organizing principle of the digestive system. But organized substances are of great value to us,—animals included, the fact that they are lower than we in the scale of consciousness justifying us in using them to suit our needs.⁸⁶ So manifold are the appetites of the body, and so diverse their modes of satisfaction, that we must recruit its vigor and equip the mind for its work by tapping every source within reach. "It is the part of a wise man to refresh himself with agreeable food and drink, as well as with perfumes, the beauty of plants, dress, music, the exercise of sports, theatrical spectacles,—in short anything that he can use without damage to another." Every such stimulus harmoniously assimilated lifts the type of character, and distinguishes its owner from every other unit in the social organism. Of course, opinion is not unanimous as to what constitutes a true stimulus. Superstition often accounts that to be good which administers pain, and rules out merriment and laughter as subversive of orderly conduct. But why should we not drive away melancholy as well as hunger? Only an envious neighbor or malevolent divinity could take pleasure in our discomfort or reckon tears and sobs and inward dread as essential parts of an ethical calculus.⁸⁷

In the main, however, men are agreed as to the basis of gratification, and by reason of that agreement enter paradoxically the disharmonies of social life. Desire must be judged not only by its typical form, but by its ability to reach the goal in individual cases. Thus, if two men covet the same thing, they are at one in the primary impulse. But the issue of action is different. Peter has the image of the desired object as in his possession, Paul conceives it as lost. Pleasure and pain, mental states subsequent to reaction, determine the value of experience.

⁸⁵ IV, 29, 31.

⁸⁶ III, 37, Sch. i.

⁸⁷ IV, 45, Sch.

Hence, pain and pleasure attest the particular grade of characterization realized at the moment.³⁸ So much for an individual object. Suppose now we are called upon to reckon the worth of a symbol, like money, the means of civilized intercourse. Three general reactions are possible. First, money may be regarded as the *sine qua non* of personal gratification,—in the vulgar mind, the source of success, luxury in dress and food, splendor of position, power over one's fellowmen. These things they desire; hence, men react to the money-stimulus. Again, money as a material object may engross the attention. Not a piece of it is relinquished even for bodily wants without a shoot of pain. The acquisitive instinct has almost annulled the lust of life. Lastly, the sage knowing the true uses of wealth remains content with a little, and escapes the contentions of the multitude in an unbroken peace of mind.³⁹ The first character may pass into the second, the second rarely into the first; but almost never either of them into the renunciation of the third.

It is universally agreed that from the standpoint of his unique purpose nothing is so useful to man as man. The psychological grounds we have already considered. Let us now observe in what way utility may be secured. It cannot come from passive acceptance of sensuous impressions. They are "uncharacterized" emotions, common to man and beast. If we are looking only for what will gratify the five senses of body we cannot find a single object altogether useful to all men. Whenever we affirm our natural right to life and the means for its maintenance, we immediately tread upon another's territory. Interests conflict; dissensions, war and death follow. The primary purpose is thwarted.⁴⁰ There is, however, a good common to all men. It has no mechanical equivalent; it is not individuated by time and place. It is man's nature construed from the angle of his unique purpose. It is the "other aspect" of his behavior. Man alone possesses this good, inasmuch as man alone can correlate his conduct with the universal activity of nature. And man is bound to introduce it into the life of his neighbor; his own security depends upon mutual enjoyment. Precisely what

³⁸ IV, 33; 34, Sch.

³⁹ IV, App. 28, 29.

⁴⁰ IV, 37, Sch. ii.

is this good, which may become the property of all without engendering intrigue or competition? It is difficult to define it in any terms short of a general formula, as, for example, "knowledge of God."⁴¹ Nevertheless, from time immemorial men have sought to realize it in the organic constitution of the State. Whatever guarantees harmony in the social structure is undeniably good. Love of justice, respect for law, due regard for the interests of all citizens are basic principles both of civil government and individual liberty. Indeed, it may be taken as an axiom that freedom gained within the bounds of society is far superior to that presupposed in the life of solitude. Why? Because character requires discipline, such as the heedless youth chafes under, and indignantly throws off by quitting his father's house, only to learn in the hardships of war and the penalties of camp how through tribulation we must enter into tranquillity of mind.⁴²

The tentative realization of the good has given opportunity for the diversification of character. Character does not settle down to the dead level of monotony. Being still in the field of physical effort, it cannot escape the peculiarities of reaction incident to the constant changes of life. Hence, differences in character will depend on a man's success in systematizing his crowding sense-perceptions after the pattern of nature's harmony.⁴³ He will at the same time make sure of his own degree of freedom. Freedom increases with the steady growth of character, that is to say, with every successful affirmation of his unique purpose. He has abandoned the uncritical notion that we are abridged in function because we cannot be as tall as trees, as aggressive as a lion, or as distinguished in some particular trait as our neighbor.⁴⁴ To be free, we must steadily move within the limits of our purpose, becoming every moment more sure of our course, and hence more independent in its construction. Therefore, whenever a purpose conceived by the imagination is found false and inadequate in the light of universal experience we shall prove our liberty by expelling it. And when-

⁴¹ IV, 36, Dem.

⁴² IV, 40, 73, App. 14.

⁴³ IV, 37.

⁴⁴ III, 55, Sch.

ever an event contradicts the postulates of our private fancy we shall stay our mind on the sure working-out of that fundamental order which we as parts thereof implicitly follow.⁴⁵ To make sure of advancing steadily the degree of ethical freedom, we should adopt certain general rules, and committing them to memory apply them with confidence when sudden passion overtakes the soul. We conclude that character and freedom go hand in hand in the unfolding of individual purpose.⁴⁶

But we must not suppose that conduct is entitled to the name *character* only when directed to a so-called virtuous end. The fact that the characterizing process moves progressively forward, no matter how vaguely conscious we may be of its tendency, proves that the end is not voluntarily imposed by us, but belongs to the organic system. The end *qua* end is neither vicious nor virtuous; it is an element in the teleological series. Ethical judgments are devised by social experience, and are valuable as guides to action, not as interpreters of our nature. Thus, the thief has as much right as the honest man to claim a "good" for his character,—though we admit he cannot reach the unruffled repose of mind which springs alone from complete acquiescence in natural law.⁴⁷ His career is built within a consistent whole. His guiding principle is that all things are his, that he need not respect the sanctity of possession with which civil law has hedged the goods of his neighbor. If he conclude that committing crime is a sure way to obtain the better life, he would be recreant to his obligation as a being of unique purpose did he not follow that leading, even though it brought him to the gallows,—that too representing as clear a fulfilment of human desire as sitting by his own table.

Yet we must remember that no individual purpose, however commanding, can overcome the salient impulses common to all life. We cannot in our right mind crush the will to live. Hence, the criminal, sunk never so low in vice, always aims to work out the accepted program without endangering his organic continuity. He is obviously a prey to passion; for he develops his career solely through the avenues of sense, and with a view to

⁴⁵ IV, App. 32.

⁴⁶ V, 10, Sch.

⁴⁷ Epis. 23.

sensuous ends.⁴⁸ Still, behavior is not without a plan. The genius of intellect, his own by inherited equipment, has taught him how to use the forces about him for a malevolent purpose. He does not differ from the good man in mental power, but in temperament, in moral atmosphere, charged oftentimes with the venom of a definite objective. His character is a coherence of badness, because every reaction of body and every "idea" of mind answer to the same general tendency. Thus, in the man we are observing, love and hate, opposite dispositions, could not coexist. Hate has secured the ascendancy according to the well-known axiom that two contrary emotions in the same subject must undergo change, one or both, until they are at length entirely congruous.⁴⁹ That intuitive vision which makes us forget the world for love of truth can find no room here. The facts are plain; why they are *so*, and not *otherwise*, is a question which it is not competent for us to discuss. Out of the infinite number of moulds at nature's command we could never be sure which one was to be used,—until we saw the product. But the facts assure us that the systematizing of conduct goes on apace, on lower levels, as well as on the summits of wisdom, and that even in the conception of crime freedom has not disowned her sovereign claims. A man is as free to do evil as to do good.⁵⁰

But what shall we say of cases that seem to admit of exception? If a man suddenly drops his antipathy towards another, and begins to view him with affection; if a timid nature, at times almost craven in temper, is in a great emergency endowed with conquering courage; if a pious man yields his devotion for an instant under the whip of human cowardice;—must we conclude that the fabric of behavior has changed, and that an entirely new set of reactions has superseded the old? Again, if we find a manifest vacillation in the judgments of the agent under observation, his ethical actions being defined according to the momentary impressions of the senses,—shall we hold that the mind is a tissue of conflicting ideas, with no harmonizing principle?⁵¹ The conclusions already established point in another

⁴⁸ IV, 32.

⁴⁹ V, Ax. i.

⁵⁰ Epis. 23.

⁵¹ III, 51, Sch.

direction. The forces of body being integrated by a fundamental impulse, the system of ideas corresponding thereto cannot fail to have a common centre, which is expressed by Spinoza in the words: "The mind endeavors to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity."⁵² Hence, while in any particular character great divergence of motives may be found, still every act will have its place in the consistent scheme of behavior. Our embarrassment results from the necessarily incomplete view of the subjective scheme. If the intricate processes of thought were brought fully to light, we should not be constrained to charge our subject with incompatibility. Thus, Judas does not suddenly change his shape under stress of temptation. The enticements expressed in the query, "What will ye give me?" afford woefully meagre ground of accounting for an attitude which is superficially contrary to his habitual regard. Such ulterior motives as disappointment, pique, hope of personal preferment, are absent from the record. But even they could not explain his reversal of feeling. We are forced to wrap the traitorous act in the envelope of a coherent character,⁵³ and say, If we had known all there was to Judas, we should not have been surprised at his course. But this is only to acknowledge the operation of a law of character running evenly with the law of mechanism. In the latter, we affirm a thing *must* happen; in the former, we say *it should*. *Sollen* not *muessen* is the rule of conduct. We are obliged, not compelled to perform a certain act.

IV

We have described character as the differentiating element in human life. Men are not unlike because they are units in the social structure. To exist as separate bodies cannot of itself guaranty variety of form.⁵⁴ Men are different by reason of a particular unfolding of the Conatus. The kind of stimulus and the strength of emotional reaction vary, and with them the type

⁵² III, 54.

⁵³ Cf. Joachim's use of the same general idea of coherence,—*"Spinoza,"* Bk. II. Appendix, sect. 8, etc.

⁵⁴ Cf. I, 17, Sch.

of character. We cannot therefore sit down and deliberately conceive a character which we at once proceed to reproduce in conduct. The elements which enter into the completed career are present already in the individual without our connivance. They wait to be unfolded. They cannot be gathered into a characterized system as by some kaleidoscopic movement. They come one by one to the surface. Hence, the process of making character is undated.⁵⁵ It does not at a certain point reach its zenith and then remain unalterable. It presents itself in the guise of a dialectic⁵⁶ which is ever moving towards the Absolute, *viz.*, a finished personality. Every synthetic adjustment is a signal for the setting up of new terms in the dialectical series. We begin in each instance with the sense of organic depression; that is the thesis; and we endeavor to the best of our ability to conceive things which exclude the existence of the enervating forces,—that is the antithesis.⁵⁷ The direction of the change is always from the passive to the active, from automatic reaction to a reflective guidance of behavior.⁵⁸ Hence, when the new synthesis appears, while it cannot once for all reject the moulding influence of outside bodies, it will yet be a little more sure of its own autonomy, that is to say, its power to shape behavior according to its individual purpose. Freedom obtains a new increment, and life broadens commensurately.

But progress as visualized in the dialectic is not achieved without effort. There are two situations which meet the agent, and in each of them his ethical strength will be sternly tested. The first of these concerns the fact of excess, evidence of which we found in certain phases of organic development. There excess crystallized into habit, and became the point of departure for new biological types. Here, one emotion, whose stimulus exceeds in intensity the body's resisting power, tends to a polarized state, the agent being changed into a man of one idea, the proponent of mental obsession.⁵⁹ Such a condition may be salutary, providing the right phases of underlying purpose are

⁵⁵ III, 8.

⁵⁶ III, 1, Cor.

⁵⁷ Cf. Brunschvicg. "Spinoza" pg. 103, etc. 1894.

⁵⁸ III, 13.

⁵⁹ IV, 6, 44.

emphasized.⁶⁰ But it may easily develop the most dangerous proclivities, as when the sybarite accepts the enticements of bodily pleasure, giving no thought to their ultimate effects nor reasoning out the relations of such sensations to the finer sensibilities of the mind.⁶¹ In this way the object of pleasure grows so absorbing in its fascination that although absent he regards it as present to his eyes, and even in sleep or delirium is not released from its thrall.⁶² How very difficult it is for the moral dialectic to proceed past this point, may readily be surmised.

Nevertheless, we cannot allow it to be permanently thwarted, in view of the serious social entanglements produced by such a character. For we may regard with pity or ridicule the lovelorn youth, as one sunk in a dream from which eventually, perhaps with bitter memories, he shall awake. The miserly or ambitious man, however, is of a different complexion. His acts affect the wellbeing of society, and interfere with its true development. Hence, he must if possible be disillusioned.⁶³ But how? The polarized impulse yields its hold with great reluctance. For instance, the proud man feeds his emotional gratification with the honeyed words of flatterer and parasite, and persistently avoids the company of judicious observers. For him there is a decided increase of power in the under-estimation of his contemporaries. Yet after all the complacency is superficial; it can be easily pricked. It is based on ignorance of the vital purposes, type-impulses of our nature. It is a negation of the true self. To remove such negation by the process of dialectics is the business of an Ethic.

We begin with the fact that the pleasure of pride is not unmixed. It is accompanied by pain, for no being like ourselves can suffer injury without the mind's being disagreeably affected in its turn.⁶⁴ There is too an acknowledged feeling that if we carry the analysis far enough we must certainly discover elements of superiority in other men, which would seriously impair

⁶⁰ IV, 52.

⁶¹ Cf. V, 23, Sch.

⁶² IV, 44, Sch.

⁶³ IV, 44, Sch.

⁶⁴ III, 47.

our calculated serenity.⁶⁵ The thesis is plain, *viz.*, organic depression, and is flanked by its antithetical terms, a character guided by reason, able to correlate its varying judgments to the needs of a single purpose. The antithesis may take the form of an Example, a Pattern of beauty and grace, into which the experiences of uncounted generations are woven. This, while not the completed personality, is nevertheless for the moment an absolute, and in accordance with its demands the next ethical synthesis may be framed.⁶⁶ In the case before us the excess of self-love is met with a true statement of what the self is, and how it should be valued. When the dialectic of Pride is finished, we shall not by any means have reached the projected goal, but we shall have extinguished the autocratic excess of mere opinion, thereby proving the process to be strictly dialectical in form, since it definitely abandoned its starting-point. The first situation is solved by the realization of desire, which has its roots in reason. There all excess is excluded.⁶⁷

But the first situation is a variation of the second, which records the play of contradictory impulses, and waits upon the subject for decision. The ingrained habit and the stubborn trait of character yield only after the pressure of individual purpose has been strongly felt. Hence, there must be a struggle between what is and what in the nature of things ought to be. An aggravated case like Pride may not disclose the sharp issues and bitter contentions which are present in commoner experiences; but it confirms the primary axiom of conduct, that no step forward is taken without the annulment or change of one group of motives by an act of choice.⁶⁸ Conscious life is an arena. Stimulating forces conflict, and for a moment thwart the unity of organic action. Thereupon, fluctuations of mind appear, leading us to affirm now the first, again the second of two courses, and involving us always in an uncertainty of mood as to which way the balance will incline. Thus, if we conceive a resemblance between a person who has affected us disagreeably and one who has gained our affection, we shall regard the former

⁶⁵ III, 55, Sch.

⁶⁶ IV, Pref.

⁶⁷ IV, 61.

⁶⁸ V, Ax. i.

with mingled feelings of hate and love; and our attitude towards him will depend on which feeling is uppermost in mind at the moment.⁶⁹ Again, the fluctuation may spring from the fact that my regard for a particular object is met by another's manifest aversion from the same. Nature prompts me at once to ask what defect or antagonizing principle lies hidden in its form. If he shrank from it, why not I? Shall I inconsiderately accept what another man has rejected? Even the most ardent lover sustains an abatement of pleasure in face of a slight cast upon his beloved. A struggle, an indecisive interval impends, until one emotion asserts its superior power and wins the victory.⁷⁰ The experience is universal, and is part of the warp and woof of character. We cannot be men if we decline the gage of battle. Problems of the most serious import press for settlement; they must be settled, or the unity of the organism is spent. Just what do the problems involve?

We shall examine the three groups of contradictory impulses which Spinoza adduces. First, one and the same desire is broken up into two forms, pure and impure. Let the desire be the primary lust for life, finding vent in the career of an avaricious man. As a fundamental purpose it is unmixed and rational. But when the love of goods, whose primary significance is their use for the support of life, degenerates into a love of goods for their own sake, it becomes impure. These two aspects are forced at times into opposition, as when a man in desperation casts his substance into the sea in order to avoid death. Nature's first law triumphs for a moment, but the character of the agent is unchanged. Inwoven qualities are not easily disentangled. The dialectic, stayed amid the tempests of the seas, begins again with redoubled energy as soon as land is reached. This is the story of a type-purpose versus individual character.⁷¹

The same contrast is at hand when one of the motives has entered the reflective consciousness. To take an example: Honor may be defined as gratification accompanied by the idea of our action as approved by others.⁷² It may be a pure emotion, a creditable desire,—hence an object of reasonable quest.

⁶⁹ III, 17 and Sch.

⁷⁰ III, 31 and C.

⁷¹ III, Def. Emot. xlviii.

⁷² III, Def. Emot, xxx.

Thus conceived it becomes the basis for all friendly relations between man and man, being guaranteed by the terms of moral obligation. But it is extremely easy to modify the reactive power of honor by a change in the stimulating medium. If for instance its strength be rooted in popular acclaim, as when the statesman strives by meretricious means to gain acceptance of his policies, then honor is an empty name, which can only be maintained by tickling the public's fancy through increasingly sensational devices, until at length men tire of their idol and transfer their affections to another.⁷³ Here again, the dialectic of character involves the passage from the impure to the pure form of impulse. Just so far as we are able to cultivate the attribute of honor without the interposition of transitory stimuli, just to that degree do we advance the dialectical process towards the final but unattainable term, an absolutely perfect self.

The second group of conflicting emotions includes debased forms of the same impulse. They are contrary not by nature, but by accidental property,—they draw in different directions.⁷⁴ Thus, avarice and luxury go back to the same source, *viz.*, self-love. Their expressions however are different, being the effects of varying stimuli. The particular stimulus, the glitter of gold, working for years upon plastic mind has rendered it almost exclusively responsive to itself, and not to another. Hence, the avaricious man refuses to disburse his funds for purposes of indulgence, though he does not decline to "gorge himself with food and drink at another's expense."⁷⁵ The dialectic here as before sets actual facts and ideal presentments in opposition. The antithetical term considers what the agent wishes his character to be; that is to say, what its natural tendency is. Only, in the conflict of impure desires the ideal can never be a proposition which we should venture to invite men generally to adopt. For if mankind should adopt the scheme of life inculcated by avarice, the very foundations upon which the scheme rests would be undermined. The inference is that the dialectic cannot stop with the framing of a bad ideal. It must eventually accept as

⁷³ IV, 37, Sch. i., 58.

⁷⁴ IV, Def. V.

⁷⁵ III, Def. Emot. xlviii.

its negating term the rule of reason, by which alone man can win his proper freedom.⁷⁶ Hence, in the last analysis, we get back to the contrast between the facts of sense and the facts of reason, whence the dialectic pursues its upward march unceasingly.

Still a third group of competitive desires confronts the student,—the largest and most conspicuous, the groundwork of every dialectic. Love and hate contend for mastery in every conscious life.⁷⁷ The phases of conflict are infinite, and every new juxtaposition establishes a new dialectical series. We select for examination the critical phase where the beloved turns the glance of indifference on her lover and bestows her affection on his rival. The pleasurable feeling is stayed; its power begins to recede. Reflective argument as to the former's ingratitude is not needed to account for the change.⁷⁸ Natural feeling cannot brook an unresponsive attitude. Jealousy and hate enter the conscious field, and the battle of emotions is joined. If the early love was deep and strong, it would not yield except under the greatest pressure; and if at any moment a glint of favor lights the eye of the beloved, it will kindle again its ancient ardor, extinguishing the incipient hate.⁷⁹ Thus, the warfare of contending impulse proceeds; thus the dialectic is developed; thus, too, the most tragic story in the field of consciousness is told. Every decision fits securely into the scheme of character, but at the same time opens up a new situation, which must in turn be resolved. That is to say, the quest upon which we have embarked is clearly without end, and the goal we conceive is forever approached, but never embraced.

V

Given the terms to the conflict, how shall its issue be determined? Spinoza adopts two general tests: First, is the cause of the reaction present or absent? Secondly, is the cause necessary or contingent?⁸⁰ The element of time is, we know, decisive as to the value of an impression. The image of a stimu-

⁷⁶ Cf. IV, 72.

⁷⁷ III, 13, Sch.

⁷⁸ IV, 41, Sch.

⁷⁹ III, 35, Sch.; V, 10 Sch.

⁸⁰ IV, 9, 11.

lating object remains present to the mind until displaced by another. If the image be of an object which we expect to enter consciousness at a later period, it is bound to be shadowed by others of present experience. Thus, hope may be defined as an inconstant pleasure, springing from the image of something future, the issue of which we do not as yet understand. Hope cannot be as strong as sight; we know what we see. For while we are ready to believe as true whatever hope reposes in, we are aware how quickly and effectively its objects have been shattered by the relentless argument of facts.⁸¹ If now the mind's grasp of a future event is fainter, it follows that desire for it is less acute. Hence, whenever a conflict of motives involves a disparity of time, other conditions being equal, the present cause will always lay its conquering hand upon the agent. He must choose it; even when he knows the good or evil, the favorable or unfavorable effects on his career, he must still choose it. It is beside the point to argue that reason determines the merits of a cause apart from its emergence in time.⁸² That is true, and its dictum exercises an increasingly large influence in the progress of the dialectic. But for the average man desires are gauged by their contact with environing forces. Hence, reasoned motives may be upset or dislodged by the intensity of reactions when the energy of body is palpably inferior to that of the stimulus. This is the general rule, verified in every moral contest. We have no assurance that because wisdom warns us to adopt a good which comes to fruition in the future, we can beat back the storm of passion, pressing at this moment on our reluctant sensibilities.⁸³

The other rule for determining the issue marks the distinction between the necessary and the contingent. Reaction to the idea of necessity and of existence is the same. Whatever we conceive to exist, exists for us, and makes its certain impression on the mind. Whatever we conceive as not existing, or as not having its causal nexus sufficiently clear, so as to be regarded as certain, cannot produce the reaction of an existent or present object. In the case of necessary causes the strength of the re-

⁸¹ III, 18, Sch. ii; 51, Sch.

⁸² IV, 15, Dem.

⁸³ IV, 62.

action is equal to that of an object present to consciousness, plus the fact that if the object be withdrawn from view its causal relations remain unchanged in the mind.⁸⁴ It appears, then, that contradictory emotions can be reconciled only by giving the necessary cause the right of way. Thus, if we cannot decide at once whether we should venerate or envy the man of prudence at our side, it is incumbent upon us to inquire if we ourselves do or can possess the same quality of mind. If not, then envy is not the necessary reaction, inasmuch as man can only envy his equal. Instead of that, we are moved to wonder; we are obliged to gaze upon, and admire, what is steadily denied to us, because of its very uniqueness. The mind is transfixed with its glow.⁸⁵ The decision in this and other cases may be reached after long and tedious experience; but the issue of the dialectic is sure, on the basis of the governing rule.

We have applied the two rules to conduct pursued in the common walks of life. They become more effective in the light of critical suggestion. The real significance of choice can be seen at this point. Choice is not a balancing of two possible courses and the ultimate appropriation of that one which commends itself to our fancy. Ethical purpose concerns only the good. Evil for it has no existence. The basic question is not, Shall we do this or that? but, *How* shall we do *this*? The difference between the two theories of moral conduct is the difference between the healthy man's and the sick man's attitude to food; one eats with evident relish; the other eats even obnoxious food, in order to elude the grip of death. That is to say, the purport of action is not a choice between good and evil in the first instance, but an affirmation of the fundamental purpose.⁸⁶ We are taught to value motives not by the comparative strength of their reactions, but by their relation to the general good of the system. For this reason the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils should be accepted, because eventually the lesser evil will really prove to be a good, while the lesser good, by itself a valuable emotion, is, compared with its competitor, distinctly inferior as a means for developing the powers of body and mind.

⁸⁴ I, 33, Sch. i.

⁸⁵ III, 56, 52.

⁸⁶ IV, 63.

These facts convince us that the wise man alone pursues a satisfactory course, since he alone can detect what actions are of primary importance in life, and what can best further his individual purposes.⁸⁷

Hence at length we ask, as we note the progressive dialectic, What determines the issue in each particular contest? Not simply the rules just deduced; they are the framework, the categories, within which the organizing force works. Man's unique purpose moulds his conduct. It steals forth from its concealment with the widening intelligence of the actor. Reflection now evokes the very decisions which formerly were produced by the senses. But the basis of choice is different. Unchastened impulse chooses because it is near; reason, because the object is more akin to our character.⁸⁸ Consistency as the symbol of behavior grows more pronounced. Therefore, we may confidently predict the outcome of each new moral struggle,—not indeed in precise terms, for the causal series is teleological, not mechanical, and the subject may have a stratum of thought as yet unknown to us,—but as belonging to the characterized system whose terms we have watched unfolding one by one. Furthermore, we may be certain that in proportion as we exalt the "better part of our nature," which is man's unique purpose, over against the disorganizing impressions of sense, in that proportion shall we advance our degree of freedom, and despite our union with nature recognize our behavior as our own.⁸⁹

To this point has the quest for a character brought us. Can human freedom go beyond it?

⁸⁷ IV, 65, 66, C; Sch.

⁸⁸ IV, App. xxxi.

⁸⁹ IV, 59, 62.

CHAPTER IV

THE REALIZATION OF SELF

I. THE MEANING OF SELFHOOD

Man as we have hitherto described him is clearly the product of individuation. Even in the making of character he feels himself a creature of circumstance, in the sense that differences of disposition cannot account for his individual purposes. He may remove every reaction from the thought of an external cause, but he cannot free himself from its environment, or exclude once for all the gratifications of sense which such contact provokes. In other words, man though furnished with a character is still an individual, a part of nature, subject to the unceasing activity of her laws.

But if man be an individual acting in harmony with her movements, can he have any freedom beyond that belonging to the type-purposes of his kind? We have found him exercising the functions of organic life, free to move within its boundaries. Can he now by specializing his behavior discriminate also degrees of freedom among individuals? Is one man freer than another, the wise and just than the slave of vice? Again—passing to actual experience—can I determine what objects shall influence my conduct? Can I plan to forestall a possible reaction and if necessary evade it altogether? Do the facts of psychology prove that I, that any man is at liberty to differentiate the human mode of life from that of the lower organisms, adapting method to need by reflective intent, and giving infinitely varied expression of the very end which bird and insect pursue by the drive of instinct? Still further, can the possessor of reason note a continuous progress in his individual character answering to the terms of the logical dialectic, each conclusion registering a new level in the realization of man's unique purpose, and hence a new increment of freedom?

These questions we believe have been favorably answered. A man is free to develop the kind of character which belongs to his particular equipment, as over against every other individual in the human series. But we have not fully described our subject when we have dealt with him as a man amongst men, one of an infinite series. We must next deal with him as a man apart from men. He is not only conscious; he is conscious of self. In this new definition he reaches his true reality. Here by a process that eludes our grasp he enters the domain of intelligent reflection, having passed beyond the bounds of organic appetite. Here he is at home, so to speak, with his essence, discovers his affinity with men of like mind, and pursues his struggle towards the goal of complete self-realization.

I

Consciousness, we found Spinoza teaching,¹ is the organizing principle in the human body. It is not itself one of two reals, of both of which psychology must take account. There is only one substance, severally viewed, now as extension, again as thought. Every percept in the mind has its exact correlate in physical change. This point-to-point correspondence is rigid and invariable.

The structure of an organism is intact; it is a self-sustaining whole. It has properties which the mass of rock or the crystal fails to exhibit; its every organ reflects the operating principle of the whole. It reveals a definite tendency to remain in its established state, to maintain its organic integrity. Still again, it has a potential character; what an organism is in its early stages, is at times a mere shadow of what it will become. But whatever shapes or capacities it develops, are all involved and included in its primitive form, subject in their unfolding to the variety and degree of environing stimuli. And finally, organic life affirms its unity by an empirical test, *viz.*, by generating one or more beings precisely like itself and endowed with the same structural individuality.

So much for the body—can we say the same for the mind?

¹ Sup. pp. 43, *seq.*

The treatment of this question, though tainted with Rationalism, forestalls in a remarkable manner the conclusions of at least one school of modern experimenters. In Def. iii, Part II, Spinoza refers to the mind as a "thinking thing" (*res cogitans*), and betrays thereby the atmosphere he was forced to breathe. But even Locke, who broke up sensation into its residual bits, and Hume, who refused to find any causal connection between successive events, whether in mechanics or perception, could not get rid of the notion of a common background into whose recesses the various psychic phenomena inevitably retreated. Spinoza was much more logical. If causality rules in the world of matter, it rules forthwith in the world of thought. The sensations of body are determined thus and so by the laws of its structure. Hence, the images of mind corresponding thereto are not disconnected, and variable in movement, but parts of a steady current. If then the structure of an organism be a well-rounded whole, its functional imprints, even when as in the case of man they are infinitely diversified, must also be a unit.

At this point the author enters a reservation. We must be careful, he says, not to identify the body as a purposeful system with this particular object which maintains unceasingly the circulation of the blood. Death comes in other ways than by reducing the body to a cadaver. The inward proportion of motion and rest, that is to say, the nice adjustment of the mechanisms of the brain, may be so disturbed as to change completely the nature of the man. Thus, a Spanish poet on recovering from a serious illness was altogether isolated from his earlier mental experiences and "could not believe the plays and tragedies he had written to be his own." But for the fact that he remembered his mother tongue he would have been thrown into the state of intellectual infancy.² The reservation here so carefully made really transgresses the rule of organic unity which Spinoza himself has laid down, and in the light of modern research is not needed to support his theory.³ Multiple personality is at root

² IV, 30, Sch.

³ Cf. McDougall, *Body and Mind*, pg. 346, for an interpretation of the same phenomena from the standpoint of interactionism.

not a complex of two or more contending personalities within the same body, but one self in its divergent forms, which could—were they all known—be fitted into as harmonious a system as is the bodily organism which it expresses. For the difference of mental content is no more marked between these “selves” than between the intelligence of the child and the matured reason of the man. Indeed, as the author himself admits, the naive observer could be persuaded that he, too, had passed through childhood only by comparing the varying stages of life about him.⁴

It is difficult to study the development of consciousness in subhuman species. How far systematization has proceeded in each must be determined by the way in which behavior reflects the primordial impulses of the organism. With man the case stands otherwise. We now deal with mind, re-inforced by a new and more powerful impulse. Reflection, the new aspect of the correlating principle, reveals the same integrating tendency. If every organism by its self-preservative instinct is able to pick and choose amid the swarm of stimulating objects,—“understanding their points of agreement, difference and contrast,”⁵—certainly man with his critical powers is fitted to control his reactions with a view to his ultimate good.⁶ In other words, intellect is the ground of all rational life. It alone can define the purpose towards which human energies tend.⁷ It alone can impress upon us the value of courses which ultimately inure to the best development of body and mind.⁸ It is this impulse which keeps life steady amid conflicting currents, which counsels cordial submission to situations, whose grip we cannot break.⁹ Finally, it is reflection which shows us how to escape from the servitude of sense into the broad spaces of communion with total nature.¹⁰ That mind such as this can be other than an organized system, a conscious whole, is an inadmissible proposition.

But when we say that reflection organizes a system of ideas, we must not fall into the error which blighted the Cartesian

⁴ IV, 39, Sch.

⁵ II, 29, Sch.

⁶ IV, 23.

⁷ IV, App. v.

⁸ IV, 36.

⁹ IV, App. xxxii.

¹⁰ V, 25.

doctrine.¹¹ Intellect and will are not separate faculties within the soul,—concentric circles, each controlling absolutely its appropriate radii. Mental experience is atomic in the sense that percepts move as individual objects across the screen. It is not atomic, if by applying that term we rob perception of its genetic associates. It would be a travesty on the critical work of intelligence if concepts were framed by sporadic guesses or a chance alignment of sensory images. In other words, mind is just as far from being a congeries of unrelated sensations as it is from being the seat of certain compartment-tight faculties. Intelligence is an active principle, a governing force—*vis perseverandi*¹² that cuts its way through the mass of environing perceptions and makes ever more clear the path of man's autonomy.¹³ By virtue of this aggressive tendency, first of all, the mind is able to conceive the idea of its continuity. Sensation is the only ground of recollection; hence, we could never remember the phases of our pre-existence, supposing there has been any. The Cartesian theory of innate ideas, immediate presentations of the mind, is likewise inept; they need a guarantee, which the mind must furnish for them. But the rational impulse, the tendency of mind which turns images of sense into commanding concepts and in the person of the wise man evolves definite rules of action, this proves its power by its deeds. "We feel and know," exclaims Spinoza, "that we are eternal. . . . For the eyes of the mind, by which it sees and considers, constitute the demonstration." That is to say, the perpetual drive of intelligence in teaching a man how to construct logical methods and practical policies which make for his progressive development, carries with it a sure argument for its own integrity. Mind is not a succession of feelings, emerging for a moment above the threshold of experience and then disappearing; mind is the presentation of feelings in their due relations, which lower organisms cannot understand, but which man is permitted to examine from a new point of view.¹⁴ To this examination we now address ourselves.

¹¹ II, 49, Sch.

¹² II, 45, Sch.

¹³ V, 7.

¹⁴ V, 23 Sch.

II

Intelligence has been defined as the impulse which differentiates the human species from its neighbors. But man and brute are as organisms complete in themselves. Every animal has an individual career, and if he could discuss it we should find it truly balanced. But the very fact that he cannot discuss it, while man can, argues a profound cleavage between the two experiences. Man becomes conscious of a self; the dog, so far as we can judge, does not. Now if there be no specific faculty to prescribe action,¹⁵ no psychic warp into which sensory figures are woven, how are we to conceive the personal identity which we are accustomed to call the Self? "It is in the nature of reason," writes Spinoza, "to perceive things under a certain form of eternity."¹⁶ The *eternal* part of a perceived object is the element which it has in common with other objects of the same kind. Thus, it is essential to a triangle that the interior angles should be equal to two right angles. Take away that property and you destroy the triangularity of the figure. Hence whenever you see a triangle, you know the measure of its interior angles. And if you never see one, you are aware of the eternal validity of the law.¹⁷ For a thing is objectively real not alone when it is fixed by the coordinates of time and place, but just as surely when it is "contained in God," that is, is universal in application. The essence of a thing is what is true, whether it is seen or thought.¹⁸

Let us apply this to the case in point. Will as a definite faculty does not exist. The agent does not rise up at a crucial moment and exclaim, "I will to be a man." He is a man by virtue of the ceaseless operation of his intelligent impulse, which he did not by private volition inaugurate. Conscious life in the higher species is signalized by two facts, sense-perception and memory, which are not unique in man and cannot enter into definition of his self. Common opinion errs grossly in this connection. It identifies personality with a man's capacity for bodily reaction,

¹⁵ II, 48, Sch.¹⁶ II, 44, C.¹⁷ II, 49.¹⁸ V, 29, Sch.

which, it is assumed, will be continued in a future existence.¹⁹ But this is to misconceive the meaning of the self. If human nature consists solely in the concatenated sensations of body, we may indeed give man a "character," but we can never endow him with the authority of a person, the right to call his actions his own. The key to this age-long conundrum Spinoza seems to find in the notion of the Universal.²⁰ We must not stop with cataloguing sensory images, each as the "idea" of its corresponding reaction and together totalled as the mind. If the percept interprets the physical change and the object that produced it, surely it in turn may be subject to a like process, the interpretation being based upon a comparison of prior and succeeding percepts. Now the "Form" of the Aristotelian philosophy was the sum of universal elements which defined the object. The Form of the mind is the universal principle which alone can define or correlate every percept and concept that pass never so swiftly through it, even when the mind is sunk into sleep. In other words, Selfhood is the Universal at stake, not as one of the logical categories, for none of them fits; but as persistent fact of consciousness. That a man can compare his acts before and after a given moment and find in them similar elements, proclaims his conduct as raised above the automatic experience of the dog, which is dependent on a series of sensory images for his every attainment. That he can do so with unfailing regularity, growing at every stroke more settled in his individual independence, proves that the new "universal" is not a makeshift function, arbitrarily conceived and flourishing for a moment, but a permanent property of mind, as surely man's as is his impulse to preserve his being.²¹

The "eternity of body" which Spinoza delights to recite, becomes now a usable notion.²² It is not a theoretical concept, like those which the Scholastics constructed with infinite care and relish, in this case conspiring to bring against our author the

¹⁹ V, 34, Sch.

²⁰ Cf. Hobhouse, *Mind in Evolution*, pg. 321, for a similar view.

²¹ For this argument, cf. II, 13, 15, 22, 48, Sch., and 49, C. and Dem.

²² Cf. V, 22, 29 and Sch.

charge of being a Realist. It is a distinct and practical factor in psychology. If intellect were unable to conceive the functions of body in their general relations it would never be fit to reach any conclusions as to the nature and laws of natural forces. All knowledge is communicated by the avenues of sense.²³ If that knowledge be nothing but an array of perceptual images, the human observer would be as helpless as his brute companion to tell what these things meant. For we read that the sensory impression does not offer complete information as to the nature of the stimulating object,²⁴ and again, that each individual percept fails to reveal the powers of the sense excited, certainly not the compass of the body's powers.²⁵ The act of intellect which organizes percepts into a conceptual system is the first attempt in organic history to arrive at the meaning of sensation. Such a process must begin with the sensory organs and end with them, all our observations being colored by the media of transmission.²⁶ Hence, it is entirely proper to hold that the privilege of making and applying the categories of thought to experience in the world of mechanism belongs to the human mind, because it alone has learned to read the universal properties of sensation.²⁷ Hence, too, the Self which emerges from the flow of correlated ideas deals expressly with the eternal qualities whose visible embodiment is found in a given individual.

Let us not suppose, however, that Selfhood is a barren abstraction, like the justice of Nominalism, or the pale, ungrasped Noumenon of a later philosophy. The self, being inextricably bound up with life, the nidus of active forces, must faithfully register the movements of the body. Thus, the child begins his career by an unreasoned obedience to primary instincts, the satisfaction of which depends almost exclusively on external causes. He is scarcely conscious of himself or his surroundings. But in normal instances growth is steady and progressive. Mind unfolds along with the capacity of sense. Education sets it as the supreme end to "educe," to draw out the powers latent in the child's nature,—to train eye and ear and touch, relate their

²³ II, 26.²⁴ II, 25.²⁵ II, 27.²⁶ II, 17, Sch.²⁷ V, 29, Dem.

percepts to a common scheme of knowledge, and at length make the grown man an independent self.²⁸ Because in this or that body, at an early age, an intelligent whole is clearly defined, Spinoza has no trouble in ascribing to each body an "eternal" nature.²⁹ He must mean by that just one thing: that amid the crush and entanglement of sense-perceptions the self which catches up the common element in each percept sees also the meaning of the act, finds this fitting harmoniously into a scheme of conduct, and relates all acts at length to a definite end. Thus intellect makes good its superiority to imagination and memory, both of which have a place in all organic experience without being correlated under the principle of a presiding self.³⁰ And it makes good its superiority by defining the residual scope of sense-perception. The self, in other words, is not concerned ultimately with the gratification of sense, but with the cordial participation in those high thoughts which link man's destiny with the destiny of the world.³¹ This is Spinoza's doctrine of personality. Let us proceed to a closer examination of its terms.

III

The awakening of selfhood is not a sudden attainment. Those who have arrived at a mature estimate of themselves know at what great cost the goal has been won. The growth of self-distinguishing thought is just as regular and just as slow as the growth of a bodily organ. Certain organic instincts like the sex-impulse do not assert their power until the body has reached a fixed development; yet all the previous life has been training-ground for their particular function. Likewise, the first glint of self-consciousness appears at a recognized period, the exact moment however being beyond the ken of the observer. But when physical impulse or mental discrimination emerges, it marks a new stage in the individual's career. It is, as Spinoza says, a new perfection, a new level of reality.³² It would be a faulty reading of the values of intellect, to study them only in the developed consciousness of the grown man. The mind is an

²⁸ V, 39, Sch.

²⁹ V, 22.

³⁰ V, 40, C.

³¹ V, 20, Sch.

³² IV, Pref.

enlarging vista, so to speak. We must study it from its beginning. If we would "better understand and more easily explain it," we should consider its form when it had just caught the first swift, startling glimpse of universal properties,—the mind's unique privilege. The initial perfection of selfhood is registered here. The meaning of "eternity" is for the first time articulately framed.³³ The infant mind possesses a reality quite its own. It would be an assumption of defect in nature to pity the child because in his tender years speech and reason and logical insight are denied. His primitive gains are the certificate of a larger reality yet to be unfolded. Given health, and length of days, he will assume the graduated perfections of human life,—adolescence, youth, manly vigor and the wisdom of age. Potentially, the last is included in the first; hence the essence of the individual never changes, though the power of action develops. Hence, too, the freedom of the adult self is amply guaranteed, because we have carried our knowledge of its real capacity back to its primary expression.³⁴

Having taken our stand at the fountain-head of a man's career, what do we find to be the germinal marks of the conscious Self? There can be no doubt as to the *fact* of self-consciousness. Whatever the origin of his experience, a man is sure that is he himself, an identical person, who sees and hears and understands. Uncritical opinion endows him with an untrammelled initiative, so that his every act is held to be the output of free deliberation.³⁵ The mistake lies in the definition of freedom. The intellect is free in precisely the same way as any other organic impulse; it is free to realize its purpose.³⁶ Hence, we cannot understand the scope of man's freedom until we ascertain how the particular impulse which makes him a man, comes to its focus.

The self does not become conscious by the registering of a sensory image. True, the percept corresponding point by point with the changes of body is not an inert something, unresponsive like a picture on a panel. It surges with life, with the energy of organic growth. It involves an active endeavor in the direc-

³³ V, 31, Sch.

³⁴ V, 6, Sch.

³⁵ III, 2, Sch.

³⁶ IV, 26.

tion of the object perceived. It is the work of a mind which is able to correlate its several tendencies by one commanding principle, but which must first gather up the data for the intellectual principle to set its impress upon. This means that the mind is sure of the thing as well as of the sensory image, but only in the same way as the mind of the child is sure of the cause of its motor-reflexes, or the mind of a dog of the object of its memory-impressions. The judgment is purely perceptual.³⁷ As a judgment of sense it is unqualifiedly true, and no observer can dispute it. But as a judgment of ultimate fact it is open to a hundred objections, and can be justified solely by applying the next function in the critical operation of mind, *viz.*, that of comparison.³⁸ Hence, getting an "idea" exactly agreeable to its stimulating object can never be a test of selfhood; but getting the habit of relating such "ideas" to a common principle sets a man on the way to winning his intellectual autonomy, the power to identify experience as his own.

"Modes of thinking such as love and desire can have no objective validity unless there be in the individual an idea of the thing loved or desired."³⁹ By this Axiom two elements are required for the complex of consciousness, the instinctive nature of the agent and the image of a stimulating object. But if we stopped there, the psychic experience of dog or man would be hopelessly monotonous. It would not be experience, it would be a succession of reactive points. But experience never stops there; the aggressive nature of the organism makes a halt impossible. In a twinkling of an eye there will be two conscious events. So far as we are at liberty to guess, for the dog each event will be related to its successor as structural neighbors in the nerve tract,—hence as necessary constituents of memory.⁴⁰ For the man the relation becomes unique. For example, one stimulus produces pain, another pleasure. The dog winces and barks; the man by his superior impulse notes the change from one level of feeling to another. Pain to him is evil, and he avoids its cause. Pleasure is good, and he cultivates every occasion that

³⁷ II, 43, Sch.

³⁸ Cf. IV, i, Sch.

³⁹ II, Ax. 3.

⁴⁰ II, 18, Sch.

can create it.⁴¹ Intellect thus carries us away from the succession of sensory shocks to the thing which is common to all. "We know nothing to be certainly good save such things as really conduce to understanding."⁴² That is to say, the moment I can declare that two experiences have in common the physical condition known as gratification, that moment I have said, in germ if not in term, that I who register these feelings am an identical person.

The essence or self of man now rises permanently above the surface. He is no longer the sport of unresisted reactions.⁴³ He can catalogue, he can categorize them; he can arrange them in an intellectual order.⁴⁴ He can call them his own, and by studying their effect upon his feelings, trace them to their cause. Hence, the freedom of the awakened child is a thousand-fold greater than the freedom of the most powerful animal, just because he has begun in never so rudimentary a way to ascertain what is good for him. For of all the conscious organisms in the world, the human mind alone is able to hold before its grasp in a definitive manner the end to be sought. The second element, then, in the correlation of Self is a comparing of experience with a purpose in view. But that purpose cannot be subserved by conformity to emotional instincts. If that were so, man after all would have in his career nothing unique. But he has something distinctive; he can think, frame concepts, assess the value of sensations. If his self-conscious thought be not devoted to the husbanding of his intellectual resources, he has defaulted his peculiar purpose and stripped himself of his rightful heritage.⁴⁵ In order that this may not happen we endeavor to cause the child to think for himself, to prescribe such teleological formulas as will at length make him master of his career. This is the business of education. When mastery is attained, whether at the start or in the mature triumphs of will, the self will discover a feeling of elation called self-approval, the knowledge that we have seen the multiplicity of sense-perceptions in their true light.⁴⁶

⁴¹ IV, 8, 19.

⁴² IV, 27.

⁴³ IV, 23.

⁴⁴ V, 10.

⁴⁵ IV, App. 5.

⁴⁶ IV, 52; V, 39, Sch.

But if the Self conceives a definite goal, what assurance have we that when it is reached it can be suitably identified as the self's own? The answer to this question will reveal a third aspect of self-consciousness, *viz.*, its continuity. If we were dealing with the modes of characterization which we discussed in a previous chapter, we should despair of ever ascribing to them the logical category of sameness. They are not the same; the individual changes with every breath he draws, and this very changefulness limits his freedom to the type-purposes which crown his life. Selfhood, however, is not measured by the coordinates of space and time, but by the essence belonging to the individual organism in every phase of its growth.⁴⁷ In the sphere of intellect the *real* element is the principle of selfhood, which binds all sensory experience into a unity. The self is forced to stand over against the mass of characterized emotions; *they* are the tokens of appearance, *it* is the essence of man. The distinction is fundamental to Spinoza's psychology and shows how deeply he entered into the practical life of the race.

Communications of sense are never reliable. They reflect, as we have seen, the momentary attitude of the percipient. Thus, if I affirm that the sun is two hundred feet away from my point of vision, I am giving only the apparent measure. All objects more than two hundred feet away *seem* to us removed an equal distance, and all in the same plane. The distance from earth to sun is not a subject of perceptual judgment; it exceeds our powers and is to be determined by computation. Not the casual observer, but the skilled scientist must reckon up orbit and parallax and set down the exact result.⁴⁸

Now it is this observing self, the self that is carried along from one observation to another and from one group of mathematical figures to another,—it is this continuous self which possesses reality. We must be extremely careful not to confuse it with the individual at a particular moment of his career. If we do, we break the continuity and destroy the principle of union. Hence, the self should never be invested with such relative terms as good or bad. They belong to man as an individual, not as a

⁴⁷ V, 23, Sch.

⁴⁸ IV, Def. vi, Remark; I, Sch.

"thinking mode," universalizing the judgments of sense. Even on the level of commonplace reactions the terms are variable in value. For example, music is good for the victim of melancholia, bad for the soul sunk in grief, and of no worth whatsoever to a man bereft of hearing. In so far as these terms refer to the condition of body there is a manifest propriety in using them; but when applied to the correlated experience of the self they lose their meaning. For the self does not deal with the body as temporarily affected, but with its essential powers. Yet while we may not bring the specific differentials of feeling to the contemplation of self, we may fittingly frame a type (exemplar) of character composed of qualities which the self has distilled from its contact with nature, or by an analysis of its own thought, and set it before our eyes as the self's crystallized objective, the guarantor of ultimate freedom.⁴⁹ To reach it, the consciousness of self must grow increasingly acute; the conceiving subject must ever more vigorously discriminate the objects of its thought from itself and hold its own by choice and initiative in face of the clamorous demands of sense-perception. That is to say, a struggle must ensue, parallel to that which we have designated as the emotional dialectic. There it was an individual impulse that provoked the contest; here intelligence, man's unique purpose, seeks the steady formulation of all impulses into a self.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ IV, Pref.

⁵⁰ Cf. V, 31, Sch. and 40.

CHAPTER V

THE REALIZATION OF SELF

2. THE MODE OF DEVELOPMENT

The dialectic of self-realization may be said to have three phases, the first psychological, the development of man as a separate self; the second ethical, his contact with other selves; the last religious, his relations to the universal idea of nature. These three phases are not mutually exclusive. Type of civilization, immediate environment, physical capacity, peculiar genius may strangely mingle and confuse the several forms of mental life; but whether mingled or consecutive we shall not mistake in marking them as Spinoza's landing-places in the progressive attainment of selfhood.

I

The initial duty of the conscious self is to study the meaning of the body's reactions, with a view to making them serve the self's best interests.¹ The meaning of every reaction, as we have noted, is gauged in part by the nature of the stimulating object; but only in part, inasmuch as no single image can carry a complete summary of the parts and relations of the object mirrored.² We must effect a comparison of several reactions either to the same or related stimuli. The rudimentary act which awoke the consciousness of self is thus the prototype of the settled practice of reflection. Each sensation must be carefully examined for its general properties.³ Why did this impulse suddenly function, what was the nature of the stimulating cause, under what circumstances will a given stimulus provoke its response,—these and similar questions are the burden of study. Just as soon as we embark on this process we begin to gain "adequate ideas," we begin to understand.⁴ By the same operation, too, we

¹ IV, 53, Dem.

² II, 25; cf. IV, 5.

³ V, 4.

⁴ IV, 23.

enter upon a new level of freedom. When intelligence first wrought its impressions into the integument of a self, man won his right to a higher freedom than the mere functional activity of the lower organisms. Now he is in position to determine the cause of his sensory experience and at his own option "perform those actions which he knows to be of the highest value in life." He has reached the second form of knowledge, sharply distinguished by Spinoza from the first form, or opinion, which accepts the casual percepts as sufficient witness and never asks whether the concept deduced is universally true. Opinion may at times hit upon the correct solution to a problem, as when a tradesman by habit or early training puts down on paper the fourth proportional without knowing *why* it is the true figure. But the universal value of the solution can only be reached when, like the mathematician acting on the basic law of proportion, we understand that the product of the extremes equals the product of the means.⁵ All which means to imply that the ignorant man, following his opinion or the crystallized habit of society, is a slave, as compared with the man who boldly acts with a full knowledge of impending results.⁶

That the first assertion of self-consciousness is not immediately attended by such an access of freedom, is proven by a variety of facts.⁷ We may cite the edict of reflection that all events in the life of man are necessary. Much of the mental suffering of the world would be averted if we knew that the object lost could not by any device have been preserved.⁸ The customary reaction to loss is pain,—severe disappointment, bitter complaint, and a tendency to query how with an assumed benevolent Creator things have grown "corrupt to the point of putrescence, repulsive deformity, confusion, evil and sin." In answer to this it is not difficult to show that the perfection of things depends on their nature and their relation to the totality of being, and that they are not more or less perfect according as the individual observer finds them grateful or repugnant to his

⁵ Cf. De Emend. Intel., pg. 9.

⁶ V, 6 and Sch.

⁷ IV, 56, Sch.

⁸ Cf. Spinoza's complaint in IV, 35, Sch.

tastes.⁹ Pain itself, though it takes its meaning from organic properties and not from the laws of mechanism, must yet have its place in the necessary operation of natural forces. It is not a stranger, drawn into the pleasurable movements of the world; it is here by right; it has a distinct service to perform. When so viewed the offices of pain—disease of body, disorders of mind, poverty, injustice, war, hidden and malefic craft—are divested of their obnoxious garb. They are not the creatures of man's unaided whim; they are not contingent, nor can they be averted; they are necessary. Their universal meaning becomes sun-clear to the mind, their causes defined, and their issues foreseen.¹⁰ Hence, pain as a psychic reaction is at once turned into pleasure, and the idea that God could be the Author of evil is forever banished.¹¹

A similar change of attitude takes place in our view of evil which has overtaken another being conceived to be like ourselves. The common reaction is called Pity, and assumes that if circumstances had been different, joy and not misery would have crowned his life. On nearer consideration, however, it appears that the impulse of pity cannot be embodied in rational conduct. Pity implies that something is wrong with the structure of the world; that certain events might and should have happened otherwise. Reflection, on the other hand, having gathered up the essential properties of given objects, assures us peremptorily that all events transpire according to a fixed law of succession. There is nothing accidental; what appears so is the deduction of an unfurnished mind. Pity, therefore, has no point at which it may crystallize.¹² Nor is this all. The effect of such reaction upon the mind is distinctly bad. It not only forces upon us a feeling of depression because we conceive the object of pity as in a state of anguish,¹³ but it leads us to actions which afterwards we have grave cause to regret. Every impulse that bids us help another is emphatically the voice of reason and has official standing in the career of the Self.¹⁴ Yet it may be misguided either by the natural rush of emotion or by the fact

⁹ I, App., sub fin.

¹⁰ V, 18, Sch.

¹¹ III, 27.

¹² Cf. I, 33 and Sch. i.

¹³ IV, 50, and Sch.

¹⁴ IV, 37.

that we are easily deceived by false tears. The man who would conform to the terms of genuine sympathy must be careful to analyze both the character of his sentiments and the external incident which evoked them at the particular moment. If he fails to do so, the pain of pity will be re-inforced by the pain of chagrin, and the development of the real Self will be measurably hindered.¹⁵

Again, the reaction of Fear is driven by reflection from its prominent place in the emotional history of man. Instinct leads every organism to seek escape from danger or to avoid its very appearance. The wise man, that is to say, the agent who has balanced his impulse and action so as to realize the highest values of selfhood, will not scruple to decline the path of peril; for it is perfectly apparent to him that foolhardiness, being a destructive impulse, ranks on an equality with the sense of danger as respects its emotional results. Both bear the seeds of pain.¹⁶ Hence, to decline danger is not in his case to evince fear. Fear may be defined as a "wavering pain elicited by the idea of an event past or future of whose issue we stand in doubt."¹⁷ But uncertainty will not linger in a mind which has grown accustomed to correlating all its reactions under the rubric of a Self. It knows not by instinct, but as the reasoned result of experience, that fear may be conquered by anticipating and examining its causes, and by devising certain rules of conduct to be resolutely applied in times of need. Selfhood for the moment is synonymous with courage.¹⁸

The thought of death institutes the most violent reaction of fear in the uninstructed mind. We have remarked¹⁹ that the sick man who has never studied the meaning of physical dissolution undergoes cheerfully the most distasteful treatment for the sake of avoiding its issues.²⁰ He is a slave to the life of sense. On the other hand the free man, understanding *how* such dissolution takes place and *why*, is not concerned with the fact itself, but with the kind of a Self that shall have been realized

¹⁵ IV, 50, Sch.

¹⁶ IV, 69.

¹⁷ III, Def. Emots. xiii.

¹⁸ IV, 47, Sch.; V, 10, Sch.

¹⁹ Page 56.

²⁰ IV, 63, Sch.

when Death at length comes.²¹ For death as a biological fact is hurtful only when we have failed to seize every opportunity for developing the powers inherent in mind. Common opinion regards the death of a child as the cause of much unhappiness, and hails every man as the beneficiary of fortune if long life *cum sana mente in corpore sano* be granted him. But length of days is not the true test of the self's efficiency. If infancy excludes the principle of correlation as a mental attainment, old age often reveals its decisive impairment. Moreover, one man whose life is measured by a short span may have reached a far richer acquaintance with the meaning of his emotional contacts than another who at the turn of fourscore years is still the servant of organic appetite.²² To define clearly the purpose of our career, and to determine how every sensory impression and the conceptual judgment that results can ultimately subserve that end,—this alone will abolish the reaction of fear in face of death.

We thus reach the verdict that in the broader sphere of self-realization as well as in the primary act of self-consciousness it is necessary to have a definite idea of the end-in-view. Under what terms does Spinoza conceive it? The endeavor of every organism is the maintenance of its integrity. So long as the endeavor deals with the processes of body it is entirely instinctive. The end is recognized after the functions of the bodily organs have been discharged. A new aspect of the end-in-view appears when the correlating principle of mind begins the formation of a Self. The Self *looks* to an end, in the course of time constructs for it a precise background, and eventually makes a consistent effort to realize it. The difference between *end-in-view* for man and *end* for animal is abysmal. It celebrates the sweep of freedom which has come to conscious life. Man is not only free to follow his organic purpose; he is free to frame a line of conduct that shall bring his intellectual powers to their highest development.²³

The complete end of self, we submit, can never be fulfilled; it is a limiting concept. Yet we should carefully state it, so as to

²¹ IV, 67.

²² Cf. IV, 26; V, 25.

²³ V, 38 and Sch.; 39, Sch.

have a standard of comparison. Scientific pedagogy recognizes a concrete terminus ad quem, *viz.*, the training of the child's nature so that his sensory experience shall be as wide and complex as possible, and his mental grasp all-inclusive.²⁴ Such an ideal stands as the goal of every career. It reduces to a minimum the undisputed play of percept and image-association, and exalts the authority of intellect over both through the detection of governing laws. If the agent could rise to a perfect understanding of himself and the world he would lay hold upon the third and most effective type of knowledge, Intuition, the ability to see a thing *auf einem Blicke*, as Fichte says.²⁵ Yet even though we cannot reach the goal we are involved in an increasingly energetic struggle in its direction. Every new reaction is an opportunity for testing the value of the ideal, and at the same time each successive interpretation of the single reaction makes the ideal clearer to the eye.²⁶

But the self-purpose does not remain submerged in the necessarily shadowy terms of a limiting concept. It is not merely a hope; it is a present power.²⁷ Self-consciousness grows like the organism it interprets; and just as the organic functions never have a chance to display their full possibilities, so the self never reaches the pinnacle of its maturity. Nevertheless, whatever its stage of development, it is continually absorbing the common elements of its environment, which alone insure both the understanding and the attainment of the Good.²⁸

Of no other contact is this so inevitably true as in man's reaction upon his fellows. We have found that a mind does not wait for the touch and friction of other minds in order to become aware of its self-correlating tendency. The awaking of self is distinctly a private concern. Still the values which very early in life we begin to associate with the self are powerfully brought to sight through the appreciation of the points held in common with other selves. Hence, Spinoza is justified in his contention that a "man can neither be nor be conceived without

²⁴ V, 39, Sch.

²⁵ V, 20, Sch.

²⁶ IV, 31.

²⁷ Wissenschaftslehre, 1801, Teil. I, sect. 1.

²⁸ Cf. V, 40.

the power of taking delight in the highest good" of mankind in general.²⁹ The simple biological fact affords sufficient basis for the remark; for man comes into existence by the laws of physical generation; he is not dropped full-grown from the skies. The verdict of psychology is every bit as clear: Deny man a companion, and you make it impossible for him to unfold the idea of self, which the first glint of consciousness has disclosed.

How comprehensive a rôle in human life this reaction plays may be discerned by studying a familiar reaction to social stimuli. Pride is defined as a man's love of self, which puts too high an estimate on his own powers.³⁰ Now except as a theoretical concept, pride can have no standing in the history of mind apart from empirical contact with other minds. Pride in this sense becomes a pleasurable emotion issuing from a false opinion which affirms one man's superiority to his neighbor.³¹ If the way were open and we took the trouble to find it, we might learn both the state of our own mind and the approximate capacity of our neighbor's; a comparison of which would give the exact degree of difference and eliminate every emotion save that of gratitude for our united attainments, however little they might be. Thus the sensory contact, producing in the framing of character a homogeneity of impressions, that is, an *opinion*, effects now a reference of current experiences to the end-in-view, the building of a Self whose properties are shared by every other being of the same grade. Human behavior is not restricted to the response excited by inanimate nature or the motions of the subordinate organisms. If it were, the area of thought would be small, and the texture of language extremely rudimentary. That man may slowly but surely ascend in "his enjoyment of his rational life" is due solely to the impact of other reflective minds upon his own.³² The Self is therefore not a whole *sine plexu*, but a swirling current within whose bounds a thousand human tributaries are incessantly mingling. And the destiny of the Self, being common to the race, is illuminated by the triumphs of reason and skill, gleaming from the history of other gener-

²⁹ IV, 36, Sch.

³⁰ III, Def. Emots. xxviii.

³¹ IV, 57, Sch.

³² IV, App. 9.

ations and full of promise for our own impending achievements.³³

Such being the terminus of the dialectic of self-realization, what, we ask, are the notes of progress in the ascending series? We observe at once that proficiency in *recognizing* an object indicates the grade of self-discrimination. A given manifold (to use the vernacular of a later school), say, a flower, is framed by the triplicate action of sight and smell and touch and is then analyzed into its specific categorical qualities. This is what Spinoza terms the capacity for "understanding many things simultaneously."³⁴ The image of the flower, the flower-concept, becomes fixed in the observer's consciousness by repeated contact with its various embodiments, and in many a life plays a conspicuous part as the subject of phrase and fancy.³⁵ That is to say, recognition is not alone recognition of the objective data; it is a tacit, as yet inarticulate affirmation of Selfhood.³⁶ It enables the agent to separate his emotional inclination, *e.g.*, admiration for flowers, from the thought of an external cause, *e.g.*, the particular rose, and range it among the tried and proven aesthetic judgments of the race.³⁷ Such an emotion grows stronger with the widening of aesthetic experience, or as Spinoza says, "in proportion to the number of simultaneous concurrent causes exciting it."³⁸ And every access of strength to the judgment renders the agent more convinced both of his authority as a conceptual thinker, and of his selective freedom amid the mass of unrelated reactions.

Not different in principle but exceedingly more intricate in structure is the scheme of conduct, which coordinates spasmodic feelings under a common rubric. Conduct proceeds upon a precarious basis if we act only in order to escape an ill. Conduct must be positive; it must aim at a good.³⁹ What, for instance, should be our attitude towards Fame? Construing it negatively, we might cite its misuse, its vanity, the perfidious applause of the crowd. That is the view of the disappointed

³³ Cf. V, 20, Sch.

³⁴ IV, 45, Sch.

³⁵ Cf. V, 11.

³⁶ Cf. V, 29, Dem.

³⁷ V, 4, Sch.

³⁸ V, 8.

³⁹ IV, 63, Cor.

candidate, who flaunts it in the face of his contemporaries as evidence of his searching knowledge of the world. But the issue of his invective proves how meagrely he understands the progress of his spiritual dialectic. For in his case each separate quest for fame is a reaction to an ephemeral stimulus; it is not coordinated to any intelligible rule of action; it is merely the output of sensuous impulse. Hence, ambition cannot remain a permanent factor in his career; it will be superseded by vehement anger, malicious insinuation, and ultimate despair. The proper values of selfhood are miserably obscured.

Profoundly antagonistic to this attitude is the course of the man who attempts to correlate kindred reactions into a definite scheme of conduct. The many and varied occasions leading to the pursuit of fame are interpreted by a single aim. In that way alone can he assert his primordial right and deepen his consciousness of freedom.⁴⁰ Therefore, he is careful to estimate the psychological uses of fame, the objects of quest, and the proper means for procuring them, and to assess the value of each new experience on the basis of that judgment. If the currents of life be conflicting or the principle of selfhood as yet ineffectually applied, he may turn the abstract rule into a group of precepts, commit them to memory, and in the event of an emergency summon them to hand one by one for instant service. Thus, recognizing an emotion will be the same as recognizing the presence of self; the keener and more comprehensive the reaction, the greater our progress in understanding the fundamental purpose of mind.⁴¹

A second note of progress is found in the self's relation to Time. Mind by its very nature must grow. If it halt, if it stagnate, selfhood is obscured and may become extinct. Idiocy is not the equivalent of personality. Now growth requires time. Hence, the development of self must be reckoned among the phenomena of a temporal experience. Nevertheless, man as a person is not in time in the same way that man as an individual is. The individual varies from moment to moment; the self abides the same, being the correlating principle which alone ex-

⁴⁰ V, 9.

⁴¹ V, 10, Sch.

plains the otherwise disjointed and unmeaning organic events. The self is always present, the permanent repository of all those properties that go to the making of a man.⁴²

That it is the same continuous self which coordinates utterly diverse reactions is a matter of record. In an unreflective period of life, *e.g.*, childhood, impulse asks for immediate satisfaction and will not take denial. If of two goods desired both be future, the one nearer in time, whatever its possible issues, will be persistently sought. Even though the issues of a future good be fully known, it will be arbitrarily sidetracked in favor of an object whose charms are exercising their momentary spell.⁴³ These are facts persuasive at once to youth, manhood and old age. They affirm inevitably the degree of freedom won or lost. They also forecast the difficulties attending the self's struggle to unfold its virtues. So long as sensuous impressions shape their career, men are the abject servants of Time. But when the awaking mind correlates events present, past and future under some common schedule of conduct, then the freedom of selfhood begins to emerge. Thus, the value of a good depends not on the moment of its enjoyment, but upon its essential character. If the present gratifications be agreeable while the remote effects are subversive of bodily health, the calculus of reflective psychology waives the element of time and pronounces the course contrary to nature. That is to say, we seek the greater good of the future in preference to the lesser good of the present, or a lesser evil of the present which leads to a definite good of the future; because the interests of self prescribe not an isolated pleasure here and there but a sustained and ultimate benison, known as harmony of mind.⁴⁴ The progress of self, it follows from this, proceeds by time-obliterating steps and clinches its indigenous powers by subduing refractory emotions to the settled scheme of life.⁴⁵

Yet just here a caution must be entered. For unreflective behavior often reveals an apparent observance of the same law, *viz.*, denial of present good for the sake of future reward. Thus,

⁴² Cf. V, 7, Dem.

⁴³ IV, 9, 10, 16.

⁴⁴ IV, 60, Cor.; 62; 76 and Cor.

⁴⁵ V, 7, Dem.

many men believe that piety and religion are burdens to be resolutely borne, in order either to escape horrible penalties after death or to gain celestial emoluments of service. They balance present evils against future good or greater future ills. Time is insidiously eliminated from the account and a calculus of good effected. The error is due to a defective psychology. The mind is subject to development only as an interpretation of the body's reactions. Hence, conditions after death cannot be compared with experience in life. If superstitious believers were deprived of this comparison, they would see no incentive in the doctrine of rewards and would return precipitately to their own lusts. For the driving force with them is not the harmonious unfolding of natural powers. They are as illogical in their attitude as one who proposed to abandon the rational life altogether in case he found the mind to cease at the body's dissolution. The true standard of judgment is not an ideal furnished by another world. It must be expressed in empirical terms or not at all. To balance real evils against a purely hypothetical good is unscientific and proves that unreflecting fancy has copied the rule of reason in vain.⁴⁶

The third mark of progress lies in the gratification incident to each advance in the self's control of its experience. We must observe the psychological order of events,—followed in Spinoza's "Ethics" as strictly as in the most systematic modern handbook. The organic impulse, developing as emotion in the higher life of man, reacts upon its environment, correlates its mental impressions and records a change in the actual state (perfectio) of body. The value of the change he terms pleasure.⁴⁷ Just as the whole body acts in the functioning of any appetite, so the whole self undergoes change with every correlated response.⁴⁸ If then we would learn whether the self is becoming properly conscious of its powers, we must consult the kind and degree of exhilaration following upon the heels of a given reaction. "Joy," says the author, "arises from the true apprehension of our virtues and their causes."⁴⁹ Change of feel-

⁴⁶ V, 41, Sch.

⁴⁷ III, 53; Def. Emot. ii.

⁴⁸ IV, 60.

⁴⁹ V, 10, Sch.

ing is instinctively associated with the idea of personal proprietorship. It is we who change; it is we who contemplate the change and are able to calculate its differentials.⁵⁰ Hence, it is we who can tell, sometimes in precise terms, how substantial is the progress effected by a rare experience.⁵¹ We have noted the diversity between the pleasures of sensual indulgence and the elation of philosophic thought.⁵² That was a comparison in the career of individuals. Here we study the conquests of growing personality. If the understanding becomes distinct in proportion to our ability to categorize experience and gradually do away with the confirmatory evidence of sense,⁵³ surely the agent's "joy" must needs register a parallel advance. Thus, the geometer who takes delight in drawing figures moves a definite pace forward when he ascertains, say, the principle of a circle, that if two straight lines intersect within it the rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another. He will advance another step in mental satisfaction when he grasps the fact that the principle cited is objectively true whether the actual figure be traced or not. A supreme joy will gird his soul if out of such a splendid principle a great discovery like the law of gravitation should issue.⁵⁴ In every case the gratification is not an impersonal event, shut off from the currents of life by abstract interpretation. It is "accompanied by the idea of the agent and his virtue," a sure result of the functioning of self-purpose. It foreshadows the limiting concept, which stands at the end of the intellectual dialectic and is called by Spinoza "blessedness," the highest possible contentment.⁵⁵

A practical test of the degree of gratification reached is found in the exclusion of excess from the course of self-realization. Excess means the disturbance of the organic equilibrium by an over-emphasis on one feeling. For instance, derision is the form of laughter which selects and pillories a moral quality which we despise in an object which we hate.⁵⁶ The generic impulse,

⁵⁰ III, Def. Emot. xxv.

⁵¹ IV, App. xxxi.

⁵² Cf. II, 8, Sch., for illustration in a totally different setting.

⁵³ V, 27, Dem.

⁵⁴ Cf. sup. pg. 52.

⁵⁵ II, 13, Sch.

⁵⁶ III, Def. Emot. xi.

laughter, being an offshoot of cheerfulness, is symptomatic of a healthy body and a sound mind and should always be cultivated.⁵⁷ As a sign of the superb joy of living it cannot be excessive; for it expresses the Self in its unmixed properties; and if the emotion were to transgress its own bounds it would at the same time exact more from the self than Nature had made possible.⁵⁸ Hence, emotion when pure is steady, but emotion when linked with baser passion, like hate, tends to engage the mind's attention to the retirement of all nobler thoughts.⁵⁹ Certain definite results, such as spiritual inertia and sinister suspicion, can be traced directly to emotional excess; and their very diversity, malignity and widespread contagion prove how little they are under our command.⁶⁰ It is the business of the developing self, then, to cleanse its emotions of extraneous elements and to guard most vigilantly against the reappearance of every excluded habit. In this sphere it is only too true that vigilance is the price of liberty.⁶¹ Our success as responsible sentinels will be attested by a change both in the outward effects of our action, and in the inward peace. Hatred with its attendant discords must inevitably give place to a genuine sympathy for our kind, which in a man's private psychology will serve to redress the balance of thought and enlarge the power of choice.

II

The second aspect of self-conscious development is ethical. It considers man as fitted into the framework of society. It affirms that the gregarious instinct, so pronounced in the construction of character, has its roots deep in the unique purpose of the race. It takes man out of the exclusion of self and plants his life in the soil of humanity. We have hitherto conceived him as possessing gifts, properties, powers; now we must describe him as the depositary of obligations. Heretofore, a multitude of impressions have thronged through his senses, tending to confirm his judgment of separateness; now from his garnished mind pours out a stream of desires whose destination is the heart

⁵⁷ IV, 42, 45, Sch.

⁵⁸ IV, 61.

⁵⁹ IV, 6.

⁶⁰ V, 20, Sch.

⁶¹ IV, App. xxx.

of another moral being. The horizon of self is indefinitely expanded. A social consciousness emerges. We are citizens of the world. The bodies and minds of individual men have coalesced into a "single body and a single mind, and all men with one consent seek what is serviceable to all."⁶² Thus the mind of humanity is not a complex of a million separate minds, but a definite consciousness, growing ever more clear with the progress of reflective civilization. Such is the hope which sweeps the fancy of our philosopher. We proceed to examine the several points that bring it within the range of credibility.

The ethical relation is primarily grounded in the nature of man. It is not forced upon him by mysterious chance nor mediated by overwhelming Fate. In the first place the mental equipment of men is the same. They respond to the same exciting causes, and can be affected favorably only by those objects which have properties in common with them.⁶³ They will be most favorably affected by individuals whose sum of qualities is the same as their own. The only stimulus of which this is true is another man. Inferior species have similar organic functions, but they lack the impulse of reflection, man's distinguishing endowment, and as truly a law of his nature as any instinct held in common with them.⁶⁴ The rational impulse therefore cannot be satisfied by commerce with animals. Towards them we exercise the same rights that they by virtue of their equipment have in us, *viz.*, the power of physical control. But since everyone's rights are defined by the intrinsic laws of his being, man will assume much more sweeping rights over his subordinates. He will use them as befits his needs, and neither religious scruple nor mawkish sentiment can dispute his mode of treatment.⁶⁵ To satisfy the reflective impulse, however, Nature has provided a multitude of kindred minds and ordained that only by the union of sexes, both endowed with the principle of intelligence, could the perpetuity of the race be won.⁶⁶ Such minds are capable of instituting fellowship quite out of keeping with the

⁶² IV, 18, Sch.

⁶³ IV, 29.

⁶⁴ IV, 35, Cor. i; *cf.* III, 49, Sch.

⁶⁵ IV, 37, Sch. i.

⁶⁶ IV, 68, Sch.; App. 20.

impact of simpler organic tendencies. They can organize an exchange of ideas through articulate symbols, an indisputable evidence of reflection, and thereby understand one another's needs and together develop their distinctive purpose.⁶⁷

To the parity of nature we must next add the community of end; their destiny is the same. We have defined the goal of the self's private endeavor and discovered that it is implicated in the nature of mind. But one self is typical of every other. What belongs to the first must find its secure place in the second, the third, and each succeeding self to the end of time. To rob one man of the end ascribed to another would be equivalent to denying him the right of selfhood.⁶⁸ The thesis is thus supported by a *reductio ad impossibile*, valid indeed as an argument but not practically persuasive. We turn to a more homely, albeit effective defense, as suggested by the universalistic aspects of hedonism. For every agent by nature seeks his own highest good and with every successful attempt advances by a fixed degree the command over his own resources. Now if all men be involved in the same moral struggle, the interests of each individual agent will be proportionately improved. Hence, no man can better serve his own ends than by aiding his neighbor in a consistent quest for rectitude of life.⁶⁹ That nature has fashioned minds with genius to fit them for entering such a mutually favorable competition, is a plain contradiction of a popular, though perverted theory, which holds that to pursue one's personal advantage is the "foundation of impiety."⁷⁰ Therefore, every man as responsible agent must lend his "skill and temperament" to the training of his fellows, with a view to organizing for them the same scheme of conduct that he has consciously conceived for himself.⁷¹ In this way man's private desires become synonymous with the wider issues of the race; and since private desires born of deep contemplation of the self's true nature are always good, it follows that our public virtues will exhibit the same standard of excellence; in other

⁶⁷ IV, App. 26.

⁶⁸ IV, 18, Sch.

⁶⁹ IV, 36, Sch.

⁷⁰ IV, App. ix.

⁷¹ IV, 35, Cor. ii; 37, second Dem.

words, that justice, fidelity and benevolence will surely prevail.⁷²

Given these two facts organic to the life of man, what has been their effect on the actual movements of society? The argument for social consciousness based on experience is singularly convincing. It has a double edge; it states, first, what privations men are saved from by association, and secondly, how their natural wants are satisfactorily covered.⁷³ A balance of interests proves that the advantage is distinctly on the side of social cooperation. For if every man exercised his so-called natural rights, he would indiscriminately avenge his private wrongs and expend hate and aversion upon all who in any way opposed his self-assertions. The result would be confusion, pain and death. Hence, such tendencies must somehow be curbed, and the natural rights which give warrant to them voluntarily relinquished. But the organization of the State is not after all a proscription of inherent powers; it is a definite recognition of man's most fundamental impulse, his desire for life. How can he protect life and limb, if on every hand unrestrained enemies are lusting for his blood? The principle of surrendering secondary rights in order to safeguard the primary purpose is well expressed by Spinoza in the words, "Men avoid inflicting injury through fear of receiving a greater injury themselves."⁷⁴ To save men from the dominion of hate by a just regard for the interests of all is the unquestioned boon which coalescence in an organized society prescribes. It cannot fail to increase the earning power of each new moral endeavor.⁷⁵

But important as this phase of the argument is, it must not be left to stand alone. In fact, by itself it would be discredited by events. For harmony in the social mind, if grounded solely in fear, is tenuous and fleeting. Fear, as we have intimated, springs always from weakness of spirit. When weakness of a specific sort is multiplied in a congeries of minds, the result can be nothing but weakness. If men entertain a truce solely because of their wavering temper, the steadfastness of the convention is

⁷² IV, 18, Sch.

⁷³ IV, 35, Sch.

⁷⁴ IV, 37, Sch. ii.

⁷⁵ Cf. IV, 46, Sch.

precarious to the last degree.⁷⁶ To found a state for the development of social life, to establish an arena for the battle of ethical principles, the argument must guarantee certain positive details. For example, it must insure the cultivation of arts and crafts as the legitimate output of the inventive mind of man. In all the history of the human race an accepted medium of exchange has been the sheet-anchor of social stability. Anthropology in its recent inquiries has amply demonstrated what Spinoza implied and all economists have dwelt on, *vis.*, that the test of organization, the evidence of a common consciousness, is revealed with great clearness in the tribe's attitude to barter and trade. Just as in untutored society a piece of metal or its equivalent evinces one man's readiness to trust his neighbor, so in the highly complex system of modern credit the same trait appears on a grandiose scale.⁷⁷ Again, common consciousness feels the inevitable discrepancy between individuals units in place, opportunity and equipment. There are numbers of men naturally disqualified for service. Individual munificence, however great, can not provide for the needs of poverty, distress and delinquency. The organized state must do so. It is the trustee of the common good, and to its offices all disabled citizens are justified in appealing. The governing motive should never be that of lordly generosity. Charity is not an emotional sentiment; it is good economic policy. It has "regard for the general advantage." By helping one, the state helps all.⁷⁸ Such is the breadth of view to which the social consciousness calls us. He who enters intelligently into the spirit of mutualism finds himself carried along the course of personal development at an amazing speed. Truly the end of all is each man's projected goal.

The term of the ethical dialectic is now in sight, a civil manhood, so to say, embodying the universalized virtues of the single self. By the very nature of the case it can never be fully reached; but its several stages will be realized *pari passu* with the realization of the individual series. The process, however, is more involved, inasmuch as a multitude of minds meet and struggle in the same arena. The persistent interaction of self-

⁷⁶ IV, App. 16.

⁷⁷ Cf. IV, App. 28.

⁷⁸ IV, App. 17.

empowered agents gives edge and value to the ethical life. Just what that interaction is, just how the contest may be successfully maintained, is the next point to be determined.

Moral energies do not spring from the play of unharnessed impulses. These by themselves evince no tendency to bind men together. The only kind of union implied is that which subjects the weaker to the forcible dominion of the stronger. Thus, if we study to make other men live according to rules devised by ourselves, we are purposely using them for the promotion of our own interest. For if they by any hap dispossess us of our coveted goods, instantly hate and threats of vengeance ensue.⁷⁹ Plainly, then, at root men cannot be in harmony and still pursue the same material end, since one of them must at length lay engaging hands upon it and wrest it from the other's control. Discomfiture and chagrin are the penalties. Not good as the particular object of desire, but good as realized by one, and denied to the other, is the true index of this state of feeling.⁸⁰ On so divisive a basis a program looking to the formation of common obligations cannot be effected. It is this very situation which Spinoza conceives as existing in prehistoric times. The "state of nature" was a state of discord and despair. Men, being a prey to unharnessed appetites, acted always in defiance of their neighbor's interests. Hence, no standards of good and evil could be framed, since each agent was a law to himself, and standards even if set up would be at once in conflict and could only be confirmed by force. Moreover, in a state of nature the idea of private property is quite unknown. Land and tools are held in common, used as each one pleases, and then abandoned. It is impossible for a man to perform the most rudimentary duty, *viz.*, rendering to another man what rightfully belongs to him. In other words, the conceits of Ethics are as yet unframed.

Ethical interaction cannot depend primarily upon reaction to common needs. From what then does it derive its impetus? Plainly from the same reflective impulse which points the way to the evolution of the social consciousness. We must not suppose however that the organic appetites of body are extinguished

⁷⁹ IV, 37, Sch. i.

⁸⁰ IV, 34, Sch.

by the magic of a word. On the contrary familiar emotions once directed to instinctive ends will be illuminated with new beauty when wrought upon by a truly moral purpose. Thus ambition, which seeks a man's private aggrandisement by absorbing other interests into his own, is transmuted into an instrument of reflection, collating the common habits, rights, duties and destinies of mankind into a superior virtue, and clothing it with the honored name of Piety.⁸¹ A broader appraisal of Self is made in view of its new relations to other selves. The exertion of power formerly confined to its effect upon our own life is now judged in a twofold way. No longer alone and irresponsible in a stimulating environment, no longer at liberty to make an unmixed sense-impact on our fellow, as the lower organism does, we are constrained to study his activity in the same manner in which we studied our own. Perceiving that all mutual interests are inextricably mingled, we are bound to treat his needs with courteous consideration. If the reflective mind is the only power capable of forming friendship, it is the manifest duty of him who possesses it to guide his behavior by the rules of friendly intercourse. For how, if he does not follow the clear tendency of his kind, can he possibly rise to a level of moral obligation, where he acts out of due respect to his neighbor's interests?⁸²

The trial of strength often comes suddenly, but when it comes it reveals the stage of development with unflinching exactness. A wrong done, perhaps amid aggravated circumstances, the deep hurt to our sensibilities, the festering sore, the smoldering resentment, the bursting of bonds in flaming anger,—who has not passed through spiritual anguish, in which emotions like these have crowded thick upon him? Impulse, the handmaid of Hate, reigns supreme, and with queenly fury terrorizes the hopes of friendship into silence. If ever the "state of nature" has been conquered, it returns again with pristine vigor, and woe to the mind that dares to challenge the intruder's entry! But the self which has already tasted the joys of freedom knows how galling the old servitude would be, if revived. Its business therefore is

⁸¹ V, 4, Sch.

⁸² IV, 37, Sch. i.

to organize a code of defense. It will affirm the value of moral relations, possible only on the footing of friendship. It will point again to the fact that coalescence, social harmony, is the birthright of the mind, and that our real good as reflective beings can spring alone from the mutual discharge of duty. It will analyze to the minutest point the causes leading to the infliction of wrong, and devise methods by which they can be either averted or mitigated in effect. When these things are done the heat of anger shall have been quenched, at least in part, and the moral equilibrium in part restored, and we shall have been taught the office of patience as a sufficient answer to the defiance and disesteem of the world.⁸³

So much for the triumph of reason among neighbors. No less impressive is its triumph in the sphere of citizenship. When men yielded to the State their right to redress private injuries, they gave up also by implication a right to pass judgment on another's conduct.⁸⁴ Judgment can be adequately framed when the interests of all are taken into account, that is to say, when the peace of the body politic is safeguarded. The intent of requital for wrong is not recrimination, and should not be attended by a feeling of indignation. Right and wrong, justice and injustice do not exist as guiding concepts in a state of nature; for, as we have seen, relationships such as owner and goods are entirely foreign to its experience. They enter when by common consent rights and privileges are delegated to particular persons. It would be meaningless to punish an organic being as a responsible agent before the basis of his responsibility has been laid. That would be an attempt to ruin him simply out of instinctive opposition, without vindicating in the least the new principle of organization which the impulse of reflection has set in motion. Penal action is not retributive but curative. It aims to preserve the harmony of the social units and to provide a field for the proper working out of ethical problems. It argues that when men enter a moral society they receive a guarantee of safe conduct so long as they comply with the terms of the compact, and that when they have violated its

⁸³ V, 10, Sch.; IV, App. 14.

⁸⁴ IV, App. 24.

terms they have by that act made it more difficult for other citizens to fulfil their part of the agreement. Hence, the public welfare compels the state to exact reprisal by distraint or physical disability. If law and its sanctions be not administered, social coalescence fails and the foundations of the State crumble away.⁸⁵

The general rule just enunciated is illustrated in the attitude of the moral agent towards the matter of honesty. Is not a man justified in resorting to deceit for the sake of defending himself against injury? Does not the most elementary conation demand that by hook or crook the menacing enemy should be circumvented? The answer must be found in the distinctive purpose governing the development of the race. What reflection prescribes for one unit it prescribes for all. If deception be a perfectly moral implement in an individual case, it must by virtue of mental consanguinity be fitted to the conduct of mankind in general. But in that event no one would feel himself under obligation to this or any other law, and the whole system of carefully developed jurisprudence would be null and void. Just as soon as we understand that such an issue contradicts both the meaning of the reflective impulse and the actual practice of history the absurdity of deceit as an instrument of self-defense is convincingly apparent.⁸⁶ We are forced to be honest in order to preserve the equilibrium of society and secure our own welfare,—so fully do the moral canons which have guided the upward trend of civilization take their color from the relation of private interests to the common good.

The destiny of man being social in its values, his freedom can be attained only under the spell of ethical interaction. If commerce with irrational creatures fails to call out the deeper motives of the self, equally unavailing is a man's communion with himself. For complete freedom of thought cannot be realized so long as he declines to throw into the scale every pennyweight of power which his unique purpose affords him. To dwell in solitude away from the haunts of men, so far from enlarging his independence, in reality shuts him off from the

⁸⁵ IV, 37, Sch. ii; 51.

⁸⁶ IV, 72.

very forces which can satisfy the needs of his nature.⁸⁷ In the last analysis, then, to live untrammelled by the restraints of traditionary law is not an evidence of freedom. The average citizen is right in dealing harshly with one who slights or scornfully rejects the received customs of society. These have been created by the determined push of the reflective instinct, questing after an ever freer atmosphere for its inspirations.⁸⁸ Selfhood comes to its surest privilege under the favoring stimulus of social organization. It must be burdened with duties in order to broaden its scope of activity. The more serious responsibilities it assumes, the greater is its degree of freedom. Therefore to possess the "general rights of citizenship" is the ambition of the freedom-seeking soul.⁸⁹

Nevertheless, in responding to social stimulus one may be as discriminating as in his organic reactions,—even more so. Freedom does not demand universal assumption of ethical relations. Indeed, the choice we make of personal obligation will frequently denote the type of freedom reached. Thus, the wise man may decline to accept favors from one ruled by appetite, on the ground that the standard of judgment is different. Reason does not reckon human intercourse as a field for barter and exchange. We do not bestow a benefit for the sake of receiving an exact recompense in kind. Impulse on the other hand regards it as a hardship when its advances are otherwise estimated than in its two terms. The result is disappointment and revenge. To avoid such a *contretemps* reflection bids us use our freedom in choosing whom we shall meet in intimate moral relations, with the reservation that when associated with those whose nature is averse from our own, and forced to accept a favor, we should match their offers with equal service, never giving them a chance to dispute our motive or suspect a note of contempt in our behavior.⁹⁰

The freedom caught in such ethical snatches finds its fulfillment in the social harmony, where men live in exclusive obedience to the laws of reason and each man is in fact his brother's keeper.⁹¹

⁸⁷ IV, 35, Sch.

⁸⁸ Cf. IV, App. 14.

⁸⁹ IV, 73.

⁹⁰ IV, 70, 71.

⁹¹ IV, 35, Cor. i; 46, Sch.

III

The dialectic of self-realization is not satisfied by man's reflective interpretation of private reaction or his absorption in the common consciousness of his kind. These two experiences, varied and engrossing as they are, yet in each analysis deal with particular objects, whose relations to him are always determined by the categories of logical thought. We catch the idea of self-hood through the unceasing correlating movements of the mind. This percept, that percept, this feeling, that feeling,—units of consciousness,—follow one another so closely, and are by instinct so concisely compared, that without initiation on the part of the thinker the picture of a self emerges. Then, brought in contact with similar minds, a new type of image is generated, new trains of thought are started. Springs of action heretofore untapped send forth their gleaming emotions. Man was not made to dwell alone. He must speak with a fellowman and through the avenues of friendship construct the laws of ethical restraint, which in the end shall refine his character and incite him to noble deeds. The reflective impulse as we have thus far studied it guarantees all this to its holders. But it guarantees more, much more; it opens a new continent of observation. Reflection, we said, operates first in the field of psychology, secondly in the field of ethics. Now we advance one step further and describe the *ultima thule* of human endeavor. The impulse becomes religious, and when it has been duly developed the dialectic of self is satisfied.

We should note at the outset that religion in Spinoza's opinion is not an interloper, masquerading under the guise of human desire. To construe its terms, as many have done, as childish reactions to nature's portents, as elaboratae figments of poetic fancy, as political machinery for the suppression of popular revolt, or in the latest form as the product of age-long development in certain nerve-tracts of the brain, would be from his point of view merely clever examples of *petitio principii*. Religion stands on the same platform as moral obligation. If men by virtue of their unique purpose are constrained to associate

themselves in the interchange of thought, just as truly are they bound to entertain the idea of wider relations, such as the term Religion connotes.⁹² To follow a religious mode of life one does not need to wait upon the high moments of inspiration, when he fully understands the values of the world-consciousness. Religious feeling of a rudimentary sort, yet a true child of natural impulse, controls even the lowest rounds of racial behavior. Even when civilization has enlightened the horizon of scientific inquiry, but kept theological dogma crude and mercenary, this offshoot of reflection remains vigorous and compelling. The explanation is not far to seek. Since private interest is and must be the "first foundation of virtue and the rule of right living," anything that conduces to that end cannot be left on one side. Plainly among the most constructive qualities of the human mind none is more insistent in its claim to primacy than broadmindedness.⁹³ The nearer evidences of so high a trait are found in the strictly empirical phenomena of sobriety and presence of mind in the face of danger.⁹⁴ But there are finer examples of it, not to be reckoned in terms of physical reaction. They may be paralleled by the edicts of civil manhood, which bid us bear with equanimity the social wrongs we cannot cure. If we, like other individuals, are imbedded in the solid fabric of nature and cannot act without her call, shall we mope and moan amid circumstances that the momentary complex of ideas proclaims as contrary to our best interests? Shall we not rather as reflective beings, understanding the irreversible necessity of every event, accept our lot without complaint and steel the mind to persist in such acquiescence?⁹⁵ To this frame of thought the Stoics approached, and certainly we cannot refrain from regarding their conduct as guided by the religious instincts of the race.⁹⁶ The conclusion is again pressed home that man can "neither be nor be conceived" without the faculty of entering into an appreciation of the highest good.⁹⁷ Religious aspirations are common to all men.

⁹² IV, 37, Sch. i.

⁹³ *Animositas*. V, 41 and Sch.

⁹⁴ III, 59, Sch.

⁹⁵ IV, App. 32.

⁹⁶ *Cf.* V, Pref.

⁹⁷ IV, 36, Sch.

Still another fact confronts the careful student. If religion and the ethical sense issue from the same impulse, there must be some intimate interaction between them. They cannot be sequestered in wholly unrelated compartments of thought. They belong to an organic Self whose every expression embodies the feeling of the entire system.⁹⁸ It is an axiom of the history of religious creeds that each new faith is still-born except as it has the capacity of projecting its tenets into the common life of the people. The milieu of religion is not individual conviction but the social exchange. It follows that the religious impulse, being supreme in the counsels of selfhood, cannot fail to exert a commanding influence over moral conduct. Private interests, we found, were practically subserved by seeking for others the same good which we crave for ourselves. Interpret private interests in the light of a religious ideal, and we expand indefinitely their values. But while we increase the compass of our own good, we cannot exclude our neighbor from sharing in the same advance. In order therefore to realize the newly conceived individual good we must put forth larger exertion for the benefit of the social whole. Each step in the understanding of the religious ideal makes a man more acutely sensitive to his ethical obligation.⁹⁹ How shall we frame a more authentic test of the purity of religious progress than by examining the state of morals in any community where the ideal has been intelligently adopted? For example, every act that carries in its train the elements of pain, is contrary to justice as organized in civil law, and to the higher instincts of religion.¹⁰⁰ Now if the social tendency be to recompense hate with hate, we not only prove how little we understand the nature of duty, but also how completely we have misconceived the salient facts of the universe. True virtue can only be maintained by repeating in human conduct the harmony of nature. What unreflective men have called disorder and injustice in the operation of her laws is now seen to have issued from their confused or fragmentary view of events.¹⁰¹ Nature is ruled by unbending necessity; it has no hate or revenge. If

⁹⁸ Cf. IV, 60.

⁹⁹ IV, 37, Dem.

¹⁰⁰ IV, App. 24.

¹⁰¹ IV, 73, Sch.

religion be allowed to have her way in the ethical development of the race, she will prescribe love and brotherhood and a just regard for another's rights.¹⁰² Her ministry is remarkably efficacious; for those who are the beneficiaries of love, especially of the sort prompted by religious intelligence, find a new joy in living, a new appreciation of the fibre of manhood, that sinks the impulse of resentment in the resolve to do good. It cannot be denied that the type and mode of execution of the religious ideal are authoritative gauges of the race's moral character. If religion does nothing else, it guarantees to every man freedom deliberately to cancel the common response to threat and abuse, and make return of good for evil. No greater evidence of the autonomy of self can be desired.¹⁰³

Having determined the universal validity of reflection's highest impulse, we next seek acquaintance with its terms. Towards what does this drive carry us? Reflective effort begins with the commonest data of perception, but it does not stop there. It continues its correlating office in the vicinage of contending minds; but here too its aims are not finally realized. There is a province of human experience as yet untouched, one too that lies altogether beyond the pale of animal simulation. For while the higher organism may take pleasure in the presence of its kind, may suffer from what looks like nostalgic depression when a mate is removed, may even recognize some signs of communication and fashion a code of subhuman ethics, there is not a scintilla of evidence to suggest that the dog or horse feels himself bowed in awe before the mystery of cosmic power. In this domain man dwells alone, serenely alone. He cannot share his secret intimations with the brute; he cannot at times express the strange exhilaration to his most appreciative neighbor. Religion, as no other function of the reflective impulse, proves that man's purpose is unique, and that however closely his other actions resemble the reactional processes of lower organisms, when we reach the stage of broadest sweep the conceptual powers of the human mind are no longer susceptible of imitation. For

¹⁰² IV, App. 15; V. 20.

¹⁰³ IV. 46, Sch.

it is essential to the program of religion that we enter the highest field of knowledge which we are capable of investigating.¹⁰⁴ This will not imply that we must cover every detail of scientific procedure. Only infinite intelligence could do that, and infinite intelligence is by hypothesis the limiting concept toward which the refinement of human experience tends. Religion assumes that we know that God exists, but it does not assume that we know all the modes of divine activity.¹⁰⁵

The attitude of reflection as respects the world-problem is, Spinoza argues, radically different from that of sense-perception. Let us take the first of the infinite attributes, *viz.*, Extension. How does the eye or the hand regard Matter? Not as infinite, for their sensuous reach is extremely limited; not as indivisible, for the parts fall into analyzable bits before the simplest experiment of chemistry; nor yet as permanent, for vapor may be condensed into water, and water into solid, all material elements being subject to the rules of genesis and dissolution. If this were the end of our inquiry, the place of religion would be entirely vacated. Reflection however enters, and shows that though one element may change into another there is no resultant loss; that when chemical units are compounded they invariably assume a fixed relation; and that each event in the purview of perception is tied back to another, and that to still another, until an infinite series is set in motion, passing by assumption the grasp of a single mind. Thus are we drawn away from the contemplation of the broken arcs to the apprehension of the spheric round. God, the unchangeable Substance, engages the religious impulse as its proper end-in-view.¹⁰⁶

No less emphatic is the mind's *rapprochement* towards the second of the divine attributes. Thought, or consciousness, we have already discovered, is another aspect of tangible matter.¹⁰⁷ The behavior of a biological organism is interpreted through the function which its primary or secondary impulses perform. In the case of man, when a wholly new purpose appears the office of consciousness becomes exceedingly complex, and at times

¹⁰⁴ IV, 28, Dem.

¹⁰⁵ IV, App. 4.

¹⁰⁶ I, 15, Sch.

¹⁰⁷ Sup. pg. 43.

baffles understanding. Nevertheless, we are persuaded that its business is to express the activity of the organic life by means of a self-discriminating personality. When we leave the level of "finite modes" may we carry with us the same principle of coordination? Is it true that the universe possesses a *consciousness*, which infallibly interprets the minutest facts of physics and chemistry? Spinoza argues for this position. He holds that we "must explain the order of the whole of nature or the whole chain of causes through the attribute of thought only."¹⁰⁸ God is not alone extended Substance; he is a thinking Thing.¹⁰⁹ Granting this, we are not merely permitted, we are obliged to examine the total meaning of nature. This impetus for examination stirs within us in the guise of religion. It must be strictly differentiated from the common habit of thought, that appoints for each natural event a specific end. Thus, men are constantly saying that Nature has blundered or left her work undone,—because she has not measured her act by their preconceived types. Her duty, they affirm, is to adapt every physical law or organic process to the good of humanity, man being her choicest product.

The mistake, which is a familiar one, lies in considering each phenomenon in its individual relations and apart from the organization of the whole. God does not act for this or that private end—he does not act for an end as such, a thing precedently conceived, but as yet unrealized. Nature exists because it exists, and acts because it acts.¹¹⁰ The doctrine of finality is without meaning here, for Nature does not admit of imperfections. Rather is she steadily and with increasing clearness revealing her glorious perfections to intelligent observers, tying both scientific laws and the single events illustrating them back to the unbending mechanism of her system.¹¹¹ Hence, the quest of the religious impulse is for a view of the world from whose contour the incidents of defect are being progressively eliminated. That the quest should not be vain may be gathered from the fundamental nature of man. For his mind can have a pre-

¹⁰⁸ II, 7, Sch.

¹⁰⁹ II, 1.

¹¹⁰ I, 11.

¹¹¹ Cf. II, 5.

cise knowledge of reality,—its own actions, its body, the environing objects, all part and parcel of the divine Substance.¹¹² If we accepted as guides only ideas that could be verified by facts, we should soon exclude pain as a human experience, and understanding perfectly the ways of Nature move with unintercepted freedom amid the varied combinations of her forces.¹¹³ Indeed, if the reflective powers had been fully developed at the start, we should have had no knowledge of good and evil, but a continuous *rapport* with the necessary order of the world. The career of humanity, however, proves that its potential capacity has never been completely unfolded except in the limiting concept. There have been temporary snatches of lucid thought, as in the faith of the Patriarchs and in the spirit of Christ, but the great majority of mankind have sold their religious birthright for the grossest gratifications of sense.¹¹⁴ They have trodden the sodden path of the beast, when they might have contributed to the framing of an ethical standard whose terms would have spelt social happiness. In short, instead of emphasizing the eternal "something" which makes man divine, they have been content to esteem the fragmentary sketches of nature as of primary value and let the vast program of causality pass by unnoticed.¹¹⁵ Only when it is too late do narrow minds realize how futile it is for a man to put himself in a mood indifferent or antagonistic to natural force. We conquer solely by compliance.¹¹⁶

The goal of the religious impulse being definitely sighted, how, it is asked, shall we organize it into the practical experience of the Self? It cannot be done by forming a general notion, in the same way that we frame the ideas of humanity, justice, necessity, etc. For though such notions are fixed in the mind as objective facts, they are in common usage inevitably cast in the mold of a sensuous image. Nor can transcendental ideas like Being, Thing, etc., escape the same alignment. Thus, the highest concept of the mind, viz., God, has its empirical associations in some natural object or artificial device from which we

¹¹² II, 47, Dem.¹¹³ IV, 64.¹¹⁴ IV, 68 and Sch.¹¹⁵ V, 23.¹¹⁶ V, 18.

have drawn or into which we have injected certain controlling properties. Such a method is a prolific source of error; for there is an unbridged chasm between the idea at the base of the religious impulse and the myriad-faced forms by which men try to express it. There is no greater correspondence between them than between the true computation of figures in the subliminal consciousness and the mistaken results as worked out on paper.¹¹⁷ The application of the logical categories helps enormously to dissipate the crude and inept conceptions of divine nature, especially by holding before the mind the principle of causality.¹¹⁸ Moreover, the correct habits of religion can only be formed by training the mind to observe the universal relations of every experience. Just as true science can not be built upon scattered observations, with no common connecting thread of law, so true religion is not satisfied unless impressions of divine exertion can be submitted to a proper and adequate test. Science is the vestibule to spiritual faith.¹¹⁹

Nevertheless, science is not religion and must not be substituted for it. By virtue of its place in the organization of the self the religious impulse demands a mode of functioning different from the earlier phases of reflection.¹²⁰ Religion is distinctly an immediate experience. It excludes the scientific formulas that embrace all things under general principles. It isolates a particular object and considers it as free, that is, as existing by the necessity of its own nature and as determining its own action.¹²¹ Nor is such an attitude without good support. For reality is embodied in every reaction, and reality is but another name for God. Hence religion does not ask, as science does, for an elaborate array of empirical data upon the basis of which an adequate conclusion can be made. Religion takes an individual fact, and by understanding it understands universal Nature.¹²² Let us study the meaning of a familiar instinct, *e.g.*, the sex impulse. Viewed simply as a function of body it responds to its proper stimulus in the same fashion as any other

¹¹⁷ II, Sch. i; 47, Sch.

¹¹⁸ II, 42, Cor. ii.

¹¹⁹ V, 28.

¹²⁰ V, 36, Sch.

¹²¹ V, 5; I, Def. vii.

¹²² V, 24.

typical impulse.¹²³ When it becomes the subject of rational discipline the end-in-view is proportionately broadened. The interests of society at large are now consulted. Instead of being an instrument for personal gratification the sex impulse turns its attention to the generation of healthy offspring, and the training of childhood in the art of living.¹²⁴ The good which a man covets for himself, *viz.*, Life, he also covets for others, and he will endeavor not only to discharge his own duty in an honorable way but also to influence other men to the same sort of action.¹²⁵

Furthermore, the implications of sex are not exhausted when we have fulfilled its natural offices. They are wider in scope; they possess profoundly spiritual values. The fact is unequivocally affirmed that every reaction, no matter how obscure, carries with it a complete *Weltanschauung*. It requires only the due exercise of reflective thought in order to disclose the cosmic elements in the simplest facts of experience.¹²⁶ Thus, in the appetite under consideration the specific organs involved become the symbols of universal fertility. Ethnic religions have seized upon their functions as evidence of the presence of superhuman power in the world. Hence, mythologic allegories like that of Leda and the swan, phallic rites, official prostitution attest the crude but natural quest for life. In the higher faiths the same symbols are employed, divested of course of their physical appurtenances and guaranteeing to their votaries unqualified "freedom of soul."¹²⁷ By a process of metaphoric change generation is superseded by re-generation, the female principle becomes the medium for the introduction of mystic vitality, while the parental instinct is lost in the gracious splendor of a divine Fatherhood.

The principle of organicity which we have just illustrated first comes to view in the action of a living body. There we are not at liberty to assume a local function of worth to itself alone. The organism is thoroughly articulated. Its appetites conform to the good of the whole and can be understood solely through its terms.¹²⁸ Every organ may be appraised as the body *in parvo*.

¹²³ III, 57, Sch.

¹²⁴ IV, App. 20.

¹²⁵ III, 6; IV, 35, Cor. i; 37.

¹²⁶ V, 14; *cf.* Intel. Emend. pg. 6.

¹²⁷ *Cf.* IV, App. 20.

¹²⁸ IV, 60.

That is to say, the body's general purpose is crystallized in the duty of a particular impulse,—a *Konzentrirung*, as Fichte would say.¹²⁹ More impressive still is the organical character of the self. It is an axiom of life that no man can preserve his corporate integrity for the sake of another object.¹³⁰ In the reflective valuation of experience no higher action can claim acceptance, for the reason that if another purpose alien to the subject's welfare should be introduced it would disturb the course of his development, and we should be unable to interpret the act by the conscious purpose of the whole. Whatever events in any life appear to be contrary to the general trend assume that aspect, in all probability, because we are not in position to detect or properly assess the value of every element entering into the system of the particular Self. Analyzed to its core, the most insignificant gesture of body will eventually reveal the stamp of personal character, the degree of self-unfolding, which the agent has attained. The mind is the formal cause of all reactions, and hence mirrors itself in the common facts of life.¹³¹

Still a third phase of teleological concentration on a broader plane is the constitution of human society. Here the particular self is reflected in the collective movements of mankind. Here a man may project himself fully upon the minds of his fellows without fearing to encounter a single trait of character that he himself cannot in some measure duplicate. If the structure of social life were not organic the principles of jurisprudence would be entirely without effect; for example, the punishment of an offender derives its force from the fact that the united will of society expresses itself concretely against any infraction of its rules. By reason of this give-and-take relation,—the individual to the State and the State to its obscurest citizen,—it is possible to make an example of some notorious misdemeanant, the majesty of common law finding its vindication in his person.¹³² It is competent, therefore, without weaving the web of legal analytics, to advance at a leap from the validity of retributive justice in one instance to its validity in the whole scheme of

¹²⁹ Cf. *Wissenschaftslehre*, 1801, Sec. 37.

¹³⁰ IV, 25.

¹³¹ V, 31.

¹³² IV, 37, Sch. ii.

juridical administration. The principle of organicity is abundantly verified in the transactions of social life.

But when we reach the supreme level of human intelligence, where the religious impulse makes itself felt, does the same principle hold good? Does the illustration already adduced rest upon a secure foundation? Is it a fact that by a process called Intuition the mind can pass *auf ainem Blicke* from the recognition of reality in a given object to the complete understanding of what it means to the whole world of reality?¹³³ The thing we are most deeply interested in is the Self, whose career we are building. The self as body is embedded in the order of Nature and of necessity obeys her will implicitly. The Self as conscious mind is not dependent on place or time. Hence, scientific inquiry has not been forced to wait for an empirical touch with all the myriad courses of the stellar world, ere its eternal secrets were divulged; such a monumental deduction as the principle of gravitation sprang from the study of inconsiderable data. Still, even here certain categories of logic, such as uniformity, were applied, in order to reach the end. In intuitive knowledge, on the other hand, the self goes directly beyond experience, and opens converse, so to say, with the universe as a whole. It begins to see that its mode of action is emblematic of the movements of nature. For as selfhood in man is the teleological equivalent of the marvellously varied and intricate reactions of body, so the divine Self—"God's power of thinking"—proves to be the teleological aspect of "his realized power of acting."¹³⁴ And as man's body follows inevitably the path prescribed by natural law, so man's mind, his personal Self, being organically associated with the world of consciousness,¹³⁵ must register the universal meaning of the mechanical order.¹³⁶

How far religious insight carries the mind beyond the pale of conceptual thinking may be judged by its attitude towards the idea of death. What is death? Death, says reflection, is the

¹³³ V, 25.

¹³⁴ II, 7, Cor.

¹³⁵ II, 13, 'Sch.; V, 30, 36.

¹³⁶ Cf. Joachim's view of teleology in Spinoza's philosophy, "A Study of Spinoza's Ethics," p. 232.

result of the joint action of certain chemico-physical forces, conspiring within the confines of a given organism. Death comes to all—none may escape. It is a standing proof of the inexorable execution of the canon of causality. The duty of the reflective observer is to absorb whatever pain emerges,—sorrow, fear, decline of personal initiative,—in a serene contemplation of the infallibility of natural law. But the “hurt of death” is not abolished by a skilful use of logic. It is deeper than argument; it is seated in the heart of human hope. We may mitigate its terrors by tracing its causes, but we cannot remove its sting. A higher office than rational persuasion is needed here. Spinoza finds its terms in the intuitions of religion. Death is not death, as we commonly esteem it. Death is the gateway to life. The plant droops, dies, and is disorganized; but its parts, scattered to the winds, become the fructifying forces in higher grades of life. The animal perishes at the stroke of man’s blade; but its flesh once digested furnishes bone and sinew, strength of arm and vigor of brain. The man dies, his body separates into its elemental units; his mind redolent of piquant thoughts is silent, unheard. Is that all? Have his mighty loves, his superb ideals, his compelling purposes vanished? For this world, as an entity he is dead, but as a spiritual power in contemporary affairs or among generations unborn no death of body can abrogate his right to live. Death viewed from its teleological implications is not itself an end, it is the means for attaining the ultimate end of all things, that is, Life.¹⁸⁷

The precepts of religion so cogent in this familiar connection may be worked out in respect to every reaction which leaves upon us the impression of pain.¹⁸⁸ They prove themselves to be more powerful than the abstract terms of reason, because we are conscious, as already pointed out, of a perfect correspondence between our possible selves and the universal self.¹⁸⁹ They prepare us, as logical categories cannot, for an approximation to the personal freedom, where sense and the recollection of sensory images shall count as little as possible in the forming

¹⁸⁷ Cf. V, 31, Sch., 42, Sch.

¹⁸⁸ V, 36, Sch.

¹⁸⁹ V, 38.

of judgment. Hence, every time we have accepted one of religion's counsels we have come that much nearer to the true self which we are striving to evolve,—“the chief part of the mind, which is eternal.”¹⁴⁰ If man could reach the terminus of the infinitely repeated dialectic, he would cease to be man, he would become God.¹⁴¹ But since that is only an intellectual concept, his business plainly is to fit every private reaction into the organic scheme of the world, learning especially that events fraught, in his view, with evil consequences, are at root symbolic of some universal principle, the understanding of which will perceptibly lighten his way.

It will be noticed that in discussing the religious impulse we have been able to distinguish the very elements which are integral to the meaning of a common reaction. Thus, we have first sought the end or purpose of the instinct, next the means of stimulating causes by which it functions, and finally the certain satisfactions issuing from every discharge of natural power. The parallel is not accidental; it is involved in the structure of the mind. That a feeling of pleasure sweeps over the body when hunger is appeased, or a beautiful object greets the eye, or very emphatically when a long-coveted treasure is secured, the most rudimentary experience can testify. Pleasure is a moment in psychic action, quite different from the original impulse or the physiological changes due to contact with environment. It calculates the successive values of consciousness, how we felt before and after the reaction took place. It cannot therefore be an enduring fact in the emotional life, except insofar as we may desire to keep a strict account of functional discharges for purposes of critical study. For directly it has affirmed the operation of one impulse, another begins to function, and its corresponding gratifications demand the same attention from the mind.¹⁴² The evanescent character of physical pleasure will appear if we compare the first glow of appreciation consequent upon—let us say—the astronomer's discovery of a new planet, with the gradually receding warmth in each recollection

¹⁴⁰ V, 39.

¹⁴¹ V, 40, Sch.

¹⁴² III, Def. Emot. iii, Explic.

thereof. Organic chemistry has no instruments for measuring the change in cellular tissue or the rapid acceleration in the blood circulation under the primary strain. It will be still more helpless when the steady abatement of feeling is contrasted with the satisfactions of mind, which grow stronger with every contemplation of the facts.

There will thus be foreshadowed a state of mind where bodily behavior is reduced to its minimum values, a state manifestly approached when the mind reacts not to particular objects, but to the totality of possible objects conceived as simultaneous stimuli, that is, to the idea of the world itself.¹⁴³ Here the pleasure-giving response attends the comprehension of a principle starting with a single event in the career, but leading out thence into the meaning of universal existence. The act is an act of reflection, and its effect upon the agent must be distinctly in the sphere of intellect, not of sense.¹⁴⁴ If now we steadily reduce the play of emotion, we shall at length reach, in concept if not in reality, the form of a Being stripped of passion, without pleasure, without pain, unable to pass from one perfection to another, knowing neither love nor hate as we know them, the apotheosis of reflection, pure intellect.¹⁴⁵ But in the mean time, —and this is the serious matter for us humans,—we may determine to a nicety how far we have advanced in the development of selfhood by the amount of satisfaction derived from religious thought, as compared with our interest in purely sensory experience.¹⁴⁶ We shall determine, too, what types of religious practice yield the most gratifying returns, whether those which appeal to the aesthetic taste, or those which go down into the philosophy of the world-scheme. The latter cannot fail to impress the mind as the superlative tests of religion. Be their appreciation by us great or small, the fact that we have actually employed their terms proves that we have attained a degree of freedom inestimably beyond the highest responsibilities of ethical intercourse, as the divine is beyond the human.¹⁴⁷

But religion does more than refine emotional interests by

¹⁴³ V, 14.

¹⁴⁴ V, 32, Cor.

¹⁴⁵ V, 17.

¹⁴⁶ V, 40, Cor.

¹⁴⁷ Cf. V, 36, Sch.

withdrawing them from sensuous contact; it brings out more clearly the intimate qualities of each. Love cannot be restricted to the mind's reaction upon objects of sense. When so understood, love is an involuntary motion of body, interpreted by the mind as pleasure accompanied by the image of an external cause.¹⁴⁸ As an ethical emotion love obeys a similar law, though now the reason why we should join in an harmonious interchange of thought becomes evident. Men have the same nature and the same goal. Yet love to one's fellowman is rarely if ever efficacious, except it be visited upon a known individual. Society as such, the social consciousness in its uncounted units, is not the fit object of a man's affection. Moral duty is direct, not pervasive. The religious impulse, however, gives rise to a new type of love. It cannot be limited to a single experience, for as soon as the mind responds thereto, instantly a whole vista of universal implications is opened up. Love that began in common fashion is suddenly transformed into a ramifying intellectual power.¹⁴⁹ The warmth of this power oftentimes overflows into the channels of sensibility, as *e.g.*, when the face of the mystic takes on a rapt expression the moment his soul has caught sight of supernal glory. But obviously the momentary elation is something more than the coalescence of certain concurrent feelings. For while we might make a sum of all possible gratifications attending the discharge of normal impulses, we should yet need to take into account the correlating activity of mind, which has united one and all under the rubric of a self.¹⁵⁰

It is apparent, then, that religion is not a meaningful conception, save as we see in man the concrete personality, the free and energetic agent, not interested primarily in reactions as physical facts, but bent on embedding them in the structure of his unfolding personal life.¹⁵¹ Man therefore identifies himself with the natural order of the world. He lives no longer in unreasoned contact with his environment; he can no longer be content with its cursory pleasures. His loves once resting on specific forms now by reflective thought embrace the essence of the whole.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁸ III, Def. Emots. vi.

¹⁴⁹ V, 16.

¹⁵⁰ V, 15.

¹⁵¹ V, 27.

¹⁵² V, 32 and Cor.

If the self with its loves could be infinitely magnified, so that the images of particular objects were entirely excluded, we should reach the idea of absolute Being, whose emotion—using still the familiar term—would be of the intellect alone. It follows from this that the richer the content of religious feeling, and the more varied the interests of private and public life affected, the more will the divine elements of selfhood be brought into play. Perfect love, complete acquiescence of spirit, remains an ideal never to be actualized, a concept which we identify with the divine consciousness.¹⁵³

Two practical assurances hinge upon the idea of love instilled by religion. In the first place, our theory of divine providence will be profoundly changed. Just as long as we continue to ascribe conflicting emotions or varying moods to the heart of Nature we shall find our religious attitude full of grave difficulties. How can God, whose breath is in the nostrils of all flesh, be forced to shower his benefactions on one man to the exclusion of others? Or what bribes shall a devotee offer sufficient in worth to affect the serenity of sovereign judgment? Again, what manner of distribution of natural forces shall a man conceive to be so inimical to his private interests as to persuade him that Deity has pursued a policy of resentment against him personally? The principle of reflective love proves his strictures to be without foundation. For none of them, when properly assessed, can satisfy either the logic or aspiration of his mind. Man craves for equanimity; he seeks for the elimination of mental distress. Pessimism, whose taint is in the foregoing queries, has always issued in counsels of despair, suicide crowning the soul's defeat.¹⁵⁴ On the other hand, the mind in its saner moods has sought for concepts which invest it with the atmosphere of certitude. Now since the highest concept the mind can entertain is the perfection of God,¹⁵⁵ it behooves us to reorganize our religious dogmatics by the excision of all childish and mercenary notions, substituting for them the principle of judgment which the religious impulse has taught us

¹⁵³ V, 35, 36 and Sch. ¹⁵⁴ IV, 18.

¹⁵⁵ II, 46, 47.

in common experience.¹⁵⁶ For if we permit any fancy no matter how ingenious to divert the current of religious feeling, falsehood of a most serious kind will follow in its train, error big enough to arrest the growth of character and pauperize the moral sense.¹⁵⁷

The second maxim of religion comes in sight at this point. Fervor of mind generated by contact with the world consciousness refuses to be defaced by the faults of social intercourse. One of man's besetting sins is jealousy, a strange mingling of love and hate,—first, consuming devotion to a beloved object and aversion toward our rival, then the displacement of love and the rise of scorn and condemnation. This is the bent of nature, and its inexorable reward is pain.¹⁵⁸ Can ethics by its brawniest effort crush the insidious destroyer? It has argued that retaliation is suicidal. Are not the interests of each so closely intertwined with the interests of all that if one be hurt the body politic, and not least he who gave the affront, suffers accordingly? If for no other reason than for self-preservation, the dictates of morality should be observed. But obviously in the final account the compulsion of the social ideal is extremely weak. Highly organized civilizations, faced by extraordinary situations, have torn up their sensitized moral code and cast its fragments to the winds. Logic has wrought many wonders in public life, but it has never yet polarized human impulses about the idea of what the good of the world demands. Spinoza, living amid the political embroilments of the seventeenth century, knew how desperately faint the call of justice was. Not theory alone but the issue of events turned him to a higher principle. Religion, the "knowledge of God," is the one safe anchor for the struggling fleet of human desires. The degree of a man's love for his neighbor will be determined, and determined solely, by the ripeness of his religious experience.¹⁵⁹ To statesmen, who build civic prestige upon military establishments and hold that religion should be officially appointed because liberty of thought engenders fantastic ideas, tending to weaken the spirit

¹⁵⁶ V, 18, 19.

¹⁵⁷ V, 37, Dem.

¹⁵⁸ III, 35, Sch.

¹⁵⁹ IV, 37.

of loyalty, such a consideration is unthinkable. Jealousies can be kept in leash by a single force, *viz.*, preparedness for striking back. Vagaries of each and every sort yield to one remedial charm, physical might. But the shallow pessimism of the superman argument has been exposed a hundred times. There is a religious instinct within the breast, and it links itself involuntarily with the noblest ideals of the race. Those ideals cover a type of character which all may share. The fact that it is open to all eliminates the element of competition. No man can take away his neighbor's birthright, no matter how hard he try. Such properties are unique to the Self. Then, if there be no contest, there can arise no misconceptions nor any heartburns. The jealousies which sensuous rewards always excite, because just one and no more can possess the good, are entirely absent. Instead of bitter contention a benevolent rivalry for the expansion of virtue is engaged in, while the delight in our personal achievements is perceptibly heightened by the conquests of a multitude in the same field. The superiority of the religious good over those of sense is forever established.¹⁶⁰

Let us not suppose, however, that either of these maxims of religion can be immediately and fully verified to us. The road to this summit is hard and will be discovered only with the greatest labor. It must be hard, for its frequenters are extremely few. It belongs to the reflective impulse to seek out and tread the path, be it never so persistently abandoned after each new success.¹⁶¹ It belongs too to the same impulse to award to us convincing evidence of its satisfactory pursuit. What the form of that evidence is we have already described. It is manifest that even on this most exalted level of human experience the principle of compensation is not forgotten. If organic appetites yield definite pleasure, which in turn drives us by the appeal of the imagination to their repeated discharge, so religion instills within us a feeling of satisfaction,—joy that we have entered into the secrets of nature, the glow of surprise that we are really bone of her bone and flesh of her flesh. The difference between sensuous pleasure and religious joy lies in

¹⁶⁰ V, 20.

¹⁶¹ V, 42.

their duration. The one is ephemeral; it may be repeated indefinitely, but at length its edge will wear off with the decay of bodily powers. The joy of divine communion is permanent. There is nothing in the realm of sense that can throw it into collapse. Organic instincts may lose their value because the organs compounding them are destroyed. This applies to every material element and is covered by the law of mechanism: "There is no individual thing, than which there is not another more powerful and effective."¹⁶² But the joy of the spirit is not defined by the coordinates of time and place. It inhabits the home of the Self, and the conjunction of physical events cannot disturb its freedom.¹⁶³ If it depended for its vigor on an immediate reaction to environment, it could not survive the first passing flush. Its virtue is not empirical. Rather it is the fruit of a different type of mental action, that which deals with universal and eternal principles. The feeling attending such thought cannot be evanescent; it must be perpetual.¹⁶⁴

If, then, a man has won the first elementary article of religious faith, he should hold to it as a priceless treasure; it will never deteriorate in value nor alter in form. "Love towards God cannot be turned into hate."¹⁶⁵ This is his sure return for giving the religious impulse room to function,—a beatitude of mind, a serenity of soul,—not the captious reward for triumph over sense, but the conscious condition of his triumph. In short, religion does not offer itself to the race as the end of an ethical struggle; it affirms that it alone is the instrument by the use of which moral obligations are essentially fulfilled and the terms of selfhood adequately met.¹⁶⁶ Because it crystallizes the universal meaning of human life, it assures to its subjects an increasing degree of freedom through a wise and affectionate compliance with its terms. If the religious attitude be seriously espoused, the last fetters of sense begin to loosen, the suffocating pangs of repression yield to a larger hope. Man awakes not to a dramatic disenfranchisement mediated by stranger hands, but to the throb of his sovereign self-consciousness. He bears the future in his own breast. His purpose has made him free.

¹⁶² IV, Axiom.¹⁶⁴ V, 33.¹⁶⁶ V, 42.¹⁶³ V, 37.¹⁶⁵ V, 18, Cor.

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